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Abstract 
Reducing disaster risk, managing rapid urbanisation and tackling poverty is 
an enormous challenge, particularly in vulnerable neighbourhoods in low 
and middle-income countries. By 2050, two-thirds of the world’s population 
will live in towns and cities, with 95 per cent of future urban expansion in 
the global South. At the same time, disasters are increasing in frequency, 
severity and intensity. Poorer people in vulnerable neighbourhoods are least 
equipped to cope with the threat of disaster. When flooding struck 
Thailand’s capital city Bangkok in 2011, the United Nations estimated that 73 
per cent of low-income households were badly affected (UNISDR 2013). 
With disasters in cities on the rise, current thinking suggests that resilience 
offers valuable insights for reducing risk.  
This research seeks to develop and validate a conceptual framework for 
understanding urban disaster resilience in low-income neighbourhoods. It 
combines two urban approaches. The first, complex adaptive systems (CAS), 
views the city as a combination of inter-dependent parts working together at 
a multitude of scales that shapes its overall behaviour. The second, urban 
morphology, seeks to understand the creation of urban form by establishing 
connections between the city’s historical economic, political and social 
transformations to its modern day form. The conceptual framework was 
applied to three low-income neighbourhoods in Bangkok affected by the 
2011 flood. Through a case study approach, qualitative information was 
gathered and analysed in order to understand city-scale and neighbourhood 
level transformations that built patterns of vulnerability and resilience to 
chronic stresses and acute shocks.  
This research concludes that combining CAS and morphology provides a 
valuable conceptual framework for understanding urban disaster resilience. 
Such a framework places people at the centre while providing a scalar and 
temporal analysis of co-evolving acute and chronic risks in urban areas. 
Moreover, the intersections of CAS and urban morphology identify 
dimensions of resilience, where human systems and the built environment 
affect each other in a positive or negative ways – before, during and after a 
disaster. Overall, this research concludes that resilience needs to be built 
both before and after a disaster to be effective, and that disaster itself is a 
test of how systems and the built environment have learned from history 
about how to cope with and adapt to shocks and stresses. To these ends, 
urban disaster resilience can be defined as the ways in which the built 
environment, complex adaptive systems and people interact to cope, adapt 
and transform in order to reduce disaster risk.  
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Preface 
I began this research in order to learn more about the origin of disasters 
and how to improve recovery. My first interaction with Bangkok came 
when I moved from rural Canada to Thailand’s capital Bangkok as a high 
school exchange student where I became immersed in Thai culture and 
language for a year.  
I later returned as a humanitarian aid practitioner working in large and 
small disasters in a regional role that covered Asia and the Pacific. When 
Typhoon Ketsana struck the Philippines in 2009, the agency I was working 
for struggled with how to respond in urban areas where the need was 
great but the agency’s presence was not well established. There were 
questions of how to help, who to help and where to help. The aid sector’s 
response to Typhoon Ketsana left me with the desire to dig further into 
urban disaster response in order to improve the way in which disaster 
prevention and recovery is undertaken in urban contexts.  
For me this research took a surprising turn away from humanitarian work 
into day-to-day development activities when disaster-affected people kept 
bringing me back to everyday risks. The research shone a spotlight on the 
following key message: resilience starts well before a disaster, and its 
presence, however small and fluctuating, significantly impacts the 
recovery process.  
It may be that alongside the humanitarian imperative there is also a 
‘resilience imperative’ that should be respected and regarded as highly. A 
resilience imperative is the commitment for humanitarian actors to think 
about the long-term implications of their relief work, and the ways in 
which it contributes to successful recovery. A resilience imperative also 
means that development colleagues are committed to disaster risk 
reduction within their development programmes. The resilience 
imperative stretches a hand to every single urban actor, suggesting each 
one is responsible for collaborating to reduce disaster risk and build 
resilience. 
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Source: the author 
Figure 5.2.3: Pedestrian roads in Bang Bua Neighbourhood are places for 
socialising and for temporarily parking motorcycles.  Lighting, humps and 
loud speakers contribute to overall safety.  Source: the author 
Figure 5.3.3a: Government and military personnel giving anti-drug 
speeches to canal residents. Source: the author 
Figure 5.3.3b: Military, government staff and canal residents from 
different neighbourhoods (adults and children) march in solidarity against 
drugs through different neighbourhoods. Source: the author 
Figure 5.4.1a: A mix of single unit housing and semi-detached housing 
made of concrete, wood or a mixture of both. A number of building 
typologies that can be found in the canal range from apartments to double 
storey terraced houses, single and double storey wooden houses on stilts, 
dormitories and single storey cement homes. Source: the author 
Figure 5.4.1b: There are two types of community centres. The first is built 
of cement as shown in the top left and right photo and bottom left photo. 
The second is an outdoor gazebo structure, often seen in hotter climates 
as shown in the bottom right photo. Source: the author 
Figure 5.4.1c: A health centre a few hundred metres from Bang Bua 
Neighbourhood. The clinic is a single story building made of cement. 
Source: the author 
Figure 5.4.1d: A library shared between two neighbourhoods. The building 
is constructed of cement. The exterior of the building is shown on the left 
and the interior on the right. Source: the author 
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Figure 7.1.1 Bang Bua Neighbourhood shows no signs of the 2011 flood, 
three years after the event took place. Source: the author  
Figure 7.1.2: A building use map from the Bangkok Metropolitan Authority 
that shows Bang Bua Neighbourhood located between a military base and 
the Bang Bua Canal. Residential buildings are indicated in yellow. Source: 
(Department of City Planning, 2014a).  
Figure 7.3.1a: This map of Bang Bua Neighbourhood indicates primary 
pedestrian lanes (with motorcycle access) in red and alleyways in yellow. 
Source: (Bang Bua Neighbourhood, nd-d) 
Figure 7.3.1b: This photograph shows a pedestrian size entrance to Bang 
Bua Neighbourhood via the shortcut through the military base. Source: the 
author  
Figure 7.3.1c: This map of the planned reconstruction in Bang Bua 
Neighbourhood indicates houses in orange and public open spaces located 
in front of the library in blue (top), at the community centre (middle) and 
next to the Tamarind tree (bottom). Source: (Bang Bua Neighbourhood, 
nd-e)  
Figure 7.3.1d: A photo of the public open space that was cleared for 
children to play safely in the centre of the neighbourhood instead of in 
parking lots. Source: the author 
Figure 7.4a: A map of Bang Bua Neighbourhood before the re-blocking of 
plots took place. Each colour signifies a group of houses that shifted their 
plots to live next to each other. Source: (Bang Bua Neighbourhood, nd-a)  
Figure 7.4b Bang Bua Neighbourhood after 100 per cent of the re-blocking 
took place. Source: (Bang Bua Neighbourhood, nd-e)  
Figure 7.5.1a: A drawing of strong, safe houses, created during a focus 
group discussion (BBFGD2) with eight Bang Bua Neighbourhood residents. 
The drawing highlights the difference between perceptions of a strong 
home (blue) and a weak one (red). Source: Bang Bua FGD2 on 2 March 
2014 
Figure 7.5.1b: Qualities described in the picture created by participants in 
the focus group discussion mentioned above can be seen in the actual 
houses in Bang Bua Neighbourhood. For example, two and three storey 
homes with cement foundations and frames as shown in this photo of 
Bang Bua Neighbourhood. Source: the author 
Figure 7.5.1c: A terrace or ‘sala’ for outdoor socialising was listed as an 
important quality of a house. Source: the author  
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Figure 7.5.2a: Meters for water and electricity (right) monitor 
consumption for individual households. Source: the author 
Figure 7.5.2b: A map of Bang Bua Neighbourhood’s water supply shows 
the main pipe (indicated in solid green) is located on the canal side, and 
that smaller pipes (indicated in dotted green lines) have been laid to 
service houses further from the canal.  Source: (Bang Bua neighbourhood, 
nd-b)  
Figure 7.5.2c: A map of Bang Bua Neighbourhood’s drainage system shows 
the primary drainage pipe (indicated in solid blue) is located along the 
canal, and that smaller pipes (indicated in dotted blue lines) have been laid 
to service houses further from the canal. Source: (Bang Bua 
Neighbourhood, nd-c) 
Figure 7.5.2d: The upgrading included a waste collection service by the 
district government. A government boat accesses the waste from a jetty. 
Source: the author 
Figure 7.5.2e: Weekly weed collection by the municipal government 
improves canal water flow. Source: the author 
Figure 7.5.3a This map shows Bang Bua Neighbourhood’s community 
centre (blue) is located near the main entrance. Source: (Bang Bua 
Neighbourhood, nd-e) 
Figure 7.5.3b: The façade of the public library in Bang Bua Neighbourhood 
(top) and the inside (bottom) showing a child friendly environment with 
books and table to read at. Source: the author 
Figure 8.1.a: Saphan Mai in the process of reblocking and reconstructing 
the last phase of houses. Source: the author 
Figure 8.1b: A municipal building use map shows Saphan Mai residential 
buildings in yellow. Saphan Mai neighbourhood is indicated by a black 
dotted line. Source: (Department of City Planning, 2014d) 
Figure 8.3.1a: A wooden bridge from a main road offers pedestrian access 
to Saphan Mai. Source: the author 
Figure 8.3.1b: One entrance to Saphan Mai through an apartment parking 
lot. Source: the author 
Figure 8.3.1c: A third entrance to Saphan Mai along the backside of an 
apartment block.  Source: the author  
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Figure 8.3.1d: There are three entrance points to Saphan Mai, starting 
with the bridge on the left, and two entrances through an apartment 
parking lot located in the centre of the map. Source: (Department of City 
Planning, 2014d) 
Figure 8.3.1e: The main pedestrian lane runs through the centre of the 
neighbourhood, and is illustrated in gray. Although the map shows 
building use as recorded by the municipal government in 2009, the larger 
roads remain relatively unchanged. A more updated map was not 
available. (Department of City Planning, 2014d) 
Figure 8.3.2a: A photo of public space located at the centre of Saphan Mai 
is used for a meeting between residents regarding a funding proposal to 
the district authority for development activities. Source: the author 
Figure 8.4a: A map of Saphan Mai before the upgrading process began. 
Source: (Saphan Mai, 2004)  
Figure 8.4.2a: A diagrammatic representation of the overlaps between a 
husband, wife and daughter who hold key leadership positions in Saphan 
Mai. Source: the author 
Figure 8.5.1a: A single story wooden home built on stilts in Saphan Mai 
neighbourhood. This type of housing is vulnerable to flooding. Source: the 
author 
Figure 8.5.1b: Homes less vulnerable to the floods were constructed from 
a mix of concrete, wood and brick as shown in the photo of a house frame 
on the left. Less vulnerable homes have two stories as shown in the photo 
on the right. Source: the author 
Figure 8.5.2a: Sewerage tanks pictured in front of the community building 
are fitted into the newly reconstructed homes. Source: the author 
Figure 8.5.2b: A rubbish collection point next to the tent at the centre of 
the neighbourhood. Source: the author 
Figure 8.5.3a: A two-storey community building where administrative 
work takes place. Source: the author 
Figure 8.5.3b: A view of the World Vision Thailand tent intended to be 
used as a community building but is instead host to a food stall for 
personal economic gain. Source: the author 
Figure 8.5.3c: Saphan Mai residents frequent the food stall that is set up in 
an area designed as a community building. Source: the author 
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Figure 9.1.a: Roi Krong neighbourhood (left). Low quality homes on the 
canal block the view of more affluent homes built on the landside of the 
neighbourhood. Source: the author 
Figure 9.1b: A building use map that shows Roi Krong’s location along the 
canal perpendicular to the main highway. Source: (Department of City 
Planning, 2014d) 
Figure 9.3.1a: Roi Krong has one narrow pedestrian lane that runs through 
the centre of it as shown in the photo above. Source: the author 
Figure 9.3.1b: There are three pedestrian entrances to Roi Krong as shown 
in the building use map of Roi Krong above. Source: (Department of City 
Planning, 2014d) 
Figure 9.3.1c: An eight-lane highway is the primary entrance to Roi Krong. 
Source: the author 
Figure 9.3.1d: Access to Roi Krong is gained through a narrow road that 
runs parallel to the bridge incline. Source: the author 
Figure 9.3.2a: A view to the left of the bridge of the fruits and vegetables 
stands that are hosted in the public open space within the road network in 
Roi Krong. Source: the author 
Figure 9.3.2b: A view to the right of the bridge of the fruits and vegetables 
stands that are hosted in the open public space within the road network in 
Roi Krong. Source: the author 
Figure 9.3.2c: The space under the narrow incline of the bridge is used for 
storing goods and socialising in Roi Krong. Source: the author 
Figure 9.3.2d: A mesh wire fence has been put up to prevent homeless 
people and drug users from accessing the public open space in Roi Krong. 
Source: the author 
Figure 9.4a: The blue cement fence (left) and the corrugated iron fence 
(right) are examples of the fences that surround outdoor living space in 
Roi Krong. Source: the author 
Figure 9.5.1a: A dormitory with large, pleasant outdoor spaces for people 
to socialise in. Source: the author 
Figure 9.5.1b: A second dormitory with large private open space with a 
table and an outdoor bed. Source: the author 
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Figure 9.5.1c: A third dormitory with large private open space with a table. 
Source: the author 
Figure 9.5.1d: A photograph of a room rental within one of the houses in 
Roi Krong. Source: the author 
Figure 9.5.3a: Roi Krong’s health centre (left) and community centre (right) 
used by Baan Mankong supporters. Source: the author 
Figure 9.5.3b: Roi Krong’s sala used by supporters of the elected leader. 
Source: the author 
Figure 9.5.3c: A diagram of the community buildings in Roi Krong shows 
that all three buildings share a plot boundary, each with their own 
separate user groups. Source: the author 
Figure 9.5.3d: A notice board inside the Roi Krong community centre. 
Source: the author 
Figure 9.5.4e: Important notices posted outside the Roi Krong community 
centre on its fence. Source: the author 
Figure 10.1.2a: The conceptual framework with dimensions of resilience 
from Bang Bua neighbourhood plotted at different intersections between 
CAS and morphological layers. Source: the author 
Figure 10.2.2a: The conceptual framework with dimensions of resilience 
from Saphan Mai neighbourhood plotted at different intersections 
between CAS and morphological layers. Source: the author 
Figure 11.1: The conceptual framework with key dimensions of resilience 
plotted at the intersections between CAS and morphology. The 
dimensions were identified in Chapter Ten through a cross-case analysis. 
Source: the author  
Figure 11.1a: The conceptual framework with key dimensions of resilience 
plotted on it. Social dynamics were identified as influential at every 
morphological layer, therefore suggesting that social dynamics an 
important CAS for poorer urban people. Source: the author  
Figure 11.1b: Four dimensions of resilience are identified at the plot layer: 
secure land tenure, financial mechanism, governance mechanisms and 
social agency. Source: the author  
Figure 11.2e: An illustration demonstrating that resilience building occurs 
before a disaster strikes as indicated by the arrows on the left. The dotted 
lines in the graphic illustrate the four morphological layers where 
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resilience building takes place. The middle section indicates that the 
disaster event serves as a test of resilience. Source: the author 
Figure 11.2f: An illustration demonstrating that resilience building occurs 
before a disaster strikes and again after the disaster as indicated by the 
arrows on the right and left. The dotted lines in the graphic illustrate the 
four morphological layers where resilience building takes place. The 
middle section shows that the disaster event serves as a test of resilience. 
Source: the author 
Figure 11.3a: A conceptual framework that blends CAS and morphological 
approaches into a single framework for interrogating urban disaster 
resilience. Source: the author 
Figure 11.3.4a: A sample of the comments from participants at NTNU 
regarding the usefulness of the conceptual framework and analytical tool. 
Source: the author 
Figure 11.3.4b: A vignette from a British Red Cross aid worker about the 
transferability of the conceptual framework. Source: FGD BRC 
Figure 11.3.5a: A sample of the analytical tool applied to a case study of 
the 2010 Haiti earthquake by students from NTNU. Arrows are drawn in 
the boxes to show linkages between the morphological layers and CAS. 
Source: the author 
Figure 12.3.2a: Practical and theoretical contributions to knowledge are 
indicated with black arrows in the research design above. Source: the 
author 
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Chapter one 
Introduction 
This introductory chapter is organised into five sections. The Research 
Problem section defines the problem and establishes the parameters of 
this research. The Research Questions section identifies the questions that 
will guide the inquiry and address the research problem. The Aim and 
Objectives section articulates the purpose of the study and the sequence 
of steps that will assist in the achievement of the aim and objectives. The 
Research Strategy explains the approach and stages for achieving the aim 
and objectives by relating each of the stages to corresponding chapters. 
The Thesis Structure section describes each of the chapters and the ways 
in which they contribute to fulfilling the overall research aim.  
1.1 Research problem 
Cities represent two percent of the earth’s land use, consume 60-80 per 
cent of the world’s energy and are host to half the population of the globe 
(Allen et al., 2012). By 2050, 66 per cent of the world’s population is 
expected to be urban, with nearly 90 per cent of the increase 
concentrated in Asia and Africa (United Nations, 2014). Lower and middle-
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income countries are estimated to host 95 per cent of future urban 
expansion, posing the enormous challenge of managing rapid urbanisation 
and alleviating poverty (Allen et al., 2012). At the same time the world is 
seeing an increase in the frequency, severity and intensity of natural 
hazards (Djalante, Holley and Thomalla, 2011). Disasters caused by natural 
hazards – earthquakes, tsunamis, cyclones and flooding – are estimated to 
cost US $314 billion per year (UNISDR, 2015b). Moreover, the 2015 Global 
Assessment Report on Disaster Risk Reduction (2015b), estimates that 
between 1980-2012 damage as a result of internationally reported 
disasters is equivalent to 42 million years of economic and social 
development loss. Measuring the impact of disasters in years of human 
development loss, the report argues, is more representative than any 
other metric because it includes time lost on economic and social 
progress. 
Within the category of natural hazard, flood risk has been found by Swiss 
Re, a Swiss reinsurance company, to threaten more people in urban 
centres than any other natural hazard (2013). In 2011, when flooding 
struck Thailand’s capital city Bangkok, the United Nations International 
Strategy for Disaster Reduction (UNISDR) estimated that 73 per cent of 
low-income households were impacted compared to 21 per cent of the 
entire city population (UNISDR 2013). With the increase of disasters in 
cities, current thinking suggests that resilience can address some of the 
key urban issues by connecting planners, local government and the private 
sector on humanitarian and development issues (Habitat III, 2015f).  
The next section will outline key urban challenges, concerns regarding the 
future of urban disasters and the role resilience can play to address these 
challenges in order to help identify where knowledge exists and where 
there are gaps (de Vaus, 2001). 
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1.1.1 Urban challenges 
Urban areas can be seen as centres of opportunity because of a diversity 
of jobs, education, specialised healthcare and cultural diversity (McClean, 
2010). Through urban centres, nations have gained wealthier economies 
by investing in international trade and production (Satterthwaite, 2002). 
The International Federation of Red Cross and Red Crescent Societies 
(IFRC) notes that ‘well-run cities can be among the safest places on earth’ 
or among the most dangerous when resources and political will are not 
present to ensure the provision of basic services such as ‘food security, 
policing, running water, sewerage and respect for building codes’ 
(McClean, 2010, p.8). Gilbert and Gugler (1992) note that state and city 
planning has attempted to address urban risks and challenges by striving 
to allocate resources more fairly between competing groups, but have 
been unsuccessful because of people with political power who are able to 
influence planning decisions that ultimately bypass the interests of those 
with limited power. This therefore supports the point that key urban 
trends are building everyday and disaster risk into cities, making urban 
living risky, especially for poorer people, who are almost always also the 
most vulnerable.  
The research problem for this thesis is formulated, in part, by four key 
urban trends that create the conditions for everyday and disaster risk 
within cities. They are: rapid urbanisation; growth in economic inequality; 
growth in informal settlements; and inadequate infrastructure. Each of 
these is discussed below. 
a.) Rapid urbanisation 
Rapid urbanisation is often understood as a shift from a predominantly 
rural to urban society, arguably one of the most complex socio-economic 
phenomenon of the twentieth and twenty-first century (Allen et al., 2012). 
Global statistics from 2014 indicate that 54 per cent of the world’s 
population was living in an urban environment (United Nations, 2014). A 
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United Nations (2014) report on urbanisation notes that in 1950, only 30 
per cent of the world’s population lived in urban centres; by 2050 it is 
projected that 66 per cent of the world’s population will be urban. 
Moreover, it is expected that by 2030, low-income countries will have 
more people living in urban areas than in rural (Allen et al., 2012). 
 
Unplanned and unmanaged urbanisation can unintentionally build disaster 
risk through inadequate infrastructure, such as sewerage and piped water, 
the growth of informal settlements, and growth in economic inequality. 
Urbanisation also generates inequality and exclusion at rates that are 
often higher than the national average of a country overall (Habitat III, 
2015c). Economic inequality is often linked with gender and spatial 
inequality, leading to exclusion and discrimination of groups such as slum 
dwellers, women, migrant workers and minority groups. There is potential 
conflict between economic growth and the preservation of environmental 
resources such as forests, water and clean air as pressures from urban 
population centres diminish resources (Rakodi and Nunan, 2002). 
McGranhan and Satterthwaite observe that ‘although urbanisation brings 
serious challenges, attempts to inhibit it through exclusionary policies are 
likely to be socially, economically and environmentally damaging’ (2014, 
p.3). The challenge then, is how to successfully manage urbanisation in a 
way that creates inclusive and safer cities for all. Having explained key 
opportunities and challenges within urbanisation, the next section 
explains the impact of the growth of the informal economy.  
 
b.) Growth of the informal economy  
This section highlights the growth of the informal sector and ways in which 
social and economic risks are built upon a fragile and complex web of 
inter-relations between the formal and informal.  
 
The informal economy became a named concept in the 1960s and has 
since been referred to as a shadow economy, a second economy, a parallel 
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economy and the informal sector (Chant and McIlwaine, 2009). It is 
estimated that the informal economy accounts for over half of global 
employment and potentially as much as 90 per cent of employment in 
low-income countries (Chambwera, MacGregor and Baker, 2011). The 
World Bank estimates that between one-fifth and four-fifths of the 
economic outputs in lower-income countries results from the informal 
economy and between 25 per cent to 40 per cent of annual output in low-
income countries in Asia and Africa (The World Bank, 2015).  
 
Conceptually, the key difference between the formal and informal 
economy is that the formal economy is made up of wage labour with 
benefits and rights governed by rules and laws concerning property, 
health and safety, commercial licensing, labour contracts, financial credit 
and social security (Feige 1990). In contrast, de Soto (1989) argues that the 
informal economy is a result of people trying to escape the over-
regulation, corruption and bureaucratic inefficiency of the state. One of 
the primary challenges with the informal economy is that it is comprised 
of self-employed persons, whose labour is not regulated and are often 
comprised of activities that shortcut costs and are labour intensive (ILO, 
2014). Additionally, the informal economy is often present where the state 
is absent, particularly within the provision of basic services (Chant and 
McIlwaine, 2009). For example, in settlements dealers provide electricity 
illegally by tapping into the electricity grid. Water is purchased in 
containers often at inflated prices or is illegally obtained by tapping into a 
pipeline. Transport is another example of an informal market with its 
provision of taxi drivers and buses. Informality also reaches into the land 
and housing markets, which will be discussed in greater detail in the 
following section. In practice, formal and informal boundaries blur as 
labour shifts between the two based on interdependent relationships.  
 
When a disaster such as that caused by a flood strikes, pressure is placed 
on the inter-relationships between the formal and informal economy, 
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sometimes causing damage or the collapse of economic systems, markets 
and supply chains linked to markets. Untangling the relationships and 
identifying vulnerabilities before a disaster is challenging, and even more 
so afterwards. Therefore understanding the challenges and responses to 
the growth of an informal economy is crucial to reducing vulnerability and 
avoidance of building back systems that do not replicate the same risks 
and vulnerabilities.  
 
Those in the informal economy are often more vulnerable, because, 
among other things, of the absence of regulations around decent work 
conditions, social protection mechanisms such as pensions, health 
insurance, retirement funds and training opportunities to improve 
specialised skill sets that enable people to move up the income ladder. 
Having explained challenges related to the growth of the informal 
economy, the next section explains how the growth of informal 
settlements creates new urban risk.  
 
c.) Growth of informal settlements 
UN-Habitat describes the growth of urban informal settlements as an 
‘urban phenomenon’ (Habitat III, 2015e). Today, there are over 863 million 
people living in settlements, equating to over a quarter of the world’s 
population (UN-Habitat, 2013b). The absolute number of settlement 
dwellers is up from 650 million in 1990 and 760 million in 2000 (UN-
Habitat, 2014). When a natural hazard strikes an urban area, informal 
settlements are often without adequate housing to withstand storms, 
earthquakes, strong winds and floods. Oftentimes they have limited 
provision of basic services before a disaster and are therefore often 
compelled to seek shelter in evacuation centres, with host families or in 
displacement camps.  
 
Almost a billion people live with insecure property tenure and ambiguous 
land occupation with direct social and economic implications (UN-Habitat, 
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2013a). For example, without a formally registered address it can be 
difficult to find work, receive official documents and even obtain 
citizenship (Chant and McIlwaine, 2009). De Soto argues that shortfalls in 
shelter are a consequence of inequitable property rights and tenure 
policies that prevent poorer people from taking full advantage of their 
assets, referring to economic assets not recognised formally as ‘dead 
capital’ (de Soto, 2000). Gilbert (2002) attributes shortfalls in housing to 
the fact that it straddles both social and economic policies, and are 
bottomless in terms of the need and economic input required to fully 
address shortages. Chant and McIIwaine (2009) argue the lack of adequate 
shelter comes not just from poverty, but from the failure of the state and 
a lack of political will to address real need.  
 
In urban areas poorer people engage in numerous housing arrangements – 
from renting to formal contracts or informal agreements to staying with 
host families in a situation of multiple occupancy agreements (either 
sharing the plot or their home) to squatter settlements formed through 
the invasion of private or publicly owned land or through renting or buying 
sub-divisions – cheap land, often illegally sold off by brokers or ‘owners’ 
who lack authorisation to sell the land. The land where poorer people live 
is frequently in locations where no one else wants to live due to 
environmentally or geologically hazardous conditions or out of the reach 
of transportation and services (Gilbert, 1992). Having explained how the 
growth of informal settlements is a key urban challenge, the next section 
explores the impact of inadequate urban infrastructure.  
 
d.) Inadequate infrastructure  
Urban infrastructure has traditionally been defined as basic infrastructure 
and services that include ‘the delivery of safe water, sanitation, waste 
management, social welfare, transport and communications facilities, 
energy, health and emergency services, schools, public safety, and the 
management of open spaces’ (Habitat II Agenda 1). While infrastructure 
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has primarily been seen in ‘siloed’, i.e. separated sectors of physical 
structures, in the last decade there has been a shift towards a systems 
based approach (that views cities as inter-dependent ‘components’ or 
‘systems’, which co-evolve with their changing environment), recognising 
the complexity of networks, assets, knowledge and institutions associated 
with infrastructure and the provision of basic services (Habitat III, 2015g). 
Urban infrastructure is a concern in urban areas for several reasons: 
sometimes it is poorly built or maintained; becomes ineffective at serving 
large numbers of users; is not regulated or does not comply with 
standards or safety codes; and finally, sometimes infrastructure does not 
reflect new technology advances (Allen, Lampis and Swilling, 2015). 
 
Investments in infrastructure are required to keep cities safe and 
sustainable, and may in fact shape a second wave of urbanisation (Swilling, 
2015). Alongside physical and financial investments in infrastructure, 
Swilling (2015) argues that governance paradigms are also in need of 
replacing through incremental urbanism, whereby suppliers and 
communities co-produce the different means of accessing to services 
based on the unique conditions of each context.  Currently there is a gap 
between supply and demand; accessibility; and affordability reflecting 
weakness in urban planning and policy approaches (Habitat III, 2015g). 
 
UN-Habitat estimates that USD 57 trillion in investment into infrastructure 
is required between 2013-2030 to meet growing global need (Habitat III, 
2015g). The World Health Organisation (WHO) and United Nations 
International Children’s Emergency Fund (UNICEF) found that by 2012 
over 542 million people did not have access to sanitation and 720 million 
people did not have access to piped water (WHO and UNICEF, 2014). 
Globally, UN-Habitat estimates that cities generate over two billion tons of 
waste and predicts this number will double by 2035 (UN-Habitat, 2010). 
Such statistics suggest that the research problem therefore, is how to 
ensure poorer people’s needs for water, sanitation, electricity and other 
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such services are met in ways are affordable and safe. Furthermore, that 
access to basic services is assured at some basic level even after a disaster.   
 
Having explained four key urban challenges related to rapid urbanisation, 
the growth of the informal economy, the growth of informal settlements 
and the presence of inadequate infrastructure, the next section will focus 
on the impact natural hazards can have on cities.   
 
1.1.2 The urban future of disasters 
When cities are not well managed they can be seen as ‘crucibles of 
hazards’, generating vulnerability and risk for large populations (Bull-
Kamanga et al., 2003, p.196). Natural hazards can be particularly 
dangerous in cities because high concentrations of people in one space are 
exposed to the same hazard with varying degrees of preparedness and 
coping mechanisms. Moreover, in a city there are a greater number of 
hazards for people to be exposed to including a wide range of infectious 
diseases, proximity to dangerous industrial processes and the potential for 
road accidents (Bull-Kamanga et al., 2003). It is the interdependence of 
urban systems with natural and constructed hazards that makes it difficult 
to identify and reduce risks. It is therefore important that analysis of urban 
disaster risk includes an understanding of the underlying everyday risks 
(i.e. the inability to afford heath care, to eat nutritious meals each day, to 
walk to school without fear of attack, or to live in a safe, adequate home) 
that shape urban vulnerability as much as the disaster risks associated 
with particular hazards.  
 
Literature suggests that there is not enough evidence around what works 
best in disaster recovery in urban contexts, and that further research on a 
number of topics is advised. In a review of humanitarian responses to 
urban crises, Brown et al. (2015) make four recommendations for 
strengthening humanitarian response in urban settings. The first is to 
reframe the problem by focusing on different approaches to better 
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understanding systems, processes and context. It suggests that asking 
‘why’ urban is different is required in addition to seeking ‘how’.  
The second recommendation is to look outside humanitarian 
interventions by investigating aspects of time and history in order to 
understand what was ‘normal’ in a particular area before a disaster struck. 
Analysing pre-disaster contexts may provide an understanding of what is 
‘normal’ and therefore how to improve recovery. A post-disaster context 
does not offer the same opportunities because ‘normal’ processes are 
disturbed. Moreover, knowing that humanitarian aid reaches a limited 
segment of the population means that research into self-recovery 
dynamics and partnerships could present new learning opportunities.  
 
The third is to broaden traditional methods and scope of research across 
multiple sectors, scales and data collection methods. The authors suggest 
that quality and validity can be severely compromised when research on a 
dynamic context is conducted over too short a time span, and therefore 
suggest support for longitudinal studies to understand transformations 
over time. Furthermore, the authors suggest more research be conducted 
on urban areas from a complex systems approach that reaches across 
sectors and scales in a holistic way.  
 
The fourth and final recommendation is to co-produce knowledge and 
evidence with local actors in order to take into account local 
understandings, perceptions and knowledge. For example, the authors 
suggest ‘subject briefings’ where land administration, urban planning, and 
building codes and regulations are explained or mapped with a possible 
questions and answer session at the end. They also suggest ‘experience 
briefings’ where local actors share experiences and lessons learned 
responding to a crisis in the same area or nearby location. 
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1.1.3 The role of resilience in disasters 
The concept of resilience has been introduced into the disaster lexicon, 
but evidence is still emerging regarding why and how resilience saves and 
protects lives (Boin, Comfort and Demchak, 2010). While the concept is 
relatively new to disaster management and is still debated, it forms the 
basis for many of the current practical frameworks in the areas of relief 
and development (Combaz, 2015). Yet, there is skepticism about the 
optimistic use of the concept. Levine et al. (2012) argue that a bigger body 
of empirical knowledge is necessary in order to understand what it means 
to build resilience in specific crises and how resilience can realistically be 
achieved after a disaster. The authors write that ‘current ways of 
portraying resilience are not useful as a guide in diagnosing people’s 
vulnerability, and are also too vague to help designing any policies or 
programmes for building resilience’ (Levine et al., 2012, p.1). Bahadur et al 
(2010) note that resilience is not only used in reference to disasters but is 
increasingly raised in discussions on policies and programming in climate 
change adaptation and disaster risk reduction, however with minimal 
scrutiny of how it might influence the ways in which it is operationalised.  
 
Manyena (2006) writes that resilience is viewed as a positive concept that 
focuses on the ability of disaster affected communities to ‘bounce back’ 
with little or no external support. However some are concerned that 
bouncing back could be dangerous for communities and systems that are 
returning to an undesirable state of vulnerability and exposure (Pelling, 
2011a). Moreover, the concept of self-reliance risks laying the ground 
work for governments to abscond from their duties to protect citizens 
from harm (Griffin, 2011). Cannon and Muller-Mahn (2010) note that a 
shift from vulnerability analysis to resilience analysis could be dangerous if 
it weakens the emphasis on the socio-economic construction of hazards 
and risk in favour of highlighting a natural science perspective.  
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Amid other concerns regarding resilience is that its definition is too broad, 
risking becoming meaningless if it is a catch all phrase that encompasses 
everything good (Bruijne, Boin and van Eeten, 2010). Moreover, because 
there is no agreed upon definition of disaster resilience, measuring it 
becomes a significant challenge due to what some call a lack of standards 
(Winderl, 2014).  
 
Therefore there is a need to understand better what is meant by urban 
disaster resilience in light of the many definitions and demands for further 
evidence of how resilience can be operationalised. This research sees the 
need to ask critical questions about urban disaster resilience from a socio-
spatial perspective in order to develop a conceptual framework for 
building resilience in low-income neighbourhoods.  
 
1.2 Research questions 
The main research question, derived from the research problem discussion 
above is: What is an appropriate approach for understanding urban 
disaster resilience in low-income settlements? 
 
The following sub-questions guide the research design: 
1. What is an appropriate conceptual framework for exploring urban 
disaster resilience? 
2. What is an appropriate method for analysing disaster resilience 
within low-income neighbourhoods? 
3. What city-scale transformations build resilience or vulnerability to 
chronic stresses and acute shocks? 
4. What are the key dimensions of resilience at different scales in a 
neighbourhood across time? 
5. What can be generalised beyond this research from the case study 
findings and the conceptual framework? 
 
Chapter one: introduction 
 Page 14 
1.3 Aim and objectives 
In order to answer the research questions, the overall aim of this research 
is to develop and validate a conceptual framework for understanding 
urban disaster resilience in low-income neighbourhoods.  
 
In order to achieve the aim, the following five objectives have been set: 
 
1. Objective one: to formulate a conceptual framework for exploring 
disaster resilience in low-income neighbourhoods.  
2. Objective two: to develop a methodology for analysing disaster 
resilience within low-income neighbourhoods.  
3.  Objective three: to apply the methodology in three low-income 
neighbourhoods to identify key findings and dimensions of 
resilience.  
4. Objective four: to validate findings and the conceptual framework 
with key actors.  
5. Objective five: to identify the generalisable results of the case 
studies and conceptual framework for building urban disaster 
resilience in low-income neighbourhoods.  
 
1.4 Research strategy 
This research draws on both theory and practice by employing a deductive 
and inductive research strategy. It is deductive through its reliance upon a 
literature review of current theories and practices in order to develop a 
conceptual framework. However, it is also inductive through its use of 
specific observations from case studies in order to make generalisations 
that link with theory. Both deductive and inductive strategies are 
complimentary approaches for analysing the complexity of reality.  
 
Furthermore, the research adopts a qualitative research strategy as the 
primary method of data collection and analysis in order to account for 
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social attitudes and perceptions; as well as the fluid and ever-changing 
concept of reality (Bryman, 2008). Moreover, a qualitative research 
strategy was chosen because it views the researcher as an active learner 
(Creswell, 2007).  
 
A case study combined with theory is used as a means of understanding 
what urban disaster resilience is in the context of low-income 
neighbourhoods. The case of a flood disaster along the Bang Bua Canal in 
Bangkok, Thailand in 2011 was chosen. In this research, a case study is the 
primary method of inquiry because the point of a case study is to see if 
theory works in real life or if it needs refinement or is applicable only in 
certain circumstances (de Vaus, 2001).  
 
The case study of Bangkok is analysed using qualitative methodologies 
from a range of disciplines, including planning and the use of urban 
morphology (Whitehand, 2001; Butina Watson et al., 2004; Moudon, 
1997); disaster and development studies and the use of participatory rapid 
appraisal (Chambers, 2002; IFRC, 2007b; Pretty et al., 1995) and ecology 
with the use of human environment interaction methodologies (Holling, 
2001; Folke, 2006; Bar-Yam, 1997b). The research methods include 
analysis of city plans, neighbourhood maps, historical photos, key 
informant interviews, focus group discussions, workshops and participant 
observation.  
 
The research has five stages, each of which is described individually below.  
 
Stage 1: Develop a conceptual framework  
In stage one a literature review of theory and practice related to cities, 
disasters, development and resilience is undertaken in order to design a 
conceptual framework for exploring urban disaster resilience (Chapters 
One, Two and Three).  
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Stage 2: Develop a methodological approach  
In stage two a methodology for analysing disaster resilience within low-
income neighbourhoods (Chapter Four) is developed based on the 
conceptual framework conceived in stage one. An analytical tool for 
practitioners that links to the conceptual framework is also developed. 
Stage 3: Data collection and analysis 
In stage three the methodology for analysing disaster resilience is used on 
the case study in order to collect and analyse data at a city level (Bangkok) 
and at a neighbourhood level (specifically in three neighbourhoods in the 
Bang Bua Canal) (Chapters Five, Six, Seven, Eight and Nine). Key 
dimensions of resilience are defined within each neighbourhood. 
Dimensions of resilience are defined in this research as the interaction 
between the built environment and economic, governance and social 
systems. 
Stage 4: Propose common dimensions of resilience  
In stage four common dimensions of resilience are proposed from the case 
studies and re-interpreted to establish cross-case dimensions of resilience 
(Chapter Ten).  
Stage 5: Validate conceptual framework and analytical tool and draw 
conclusions  
In stage five urban professionals from academia and practice validate the 
conceptual framework and accompanying analytical tool in order to 
identify elements of generalisability (Chapter Eleven). Conclusions about 
the research are then drawn, including the research’s limitations and 
strengths, the ways in which it met the aim and objectives and 
recommendations for further research (Chapter Twelve).    
Chapter one: introduction 
 Page 17 
1.5 Thesis structure 
This thesis is organised into twelve chapters that address the research 
questions and fulfill the aim and objectives of this research. This section 
explains the role of each chapter and summarises the content. 
 
Chapter One: Introduction  
This chapter introduces the research problem as a question of what are 
the key approaches for understanding urban disaster resilience in low 
income settlements. It then introduces key research questions, the thesis’ 
aim and objectives as well as its overall research strategy in order to 
provide an overview of the thesis for the reader. 
 
Chapter Two: Theoretical and Practice-Based Constructs of Urban 
Disaster Resilience 
This chapter identifies key theoretical and practical constructs of cities, 
disasters, development and resilience. It reviews key debates, 
conceptualisations and frameworks in order to understand the ways in 
which the concepts interact, and provide input into addressing the 
research sub-question, ‘What is the most appropriate conceptual 
framework for exploring urban disaster resilience?’  
 
Chapter Three: A Conceptual Framework for Urban Disaster Resilience  
This chapter answers the research sub-question, ‘What is the most 
appropriate conceptual framework for exploring urban disaster 
resilience?’ by developing a conceptual framework that incorporates key 
concepts and theories reviewed in the literature.  The conceptual 
framework chapter specifically focuses on the interaction between 
humans and urban built form as a holistic approach to understanding 
urban disaster resilience.  
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Chapter Four: Methodological Approach 
This chapter answers the research sub-question, ‘What is the most 
appropriate method for analysing disaster resilience within low-income 
neighbourhoods?’ by using the conceptual framework to develop a 
research methodology for analysis. The methodological approach 
establishes methods and techniques for inquiry, data analysis and research 
validation.  
Chapter Five: A Systems and Morphological Analysis of Chronic Stresses 
in Bangkok and the Bang Bua Canal 
This chapter answers the research sub-question, ‘What city-scale 
transformations build resilience or vulnerability to chronic stresses and 
acute shocks?’ The conceptual framework is used to conduct analysis of 
the historical transformation of Bangkok and the Bang Bua Canal in 
relation to human interactions between the built and natural environment 
and everyday risks presented by chronic and acute stresses.  
Chapter Six: A Systems and Morphological Analysis of the 2011 Flood in 
Bangkok and the Bang Bua Canal 
This chapter answers the research sub-question, ‘What city-scale 
transformations build resilience to flood shocks?’ The conceptual 
framework is used to conduct analysis of the historical transformation of 
Bangkok and the Bang Bua Canal in relation to disaster related risks and 
the impact of the 2011 flood disaster.  
Chapter Seven: Case study One: Analysis of Bang Bua Neighbourhood 
Chapter Eight: Case study Two: Analysis of Saphan Mai Neighbourhood 
Chapter Nine: Case study Three: Analysis of Roi Krong Neighbourhood 
Chapters Seven, Eight and Nine answer the research sub-question, ‘What 
are the key dimensions of resilience at different morphological scales in a 
neighbourhood across time?’ The methodological approach analyses 
systemic patterns of vulnerabilities and capacities in relation to the 2011 
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flood in order to establish dimensions of resilience before, during and 
after the flood in the Bang Bua Canal.   
 
Chapter Ten: Key Findings From the Case Studies 
This chapters answer the research sub-question, ‘What are the key 
dimensions of resilience at different scales across time?’ by re-interpreting 
and consolidating key findings from the case studies in order to establish 
cross-case dimensions of urban disaster resilience.  
 
Chapter Eleven: Generalisable Key Findings 
This chapter answers the research sub-question, ‘What can be generalised 
beyond this research from the case study findings and the conceptual 
framework?’ The chapter aims to identify generalisable dimensions of 
resilience that exist in theory and practice, establishing connections 
between the case studies and the conceptual framework. The chapter 
then seeks to evaluate the validity of the conceptual framework and 
analytical tool through input by urban stakeholders in academia and 
practice. It then establishes connections between the conceptual 
framework and general body of theory.  
 
Chapter Twelve: Conclusion 
This chapter reviews the process of meeting the research aim and 
objectives in order to identify the new contribution to knowledge and 
further areas for research.  
 
Figure 1.5a below provides a visual representation of how the chapters 
link to thesis objectives. 
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 Figure 1.5a: A visual representation of the link between chapters and objectives. 
Source: the author  
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Conclusion 
This chapter introduced the research problem, highlighting four key urban 
challenges facing the world today. It then explained the ways in which 
urban disasters set out new challenges for cities and questioned the 
usefulness of the concept of resilience in disaster preparedness, response 
and recovery. The primary research question was then presented, which 
seeks to investigate what key approaches can be used for understanding 
urban disaster resilience in low-income settlements; five other sub-
questions were stated. A research strategy was then presented, outlining 
key stages and approaches to the research. The chapter closed with a 
description of the thesis structure and the purpose of each chapter.  
 
The next chapter provides a literature review of key theoretical and 
practical constructs drawn from different fields and disciplines that reflect 
urban complexity in order to formulate a conceptual framework for 
understanding disaster resilience in low-income neighbourhoods. 
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Chapter two 
Theoretical and practice-based 
constructs of urban disaster 
resilience  
 
 
Introduction 
This chapter seeks to examine key theoretical constructs of urban, disaster 
and resilience in order to develop a conceptual framework for 
understanding urban disaster resilience. It begins by analysing the links 
between urban and development through tracing the history of key 
development theories and their connection with urban growth. It then 
presents two approaches for conceputalising the city, namely complex 
adaptive systems and urban morphology. It then specifies key challenges 
and opportunities within the city beginning with urban form and risks 
related to the built and natural environment. It then explains the types of 
economic, governance and social complexities within urban areas from a 
systems perspective. The chapter then analyses key disaster theories and 
approaches and where possible, establishes links with cities. Finally, the 
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chapter closes with an explanation of resilience within urban disaster 
contexts, critiquing resilience from both theoretical and operational 
perspectives.  
 
2.1 Urban 
This section explains key concepts and debates about cities. It forms the 
largest part of the chapter in recognition that the literature review on 
disasters and resilience is conducted in relation to cities. In order to 
develop an appropriate framework for understanding urban disaster 
resilience, this section begins with an explanation of how key 
development theories link with urbanisation. It then explores the 
application of complex adaptive systems and urban morphology as 
approaches for understanding inter-relationships within a city. An analysis 
of urban form and related risks is then presented followed by an 
examination of what a city conceptually looks like when it is analysed 
through an economic, governance and social systems lens.  
 
2.1.1 Understanding urban and development  
Development and post-development theories have been used to 
understand cities, mostly in the global South (Williams, Meth and Willis, 
2009), but not without critique. This section will outline the key 
theoretical approaches to the city and corresponding critiques, 
highlighting current urbanisation trends, opportunities and challenges that 
arise. It will then present a conceptual analysis of the city using two 
approaches: urban morphology and complex adaptive systems.  
 
Development theory is an interdisciplinary body of theory that examines 
economics, politics and culture in order to identify problems and provide 
solutions for dealing with them (Chant and McIlwaine, 2009). Theories, 
approaches, ideologies and schools of thought within development are 
similar in that they are formed around the intention of changing a society 
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in a concrete and particular way, and in its early days that involved almost 
exclusively economic growth (Potter, 2002) in urban centres. Much of the 
theory used today was developed post-World War II (Escobar, 1995). In 
order to ‘modernise’ it was believed that urbanisation, industralisation 
and economic growth were essential (Williams, Meth and Willis, 2009). To 
this end, development theory has been influenced by the work of 
planners, administrators, politicians, and international agencies, including 
but not limited to non-government organisations (NGOs) and community-
based organisations (CBOs) in addition to academics (Chant and 
McIlwaine, 2009). While there are many development theories and 
schools of thought, five broad and overlapping ones dating back from the 
mid 1940s to present day have been selected for analysis, having had a 
great impact on the formation of urban thinking (Pacione, 2001).  
 
The first is Modernisation theory, which became influential in the 1940s-
1960s. Modernisation theory is a school of thought or an approach that 
posits that development in the global South is done best when it mirrors 
the processes undertaken in the post-war reconstruction of Europe, 
resulting in modern, industrialised societies (Hettne, 2002). Modernism is 
characterised by the drive for industrialisation, commercialisation of 
agriculture, the introduction of technology, large-scale infrastructure 
projects and training in cultures and values from the global North. For 
example, Rostow (1960) used global economic history to develop a model 
with five key stages of growth. Key to the model’s success was the ‘take-
off’ stage where modernising elite invested in industrialisation, which was 
expected to yield high levels of industrial productivity that would 
eventually become self-sustaining and diversify into other sectors (Chant 
and McIlwaine, 2009). The diversified income base would then 
theoretically ‘trickle-down’ to other sectors and regions. While this 
process of industrialisation had taken over one hundred years in 
nineteenth and twentieth century Britain, Rowstow’s model believed this 
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pace could be accelerated in the global South, taking less than a 
generation (Williams, Meth and Willis, 2009).  
 
However, by the 1960s there was little evidence in way of economic 
growth and poverty reduction that suggested modernisation-based 
policies were working. Moreover, Modernization theory faced critiques of 
being ethnocentric and not accounting for colonial constraints that 
prevented a number of countries from freely developing their own 
strategies and goals for ‘development’ (Chant and McIlwaine, 2009).  
 
The second theory that gained prominence between 1960s to mid-1970s 
was Dependency theory, comprising a range of approaches from the 
global South, specifically Latin America, that believed exploitation by the 
global North was the root cause of poverty and a lack of economic growth 
(Handelman, 2009). Dependency theory takes into consideration historical 
and global contexts as well as colonialism. Baran and Frank, influential 
dependency theorists challenged capitalist development expectations of 
the global South (Hettne, 2002). Frank’s Marxist perspective posited that 
the global South should de-link their economies from the global North due 
to exploitation and an unhealthy relationship of dependency (Hettne, 
2002). Dependency theory was critiqued however, for over-generalisation 
and oversimplification because the theory was primarily based on the 
Latin American experience. Nor did empirical evidence support the 
premise that southern countries with the most extensive relationships 
with northern countries were the poorest and most underdeveloped 
(Chant and McIlwaine, 2009). However, perhaps the most important 
critique of Dependency theory is its failure to articulate specific causes of 
under-development beyond the scope of capitalism (Chant and 
McIlwaine, 2009; Handelman, 2009).  
 
To address some of the criticisms against Dependency theory, Wallerstein 
(2004) developed the World Systems theory (widely regarded in the mid-
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1970s to mid-1980s), which argued that a country’s development 
prospects are shaped by global economic processes and inter-
relationships (Pacione, 2001). It viewed the world as inherently unequal 
with variations of capitalist potential in different countries at different 
times due to the possibility of asset accumulation in specific periods of 
history. However, this theory also suffered from over generalisation and 
simplification of complex global, national and local economic, political and 
social processes. Klak (2002) notes that the theory is difficult to test and 
therefore may be better referenced as a perspective. 
 
The fourth theory is that of neoliberalism, an approach that highly shaped 
policies and practices within the scope of ‘sustainable development’ 
(Escobar, 1995) beginning in the 1980s until today. Williams, Meth and 
Willis (2009) describe the approach as ‘hegemonic’ when it first 
dominated international development practice in the 1980s and 1990s. 
Neoliberalism is based on the belief that deregulation of markets and 
promotion of free trade will result in economic development. 
Neoliberalists posit that minimal state involvement in the market 
economy provides the necessary space required for social and economic 
growth.  
 
The main characteristics of neoliberalism include privitisation of state-
owned enterprises, increased foreign investment and the elimination of 
government regulations and protectionism (Chant and McIlwaine, 2009; 
Escobar, 1995; Williams, Meth and Willis, 2009).  Poverty and a lack of 
economic growth are understood by neoliberalists to be a result of an 
overextended government and a public sector burdened by corruption 
and inefficiency (Handelman, 2009). Neoliberalism was especially popular 
in the 1980s through economists Von Hayek and Friedman known as the 
‘Chicago Boys’ who advocated that market forces were the primary 
mechanism for development and that government interference hindered 
their growth (Chant and McIlwaine, 2009). Free market policies were 
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reflected heavily in Thatcherism and Reaganism in the UK and the USA 
(Pryke, 1999; Williams, Meth and Willis, 2009), both countries that held 
the majority votes on the boards of the International Monetary Fund 
(IMF) and the World Bank, which influenced the neoliberalist turns taken 
by the financial institutions’ approach to development in the global South 
(Chant and McIlwaine, 2009).  
 
In the early 1980s when the ‘debt crisis’ started, international financial 
institutions responded with structural adjustment programmes (SAPs) 
intended to reduce repayments from countries through mobilisation of 
domestic resources, economic policy reforms, increase in exportation of 
traditional and non-traditional commodities and the reduction of the 
state’s role in economics (Simon, 2002; Williams, Meth and Willis, 2009). 
Two measures were put in place. Stabilisation, a short-term measure was 
a strategy that involved a freeze on public sector wages, a reduction in 
food subsidies and devaluation of the currency (Simon, 2002). Meanwhile, 
adjustment measures, a longer-term strategy, focused on export 
promotion, civil service downsizing, privatisation, tax reductions and the 
relaxing of economic regulations (Simon, 2002).  
 
Critiques of neoliberal policies were that they were seen to create 
widespread dependence on international financial institutes; ignored 
inequalities and instabilities in global markets; perpetuated exploitation of 
the environment through mineral resource extraction, and promoted the 
industrialisation of crops and activities that resulted in land degradation. 
Additionally, neoliberal policies were seen to have taken little account of 
the impact colonialism had on social and economic structures in the global 
South. Moreover, from a human perspective, UNICEF noted that SAPs 
were the source of high unemployment, an increase in the cost of food 
staples, declining actual wages and reduced spending on social and public 
services by governments (1987). Urban areas were particularly affected by 
these policies because civil servants lost their jobs and poorer urban 
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people became unable to afford the cost of goods and services (Chant and 
McIlwaine, 2009). Moreover, SAP policies have undermined the ability for 
many cities to manage urbanisation effectively (Williams, Meth and Willis, 
2009).  
 
The fifth and final theory is that of Post-development, which has been a 
rival movement to the earlier mentioned theories from the 1990s until 
today. Post-development thinking rejects the meta-theories of 
Modernisation and Dependency in favour of embracing, ‘diversity, context 
and alternative voices’ (Chant and McIlwaine, 2009, p.49). It is a bottom-
up approach that employs non-hierarchical strategies that consider each 
context as unique and individual, is inclusive of local knowledge and 
promotes equitable power sharing (Willis, 2005). Post-development 
thinking highlights alternative approaches by focusing on the importance 
of local voices and excluded perspectives. Post-modernist theorists such 
as Escobar (1995) believe that the global South has wrongly been treated 
as one homogenous and uniform context. Post-modernist writers such as 
Chambers (1997), pose the question: ‘whose reality counts?’ in response 
to top-down, development theories, policies and activities imposed on the 
global South by institutions from the global North. Some Post-
development theorists advocate not for ‘development alternatives’ but 
for ‘alternatives to development… a rejection of the paradigm altogether’ 
(Escobar, 1995, p.215).  
 
Critiques against Post-development theory include the argument that if 
postmodernisms reject the concept of ‘development’ then they should 
provide an alternative. Literature suggests that perhaps it is more helpful 
not to reject development in its entirety, but to offer clarity over what 
aspects of development are being rejected such as traditional thinking 
around how development can be better achieved. Others with a more 
ecological focus such as Rist, argue that a kind of ‘green capitalism’ is 
needed to correct the mistakes of the past by moving away from 
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economic growth, production and consumption into ‘de-growth’, large-
scale recycling, energy-saving measures and becoming ‘conscious 
objectors to growth’ (2014, p.259). 
 
Having explained how development has fostered urbanisation through 
policies and industrial activities, the next section will provide an analysis of 
the city through examination of key concepts and elements through a 
complex adaptive systems and urban morphological approach.  
 
2.1.2 Conceptualising the city through complex adaptive systems and 
urban morphology approaches  
This section analyses the city through a complex adaptive systems (CAS) 
and urban morphology approaches. It begins with an explanation of CAS 
and how it can be used to analyse cities.  
 
Complex Adaptive Systems 
A city can be difficult to define. Cities fluctuate, are porous and have no 
clear boundaries (Ramalingam and Knox Clarke, 2012). Kostof (1991) 
observes that cities are made up of buildings and people. Lynch 
extrapolates the same idea by writing, ‘City forms, their actual functions, 
and the ideas and values that people attach to them make up a single 
phenomenon’ (1981, p.36). However, urban approaches such as complex 
adaptive systems and urban morphology can assist with understanding 
what the city is by reflecting the complexities of interdependencies 
determined by social, political, physical, natural and economic 
components of an urban centre. Various component parts of a city behave 
independently. For example, analysis of a neighbourhood requires 
knowledge of its component parts, such as the behaviour of households in 
that neighbourhood, in order to understand what each of the component 
parts are doing. Yet, from a larger scale it is difficult to differentiate the 
behaviour of various component parts (in this case the houses), and at 
times only their emergent behaviour as one system is observable (the 
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neighbourhood). Therefore, a systems approach focuses on the processes 
undertaken when component parts interact, and how they behave as one 
(Bar-Yam, 1997a), which is crucial for understanding urban complexity. 
Moreover, both approaches allow for scalar and integrative analysis that 
reflects the myriad of ways in which humans engage with the built and 
natural environment.  
Complex systems theory views the city as a system with internal 
interdependent component parts working together at a multitude of 
scales that shape the behaviour and development of a city (Aiken et al., 
1987). The city is not only shaped internally but externally as well by other 
global, national or municipal systems (da Silva, 2014). Complex ‘adaptive’ 
systems adapt and co-evolve with their changing environment (da Silva, 
Kernaghan and Luque, 2012; Holling, 2001), and are sometimes referred 
to as Social Ecological Systems (SES) in urbanisation and climate change 
debates (Friend and Moench, 2013).  
This research views cities and neighbourhoods as complex adaptive 
systems. The word ‘adaptive’ provides an emphasis on conditions that 
allow complex systems and their relationships to co-evolve over time in 
response to dynamic interplays between systems, their internal 
component parts and external systems that might influence them. For 
example, a city may be affected by a failed crop, which lowers the overall 
availability of a grain. Market systems inside the city may see grain prices 
increase due to reduced availability in external supply chains in a nearby 
region. For an individual within the city the increase in the price of grain in 
the market may affect other component parts of a person’s life; access to 
healthcare for example, may become prohibitive because a greater part of 
the salary goes toward food costs, reducing amounts that can be spent 
elsewhere.  
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Conceptualising a city and its neighbourhoods through a CAS lens fits the 
complex reality of urban life. It provides a focus on complexity (Bar-Yam, 
1997b), process (Folke, 2006) and scale (Juarrero, 2000). Complex systems 
have a high degree of order, despite appearing chaotic; they are non-
linear and highly complex; dynamic in nature; and interdependent (Bar-
Yam, 1997b; Gunderson and Holling, 2002; Gunderson, 2010). They have 
feedback loops triggered by bottom-up and top-down causations 
(Juarrero, 2000) and internal and external shocks and stresses. Complex 
systems have fuzzy boundaries that make it difficult to demarcate where 
one stops and another systems starts.  
CAS processes are analysed through the ways in which heterogeneous 
individual component parts interact (Levin, 1998) as a loosely formed 
group that self-organises even in the absence of a ‘global’ or overall 
controller (Arthur, Durlauf and Lane, 1997), meaning that each 
component part interacts with other component parts to produce 
emergent behaviour, much in the way flocks of birds move, bees swarm or 
a crowd leaves a stadium (Cleveland, 2005). The processes within CAS are 
non-linear; systems are made up of autonomous agents that make choices 
that influence and limit each other (Cleveland, 2005). 
Friend and Moench write that examination of urban processes is 
important because they are often, ‘dependent on complex infrastructure, 
energy, food, water, transport, communications and accompanying socio-
cultural systems’ and are vulnerable to a range of shocks and stresses 
(2013, p.103). Processes in a city can be interrupted by natural 
disturbances, which are slow such as drought or rapid, such as a flood, but 
are part of a process of disruption, renewal, growth or decline (Cleveland, 
2005). Disturbances also provide an opportunity for a system to 
demonstrate its adaptive capacity, a requirement for evolution and 
development (Folke, 2006; Martin-Breen and Anderies, 2011). In other 
words, CAS processes are a part of urban transformation.  
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While CAS theory provides the opportunity to recognise 
interdependencies and to study the processes that emerge from them, it 
has been critiqued for diminishing the importance of the individual (Bar-
Yam, 1997b) in order to focus on component parts or a system as a whole. 
Friend and Moench (2013) write that systems theory does not address 
social value sets such as equity, poverty and justice and therefore must be 
supplemented with other relevant theories to account for agency and 
power in human systems. Arup International Development, an 
organisation that provides technical expertise to humanitarian and 
development work, and the Rockefeller Foundation (originators of the 100 
Resilient Cities initiative) counter this argument based on collaborative 
research that recognises the city as a ‘system of systems’, which includes 
‘systems that determine human behaviour’ such as social, governance and 
economic systems (da Silva, 2014). In summary, economic, governance 
and social CAS can be useful for determining who benefits and who is 
disadvantaged when changes within a system occur.  
There are many typologies of scale within CAS, such as a family, a tribe, a 
neighbourhood, a corporation, or a nation state. Even all of civilisation can 
be viewed as a complex system (Bar-Yam, 1997b). A CAS is composed of 
many elements or sub-systems that interact at multiple scales and operate 
as a whole, giving rise to what is known as emergent behaviour (Bar-Yam, 
1997b). Emergent behaviour is the result of the relationships between 
individual parts and how those behaviours merge together and appear as 
one (Fiksel, 2006).  Emergent behaviour that is self-organised without a 
preplanned result is a key characteristic of complex systems (Walker et al., 
2004; Levin, 1998). Due to the unpredictable element of human 
behaviour, it is challenging to predict or control a complex system (Bar-
Yam, 1997b). Bar-Yam (1997b) observes that hierarchical structures are 
increasingly being replaced with flatter structures due to individual 
empowerment from technological shifts such as the industrial revolution 
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and the current information revolution, arguing that, in large parts of the 
world, individuals are now empowered to act more independently while 
engaging with more layers of collective behaviour through networking, 
organisations and institutions, thus increasing complexity.  
Urban Morphology 
The second approach discussed in this section is urban morphology. 
Broadly defined, urban morphology is the study of how urban form is 
shaped by social, political and economic factors (Whitehand, 2012). Urban 
morphology engages with history, seeking to draw connections between 
historical and modern day transformations at different scales and 
resolutions of urban form in order to identify underlying factors that shape 
a place (Warner and Whittemore, 2012). The primary concern of urban 
morphology is the study of urban form; understanding the creation of 
form is essential to the success of future molding and reshaping of it, 
making morphology essential to urbanism and urban design (Kropf, 2005). 
Karaman argues that ‘the morphological patterns of cities are as important 
as economical, social, political, and cultural factors’ (Karaman, 2001, p.1). 
Interpretation of physical form historically comes from a long chain of 
different disciplines, including architecture, urban design and planning, 
geography, history, archeology and social anthropology, each of which 
emphasises different perspectives (Gauthiez, 2004). Research on urban 
form is not based in one discipline, rather it is scattered across a range of 
disciplinary, linguistic and cultural backgrounds (Gauthier and Gilliland, 
2006). 
There are various schools of thought that have defined urban morphology. 
In the late eighteenth and nineteenth centuries Durand and Quatremere 
de Quincy from the French school and Stubben, Geisler and Keyser from 
the German school focused on identifying architectural types of buildings 
(Gauthiez, 2004). Meanwhile, at the same time Fritz in Germany focused 
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on the value town plans had in understanding historical transformations 
(Gauthiez, 2004). However, it was Muratori and Caniggia from Italy and 
Conzen, a German geographer, who gave prominence to the value of 
analysing architectural types and town plans together in the mid-
twentieth century (Gauthiez, 2004). This same combination of theory was 
then introduced again in 1998 by Kropf as a tool for urban designers and 
planners, and further developed by Whitehand (1987), Moudon (1997), 
Butina Watson (2007) and others.  
Moudon argues that form, resolution and time comprise the three 
fundamental pillars of urban morphological research, all of which can be 
used as an interdisciplinary approach to analysis of the city (Moudon, 
1997). Urban form is often described in the literature as some variance of 
the following categories: buildings; plots and lots; open space; streets and 
movement networks; and topography (Moudon, 1997), depending on the 
aims and scale of the research (Levy, 1999). These components can be 
viewed as urban form layers at different scales of resolution. For example, 
the building layer is the smallest scale of resolution followed by plots and 
lots then open spaces and movement networks, going out to the largest 
scale, which is topography and its natural landscape components 
(Whitehand, 2001; Kropf, 2005; Kostof, 1991).  
Analysing scale is important because form is produced and managed at 
different scales. The examination of scales reveals different degrees of 
control and power (Massey, 1993). Who is included at different scales is as 
important as how they are included because it reflects power (Kesby, 
2005). Furthermore, scale recognises that a ‘place’, such as a 
neighbourhood or a city, is constructed by a range of social relations 
within a wider geographical context. A place is influenced by the internal 
processes of relationships between people on the one hand, and between 
people and their environment on the other. Scale reveals that places have 
no single identity and are full of internal conflicts (Massey, 1991).  
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Time is also important because it offers cultural context to the influences 
on different forms at different scales as they transform over time. Butina 
Watson and Bentley (2007) observe that up until the nineteenth century, 
transport limitations in the UK meant that, mostly, buildings were 
constructed by local materials; however, by the middle of the nineteenth 
century, industrialisation led to urbanisation, providing access to new 
channels for sourcing building materials through relatively cheap 
transportation means. Changes in maps and town plans over time show 
that different scales of morphology change at different rates. Combining 
and coordinating analysis of scale and time is aimed at achieving a better 
understanding of human settlements (Kropf, 2009). Analysis of scale, 
power and social relations is particularly important for research in low-
income settlements where people live on marginalised land, are often 
socially excluded and therefore are more vulnerable (Dovey and King, 
2011).  
 
Having explained why CAS and urban morphology are appropriate 
approaches for analysing the city and how each approach can be 
employed, the next section will analyse the city in relation to risks, 
vulnerabilities and capacities related to urban form, economic, governance 
and social systems.  
 
2.1.3 Urban form and risk 
This section explains the ways in which spatial inequality creates risk in 
urban form over time. It focuses on risks associated with limited access to 
adequate housing and basic services.  
 
In 1948 the right to housing was included in the United Nations Universal 
Declaration of Human Rights and reaffirmed again in the 1966 
International Covenant on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights by the 
Office for High Commission for Human Rights (Habitat III, 2015b). UN-
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Habitat (2015b) notes that the right to adequate housing is defined by 
seven key conditions, many of which are not met in informal settlements 
and slums, leading to greater vulnerability. The first condition is tenure 
and security to protect against threats such as forced evictions. The 
second is access to adequate services such as electricity, safe drinking 
water, sanitation and refuse disposal. Third and fourth are the conditions 
of affordable and habitable housing, which encompasses physical safety at 
affordable costs. Fifth and sixth are the accessibility and location of 
housing, which are meant to underscore the importance of housing that 
meets the needs of people with disability and that housing is located in 
places with employment opportunities, health care centres, schools and 
other social services. The final condition is cultural adequacy, which 
reinforces that housing respect the expression of culture and identity. 
While urbanisation offers the opportunity to meet these conditions, poor 
governance fuels inequality and disaster risk in many low and middle-
income countries (McClean, 2010). 
The housing needs of poorer urban people are met in diverse ways that 
often do not satisfy the criteria listed above. Many find accommodation by 
building or buying homes in illegal settlements, while others rent in a 
tenement building, a inexpensive boarding house or in an illegal 
development (Hardoy and Satterthwaite, 1989). Some sleep in public 
spaces such as graveyards or railway stations, paying gangs or local 
officials to stay there (Hardoy and Satterthwaite, 1989). UN-Habitat 
defines ‘informal settlement’ or ‘squatter settlement’ as lacking security of 
tenure of land or housing; as neighbourhoods without basic services such 
as power, sanitation, electricity and refuse collection; and as housing that 
does not comply with planning and building regulations (Habitat III, 
2015e). Meanwhile, ‘slums’ are often characterised by conditions of 
depravity and exclusion (Habitat III, 2015e). Dovey and King write that ‘a 
squatter lacks land tenure; a slum variously lacks space, durability, water 
and sanitation; informality implies a lack of formal control over planning, 
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design and construction’ (2011, p.12). However, terms like ‘informal’, 
‘squatter’ and ‘slum’ are problematic because of negative connotations 
that frame people in terms of what they lack. Therefore the more neutral 
word ‘settlement’ will be used throughout the research.  
For poorer urban people, proximity of housing to the location where one 
can earn money is often a priority over the size and quality of housing 
(Hardoy and Satterthwaite, 1989). Therefore situations of overcrowding in 
settlements can become an issue. To this end, health and hygiene risks 
increase where access to water and sanitation is lacking and the risk of 
diseases such as diarrhea, dysentery and acute respiratory infection 
grows. Children in settlements are particularly vulnerable to health risks 
due to environmental decay (UNICEF UK, 2013). Satterthwaite (1989) 
notes that when people have to cut the costs of living, many usually 
sacrifice on their environment and live in places that are unsafe due to 
factors such as pollution, overpopulation, frequent flooding and/or 
landslides.   
When natural hazards such as floods or cyclones strike, poorer urban 
people are almost always significantly more exposed and vulnerable 
because of housing with poor construction, design, workmanship and low-
quality building materials (Kyazze, Baizan and Carpenter, 2012). Moreover, 
they are prone to receiving less housing assistance due to informal tenure 
(McCallin and Scherer, 2015) because they are out of the formal system. 
The British Red Cross (2012) notes that reconstruction of settlement 
housing after a disaster can be further complicated by contested land 
ownership, high costs of land, risks of reconstructing in the same 
hazardous environmental locations and in areas that lack access to 
services. To overcome challenges related to housing and access to basic 
services, different settlement upgrading approaches have been employed 
over the years. The next section analyses key approaches to low-income 
housing provision.  
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Settlement and ‘slum’ upgrading 
Various approaches to settlement and ‘slum upgrading’ have been taken 
over the years. The 1950s and 1960s established a trend of demolition of 
settlements in the search for a ‘new Utopia’ through standardization and 
mass production of housing, an approach that was intended to improve 
living conditions by removing obstacles to ‘modernisation’ (Hamdi, 2010), 
as was described earlier in this chapter concerning development theory. 
However, this approach was socially disruptive (Abbott, 2002), and was 
subsequently replaced in the 1970s by a ‘sites and services’ approach 
where urban lots were provided for people to incrementally build their 
own homes (Jaitman and Brakarz, 2013). Instead of removing settlements, 
governments focused on the provision of ‘in land regularisation, 
infrastructure planning, security of tenure, self-build opportunity and 
credit provision’ (Hamdi, 2010, p.3). Turner’s (1976) approach to housing 
highly influenced thinking about shelter, with Turner’s observation that, 
for many, housing should be treated ‘as a verb’ (i.e it is what a house does 
for the owner that matters, such as providing income earning 
opportunities), and also that  housing can serve as an intergenerational 
asset (Sanderson, 2009a).  
However, the sites and services method was perceived to have failed by 
some because it displaced people from the city centre and their jobs to 
the periphery; banks were uninterested in providing loans to poorer 
people who were not guaranteed to repay debt; programmes were often 
taken over by less poor people; and governments needed to continue to 
pay large subsidies for land and infrastructure, which was not an 
affordable long-term solution (Hamdi, 2010). 
Building largely on Turner’s thinking, in the 1980s an in-situ upgrading 
approach took hold where low-income neighbourhoods were better 
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integrated into cities through social and economic strategies such as 
networks and savings groups in addition to physical upgrading. Some new 
homes were built, but the primary focus was on ‘upgrading’ existing 
housing stock through ‘integrated development projects’ that offered 
loans to improve housing, sanitation, electricity, sewerage and streets 
(Hamdi and Geothert, 1997). Legalisation of land tenure was also a key 
area of focus (Hamdi, 2010). In Thailand, and in many other countries, 
upgrading was dominated by different ministries, local authorities and 
government agencies, many of which had siloed approaches to dealing 
with the interconnected aspects of a poor neighbourhood, failing to 
address root causes of everyday and disaster risk (Boonyabancha, 2009).  
In-situ upgrading is most noted for its success in places where 
governments have made political commitments to large-scale upgrading 
programmes ‘in parallel with legal and regulatory reforms in land policy 
and land regularization’ (Jaitman and Brakarz, 2013, p.5) and where 
poorer people have worked collectively to tackle their own poverty and 
exclusion (Boonyabancha, Carcellar and Kerr, 2012). Currently upgrading 
approaches on the whole promote tenure legalisation and in-situ 
upgrading with a focus on participation between settlement dwellers, 
institutions and governments and incremental change (Hamdi, 2010).  
In summary, looking at the different aspects of urban form demonstrates 
that settlements are often spatially segregated from the wider-city and are 
excluded from conditions that protect people from everyday and disaster 
risk, but that there are ways to address housing and services challenges. 
The next section analyses the city from a CAS perspective, looking 
specifically at economic, governance and social CAS. These systems have 
been chosen to compliment the urban form analysis in this section. 
2.1.4 Economic complex adaptive systems 
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Economic CAS are defined as systems that provide economic benefits such 
as money, markets, businesses, rent, jobs, savings, loans, credit, 
ownership and skills. Different economic CAS operate throughout the city 
at different scales. For example, imports and exports at a national level 
impact the local level; the health of the global financial market impacts the 
health of a city’s local markets and the way in which economic forces 
affect an individual’s ability to carry out small-scale trade. Cities thrive on 
commerce, cash and competition driven by global, regional and local 
forces; therefore access to key economic systems such as markets, jobs, 
savings, loans, credit, land ownership or skills that enable participation in 
different economic systems is crucial for people. For poorer people, access 
to economic capital is one of the most effective tools to escape poverty 
(Moser, 2006). The British Red Cross (2012) states that after a disaster, 
some of the key economic challenges faced by poorer urban people 
include inadequate or unstable income, high levels of unemployment, the 
need for cash to meet basic needs and the lack of skills necessary to 
survive in a market economy. De Soto (2000) argues that turning 
informality into formality would allow poorer people to convert informal 
savings and investments in housing and businesses into meaningful ways 
to generate capital. Having explained what an economic CAS is, the next 
section will focus on the opportunities and challenges for specific 
components of economic CAS, including land, markets and microfinance.  
 
Land 
When land rights are adequately documented land can be turned into 
capital to be used as a loan, as investment or traded within broad circles 
(de Soto, 2000). A report on the impact of displacement after disaster by 
the Internal Displacement Monitoring Centre (IDMC) found that housing 
responses tended to favour people with secure tenure to the exclusion of 
people living in settlements, including tenants (McCallin and Scherer, 
2015). To this end, lack of access to land tenure can make people more 
vulnerable. While more work is required to understand how the 
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humanitarian sector can better provide support to different degrees of 
land ownership and access after a disaster, some examples include land 
pooling and re-allocation (Dodman et al., 2013); working with land owners 
or municipalities on strengthening tenure; regularising informal 
settlements, acquiring private land or allocating public plots for housing 
(McCallin and Scherer, 2015). Such measures require cooperation 
between multiple stakeholders including the government, development 
and humanitarian partners.   
 
Cash, markets and employment  
Poorer people generally have unstable or inadequate income before a 
disaster strikes. To this end, access to cash, markets and some form of 
employment is crucial to meet basic needs. In a review of evidence of 
what works in urban disaster recovery, Sanderson and Knox Clarke (2012), 
found that cash transfer programmes (an alternative to in-kind 
distribution where people are given money instead of goods) can meet 
immediate and recovery needs after a disaster, and may in fact be 
preferable to cash for work (Harvey and Bailey, 2015). Cash programming 
is increasingly being used in humanitarian response in urban settings (as 
well as elsewhere) (Sanderson and Willison, 2014; Clermont et al., 2011) 
as ‘the default setting’ due to the fact that people in cities rely on cash to 
meet their basic needs, thereby increasing reliance on local markets 
(Kyazze, Baizan and Carpenter, 2012). The Cash and Learning Partnership 
(CaLP) organisation writes that cash programming in urban disaster 
environments aims to ‘improve speed, appropriateness, and efficiency in 
humanitarian programmes’, pointing out that cash responses tend to build 
the resilience of markets while capitalising on different states of urban 
connectivity (Cross and Johnston, 2011, p.vi). After a disaster, rebuilding 
livelihoods requires integration in the urban economy, working with 
market systems and the private sector to identify employment 
opportunities and microfinance institutions that can support recovery 
(Grunewald et al., 2011). 
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Microfinance 
Microfinance, in the sense of providing formal lending services to poorer 
people through microcredit schemes, was made popular in the early 1970s 
(Hossain, Rees and Knight Millar, 2012) by pioneers such as the Grameen 
Bank, Self Employed Women’s Association (SEWA) in India and Accion 
International in Latin America (Sundaresan, 2008). Microfinance later 
included other services such as savings and insurance (Roodman, 2012). 
Between the 1980s-1990s NGOs and non-bank financial institutions set up 
their own microfinance models as ‘group lending’ and ‘self-help groups’ 
(Sundaresan, 2008). Yunnus, a pioneer of microfinance and founder of 
Bangladesh’s Grameen Bank writes that microfinance is ‘not a miracle cure 
that can eliminate poverty in one fell swoop. But it can end poverty for 
many and reduce its severity for others (Yunnus, 2003, p.171).  
 
Microfinance is most effective when paired with access to education, 
health care and advances to technology such as mobile phones and 
biometrics (Yunnus, 2003). It has also been an effective tool to empower 
women to expand their financial asset bases (Moser, 2006). Microfinance 
in groups can alleviate livelihood shocks and reduce chronic poverty 
stresses (Devereux, 2002) through providing means to purchase or replace 
tools such as food carts, which may have been destroyed in a disaster. 
Moreover, collective action through activities such as group lending can 
contribute to the creation of positive social capital (the networks and 
quality of relationship people have with each other (Woolcock and 
Narayan, 2000)) such as when people build higher levels of trust between 
members of the lending groups.  
 
Having explained the ways in which economic systems interact to create 
risks and opportunities for poorer people living in cities, the next section 
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will analyse governance systems for managing institutions and policies in 
urban areas. 
 
2.1.5 Governance complex adaptive systems 
Governance CAS involve the organisation of power and decision-making by 
entities such as civil society, the government, institutions, leaders and 
networks through frameworks such as planning policies and legal systems 
(Resilience Alliance, 2007). Governance concerns the management of a 
country’s affairs at all levels. It includes the mechanisms, decision-making 
processes and institutions that mediate the interest of governments, civil 
society, the private sector and all other relevant groups within the rule of 
law (UNDP, 2010). Governance includes, ‘formal and explicit mechanisms 
such as legislation, policies, mandatory standards and administrative 
procedures through which societies are organized as well as the wide 
range of informal and implicit arrangements that mediate social, economic 
and political relationships and the management of territory and resources’ 
(UNISDR, 2005a). A key point to note is that governance is broader than 
government; it includes the interaction between formal institutions and 
civil society (de Haan, 2009).  
 
Good governance 
In the aid sector ‘good governance’ dominates the literature, specifically in 
terms of defining what good governance means (Botchway, 2000). Good 
governance is understood to include institutional processes that are 
transparent, free of corruption, accountable, inclusive, efficient and follow 
the rule of law (UNESCAP, 2013; Maldonado, 2010; Weiss, 2000). Pelling 
(2011b) notes that good governance includes a strong civil society and 
collaboration while Uddin (2013) emphasises the importance of 
decentralised and devolved decision-making systems. Wide stakeholder 
engagement at a variety of levels is also crucial in disaster governance 
(Gall, Cutter and Nguyen, 2014), however coordinating decisions and 
activities between a wide spectrum of stakeholders is a particular 
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challenge (Grunewald et al., 2011) alongside working with governments 
who often lack authority, capacity and knowledge (Brown et al., 2015). 
 
Exclusion from decision-making 
Sanderson and Knox Clarke note that ‘Many urban residents, especially 
those living in informal settlements, are largely excluded from formal 
governance processes and services’ and furthermore, that informal 
settlements have a distrust of public-private partnership and the potential 
influence on planning priorities and agendas (2012, p.14). Exclusion from 
such processes can hinder a sense of ownership in disaster recovery 
processes, which is necessary for achieving sustainability, resilience and 
long-term effectiveness of activities in the recovery (Sanderson and Knox 
Clarke, 2012). 
 
Urban laws and planning 
As stated earlier, governance also includes urban law, defined by Habitat 
III as a collection of ‘policies, laws, decisions and practices that govern the 
management and development of the urban environment’ (Habitat III, 
2015d, p.1).  When laws or policies are ineffective or are an inappropriate 
reflection of the realities on the ground, informality grows, denying large 
parts of society the opportunity to participate in a range of social, 
economic and political decision-making processes (Habitat III, 2015d).  
 
Moreover, few national and international disaster management agencies 
work with urban governments and communities to identify and act upon 
the urban processes that are a source of disaster risk (Bull-Kamanga et al., 
2003). The IFRC’s 2015 World Disasters Report on local actors notes that 
supporting coordination of decision-making regarding disaster risk 
management (DRM) across diverse governance stakeholders is an 
effective way for agencies to engage with urban governance. The report 
states, ‘when it is well done, mainstreaming disaster risk reduction into 
development planning is a sustainable method to improve resilience and 
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reduce vulnerability in a country’ between local actors (Hamza, 2015, 
p.54). To address the challenges of informality, rising inequality and 
disaster risk, a DFID funded report entitled, Future Proofing Cities suggests 
coordination is required across ‘infrastructure, engineering, environment, 
planning, design, economics, and social science professions to help cities 
develop solutions at the nexus between urban planning, transport, water, 
energy, waste, agriculture, ecosystems, and design and architecture (Allen 
et al., 2012, p.9). Having explained the conceptualisation of governance 
CAS, the next section presents key challenges and opportunities within 
social CAS.  
 
2.1.6 Social complex adaptive systems 
Social CAS are defined by social interaction such as networks, social 
capital, discrimination, culture and values. Social CAS also includes social 
services such as education, welfare and healthcare (Resilience Alliance, 
2007). This section analyses the ways in which networks, partnerships, 
participation, social capital and social services provide opportunities and 
challenges for poorer people living in cities.  
 
Networks 
Boonyabancha et al. (2012) observe that networks are the ‘greatest force’ 
for tackling poverty and exclusion when they are comprised of people who 
experience poverty and exclusion themselves, reasoning that such people 
have the greatest motivation to change their situation. Networks can have 
a cross-scalar function at a neighbourhood, city and national level as seen 
by the Asian Cities Climate Change Resilience Network (ACCCRN) and Baan 
Mankong in Thailand (Boonyabancha, 2005) or at a global level as seen in 
UNISDR’s Making Cities Resilient Campaign (Johnson and Blackburn, 2014). 
They can create space for new collaborations (Boonyabancha, Carcellar 
and Kerr, 2012) to address everyday risks and disaster shocks. ACCCRN’s 
work on city resilience in Asia highlighted that when networks include 
policy and advocacy work at national levels of governance there is a 
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greater chance of influencing and shaping change at a state level (Bahadur 
and Tanner, 2014). Networks empower poorer people in cities to 
negotiate access to land, loans and public utilities as well as policy change 
for housing regulations that better suit their context, for example by 
permitting houses to be built closer together. Balances of power are 
shifted when networks of people form and work together in the absence 
of possessing monetary wealth. Moreover, networks build social 
relationships between people, creating the potential for societal 
transformation.   
 
Partnerships 
Partnerships, also known as ways of working together for mutual gain, are 
particularly important ways of collaborating to achieve ‘a common goal 
[that] can be reached by satisfying partner needs while sharing risks and 
rewards along the way (Rein et al., 2005, p.3). Partnership models draw on 
development thinking and other disciplines to understand the different 
ways in which people work together. Multi-sectoral partnerships in urban 
areas are crucial within a city due to the centralisation of services such as 
water and the subsequent multiple levels of accountability that is required 
for such services to run reliably and effectively (Reed, 2007).  
 
Sanderson and Knox Clarke (2012) write that in an urban disaster the scale 
and complexity of immediate assistance and long-term recovery increases 
the need to work in partnerships, and that the most effective partnerships 
are likely to be those established ahead of a disaster. However, for some, 
partnership is an idealised concept. Hamdi observes that partnership is 
‘one of those motherhood words incorporating everything good and 
desirable – mutual respect, accountability, transparency, shared values, 
shared objectives and the mutual pursuit of ends and means’ (2004, p.29). 
Principles of partnership is an important component of humanitarian 
response (Hancock, 2009) that can assist with grounding the desirable in 
clearly defined reality by using contracts, for example.  
Chapter two: theoretical and practice-based constructs of urban disaster resilience 
 Page 47 
 
 
 
 
The asymmetry of participation 
Much like partnership, participation is a concept that suggests 
inclusiveness and mutual opportunity to contribute to an agreed upon 
goal, however it suffers from similar critiques as partnership does in 
relation to the sharing of power. The World Bank defines participation as 
‘A process through which stakeholders influence and share control over 
development initiatives and the decisions and resources which affect 
them’ (World Bank, 2007, p.3). Moser defines ‘genuine’ participation as 
‘an inevitable sharing and then transfer of power involved as social groups 
deliberately attempt to control their own lives and improve their living 
conditions’ (1983, p.4). Definitions that discuss power in relation to 
participation stem from the belief that economic and social policies and 
institutions (including formal and informal) determine who participates 
and who does not (Moser, 1995). Guimaraes (2009) observes that 
participation is strongly influenced by cultural understandings of roles and 
responsibilities; social norms; and the presence or absence of governance 
structures that promote positive participation.  
 
Participation of poorer people in decision-making in the city can be 
difficult due to the heterogeneity of urban ‘communities’ (Bahadur and 
Tanner, 2014). Pimbert and Pretty (1997)  write that there are seven types 
of participation, including: passive participation, participation in 
information giving, participation by consultation, participation for material 
incentives, functional participation, interactive participation and self 
mobilisation. Linked to participation, is the notion of two-way 
communication between people who provide aid and recipients of aid. 
Anderson et al.’s Time to Listen project interviewed 6,000 people who 
have received or given international aid from across the world, and found 
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among other things, that there was an ‘information gap at every phase of 
international assistance’ (2012, p.114). The project also concluded that aid 
recipients wanted to know more about recipient selection criteria, project 
objectives and timeframes and funding information’ in order to not feel 
‘sidelined’, ‘suspicious’ or ‘disappointed’ (Anderson, Brown and Jean, 
2012, p.114).   
  
Social capital 
Social capital operates as one of many sub-systems within the larger 
system of social dynamics, and can be described as the ability to accrue 
resources through membership in social groups that take collective action 
guided by specific social norms (Portes and Landolt, 2000). Aldrich (2012) 
argues that high levels of social capital are at the core of disaster recovery. 
Scholarship identifies many typologies of social capital, but amongst some 
of the most common are three types: bonding, bridging and linking. 
Bonding social capital is identified by forms of reciprocity and solidarity 
between homogenous groups of people (Putnam, 2000) such as family 
members, friends or neighbours (Woolcock and Narayan, 2000). Bonding 
is comprised of horizontal or ‘intra’ bonds that tie together similar 
individuals (Archer, 2009). In times of stress, such groups cope by giving 
members short-term access to socio-economic support (Pelling, 2003). 
Meanwhile, bridging social capital occurs when a homogenous core group 
inter-relates with external groups that maintain the same horizontal 
status, but are from different organisations, locations and identities 
(Aldrich, 2012). Finally, linking capital can be defined as the vertical links 
between different power gradients and hierarchy structures (Lin, 1999). 
Archer (2009) observes that social capital is most valuable when horizontal 
and vertical levels of interaction are promoted. 
 
Social services: health care, education and cultural rights 
The protection and promotion of access to social services such as 
education, health care and cultural rights is another aspect of good 
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development. However, when a disaster strikes oftentimes such 
development gains can be set back (i.e. years of investment in social, 
economic, physical, and political development interventions). Access to 
health care in a disaster is crucial but it is likely for hospitals and clinics to 
be damaged, and the ability to provide adequate service impeded due to 
disruptions in the supply of power, medicine and human resources as well 
as an increase in patient case loads (Brown et al., 2015). The Inter-Agency 
Standing Committee’s (IASC) Operational Guidelines on Human Rights and 
Natural Disasters (2006) states that measures should be taken to ensure 
the return of children to education as quickly as possible without cost in 
order to ensure children from families that can no longer afford schooling 
are able to continue with their education. The guidelines also state that a 
freedom of expression, association and religion should be respected when 
planning humanitarian assistance and recovery in order to avoid 
discrimination (Inter-Agency Standing Committee, 2006). Belief systems 
within different cultures shape how people view disaster risk, therefore 
understanding the variations of cultures in a city or a neighbourhood can 
assist governments and other urban actors on how to communicate 
disaster risk (Cannon and Schipper, 2014).  
 
Having described key development theories that influenced the growth of 
urban centres, the ways in which cities can be conceptualised through CAS 
and urban morphology approaches, and the types of risks and 
opportunities that exist within the urban form and economic, governance 
and social systems, the next section of this chapter presents analysis of 
key disaster theories and approaches.  
 
2.2 Disaster 
This section aims to explain key disaster theories that provide an 
understanding of vulnerability and capacity in relation to urban areas. It 
begins with an explanation of two key theories that illustrate the cause of 
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a disaster – the Pressure and Release Model and the disaster management 
cycle. It then explains key attempts to link disaster and development 
paradigms before it closes with an explanation of disaster risk reductions 
measures that were put in place to mitigate and prevent disaster risk.  
 
2.2.1 Explaining disaster 
Pressure and release model 
The Pressure and Release Model (PRA), also often referred to as the 
crunch model, developed by Wisner et al. (2004), describes disaster in 
terms of vulnerability meeting a hazard. Vulnerability can be described as 
susceptibility to damage or injury. Wisner et al. define it as, ‘the 
characteristics of a person or group and their situation that influence their 
capacity to anticipate, cope with, resist and recover from the impact of a 
natural hazard (2004, p.11). Moreover, Cannon (2008) argues that for 
vulnerability to be useful as a concept it must be predictive. Meanwhile, a 
natural hazard can be defined as aspects of the physical environment that 
cause harm such as an earthquake, flooding, drought and landslide 
(Collins, 2009).  
 
The PAR model is illustrated below in Figure 2.2.1a. The first box on the 
left identifies root causes of risk such as social, economic, cultural, social 
and political processes that create vulnerability (for example 
neoliberalism). Dynamic pressures, indicated in the second box from the 
left, channel root causes into processes such as rapid urbanisation. The 
third box from the left identifies unsafe conditions, which are factors that 
make an environment dangerous for people, for example having to work 
in hazardous conditions such as a mine. Wisner et al. (2004) explain that 
together, the three boxes on the left create a progression of vulnerability. 
The diagram in Figure 2.2.1a bellows illustrates that when vulnerability 
meets a hazard, disaster occurs. Twigg defines a disaster as, ‘What occurs 
when the impact of a hazard on a section of society (causing death, injury, 
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loss of property or economic losses) overwhelms that society’s ability to 
cope’ (2004, p.13). 
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Figure 2.2.1a: An interpretation of the Pressure and Release Model from (Wisner 
et al., 2004), which illustrates that a disaster occurs when vulnerability meets a 
hazard. Source: the author 
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A version of the pressure aspect of the PAR model is often given in the 
formulaic representation: Disaster = hazard x vulnerability (Wisner et al., 
2004), where the multiplier implies that both elements, hazard (the 
natural phenomenon) and vulnerability need to be present for a disaster 
to occur. 
Disaster management cycle 
Another way to understand the progression of disaster related 
vulnerability in terms of time is through the disaster management cycle. 
While there are different representations of the cycle, the focus of disaster 
management is on three key stages: before, during and after a disaster, 
commonly articulated through the categories of mitigation and 
preparedness (before); the disaster itself (during); and relief, recovery and 
rehabilitation (afterwards) (Collins, 2009). Preparedness consists of 
measures taken before a disaster that reduce disaster risk (Twigg, 2004). 
Early warning, a form of preparedness, is when a disaster is forecasted 
ahead of time and those who will be affected are warned (Collins, 2009). 
Mitigation is when actions are taken to reduce the scale of, or even 
prevent, a disaster from occurring (Sanderson, 2009b). Examples include 
structural measures such as building flood damns and non-structural 
measures such as public education (Twigg, 2004). Relief, as defined by 
IFRC, is when ‘goods and services [are] provided to meet the immediate 
needs of disaster affected communities’ (IFRC, 2007a, p.8). Meanwhile, 
recovery is understood as rebuilding and adapting physical, natural, social, 
and economic aspects of a society in order to better withstand future risks 
(Smith and Wenger, 2007). Lastly, rehabilitation is about using 
development approaches to deal with the longer-term effects of the 
disaster (Collins, 2009).  
Collins highlights that the disaster management cycle includes disaster 
prevention, noting: ‘the right type of development’ can prevent a disaster 
and that a response to a disaster can ‘be part of the prevention of future 
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disasters’ (Collins, 2009, p.28). However, there are critiques of the model. 
In a study of 22 UK-based relief and development NGOs running disaster 
risk reduction initiatives, Benson et al. (2002) found that in reality there is 
no clear continuum of stages in disaster management, that disaster 
recovery is not linear, and that aid agencies (agencies that receive money 
from donors to conduct relief or development activities) often find 
themselves conducting emergency programming within long-term 
development projects and visa versa. DFID (2004) also critiqued the cycle 
noting that it does not reflect successful preparedness and prevention 
activities that avoid a disaster occurring. Additionally, the cycle infers that 
after a disaster, things go back to ‘normal’ when ‘normal’ is what may 
have resulted in the kind of vulnerability that enabled the disaster in the 
first place (Sanderson, 2009a).  
Having explained the origins of disasters through the PAR model and the 
disaster management cycle, the next section will focus on theories and 
models that link disasters and development.  
2.2.2 Linking disaster and development 
This section introduces key approaches that link disasters and 
development thinking, including the linking relief, rehabilitation and 
development (LRRD) approach; the access model; capacities and 
vulnerabilities assessment; livelihoods approaches and disaster risk 
reduction.  
Linking relief, rehabilitation and development 
Traditionally links between short-term humanitarian assistance and 
longer-term development interventions have been difficult to 
operationalise, therefore the concept of linking relief, rehabilitation and 
development arose, but has been put into practice in a limited manner 
(Mosel and Levine, 2014). LRRD attempts to reconcile short-term 
objectives of saving lives with longer-term development objectives of 
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reducing vulnerability and poverty, and considers the type of aid provided 
within each area. To address the challenge of working in silos it was 
argued that ‘Better ‘development’ can reduce the need for emergency 
relief; better ‘relief’ can contribute to development; and better 
‘rehabilitation’ can ease the transition between the two’ (Buchanan-Smith 
and Maxwell, 1994, p.2).  
LRRD derives from the African food crisis in the mid to late 1980s  
(Buchanan-Smith and Fabbri, 2005) but grew into a larger discussion in the 
1990s (Mosel and Levine, 2014) when it was used to address what are now 
called complex emergencies, defined broadly as when total or considerate 
breakdown of authority has occurred and an international response is 
required (IFRC, 2015). Then, as now, the humanitarian sector was faced 
with an increase in disasters setting back development gains, and had the 
need to do more with less. However, there were several problems with 
LRRD. Firstly, there was no agreed upon definition of the relief, 
rehabilitation and development components of this approach, including 
when they start and when they end (Otto and Weingärtner, 2013). Nor 
was it a process driven by consultation with disaster-affected people; it 
was about defining the type of aid that was required at different stages 
and the types of solutions to the gray zone (the stage between relief and 
development) (Buchanan-Smith and Fabbri, 2005). Moreover, LRRD is 
critiqued for focusing on a one-way continuum: linking relief with 
development and neglecting the importance of a contiguum, which would 
imply movement in both directions (Harmer and Macrae, 2004).   
Yet, Mosel and Levine (2014) argue that many people see resilience as the 
best opportunity yet to achieve progress on LRRD  by bringing together 
relief and development thinking. Otto and Weingartner (2013) write that 
resilience may be able to achieve an entry point for integrated 
programming, an aspect of LRRD that was unclear.  
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Having explained the key components of LRRD, the next section discusses 
the strengths and weaknesses of the access model’s ability to link relief 
and development.  
 
Access model 
The access model expands on the PAR model by focusing on the economic, 
political, and social processes that impact people’s vulnerability and 
exposure to physical hazards (Wisner et al., 2004). It is designed to 
understand complex and varied processes that are associated with the 
creation of unsafe conditions resulting from ‘economic and political 
processes that allocate assets, income and other resources in a society’ 
(Wisner et al., 2004, p.92). Sanderson (2009a) notes the linear flow chart 
model emphasises the nature of livelihood strategies in vulnerability 
reduction and capacity building through the interplay of concepts such as 
‘household’, ‘assets’, ‘the flow of power’ and ‘social relations’.  
 
A household is defined by people who ‘live and eat’ under the same roof 
(Rakodi, 2002, p.7). Assets are defined an asset as a ‘stock of financial, 
human, natural or social resources that can be acquired, developed, 
improved and transferred across generations’ (Ford Foundation, 2004, 
p.9). An increase in five types of assets (physical, human, natural, financial 
and environmental), which Moser (1998) calls ‘capital’ reduces people’s 
vulnerability. A decrease in assets results in greater household insecurity 
(Moser 1998). The Access Model analyses people’s access to assets, which 
is controlled through power and social relations. Sanderson (2009a) notes 
that the model was not adopted widely when it was developed in the 
1990s, perhaps due to the popularity of the livelihoods model at the time. 
 
Capacities and vulnerabilities analysis 
The capacities and vulnerabilities analysis (CVA) by Anderson and 
Woodrow (1998) also explores the relationships between disasters and 
development. It is an assessment tool developed as a way for 
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developmental priorities to be maintained while responding to disasters. 
Shared by both development and disaster practitioners alike, Anderson 
and Woodrow (1998) enable the classification of complex interactions 
through the use of a simple matrix that services as a tool for identifying 
vulnerabilities and capacities within three categories. The first is the 
‘physical/material’ category that analyses the productive resources and 
skills that exist within a community. The second is the 
‘social/organisational’ category, which explores the types of relationships 
and societal structures that organise people. The third is the 
‘motivational/attitudinal’ category that seeks information about how the 
community views its ability to create change. Figure 2.2.2 below shows the 
CVA tool and its respective categories.  
 
 
Figure 2.2.2a: Anderson and Woodrow’s (1998) CVA tool as interpreted by the 
author. Source: the author  
 
 
The tool has many strengths, including its ease of use (Sanderson, 2009a); 
its recognition of the physical and non-physical, including livelihoods 
(which would fall into the physical/material category) (Twigg, 2004); and 
its acknowledgment of capacity as an aspect of vulnerability, thereby 
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valuing the skills and abilities disaster-affected people have to cope and 
recover from a crisis (Sanderson and Sharma, 2008). Although it has been 
critiqued for not including the hazard, which could change the types of 
capacities and vulnerabilities that exist (Twigg, 2001). 
 
Livelihoods 
The livelihoods approach combines analysis of chronic stress (reoccurring 
stressors that reduce one’s ability to cope) and disaster shocks. Moreover, 
it places disasters within a wider development frame, which breaks away 
from traditional approaches to disaster risk reduction that first seek to 
identify hazards and risk and second identify development links (IFRC, 
2004). While the word ‘livelihoods’ was first made prominent in the 1987 
Brundland report, it was Scoones at the UK’s Institute of Development 
Studies (IDS) who developed the first model, which was later made well 
known by Chambers and Conway, and served as the basis for other 
livelihood models (Sanderson, 2009b). Chambers and Conway define 
livelihoods as, ‘…the capabilities, assets (stores, resources, claims and 
access) and activities required for a means of living: a livelihood is 
sustainable which can cope with and recover from stress and shocks, 
maintain or enhance its capabilities and assets, and provide sustainable 
livelihood opportunities for the next generation; and which contributes 
net benefits to other livelihoods at the local and global levels and in the 
short and long-term’ (1991, p.6).  
 
Chambers and Conway’s (1991) definition encompasses three relational 
areas of capability, equity and sustainability while focusing on shocks 
(sudden events that impact vulnerability such as floods and fires) and 
stresses (cumulative and continuous pressures such as rapid urbanisation). 
Oxfam later developed a model from which Carney (1998) subsequently 
developed for DFID into a widely used approach. Carney’s 1998 model 
brought together the concepts of vulnerability, assets, access and control. 
It was widely influential and adopted within a number of international 
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developmental organisations. Carney’s model, as had Oxfam’s, highlighted 
the importance of household level assets. This was depicted as the ‘assets 
pentagon’ within the model. 
 
DFID’s Infrastructure and Urban Development Division (IUDD) 
subsequently commissioned the Development Planning Unit (DPU) at 
University College London (UCL) to develop an urban livelihoods approach, 
reasoning that rural models do not reflect the ‘depth and scale’ of urban 
poverty and that there was an overall lack of urban tools and approaches 
targeting development and disasters together (Sanderson, 2009a, p.28). 
Meikle et al. (2001) write that while the household is placed at the centre 
with an emphaisis on assets and how they change over time, there are 
notable differences between Carney’s model and the DPU model. From an 
economic perspective, the DPU model highlights the important of a cash 
based economy; socially it underscores the importance of social capital; in 
governance it emphasises the multiple layers of actors from a local to a 
national scale; and from an environmental perspective it notes the impact 
of population density, pollution and hazardous living conditions. 
Furthermore, Meikle et al. (2001) write that in urban areas, assets that are 
not personally owned are important for reducing vulnerability, for 
example electricity lines.  
 
There are multiple of critiques of the sustainable livelihoods model. By the 
mid-2000s a number of agencies dropped the model because it was found 
to be difficult to operationalise, especially for those with sectoral 
mandates who were unsure how to implement their work in a holistic way 
as per the model (Sanderson, 2009b). Pinder (2009) notes that the main 
constraint with the livelihoods approach is that it works at the  micro level, 
making it difficult to scale-up and include things like markets and policy. 
Other critiques include that it does not lead to conclusions for programme 
design; lacks analysis of power dimensions (particularly in relation to 
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gender and social exclusion) and is limited in the evidence it provides that 
the approach reduces poverty (Pinder, 2009).  
 
Finally, it is worth noting that upon reflection on the differences and 
similarities between livelihoods and resilience, Sanderson (2009a) 
highlights that the two concepts share a common foundation. While 
livelihoods uses household as a unit of measurement, resilience uses 
communities; livelihoods uses the word ‘assets’ and phrases like ‘coping 
and recovering from’, while resilience uses ‘systems’ and talks about 
‘bouncing back’ and ‘adapting’ to future threats. Therefore, Sanderson 
(2009a) recommended that in the emerging presence of resilience, 
sustainable livelihoods changes its name to ‘resilience and livelihoods’ and 
talk about ‘building resilience’ instead of increasing assets.  
 
Disaster mitigation and preparedness, and disaster risk reduction 
Another concept that attempted to link disasters and development was 
disaster mitigation and preparedness (DMP), which is observed by 
Christopolos et al. (2001) as a concept that lived in the shadows of 
humanitarian and development aid because it did not ‘save lives’ or 
‘reduce poverty’. DMP is about risk management and is concerned with 
minimising the effects of disasters while taking precautionary measures to 
prepare for risk (Christoplos, Liljelund and Mitchell, 2001). However, 
disaster risk reduction (DRR), which came to the fore in the early 2000s, is 
the concept more broadly embraced by the aid sector today with its focus 
on ‘policies, strategies and practices to reduce vulnerabilities and disaster 
risks throughout society’ (Twigg, 2015, p.6). DFID defines DRR as ‘policies 
and practices to minimise (with a view to longer-term prevention) disaster 
losses’ (DFID, 2004, p.17). DRR and climate change adaptation (or CCA, 
which is understood as adjustments to actual or explicit climate events 
that can cause harm to human and natural systems) are often described as 
sharing a common focus. UNISDR and UNDP note ‘there is little practical 
difference between the two’ and therefore suggest in their report on 
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Disaster Risk Reduction and Climate Change in the Pacific that 
opportunities for working together should be sought in order to ease 
programming duplication, avoid potential policy conflicts and use limited 
resources wisely (Hay, 2012, p.ii).  
 
Having explained how different approaches to linking disasters and 
development have manifested throughout the years, the next section will 
provide analysis of the key debates and discussions within the concept of 
resilience.  
 
2.3 Resilience  
This section comprises a literature review of the theory and practice of 
resilience. The theory section traces the evolution of resilience and then 
analyses how the word is defined from three perspectives relevant to this 
research, namely, socio-ecological, disaster and urban. It then explains the 
key conceptual debates that highlight the strengths and weaknesses of the 
word when applied to urban disaster.  
 
The practice of resilience analyses practical debates about operationalising 
resilience. It then analyses global policies that turn the concept of 
resilience into practical actions. A review of a selection of operational 
frameworks is then presented, further investigating how resilience is put 
into practice in disaster affected communities and neighbourhoods. This 
section ends with a definition of urban disaster resilience that will be used 
to frame the research.   
 
2.3.1 Theory of resilience  
This section investigates the evolution of resilience. It then analyses the 
different ways in which resilience can be defined. Key conceptual debates 
are then presented for analysis.   
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Evolution of resilience 
Resilience can be understood in multiple ways. It was first used in 
sciences, humanities, political and legal disciplines before it was adopted 
by social science and sustainability researchers (Alexander, 2013). The 
word ‘resilience’ originates from the Latin word ‘resilire’ or ‘resilio’ and 
means ‘bounce’, which is where the concept of ‘bouncing back’ appears to 
have arisen from (Manyena, 2006). Tracing the etymology of resilience, 
Alexander writes that uses of the word resilience are marred in a history of 
positive and negative connotations whereby resilience can be understood 
positively as ‘leaping, jumping or rebounding’ or be interpreted negatively 
as ‘retracting’, ‘recoiling’, or ‘desisting’ (2013, p.2708).  
 
Alexander (2013) also notes that resilience was first documented in English 
in 1625 in relation to natural history, and then again in 1858 in a 
discussion of robustness in mechanics and later still in the 1950s in 
psychology, specifically in relation to child psychology, and finally in the 
1990s where it reached human ecology and social sciences, specifically in 
relation to the ways in which people adapt to their environment. 
However, others challenge this, writing that resilience originates from 
ecology (Batabyal, 1998; Djalante, Holley and Thomalla, 2011).  
 
While the history of resilience is somewhat contested, what can be said is 
that Holling’s 1973 paper, ‘Resilience and Stability of Ecological Systems’, 
gave resilience prominence in relation to systems theory and ecology, 
which is believed to be the foundation of resilience in social sciences 
(Adger, 2000). By the 1980s resilience was increasingly used to analyse 
interactions between humans and the environment (Janssen et al., 2006). 
In 1999 in the humanitarian action sphere the Resilience Alliance was 
formed in order to develop an interdisciplinary approach to resilience with 
some agreed upon core fundamentals (Janssen et al., 2006).  
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Defining resilience 
The qualities emphasised in the concept of resilience vary depending on 
the discipline from which resilience is defined. Disaster management and 
socio-ecology have a strong focus on environmental and human 
interaction, which means an understanding of resilience from a socio-
ecological perspective can be helpful.  
 
a.) Socio-ecological resilience 
Socio-ecological resilience is when transformation, development and 
sustainability occur through processes of reorganisation, learning, 
adapting and building capacity (Bruijne, Boin and van Eeten, 2010). The 
assumption is that disturbances within systems have the potential to 
create opportunity for change when control shifts between different 
variables, transforming relationship dynamics and the power to influence 
or provoke change (Folke, 2006). Folke states that resilience is ‘…about the 
opportunities that disturbance opens up in terms of the recombination of 
evolved structures and processes, renewal of the system and emergence 
of new trajectories’ (Folke, 2006, p.259).  
 
Holling argues that there are two faces of ecological resilience (2010), and 
the difference is in the stability aspect. The first is described as a 
traditional perspective that values single state equilibrium by focusing on 
‘efficiency, constancy and predictability – all attributes of a core engineers 
fail-safe design’ (Holling, 2010, p.53). The second definition is ‘far from any 
equilibrium steady state’ and focuses on, ‘persistence, change and 
unpredictability – all attributes embraced and celebrated… by those who 
search for safe-fail designs’ (Holling, 2010, p.53). This definition measures 
resilience by how much disturbance a system can manage before the 
system changes its shape and structure (Holling, 2010). It is the second 
definition of resilience from which the paradigms of urban and disaster 
resilience are linked. Disaster and urban resilience paradigms are 
interested in understanding the characteristics (Twigg, 2009; ARUP, 2011) 
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of a system that firstly build a system’s ability to tolerate stress and 
secondly that result in positive change when a disturbance takes place 
(Cutter et al., 2008).  
 
b.) Disaster resilience  
Resilience is a theme that ties together disaster and development contexts 
(Luthar and Cicchetti, 2000). Manyena defines disaster resilience as, ‘the 
intrinsic capacity of a system, community or society predisposed to a 
shock or stress to adapt and survive by changing its non-essential 
attributes and rebuilding itself (Manyena, 2006, p.443). Combaz defines it 
as, ‘… the ability of individuals, communities, organisations and states to 
adapt to and recover from hazards, shocks or stresses without 
compromising long-term prospects for development’ (2015, p.2). DFID 
defines disaster resilience as, ‘the ability of countries, communities and 
households to manage change, by maintaining or transforming living 
standards in the face of shocks or stresses – such as earthquakes, drought 
or violent conflict – without compromising their long-term prospects’ 
(DFID, 2011a, p.6). UNISDR defines resilience as, ‘The ability of a system, 
community or society, exposed to hazards to resist, absorb, accommodate 
to and recover from the effects of a hazard in a timely and efficient 
manner, including through the preservation and restoration of its essential 
basic structure and functions’ (Blackburn and Johnson, 2012, p.92).  
 
These definitions share four common elements. Firstly, they place 
emphasis on coping with shocks and stresses. Secondly, they emphasise 
recovery. UNISDR in particular qualifies the kind of recovery by adding the 
word ‘timely’ to its definition. Thirdly, all the definitions include direct 
reference or inference to adaptation. Manyena (2006) and Combaz (2015) 
use the word adaptation while DFID (2011a) and UNISDR (2012) use the 
words ‘transforming’ and ‘accommodate’ respectively. Fourthly, all of the 
definitions mention survival of long-term prospects, encapsulating a 
development perspective. Manyena’s (2006) link is perhaps the least 
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strong with a mention of ‘rebuilding itself’ while Combaz (2015) and DFID 
use the same phrase, ‘without compromising long-term prospects for 
development’. UNISDR (2012) draws in a development angle through its 
focus on the, ‘preservation and restoration of essential basic structure and 
services’ in its definition.  
 
From a development and disaster management perspective, many factors 
affect the ability to be resilient. For example, a 2012 IIED report on the 
nature of urban risk states that high-income countries with appropriate 
financial, institutional and governance frameworks will have better 
resistance against shocks (Dodman et al., 2013). Much of this is due to the 
fact that basic infrastructure is safe and services reliable. Risks are often 
forecasted and prepared for. Resistance against shocks is more difficult in 
low-income countries due to gaps within the economic, institutional and 
social aspects of disaster risk management and safe urban development 
(The Government Office for Science, 2012). 
 
According to Demchak (2010), other factors of importance include the 
ability to forecast, adapt and collectively problem solve along side the 
presence of trust, collaboration and knowledge. In studies on the military, 
Demchak found that ‘repeated interactions are necessary to build the 
foundations for resilience, blending the social with the technical for 
collaborative knowledge development’ (Demchak, 2010, p.74).  
 
c.) Urban resilience 
When investigating resilience in cities, physical and human elements 
comprise a large portion of the literature on what it means to be resilient. 
Physical elements broadly refers to infrastructure within the constructed 
and natural environment, while human components are often categorised 
as formal or informal social, economic and governance elements 
(Godschalk, 2003).  
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Within many of the urban resilience definitions a reference to being able 
to withstand or cope with hazards is often mentioned. For example, 
UNISDR’s Making Cities Resilient Campaign uses the following definition: 
‘A resilient city is characterised by its capacity to withstand or absorb the 
impact of a hazard through resistance or adaptation, which enable it to 
maintain certain basic functions and structures during a crisis, and bounce 
back or recover from an event’ (Twigg, 2007 in UNISDR's terminology, 
Blackburn and Johnson, 2012, p.11). Blackburn and Johnson note a focus 
on process can also build urban resilience such as, ‘the process of 
urbanisation and planning; through sound development practices; 
inclusive political processes; and disaster risk reduction activities by 
government, citizens and other stakeholders’ (2012, p.11). 
 
Urban resilience is defined by da Silva in the City Resilience Framework as, 
‘the capacity of individuals, communities, institutions, businesses, and 
systems within a city to survive, adapt, and grow no matter what kinds of 
chronic stresses and acute shocks they experience’ (2014, p.3). This 
definition takes shocks and stresses into account, and highlights that 
urban resilience occurs at different scales. Moreover, this definition 
conceptualises the city through a systems lens.  
 
Godschalk further focuses on systems in his definition of urban resilience, 
stating that ‘A resilient city is a sustainable network of physical systems 
and human communities’ (2003, p.137). The definition also raises the 
concept of sustainability as does the definition by the International Council 
for Local Environmental Initiatives (ICLEI), which states that ‘Resilient cities 
reduce vulnerability to extreme events and respond creatively to 
economic, social and environmental change in order to increase their long-
term sustainability’ (2015, p.np). ICLEI’s definition highlights the 
importance of understanding urban nuances and the diverse ways of 
influencing change when it continues to say, ‘Resilient city activities are 
sensitive to distinctive unique local conditions and origins… As such, 
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resilient cities define a comprehensive ‘urban resilience’ concept and 
policy agenda with implications in the fields of urban governance, 
infrastructure, finance, design, social and economic development, and 
environmental / resource management’ (2015, p.np). 
Other definitions of urban resilience, such as the one from UN-Habitat’s 
New Urban Agenda take more of a risk-based approach to analysing 
vulnerability, exposure and preparedness for protecting physical assets 
and human life. UN-Habitat’s definition also takes a systems approach to 
the city, stating that ‘the factors that influence a city’s resilience include 
the range and severity of hazards; the risk to lives and property; the 
vulnerability and exposure of human, social, and environmental systems, 
and; the degree of preparedness of both physical and governance systems 
to any shock or stress’ (2015f, p.2). 
Having analysed various definitions of resilience from a socio-ecological, 
disaster and urban perspective, an analysis of conceptual debates about 
resilience will now be presented.  
Conceptual elements of resilience 
This section outlines key conceptual elements of resilience, analysing 
representations and debates commonly found in the literature.  
Resilience has been critiqued for largely being a theoretical construct, an 
umbrella term that encompasses everything good and desirable (Bruijne, 
Boin and van Eeten, 2010). Bahadur et al. (2010) suggest the lack of 
specificity in definition comes from a weak link between research and 
practice. Tanner et al. argue that the wide applicability of the word can 
sometimes be its shortfall because without context and nuance, it risks 
becoming a ‘catch-all buzzword’, a concept possibly too vague to be useful 
(2015, p.3).  
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Due to its broad range of applicability, defining resilience for whom, and to 
what, provides a way of adding clarity to the concept. As established 
above, resilience can be used within a wide range of disciplines and 
paradigms. Within the disaster and development paradigm resilience can 
be used in relation to aspects related to climate change (Joakim, Mortsch 
and Oulahen, 2015), DRR (Kelman, Gaillard and Mercer, 2015) or conflict 
(Chandler, 2015). Defining resilience for whom is important when 
interrogating disaster resilience in cities because one hazard such as 
flooding, may identify traditionally vulnerable groups, while another 
hazard such as earthquakes, may identify some non-traditional groups i.e. 
middle class people who build multi-storey homes without adhering to 
building codes (Bahadur and Tanner, 2014).  
There are strong links between resilience and livelihoods theory 
(Sanderson, 2016). For Cannon (2008), strengthening the resilience of a 
system is about strengthening and protecting livelihoods. The debate on 
how to protect livelihoods from a disaster then enters the realm of 
livelihoods theory with analysis of assets, power, capacity and vulnerability 
in a range of social, economic, political, environmental and physical ways 
described in Wisner et al.’s (2004) Access Model in section 2.2 above.  
Perhaps one of the biggest arguments in favour of resilience is the 
opportunity it affords people to build upon what already exists. Resilience 
frames problems in a positive light while concepts like disaster risk 
reduction implies a need to ‘reduce’. While some may call it splitting hairs, 
Manyena writes that the social metaphors we use have important 
implications because ‘…words are prisons, as well as searchlights and 
pigeonholes, for what we see’ (2006, p.436). Taking action towards a 
better future for individuals, neighbourhoods and cities means aspiring to 
do more than attain the minimum standards for coping (McEntire et al., 
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2002). Resilience thinking in disasters and development is about more 
than mere survival; it is about having the opportunity to thrive.  
It has been argued that resilience can be understood as a process, an 
outcome, (Bahadur, Ibrahim and Tanner, 2010; Ahmed, 2006; Manyena, 
2006) and a goal (McCreight, 2010), creating potential for further 
conceptual confusion. McCreight (2010) views resilience as a goal of 
restoring civil and public safety, economic and governance operations 
after a disaster, even if it takes years to achieve. While viewing resilience 
as a goal is not wholly negative, it has been criticised for setting the 
standard of disaster management too low, and it is on this basis that 
Manyena (2006) argues resilience is more than restoration or survival, that 
its about the aspiration for a better life.  
Resilience as an outcome has also been critised by Manyena as being too 
reactive and response driven by its focus on concepts such as ‘cope’, 
‘bounce back’, ‘withstand’, ‘absorb negative impacts’ without addressing 
the preparedness aspect of resilience. Meanwhile, Kaplan (1999) views 
resilience as a desired outcome of a process. Viewing resilience as a 
process means disaster resilience is seen as a characteristic, quality or 
result generated by a process (Bahadur, Ibrahim and Tanner, 2010). While 
the difference might seem small, a minimum consensus on the defining 
features of resilience as a goal, outcome or process may assist with the 
ability of different disciplines to interface on the topic (Quarantelli, 1995). 
Resilience has a history of being criticized for promoting the status quo by 
enabling systems or communities to ‘bounce back’ (Twigg, 2009). 
Therefore, proponents of resilience prefer to talk about ‘bouncing 
forward’, suggesting disasters as a potential opportunity (Folke, 2006) for 
systems to metastasise and adapt into new shapes that improve their 
operation. Some scholars believe that bouncing back and maintaining the 
same core functions can be reckless, and sometimes even dangerous, 
when the status quo is one of corrupt governance, flailing economic 
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policies and restricted civil rights (Pelling, 2011a). Berkhout (2008) 
observes that resilience has a ‘dark side’ and that there may be good 
reasons for wanting to transform a system such as slavery, terrorist groups 
or fossil fuel-based energy. When the state of return is undesirable, 
transformation is sometimes suggested as an alternative. Pelling (2011a) 
proposes transformation is on the same continuum as resilience but offers 
a regime change when power dynamics are unequal and unjust. Due to 
the emphasis on shifting power, Bahadur and Tanner (2014) argue that 
resilience ought to be coupled with transformation.  
Perhaps the debate about state of return could be assisted in part with 
clarifications in the conceptual relationship between resilience and 
adaptation (Gallopin, 2007; Bahadur, Ibrahim and Tanner, 2010; Manyena, 
2006; Ahmed, 2006). While some view adaptation and resilience as 
interchangeable terms (Ahmed, 2006), others understand adaptation to 
be a separate concept, usually linked to climate change (Pelling, 2011a). 
Adaptive capacity is often included in the definition of resilience because a 
response to unanticipated risks requires a degree of flexibility (Johnson 
and Blackburn, 2014). Surjan et al. view adaptation as separate from 
resilience but with what they call ‘an unavoidable association’ (2011, 
p.30). Janssen et al. (2006) propose that there may always be difference in
how academics understand the concepts of resilience and adaptation due 
to the different knowledge domains each one originates from.  
Resilience can be critiqued for not recognising the role of power (Friend 
and MacClune, 2013). In an Annual Resilience Scan for ODI, Tanner et al. 
(2015) write that ‘calls for more attention to political, power and 
normative dimensions [of resilience] have now reached a critical mass’. 
Moreover, a systems approach to resilience is critiqued for its emphasis on 
physical systems and not humans within the systems (Bahadur and 
Tanner, 2014). However, there are a number of conceptualisations and 
frameworks that emphasize power, social justice and equity. Mayunga 
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(2007) views resilience as a determined by five capitals commonly used in 
the sustainable livelihoods approach: social, economic, human, physical 
and natural. Adger (2001) defines resilience in relation to the ability of 
communities to withstand shocks to their social infrastructure. The 
Resilience Alliance (2007) approaches resilience from the perspective of 
how much change a system can endure and still function, placing an 
emphasis on stability, self-organisation and learning, all human 
components. Twigg (2009) uses the Hyogo Framework for Action to define 
components and characteristics of resilience based on five thematic areas 
of governance; risk assessment; knowledge and education; risk 
management and vulnerability reduction; and disaster preparedness and 
response. Cutter (2008) conceptualises resilience as the nexus between 
social systems, natural systems and the built environment. Therefore the 
literature suggests human systems and their influence on power and 
equity can in fact be considered within resilience, and when done so, 
provides a more holistic approach.  
2.3.2 Practice of resilience  
This section examines some of the debates regarding the practice of 
resilience. It then analyses the ways in which frameworks operationalise 
resilience at a global, city and community scale.  
At a practical level, justification for focusing on resilience-building has 
come from the argument that because humanitarian needs are high and 
the resources for meeting needs low, resilience can play an important role 
in crisis prevention (Pain and Levine, 2012). The 2011 Humanitarian 
Emergency Response Review (HERR), commissioned by the UK 
Government, specifically states this when it writes, ‘It should not be 
forgotten that building resilience is often the best means of providing 
value for money’ (2011, p.53). With austerity measures being put in place 
in some donor countries, a migrant crisis on the shores of Europe and a 
‘global war on terrorism’ there are many strains on donor countries. 
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Therefore, DFID in particular has recommended a budget for resilience 
and has declared in its strategy that the agency must, ‘place the creation 
of resilience at the heart of [its] approach both to longer-term 
development and to emergency response’ (Ashdown, 2011).  
Secretary General, Elhadj As, and Senior Vice President, Sven Mollekleiv, of 
IFRC (2015) write that within the debate about value for money is another 
debate about whether humanitarian aid should be spent on ‘the most 
pressing and urgent suffering’ or on ‘longer-term solutions’. They argue 
that resilience is necessary because it allows both to be achieved, thereby 
bridging the gap between disasters and development. Combaz (2015) 
writes that while the terminology of disaster resilience is still new, 
emerging evidence suggests resilience is a cost-effective way to save lives 
and protect development gains, thereby integrating two paradigms that 
have traditionally been quite separate in practice (Collins, 2009).  
While resilience is appealing because of its diverse application, some argue 
that it is precisely this quality that makes it harder to operationalise 
(Tanner et al., 2015). After a study of the DRR activities of local 
governments participating in UNISDR’s Making Cities Resilient Campaign in 
50 cities, Johnson and Blackburn (2014) propose that operationalising 
resilience means resisting a hazard; coping with a hazard; recovering from 
a hazard; and adapting to ensure past mistakes are not repeated. In other 
words, ‘Resilience = resistance + coping capacity + recovery + adaptive 
capacity’ (Johnson and Blackburn, 2014, p. 48).  
No consensus on how to measure resilience currently exists, therefore 
making measuring resilience a challenge, according to some (Winderl, 
2014; Arbon et al., 2013; Oddsdottir, Lucas and Combaz, 2013). However, 
aid agencies, governments and donors want to measure and monitor 
resilience to understand the impact of their interventions. To this end a 
Resilience Measurement Technical Working Group under the Food 
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Security Information Network (FSIN) was set up by the Food and 
Agriculture Organization (FAO) and the World Food Programme (WFP) to 
find a way to universally measure resilience (Food Security Information 
Network, 2015). Scholarship has found that measuring characteristics is 
the most common form of operationalising resilience (Tanner et al., 2015). 
However, Bene (2013) argues that inductive approaches whereby specific 
characteristics are identified as the foundation of resilience and used to 
measure it can be critiqued for being too case specific; reflecting the 
discipline or background of the researcher; and for not being constructed 
from a deductive, generalisable approach, which can lead to circular 
analysis. Bene therefore argues that there is a need to develop indicators 
not based on characteristics of resilience, but on the costs of resilience 
such as different ‘ex-ante and ex-post investments, losses, sacrifices, and 
costs that people have to undertake at individual and collective levels to 
‘go through’ a shock or an adverse event’ (2013, p.11). Bene’s formula for 
measuring resilience in simplified terms is: ‘resilience = anticipation costs + 
impact costs + recovery costs’ (2013, p.12). The literature suggests that 
when measuring resilience, especially from a systems approach, it is 
widely agreed that frameworks should be multi-sectoral and multi-scalar 
(Carpenter et al., 2001; Folke, 2006). 
There are concerns that operationalising resilience means placing an 
emphasis on local self-reliance, thereby eroding the state’s responsibility 
to protect its citizens (Griffin, 2011). Beilin and Wilkinson (2015) argue 
that urban disaster resilience is best built at multiple scales through 
bottom-up methods of self-organisation and internal capacity in 
conjunction with top-down, centrally coordinated government policy 
based activities. Chandler argues that the concept of self-reliance 
highlights agency and self-empowerment of local actors (Chandler, 2015) 
whose participation in building resilience at every stage of the disaster 
management cycle is crucial (Bahadur, Ibrahim and Tanner, 2010). 
Therefore, the literature suggests the importance of self-reliance and 
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active engagement in disaster preparedness and response by the 
government. 
Global policy agendas and frameworks 
This section reviews frameworks, summits and recently agreed global 
goals concerning resilience, beginning with four global frameworks that 
have current influence on policy then moving to a selection of frameworks 
that operationalise resilience in cities and communities. A review of 26 
frameworks is then presented. The frameworks were chosen because they 
reflected the key debates around resilience highlighted earlier in this 
chapter, namely that resilience includes disaster and development 
dimensions; is community driven (bottom up) and policy derived (top 
down); is holistic in its approach, which is represented through 
consideration of physical, social, economic and governance aspects. The 
frameworks were also chosen because they represented a range of scale 
from global to neighbourhood. In summary, each of the 26 frameworks 
provided analysis of the concepts of urban, disaster and resilience.  
Six frameworks that were felt to be most relevant to this research were 
then chosen for analysis. These six were chosen because they were 
developed for operational purposes; covered different scales (global to 
neighbourhood); included policy and non-policy activities; and were put in 
practice or created for use by foundational thinkers or well known 
operational aid agencies. Finally, some of the six frameworks also included 
systems thinking, an integral part of this research.  
a.) Sendai Framework for Disaster Risk Reduction 
The Sendai Framework for Disaster Risk Reduction 2015-2030 is a global 
framework for preventing and reducing disaster risk in countries around 
the world (UNISDR, 2015c). It was adopted in March 2015 in Sendai, Japan, 
building on achievements made by its predecessors, the Yokohama 
Strategy for a Safer World: Guidelines for Natural Disaster Prevention, 
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Preparedness and Mitigation 1994-2004 (IDNDR, 1994), and the Hyogo 
Framework for Action 2005-2015 (UNISDR, 2007), which is discussed 
further below. The framework applies to a range of disasters small and 
large, frequent and infrequent, human induced or resulting from natural 
hazards. The framework’s expected outcome is to reduce disaster risk, 
specifically in terms of loss of life, livelihoods and health while reducing 
damage to ‘physical, social, cultural and environmental assets’ (UNISDR, 
2015c, p.12).  
 
The overall goal of the framework is to strengthen resilience through a 
long list of multi-sectoral areas (including ‘economic, structural, legal, 
social, health, cultural, educational, environmental, technological, political 
and institutional’ areas (UNISDR, 2015c, p.12)) that reduce exposure and 
vulnerability and increase preparedness, response and recovery measures. 
To meet the framework’s goal, four priority actions have been listed of 
which resilience is number three. The priority action for resilience is 
phrased as  ‘Investing in disaster risk reduction for resilience’ and includes 
priorities such as ‘public and private investment’ in ‘structural and non-
structural measures’ in order to ‘enhance the economic, social, health and 
cultural resilience of persons, communities, countries and their assets as 
well as the environment’ (UNISDR, 2015c, p.12).  
 
The Sendai Framework places emphasis on the importance of a holistic 
approach to risk reduction through multi-sectoral means. It suggests that 
resilience is intertwined with achieving successful physical, social, 
economic and governance aspects of preparedness and response at a 
range of scales from local to national. It also emphasizes the 
‘preparedness’ aspect of resilience and measures that can be taken 
through good development before exposure to shocks can occur. 
 
b.) World Humanitarian Summit 
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The World Humanitarian Summit (WHS) is a process aimed at setting a 
new humanitarian agenda to meet the scale and complexity of today’s 
global challenges. With nearly 60 million people displaced by crises, and an 
annual global spending on recovery from natural hazards in excess of USD 
300 billion globally, the humanitarian system, many argue, is 
overstretched (WHS, 2015b). Between 2013-2015 the WHS process 
consulted over 23,000 people in 151 countries who engage with the 
humanitarian system (including aid recipients) in order to develop a set of 
actions for how humanitarian aid can be improved, to be agreed at the 
Summit held in May 2016 (WHS, 2015a). Consultations focused on the 
thematic areas of urban, stakeholder engagement and private sector 
partnerships. From those consultations a synthesis of five major areas for 
action was drawn up, which included: dignity, safety, resilience, 
partnership and finance. The resilience action point states that 
humanitarian aid will build hope and solutions in new or prolonged crises 
between development and humanitarian partners by ‘investing in 
preparedness, managing and mitigating risk, reducing vulnerability, finding 
durable solutions for protracted displacement, and adapting to new 
threats’ (WHS, 2015b, p.3).  
 
The inclusion of resilience in the WHS Agenda demonstrates that resilience 
is prioritised as a key action that contributes to the goal of improving the 
global humanitarian aid system. Furthermore, in a similar vein to the 
resilience definitions discussed earlier, the WHS Synthesis Report suggests 
that activities related to resilience should emphasize preparedness, the 
reduction of vulnerability and adaptation measures (WHS, 2015b).  
 
c.) 2030 Agenda for Sustainable Development 
The 2030 Agenda for Sustainable Development also focuses on resilience. 
It is a universal agenda with 17 goals aimed at eradicating poverty, 
protecting the planet and ensuring prosperity for all (United Nations, 
2015a). The 17 Sustainable Development Goals (SDGs) follow on from 
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eight Millennium Development Goals (MDGs) created to reduce poverty 
from 2000-2015 (United Nations, 2015a). SDGs nine and 11 mention the 
word resilience in relationship to infrastructure and cities respectively.  
 
Goal nine is to ‘Build resilient infrastructure, promote inclusive and 
sustainable industrialisation and foster innovation’ while goal 11 is to 
‘Make cities and human settlements inclusive, safe, resilient and 
sustainable’ (UNDP, 2015, np). In goal nine resilience is used in relation to 
infrastructure, which suggests qualities more in line with traditional 
engineering definitions of resilience (Godschalk, 2003). Meanwhile, goal 
11 takes a more socio-political view of resilience in relation to cities and 
settlement, noting that resilient cities and settlements include affordable 
public housing, good public transport, green open spaces and employ 
inclusive urban planning processes (UNDP, 2015).  
 
d.) Habitat III, the New Urban Agenda 
Habitat III, shorthand for the United Nations Conference on Housing and 
Sustainable Urban Development, is the means through which a New Urban 
Agenda will be agreed upon in Quito, Ecuador in October 2016 (Habitat III, 
2015a). The New Urban Agenda will guide sustainable development in 
cities and towns until 2036 (Citiscope, 2015). Its predecessor was Habitat 
II, the Habitat Agenda: Istanbul Declaration on Human Settlements, calling 
for adequate shelter for all, and was agreed to in 1996 (Habitat II, 1996). A 
broad spectrum of stakeholders is participating in Habitat III, including civil 
society, various levels of government, regional governance bodies, 
development actors and funders. Before the New Agenda is agreed upon, 
22 key issues have been selected for debate and exploration, one of which 
is urban resilience. The Issue Paper on resilience refers extensively to 
hazards, vulnerability, climate change, disaster risk reduction, shocks and 
stresses, governance and urban planning in an effort to identify key drivers 
of urban resilience (Habitat III, 2015f). The ‘operationalisation’ of the 
concept resilience is described as taking place through activities that 
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target physical infrastructure and basic service provision, jobs, good 
governance, social inclusion and environmental sustainability.  
 
 
e.) Operational frameworks for resilience 
In addition to the four global frameworks reviewed above, an analysis of 
26 operational frameworks was conducted by the author to understand 
how resilience was being implemented in cities and communities. On that 
basis, six frameworks were chosen for in-depth analysis in order to identify 
strengths, weaknesses, their relevance to urban disaster resilience and the 
key concepts employed. The next section is a summary discussion of the 
relevant aspects of each of the six frameworks. A more in-depth analysis 
of the six frameworks can be found in the CD appended to this thesis. 
 
Six frameworks were chosen to represent key approaches to 
operationalising or understanding resilience deemed most relevant to this 
research. The criteria for choosing the frameworks was based on the 
literature review conducted earlier in this chapter. The criteria are: global 
level policy frameworks on disaster risk reduction, community based 
resilience, urban frameworks with a systems focus, climate change in 
urban areas, place-based assessments to natural hazards and frameworks 
for resilience that are used by humanitarian networks.  
 
The first, the Hyogo Framework for Action (HFA) framework by UNISDR 
(2005b), the precursor to the Sendai Framework for Disaster Risk 
Reduction, discussed above, was selected to understand how a global 
framework for disaster risk reduction operated, was monitored and 
evaluated and engaged a broad range of stakeholders at various levels in 
its five thematic areas. The HFA was analysed not only because it 
influences global policy and national risk reduction activities, but also 
because it combines development and disaster approaches in three goals, 
which are to 1.) reduce risk in sustainable development activities; 2.) 
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improve governance by developing the capacity and resilience of 
institutions; and 3.) to incorporate disaster risk reduction into every stage 
of the disaster management cycle (UNISDR, 2011). 
 
Twigg’s (2009) guidance note, Characteristics of a Disaster Resilient 
Community, commissioned by six international NGOs (ActionAid, Christian 
Aid, Plan UK, Practical Action and Tearfund), along with the British Red 
Cross, depicts what a disaster resilient community looks like. It uses the 
five thematic areas represented in the HFA, demonstrating how a global 
framework can be integrated at the community level. The five thematic 
areas are then broken into three sub-sections. There are 28 ‘components 
of resilience’ which act as key activities that serve to identify what disaster 
resilience is. There are 167 ‘characteristics of a disaster-resilient 
community’, which illustrate what an ideal disaster resilience community 
looks like. There are also six characteristics of an ‘enabling environment’, 
which create the conditions for the components of disaster resilience to 
be achieved.  
 
Da Silva et al.’s Urban Resilience Framework (2010), which was designed 
to respond to climate change challenges at a city scale, was also reviewed. 
The framework employs a systems approach to understanding cities, 
specifically focusing on the linkages between ‘interdependencies, 
agencies, vulnerabilities and capacities’ within systems. It also analyses 
shocks and stresses together, highlighting in particular the role of physical 
and institutional systems (da Silva et al., 2010, np). It is split into two 
broad categories, one that analyses vulnerability, the other which 
identifies ways to build resilience. Both consider the role of external and 
internal agents as well as urban systems.  
 
Moser’s Conceptual and Operational Framework for Pro-Poor Adaptation 
to Urban Climate Change (2011) also analyses urban resilience to climate 
change hazards with a specific emphasis on assets instead of systems. The 
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temporal aspect is more drawn out than in any other framework analysed 
through an assessment of asset vulnerability followed by an adaptation of 
assets in four ‘phases’ that include long-term resilience; pre-disaster; 
immediate post-disaster and rebuilding (2011).  Moser (2011) also 
conducts analysis at individual, household, and community scales.  
 
Cutter et al.’s DROP model (2008), which is designed to assess disaster 
resilience to natural hazards at a community or local level, was also 
analysed and found to focus on vulnerability and the ways in which 
communities adapt or cope. The framework analyses the antecedent 
conditions (existing vulnerability) alongside characteristics of a specific 
hazard and coping responses of the community as a formula for 
understanding disaster resilience.  
 
Lastly, the IFRC’s Characteristics of a Safe and Resilient Society (ARUP, 
2011) was analysed in order to understand how the world’s largest 
humanitarian network is implementing resilience. The characteristics in 
the research were intended to be used ‘in the design, monitoring and 
evaluation of future programmes,’ thereby offering a way of seeing 
resilience operationalised (ARUP, 2011, p.ii). The framework identifies six 
characteristics for resilience within a community: knowledge and health; 
economic opportunities; infrastructure and services; natural resources; 
organisation; and connectivity (ARUP, 2011). It places health and 
knowledge at the centre, arguing that other aspects were also important 
such as the ability to be organised in order to identify and act on 
problems; to be connected with external actors, the environment and 
supply chains; to manage natural assets that protect the environment; to 
create economic opportunities and access infrastructure and services such 
as housing, transport and power.  
 
The in-depth analysis of the six frameworks or methods for 
operationalising resilience alongside an analysis of 20 other frameworks 
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highlighted that resilience is currently being used in a variety of ways. 
Furthermore, it suggests that many frameworks place their chosen area of 
focus at the centre of analysis, be it health (as in the case with the IFRC 
research), climate change (as was seen in Moser and da Silva et al.’s 
frameworks) or natural hazard risk (as was the case for Cutter et al.’s 
DROP model). All of the frameworks had strong social and governance 
components to them, while one out of two urban frameworks had a 
strong emphasis on physical aspects (da Silva et al., 2010). Having selected 
all of the frameworks from a disaster management-development 
paradigm, it is worth noting that none of the 26 frameworks had an urban 
morphology component to them. Table 2.3.3a below provides a list of the 
six frameworks that were chosen for in-depth analysis. Table 2.3.3.b below 
provides a list of 26 frameworks reviewed. 
 
An in-depth review of six resilience frameworks 
 Author Framework  
1 (UNISDR, 2005b) Hyogo Framework for Action  
2 (Twigg, 2009) Characteristics of a Disaster Resilient 
Community 
3 (da Silva et al., 2010) The Urban Resilience Framework 
4 (Cutter et al., 2008) Disaster Resilience of Place (DROP) Model 
5 (Moser, 2011) A Conceptual and Operational Framework 
for Pro-Poor Adaptation to Urban Climate 
Change 
6 (ARUP, 2011) Characteristics of a Safe and Resilient 
Community 
 
Table 2.3.3a: A list of the six frameworks chosen for in-depth analysis. Source: the 
author 
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A review of 26 resilience frameworks 
 Author Framework  
1 (UNISDR, 2005b) Hyogo Framework for Action  
2 (Twigg, 2009) Characteristics of a Disaster Resilient 
Community 
3 (da Silva et al., 
2010) 
The Urban Resilience Framework 
4 (Cutter et al., 2008) Disaster Resilience of Place (DROP) Model 
5 (Moser, 2011) A Conceptual and Operational Framework for 
Pro-Poor Adaptation to Urban Climate Change 
6 (ARUP, 2011) Characteristics of a Safe and Resilient 
Community 
7 (U.S. Indian Ocean 
Tsunami Warning 
System Programme, 
2007) 
How Resilient is Your Coastal Community? A 
Guide for Evaluating Coastal Community 
Resilience to Tsunamis and Other Coastal 
Hazards 
8 (World Bank, 
2012a) 
Building Urban Resilience: Principles, Tools 
and Practice 
9 (EMI, 2012) Programmatic Directions for the Red Cross 
and Red Crescent in Building Urban 
Community Resilience in the Asia Pacific 
Region 
10 (Rivera and 
Settembrino, nd) 
Toward a Sociological Framework of 
Community Resilience 
11 (Kafle, 2010) Integrated Community Based Risk Reduction: 
An Approach to Building Disaster Resilient 
Communities 
12 (DFID, 2011b) Saving Lives, Preventing Suffering and Building 
Resilience: The UK Government’s 
Humanitarian Policy 
13 (Wongbusarakum 
and Loper, 2011) 
Indicators to Assess Community Level Social 
Vulnerability to Climate Change: An 
addendum to SocMon and SEM Pasifika 
Regional Socioeconomic Monitoring Guideline 
14 (Renschler et al., 
2010) 
Developing the ‘Peoples’ Resilience 
Framework for Defining and Measuring 
Disaster Resilience at the Community Scale 
15 (ADPC, 2006) Critical Guidelines: Community-Based Disaster 
Risk Management 
16 (Turner et al., 2003) A Framework for Vulnerability Analysis in 
Sustainability Science 
17 (UNISDR, 2013) The Pacific Experience in Developing Policy 
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A review of 26 resilience frameworks 
 Author Framework  
and Legislation on Disaster Risk Reduction and 
Climate Change Adaptation 
18 (DFID, 2011a) Defining Disaster Resilience: A DFID Approach 
Paper 
19 (Tyler and Moench, 
2012) 
A Framework for Urban Climate Resilience 
20 (IDNDR, 1994) Yokohama Strategy and Plan of Action for a 
Safer World: Guidelines for Natural Disaster 
Prevention, Preparedness and Mitigation 
21 (Heijmans, 2013) Reaching Resilience: Handbook Resilience 2.0 
for Aid Practitioners and Policymakers 
22 (TANGO 
International, 2012) 
The Resilience Framework 
23 (da Silva, 2014) The City Resilience Framework 
24 (da Silva, Kernaghan 
and Luque, 2012) 
A Systems Approach to Meeting the 
Challenges of Urban Climate Change 
25 (Shaw, 2014) Urban Disaster Risk Reduction Framework 
26 (Suri, 2015) Resilient cities for children: a strategic 
framework for World Vision 
 
Table 2.3.3b: A list of the 26 frameworks chosen for review in relation to urban 
disaster resilience. Source: the author 
 
 
In summary, this section on resilience has covered practical challenges and 
debates with operationalising resilience. It then reviewed operational 
frameworks in order to gain an understanding of the key concepts and 
ways in which those concepts interact. The next and final section offers 
and interpretation of urban disaster resilience for this research.  
 
2.3.3 Defining urban disaster resilience for this research 
After conducting a literature review of cities, disasters and development, 
as well as the theory and practice of resilience, it is important for this 
research to be clear how it defines urban disaster resilience. This research 
therefore defines resilience as ‘the capacity for dynamic systems to cope, 
adapt and transform in ways that reduce future risks to shocks and 
stresses’. Furthermore, it defines urban disaster resilience as ‘the ways in 
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which the interactions between the built environment, complex adaptive 
systems and people build the capacity to cope with shocks and stresses 
and re-organise in order to reduce future disaster risk’. 
Conclusion  
This chapter presented a literature review of theories related to 
conceputalising the city, disaster development and resilience. It began 
with an explanation of the ways in which development theory fostered 
urban growth. It then conceptualised the city from a CAS and urban 
morphology approach, observing that such approaches account for the 
interdependencies and complex overlaps between humans and the built 
and natural environments they live in. Specific opportunities and 
challenges within the city were identified through the examination of 
urban form and risk; economic systems and their impact on the informal 
sector; governance systems and the role of key actors as well as social 
systems and the way relationships can become successful socioeconomic 
coping mechanisms. The chapter concluded with a discussion on the 
history of resilience, including key conceptual and practical debates about 
the concept.  
 
The literature review has identified some key aspects for consideration in 
the development of a conceptual framework for understanding urban 
disaster resilience. In particular, the development theory section of this 
chapter underscored the need for inclusive, participatory methods in 
order to foster inclusive, safe and just cities for all, including poorer 
people. Analysis of urban form highlighted the physical risks brought out 
by informality in buildings, specifically homes. Meanwhile the analysis of 
economic systems emphasised the role of informality and the need for 
greater economic access for poorer people in urban centres. Furthermore, 
analysis of governance systems concluded that the rule of law, including 
planning policies and development strategies at the national level, are as 
important as individual ‘self-help’ systems and networks that informally 
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govern poorer areas of cities and neighbourhoods. Meanwhile, the social 
systems analysis emphasised that people with monetary weaknesses have 
stronger economic and political access when they work together.  
 
The disasters section highlighted a history of theories and approaches that 
attempt to link disasters and development, suggesting that resilience is 
the latest of such attempts and differs by way of using systems instead of 
asset analysis. The resilience section demonstrated that while the concept 
has some obstacles conceptually and practically, it has gained a lot of 
uptake in global policy agendas and local frameworks. Then next chapter 
will use this literature review to formulate a conceptual framework for 
understanding urban disaster resilience.  
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Part II. Research 
approach 
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Chapter three 
A conceptual framework for urban 
disaster resilience
Introduction 
This chapter formulates a conceptual framework for understanding 
disaster resilience in low-income neighbourhoods with a view to use it to 
identify key dimensions of resilience. To this end, two urban approaches 
for analysing the city are aggregated to create a conceptual framework 
that investigates human interactions and their influence on built form. 
Complex adaptive systems (CAS) and urban morphology are combined to 
create a framework for investigating patterns of urban vulnerability, 
capacity, risk and opportunity in order to understand dimensions of 
disaster resilience, and the ways in which the concept assists with 
improving disaster response.  
This chapter begins by explaining CAS and the reason for choosing three 
CAS for the framework. A definition of the chosen economic, social and 
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governance CAS is given followed by an explanation of how the CAS 
systems were triangulated with other systems frameworks. The urban 
morphological component of the conceptual framework is then presented 
through four layers of analysis within the built and natural environment. 
The four layers comprise topography, movement networks and public 
open spaces, plots and buildings and services and exist in order to conduct 
scalar analysis of human interaction with the built and natural 
environment. The chapter concludes by illustrating how CAS and 
morphology can be integrated into a single approach for analysing disaster 
resilience in the city. 
Methodological approach 
A literature review was the primary methodological approach employed to 
develop the conceptual framework, as presented in Chapter Two. The 
literature review examined different conceptualisations of CAS and urban 
morphology in order to understand how they explain the city and its inter-
connections. The review of theory is a deductive approach to forming the 
conceptual framework, whereby key theories are reviewed and used to 
form the foundation of the framework. A review of 26 resilience 
frameworks that guide practice was then conducted across a range of 
thematic areas within resilience, including climate change, community 
resilience, place-based resilience and global disaster risk reduction 
frameworks. The frameworks were examined in Chapter Two in order to 
ascertain key characteristics and themes of resilience that could be 
generalised, again employing a deductive approach to test commonalities 
within practice. Moreover, the examination of practical frameworks made 
connections between theory and practice.   
The key links that were drawn from theory included emphasis on social 
capital, microfinance, secure land tenure and the importance of 
temporality and scale when building capacity to withstand and recover 
from disaster shocks. Meanwhile practice revealed an emphasis on 
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building capacity, forming partnerships and developing multi-sectoral 
approaches.  
Having explained the methodological approach for this chapter, the aim of 
the conceptual framework is presented next. The development of the 
conceptual framework is then explained starting with CAS and then 
moving to morphology. A rationale for using the approaches is then 
explained.  
3.1 The conceptual framework’s aim 
The aim of developing an urban disaster resilience framework in this 
chapter is to understand changes in the contemporary urban fabric that 
take place as a result of influence from CAS and visa versa. Through urban 
morphology, the framework will analyse the quality of the urban built and 
natural environment, and serves as the basis for asking, how did the 
neighbourhood become what it is today and what are the key dimensions 
of resilience that can be identified within it? 
The framework comprises a horizontal axis (complex adaptive systems) 
and a vertical axis (urban morphology), illustrated in Figure 3.1a. The CAS 
elements of the conceptual framework identify patterns of resilience, risk, 
capacity and vulnerability. Meanwhile, the morphological elements 
highlight changes within the built and natural environment as shown 
Figure 3.1a below.  
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Figure 3.1a: The CAS aspect of the conceptual framework is represented in blue 
(horizontal axis), and analyses patterns of resilience, risk, capacity and 
vulnerability. The morphological element of the conceptual framework 
represented in green (vertical axis), analyses changes within the built and natural 
environment. Source: the author 
The conceptual framework is structured in order to conduct analysis by 
asking: what interactions took place at the intersections between the 
systems and the morphological layers? Did the impact at the intersections 
create resilience? Was the resilience positive or negative? The next section 
explains the CAS components of the framework.  
3.2 Complex adaptive systems: the framework’s 
horizontal axis 
This research contends that urban disaster resilience can be analysed 
effectively using a theoretical landscape that acknowledges and 
accommodates overlap, complexity and adaptive behavior (da Silva, 2014; 
Anderies, Walker and Kinzig, 2006). Therefore, systems theory is used in 
this research as one of two key theories because it recognises cities and 
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neighbourhoods as complex adaptive systems that have a plethora of 
feedback loops that are created through intra and inter-dependent causal 
and adaptive relationships (Walker et al., 2004; Holling, 2001; Walker et 
al., 2006; Juarrero, 2000; da Silva, Kernaghan and Luque, 2012). The 
horizontal axis of this framework is host to three key interdependent 
complex adaptive systems used for analysis in this framework: economic 
flows, governance networks and social dynamics. Economic flows in this 
conceptual framework are defined as economic benefits such as money, 
markets, businesses, rent, jobs, savings, loans, credit, ownership and skills. 
Governance networks (Resilience Alliance, 2007) involve the organisation 
of power and decision-making such as government, institutions, leaders, 
networks, planning policies and legal frameworks. Social dynamics 
(Resilience Alliance, 2007) are defined by social interaction such as 
networks, social capital, discrimination, culture and values. It also includes 
social services such as education, welfare and healthcare. These three CAS 
were identified after the literature review of theories and frameworks in 
Chapter Two. The next section will provide further a justification of the 
three systems chosen for the framework by triangulating them with three 
other influential systems frameworks. Figure 3.2a below shows the 
overlapping nature of the economic flows, governance networks and 
social dynamics CAS.  
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Figure 3.2a: A diagrammatic representation of overlapping economic flows, 
governance networks and social dynamics CAS. Source: the author 
3.2.1 Economic flows 
Economic flows provide economic benefits to individuals, 
neighbourhoods, cities and nations. Economic benefits and losses can 
arise at any given time in the production, supply and consumption of 
goods (Resilience Alliance, 2007). Urban areas are consumption driven, 
meaning people are required to purchase basic necessities such as food, 
water, shelter and electricity often from other areas in order to survive 
(Friend and MacClune, 2013). Regardless of race, ethnicity, gender or 
creed, unrestricted access to money, markets, loans, insurance, credit and 
microfinance are crucial to ensuring unhindered economic flows for 
poorer urban people who often grapple with unstable financial asset 
bases, indebtedness and lack of access to loans or insurance (da Silva, 
2014). Equally important is access to skills training and employment in 
decent work occupations supported by social protection and security (ILO, 
2002). Finally, ownership of assets such as land, houses and rooms for 
rent greatly impacts the economic stability of an individual, 
neighbourhood and city, and are therefore included in the definition of 
economic flows. The recent rise of the urban ‘sharing economy’ also 
creates opportunities for asset owners to rent out their services or assets 
for a small fee (The Economist, 2013). Having explained the economic CAS 
in the framework, the next section will focus on the governance CAS. 
 
3.2.2 Governance networks 
Governance networks CAS in the framework consists of institutions, 
governments, the private sector (and their tools such as planning policies 
and legal frameworks). The governance CAS also includes processes that 
shape power sharing, decision-making, participation, justice, and agency 
(Siisiainen, 2000; Friend and Moench, 2013; Allen, 2003). Governance 
networks strongly impact on social systems by constraining or enabling 
access for different groups of people. Good governance networks are 
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integrated; inclusive, exchange information and have accountable 
authorities (Anderies, Walker and Kinzig, 2006; Arup International, 2014; 
MacClune, Tyler and Allan, 2014). Integrated networks ensure investment 
and management of all sectors and departments and are aligned to a 
mutually supported outcome (da Silva, 2014). Good governance engages a 
broad range of stakeholders, including civil society, in a shared ownership 
of a joint vision (Anderies, Walker and Kinzig, 2006).  
Good governance also relies on information exchange that is accurate and 
shared in a timely manner to shorten feedback loops and protect public 
safety when shocks or stresses occur (da Silva, 2014). Finally, government 
authorities should be transparent in their decision making and 
accountable to the public (MacClune, Tyler and Allan, 2014).  Therefore 
this CAS component of the framework will be considering elements of 
good governance, civil society networks and accountability in decision-
making processes. The next section will explain the way in which the 
framework will analyse social dynamics CAS. 
3.2.3 Social dynamics 
Social dynamics are comprised of dynamic interactions such as networks, 
social capital, leadership, discrimination, cultural values (Putnam, 2007; 
Keeley, 2007; Siisiainen, 2000; Stephenson, 2011; Anderies, Walker and 
Kinzig, 2006). Healthcare, education, financial structures, social welfare 
nets and the like are also included in social systems (Wallace and Wallace, 
2008). A resilient social dynamic system has the ability to self-organise, is 
capable of facilitating collective action and engenders trust (Putnam, 2007; 
Anderies, Walker and Kinzig, 2006). The qualities of resilient dynamic 
social systems are understood to include learning, resourcefulness, and 
responsiveness (Levine, 1998).  
Social systems demonstrate learning through evolving practices (Reed et 
al., 2013) such as forming a savings group to access livelihood loans but 
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then adapting the purpose of the group to also include allowances for 
social welfare needs. Resourcefulness is demonstrated when people are 
able to identify a variety of ways to achieve their livelihood and well-being 
goals, even in response to a disaster shock. Lastly, social systems are 
responsive when they are able to make decisions in a timely manner and 
take appropriate actions to adapt to shocks (MacClune, Tyler and Allan, 
2014). This framework will consider how the social dynamics explained 
above interact as part of understanding how the social CAS works in a city.  
3.2.4 Triangulation: a review of three urban resilience frameworks  
By way of further triangulating the justification for the categorisation of 
CAS in this framework, a critical review of three recent systems 
frameworks for urban resilience is conducted in order to ascertain 
similarities and differences between the categories of this conceptual 
framework and those developed by others. A short discussion of the 
findings and how they support the choice of the categories in this 
framework is outlined below.  
Resilience Alliance (2007) 
 The Resilience Alliance describes cities as the ‘quintessential example of a 
complex adaptive system’ because they are constantly evolving based on 
‘internal interactions and the influence of external factors’ (Resilience 
Alliance, 2007, p.9). Following a workshop in Gothenburg, Sweden in 
2005, the Resilience Alliance developed key themes to guide a systems 
approach to building the general resilience of a city and its component 
parts (Resilience Alliance, 2007). The four themes developed were: 1.) 
metabolic flows, described as the production, supply and consumption of 
goods; 2.) governance networks, defined as organisations and mechanisms 
of good governance that redistribute equitable services and benefits to an 
urban population; 3.) social dynamics defined as the social patterns that 
influence density, shape human capital, access and inequality; and 4.) the 
built environment, referring to the spatial organisation of the city and its 
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infrastructure, and the way it interacts with ecosystem service provision 
(such as food and water). The interaction and overlapping nature of the 
themes is pictured below in Figure 3.2.4a.  
The urban disaster resilience conceptual framework developed by the 
author in this chapter uses the Resilience Alliance’s four themes as the 
basis for its categorisation of systems, with some modifications as 
demonstrated in Figure 3.2.4b. As explained in section 3.2 above, the 
author’s framework uses three systems that are similar in nature to the 
Resilience Alliance’s framework, namely social, governance and economic. 
However, the economic aspect in the author’s framework is described as 
economic flows while the Resilience Alliance uses the term ‘metabolic 
flows’. The ‘metabolic flows’ category is defined by the Resilience Alliance 
as ‘production, supply and consumption chains’. However, it arguably 
lacks a focus on people and their relationship to economic resilience. 
Therefore, the definition of the ‘economic flows’ system is believed to 
provide a greater focus on the ability of groups and individuals to 
economically thrive, and shall be defined in this conceptual framework as 
economic benefits such as money, markets, businesses, rent, jobs, savings, 
loans, credit, ownership and skills.  
Another notable change between the two frameworks is the author’s 
emphasis on the physical component by using urban morphology to 
analyse the built and natural environment. Therefore the three CAS 
systems that are similar in nature to the Resilience Alliance are shown in 
blue in Figure 3.2.4b below while the green circle indicates a greater 
emphasis on the built and natural environment in order to account for the 
importance of the interaction between the built environment and people. 
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Figure 3.2.4a: An interpretation of The Resilience Alliance’s (2007) key themes 
for building the urban resilience within a city and its component parts. Source: 
the author  
 
 
 
 
 
 
Figure 3.2.4b: The author’s framework builds on the knowledge of the Resilience 
Alliance (2007) by using similar social and governance systems while making 
modifications to the way in which economic systems is understood (as indicated 
in blue). Urban form is indicated in green and will be given greater emphasis 
through a morphological analysis. Source: the author 
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A systems approach to meeting the challenges of urban climate change  
Similar categories are identified in da Silva et al.’s (2012) systems 
approach to urban climate resilience. Three primary ‘networks’ were 
identified as significantly contributing to the resilience of a city or its parts. 
They are: 1.) Infrastructure networks (key physical and technological 
networks); 2.) Knowledge networks (structures that regulate access to 
information) and 3.) Institutional networks (rules and practices that 
govern human interaction). While the physical, political and social 
networks are arguably included in these categorisations, the economic 
network appears to be insufficiently represented. Da Silva et al. (2012) 
have placed the description of economic systems within the broader 
definition of institutional networks. However based on a review of the 
literature and data collected regarding flooding in Bang Bua Canal, 
emphasising the role of economic systems is crucial. Access to income is 
the lifeblood that allows people in a city to meet their basic human needs 
and requires analysis in its own right.  
 
Figure 3.2.4c below illustrates how da Silva et al. (2012) organise their 
three networks. The box on the top (gray) indicates that a local 
government has direct control over what happens to its infrastructure, 
knowledge and institutional networks. Meanwhile, the box on the bottom 
(dotted lines) depicts an environment where a city has influence, not 
control, due to an increase in density of spatial and non-spatial dynamics 
(such as settlements, markets, policies and global networks) that operate 
within and outside of its administrative boundaries. Essentially the 
diagram shows that smaller scales of networks such as a district have 
more control than larger scales of networks such as a city.  
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Figure 3.2.4c: An interpretation of da Silva et al.’s (2012) model of the city as an 
open system shows that smaller levels of governance i.e. a district, has a strong 
ability to control networks inside of its administrative boundaries (as indicated in 
the top gray box), and as the level of government grows in size i.e. multiple 
districts are under the control of a single authority, and a reduced ability to 
influence networks inside and outside of its boundaries is seen. Source: the 
author 
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City resilience framework 
The City Resilience Framework developed by the Rockefeller Foundation 
and Arup (2014), can be viewed as an updated version of Arup’s (2010) 
conceptual framework of urban climate change co-developed by da Silva. 
At the broadest level of the City Resilience Framework there are four 
categories that host 12 indicators, 48-54 sub-indicators and 130-150 
variables that determine urban resilience.  
 
The four categories in this framework consist of: 1.) Health and well-being, 
which focuses on the reduction of vulnerability, the increase of protection 
and livelihoods opportunities for people; 2.) Infrastructure and 
environment, which focuses on the quality of place; 3.) Economy and 
society, which focuses on financial flows and the organisation of society; 
4.) Leadership and strategy, which refers to the way in which effective 
leadership and management occur, and how they empower people in 
cities. Figure 3.1.4 c below is a diagrammatic representation of da Silva’s 
(2014) City Resilience Framework.  
 
While the categories in da Silva’s (2014) framework are grouped 
differently to the urban disaster resilience framework being developed by 
the author in this chapter, there are similarities. Both have a focus on the 
economy, infrastructure and the environment, social issues and 
governance. While the urban disaster resilience framework developed by 
the author uses similar concepts to the City Resilience Framework, the 
author’s framework provides a greater emphasis on the built and natural 
environment by adding urban morphology, which is described in the next 
section.  
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Figure 3.2.4d: An interpretation of The City Resilience Framework (da Silva, 
2014). The four categories of urban resilience are highlighted in blue. Source: the 
author 
 
Therefore, having explained the ways in which the author used urban 
resilience frameworks to develop the CAS component of this chapter’s 
conceptual framework, the next section will explain the framework’s 
morphological component.  
 
3.3 Morphology: the framework’s vertical axis 
An urban morphological approach allows for analysis of the complexity 
and layered nature of the natural and built environment at multiple scales. 
Levine et al. (2012) argue that resilience lacks a historical dimension, and 
that is why mistakes are repeated. Morphology is a tool that can assist 
with understanding the historical transformation of a city and its 
component parts, especially in relation to the ways in which social, 
economic and demographic changes have influenced urban form (Bolio 
Arceo, 2012; Whitehand, 2012). 
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To this end, four morphological layers have been selected. The first is a 
topographical layer that investigates land and water in order to 
understand the implication of policy as well as longer-term 
transformations of topography over time. The second layer is that of 
movement networks and public open spaces, which investigates key CAS 
that influence change in roads, canals and public open spaces over time. 
The third, the plots layer, has been chosen to analyse the ways in which 
small or large parcels of land change over time in order to identify the key 
dimensions of CAS that have most influenced change at the plots layer. 
Lastly, the buildings and services layer was chosen in order to explore the 
ways in which buildings and access to services impacts upon disaster risk. 
These four layers were chosen based on the criteria of time and scale. 
Together they cover a range of scales from topography at the largest scale 
with the longest rate of change to buildings and services at the smallest 
scale with the shortest rate of change. The different layers across the 
range of scales create an understanding of the influence and power 
different actors have. Figure 3.3 is an illustration of the four morphological 
layers used in this framework.  
 
The morphological layers comprise the vertical axis of the conceptual 
framework, and explains urban form components and traces changes in 
the spatial relationships between the built and natural form of a city over 
time (Kropf, 2009). The four morphological layers are used to investigate 
influences on the built and natural environment at different resolutions of 
scale (Moudon, 1997).  Morphology can be used to understand how 
individual layers function as separate parts (Kropf, 2005), as well as in 
relationship to one another (Kropf, 2005) and in relation to the CAS on the 
horizontal axis of this framework. In the next section the four layers are 
explained in more detail. 
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Figure 3.3: The four morphological layers used in the conceptual framework 
includes the topography layer; movement networks and public open spaces 
layer; the plots layer; and the buildings and services layer. Source: the author 
 
 
3.3.1 Topographical layer 
The topographical layer is comprised by natural landscape such as land, 
water and observable features of a specific terrain (Bolio Arceo, 2012). The 
topographical layer is investigated first because it is the largest, most 
permanent morphological layer where changes manifest across centuries 
(Bolio Arceo, 2012). Analysis of the topographical layer adds value by 
investigating the terrain and soil of pre-urban structures (Koster, 1998). 
Historical analysis of how human agents affect change at a topographical 
level can shed light on modern day challenges and opportunities related to 
quality of place (Bolio Arceo, 2012; Choi, 2011), and a subsequent need to 
investigate other morphological elements (Butina Watson and Bentley, 
2007). The topographical layer is important in this framework because it 
accounts for changes in naturally occurring elements including, climate 
hazards and risks. Figure 3.3.1 below overlays the topographical layer with 
the economic, governance and social CAS.  
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Figure 3.3.1: A visual graphic of the way in which the three key CAS intersect with 
the topographical layer. Source: the author 
3.3.2 Movement networks and public open spaces layer 
The second layer investigates movement networks and public open 
spaces. Movement networks are defined as mobility infrastructure such as 
streets, large highways and small as pedestrian lanes (Kropf, 2009) as well 
as water channels used for transportation, commercial activities or 
socialising (Truong, 2013). The design of movement networks impacts the 
safety and permeability of an area and increases legibility (Carmona, 
Heath and Tiesdell, 2003). Public open spaces are open spaces that are 
accessible to the general public and often host social and economic 
activities (Carmona, Heath and Tiesdell, 2003). Examples of public open 
spaces are informal market places, playgrounds, parks and squares. Public 
spaces ‘mirror the complexities of urban societies’; they can be 
impersonal, fragmented, contested or exclusive (Madanipour, 2010, p.1). 
Alternatively, when public spaces are accessible and inclusive 
(Madanipour, 2010) they can create a safe environment for strangers to 
connect and for friendships, cultural attitudes and identities to be 
strengthened. Public spaces tend to remain relatively stable in comparison 
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to plots and buildings (Butina Watson et al., 2004). Analysis of public open 
spaces within this conceptual framework focuses on how patterns of use 
have evolved over time, and the innovative trade-offs between private 
and public space (Dovey and King, 2011). This urban disaster resilience 
framework focuses on the use of movement networks and public open 
spaces in crisis and non-crisis periods; the types of people who use public 
spaces and the risks and opportunities involved. Figure 3.3.2 below 
illustrates the overlapping of economic, governance and social CAS with 
morphology’s movement networks and public open spaces layer, as it is in 
these intersections where the interrogation of resilience takes place.  
Figure 3.3.2: A graphic of the way in which the three key CAS intersect with the 
movements network and public open spaces layer. Source: the author 
3.3.3 Plots 
The third layer of analysis focuses on plots, used in this framework to 
identify changes in access to and quality of a piece of land, its use and 
ownership. Once street patterns have been established, plots begin to 
appear (Koster, 1998), hosting people settling or working on parcels of 
land (Whitehand, 2001). Plots are defined by land use and their physical 
form (Kropf, 2009). Streets in particular exert a long standing influence on 
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framing the way rural land is converted for urban use, which in turn 
influences the form of future plots through the residual elements passed 
down (Whitehand, 2001). This conceptual framework includes plots as a 
separate layer of analysis because it allows interrogation of land utilisation 
and mechanisms for securing tenure. Since plots are usually objects of 
ownership, analysis of ownership and control provides an essential insight 
into socially defined relationships between the controller and the user 
(Kropf, 2009). It is widely recognised that many towns and cities lack 
regulated plot dimensions (Whitehand, 2001), and thus they vary in shape 
and size. Examination of the plot layer can reveal patterns in the 
‘neighbourhood effect’ where occupants influence one another by the 
type of changes they make to their individual plots, especially in areas of 
high density (Whitehand, 2001). In urban spaces where land is a scarce 
resource and land rights in informal settlements are frequently contested, 
it is important to analyse the use and access to specific plots of land – be 
they neighbourhoods or households. Figure 3.3.3 below illustrates the 
ways in which overlapping and interconnected economic, governance and 
social CAS intersect with the plots layer to create change over time.  
 
 
Figure 3.3.3: A graphic of the way in which the three key CAS systems intersect 
with the plots layer. Source: the author 
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3.3.4 Buildings and services layer 
The final layer of analysis is that of buildings and services, the most rapidly 
changing of the physical layers, and arguably one of the most fundamental 
layers in morphological analysis for understanding the social, political and 
economic factors that influence a neighbourhood (Bolio Arceo, 2012; 
Whitehand, 1987). So important are infrastructure and services, that UN-
Habitat describes them as the ‘bedrock of prosperity’ in its 2012-2013 
State of the World’s Cities Report (UN-Habitat, 2013b), arguing that 
‘inadequate infrastructure is a major impediment to the prosperity of 
cities’ (UN-Habitat, 2013b, p.xvii). Building types have traditionally been 
mapped in order to ensure future urban development takes into account 
historical transformations and cultural traditions (Whitehand, 2001). While 
this is important, the main focus of analysing buildings and services in this 
framework is to ascertain opportunities for improving quality of life and 
well-being.  According to UN-Habitat (2013b), access to adequate housing 
and residential services promotes competiveness and economic growth; 
improves urban connectedness; reduces poverty and contributes to safer, 
more sustainable cities. Investing in, and maintaining critical infrastructure 
and services is listed by UNISDR (2015a) as one of ten essentials in its 
Making Cities Resilient campaign.  
 
This layer of the framework provides an opportunity to identify the 
infrastructure that reduces flood risk, and maintains a basic mode of ‘fail 
safe’ functioning without complete breakdown in a disaster, one of the 
major criteria for measuring urban resilience (World World Bank, 2012a; 
Jha, Bloch and Lamond, 2012). Linking this particular layer with all of the 
other layers in the framework recognises that in a crisis, people who live in 
neighbourhoods rely on the city to maintain a low-level functionality of 
basic services such as power and water in order to survive. In non-crisis 
periods, people not only require access to working infrastructure, but also 
quality infrastructure that is affordable (Lucci, 2014 ). The buildings and 
services layer experiences changes faster and more frequently than any 
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other of the layers (Butina Watson et al., 2004). Figure 3.3.4 illustrates the 
ways in which overlapping and interconnected economic, governance and 
social CAS intersect with the buildings and services layer to create change 
over time. 
Figure 3.3.4: A graphic of the way in which the three key CAS intersect with the 
building and services layer. Source: the author 
Having described the four morphological layers in this framework, the 
next section will explain how urban morphology and CAS approaches can 
be combined to create a single approach to analysing and understanding 
urban disaster resilience. 
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3.4 A conceptual framework for urban disaster 
resilience  
 
This section explains how CAS and urban morphology approaches are 
combined to create a conceptual framework that investigates disaster 
resilience in order to identify key dimensions of resilience.  
 
The urban disaster resilience conceptual framework pictured below in 
Figure 3.4.1 creates the image of a lattice with the horizontal axis 
representing three key complex adaptive systems and the vertical axis 
representing four morphological layers. A lattice structure enables 
analysis of the urban fabric to be conducted column-by-column, row-by-
row. The blue horizontal axis represents CAS deemed most relevant to 
urban disaster resilience. The green vertical axis represents morphological 
layers used to analyse the quality of place in different layers of the built 
and natural environment.  
 
The conceptual framework forms a matrix, whereby systems intersect with 
morphological layers, allowing data to be gathered and analysed across 
the two-way relationship. Complex interactions and feedback loops are 
deconstructed within the relationships in order to establish patterns of 
resilience, risk, vulnerability and capacity within CAS and identify key 
dimensions of resilience.  
 
The dimensions of resilience are deemed positive or negative based on an 
analysis of power, in order to determine who is at risk, the types of risk 
they face and whether they need to adapt to or transform their situation. 
The key dimensions of resilience found within CAS are then allocated to 
the morphological layers they most influenced. The intersection between 
CAS and morphology is where dimensions of resilience are identified. 
Dimensions of resilience are points that indicate where human systems 
influence the built and natural environment and visa versa. The 
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dimensions of resilience may be positive for some, and negative for 
others, making it essential to couple resilience with transformation 
(Bahadur and Tanner, 2014).  
 
 
Figure 3.3.1: A conceptual framework of urban disaster resilience. The blue 
horizontal axis represents CAS deemed most relevant to urban disaster resilience. 
The green vertical axis represents morphological layers used to analyse the 
quality of place in different layers of the built and natural environment. Culled 
together into one framework, the intersections between human elements of CAS 
and morphological layers create dimensions of disaster resilience. Source: the 
author  
 
 
3.4.1 Framework justification  
This conceptual framework blends systems and morphology in order to 
investigate concepts of density, power, complexity and dynamism. 
Analysis of the morphological layers and their relationships with 
economic, political and social systems generates an understanding about 
the interactions that shape risk, opportunity and vulnerability in the built 
environment and the degrees of influence each of the systems have at 
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different physical scales. Moudon (1997) believes that reading the city and 
understanding its risks can only be done historically because its urban 
form components undergo continuous transformation.  
 
Morphological analysis assists in understanding the city because it 
considers the transformation of form; resolution and time and can be 
correlated with factors that influence urban transformation (Moudon, 
1997). Alesch (2005) writes that systems theory, the theory of complex 
self-organising systems, chaos theory, and urban morphology are a 
powerful and necessary basis for ‘understanding systems we are trying to 
affect’ (Alesch, 2005, p.3). In a paper that maps out a decade-long 
longitudinal study of more than a dozen disaster sites, Alesch (2005) 
argues that during disaster recovery, the built environment is rebuilt 
relatively quickly, but that the social, political, and economic relationships 
and capacities are not adequately addressed.  
 
Bringing together theories of morphology and complex systems aims to 
provide a more powerful context analysis and a more accurate 
identification of the interaction of the built environment and the systems 
that influence it. This particular framework is different from other 
frameworks reviewed in this chapter because it combines morphology and 
CAS in order to understand resilience from a space-based systems 
approach in a way that no other conceptual framework known to the 
author does.  
 
Moreover, the framework can be useful to a range of urban practitioners 
(i.e. urban planners and designers, engineers, architects, urban water 
management specialists etc.) looking to initiate activities that build 
resilience. It can be used to conduct a context analysis or a capacity and 
vulnerability assessment because it is holistic, comprehensive and easily 
adaptable. For example, if a local government wanted to build a road, 
they could use this conceptual framework to understand the social and 
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economic impacts of doing so. Or, if a neighbourhood wanted to change 
the way in which access to water occurs, the conceptual framework could 
also be used to map out the key social, economic and governance aspects 
that influence access to water at a range of levels from local to national.   
 
In summary, the intersections between CAS and morphology provides a 
urban perspective on disaster resilience that combines a physical 
approach with a human approach to create a holistic analysis of the types 
of chronic stresses and disaster shocks people in a city face.   
 
3.4.2 Analytical tool  
The analytical tool, presented in Figure 3.4.2 below translates the 
conceptual framework into a matrix that can be populated with 
information from a range of scales – national, city, district or 
neighbourhood. It provides a way for practitioners to transfer theory into 
a practical tool by documenting patterns formed by CAS and plotting them 
on the morphological layer where the greatest amount of impact is seen. 
The tool can also be used to conduct a context analysis or a capacity and 
vulnerability assessment because it is holistic, comprehensive and easily 
adaptable. 
 
As in the conceptual framework, the interdependent systems populate the 
horizontal axis and morphological changes in physical and natural 
environment populate the vertical axis. Once the user has decided on the 
scale of analysis, the next step is to identify the hazard. The title of the 
analytical tool ‘Urban Disaster Resilience’ is deliberately generic with the 
word ‘disaster’ interchangeable with a number of natural hazards. The 
next step is to fill in the boxes with analysis from the pairing of each of the 
categories.  
 
The names of the complex adaptive systems in the horizontal axis have 
remained the same as presented in the conceptual framework, and are 
Chapter three: a conceptual framework for urban disaster resilience 
 Page 112 
accompanied by a short list of examples of the type of information that 
could potentially be included under each heading. For example, economic 
forces are defined as things that ‘provide economic benefit such as money, 
markets, businesses, rent, jobs, savings, loans, credit, ownership and 
skills’. The governance networks are defined as involving ‘the organisation 
of power and decision-making from local to national levels, such as 
governments, institutions, leaders, networks, planning policies and legal 
frameworks’. The social dynamics are described as including ‘social 
interaction such as networks, social capital, discrimination, culture and 
values. The social section also includes social services such as education, 
welfare and healthcare.  
 
While the essence of the categories and their definitions remain the same, 
the names of the morphological layers have changed to words that more 
colloquially communicate the concepts to people who do not have a 
background in morphological or systems approaches. Deliberately simple, 
but not simplistic, the names and descriptions reflect the kind of 
information that is intended to populate boxes. For example, the 
topography layer is described as ‘land and water’, and instructs users to 
input information related to historical and recent changes in the use of 
fields, rivers, lakes and other natural aspects.  
 
The word ‘plot’ has been replaced with ‘parcels of land’ for users outside 
of Europe who may find the classification of plots is less frequently used. 
The ‘movement networks and public open spaces’ has been replaced with 
‘roads and public spaces’ and defined as ‘changes in access to and quality 
of roads and public spaces, including paths, playgrounds, parks and market 
squares’. The category of buildings and services has stayed the same 
because it was felt the name imbued the description, which is defined as 
‘changes in access to and quality of homes, community centres, shops, 
electricity, water and sewerage’.  
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Figure 3.4.2 Analytical tool that uses the intersections of CAS and morphology to 
interrogate key elements of urban disaster resilience. Source: the author 
 
 
Conclusion  
This chapter explained the development of a conceptual framework that 
seeks to explore urban disaster resilience. It began with a discussion of the 
aim of the framework, which is to understand the relationships between 
the built environment and people in order to identify dimensions of 
resilience. It then discussed the two main components of the framework – 
CAS and urban morphology.  
 
It was explained that based on the literature review in Chapter One, it was 
identified that economic, governance and social CAS are key systems used 
for analysing the city, and therefore these systems were chosen as 
categories for analysis along the horizontal axis of a matrix. The discussion 
highlighted that CAS interact with each other, but also within their own 
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component parts, such as land and housing, which have an inter-
dependent relationship within the economic CAS. The CAS section then 
explained how the systems selected for this framework were triangulated 
with systems from other key frameworks, identifying where the author’s 
framework aligns with current thinking and where it deviates.  
 
The chapter then discussed the use of urban morphology to analyse the 
built and natural elements within a city at finer scales (referred to as 
layers) that captures the historical transformation of relationships 
between humans and the built environment. The four morphological 
layers included in the framework are topography; movement networks 
and public open spaces; plots and buildings and services.  
 
This chapter ended by discussing that the culmination of the two urban 
approaches results in a framework for urban disaster resilience. A lattice is 
formed with CAS on the horizontal axis and layers of urban morphology on 
the vertical axis. The lattice assists with analysis of patterns of 
vulnerability, capacity, risk and resilience. Based on those patterns, 
dimensions of resilience i.e. activities and factors that help a 
neighbourhood better cope with and adapt to shocks and stresses, are 
identified. The dimensions can then be analysed through a lens of power 
in order to establish whether they are positive or negative by asking, 
‘resilience for whom and to what’. Once the dimensions of resilience are 
identified they can then be triangulated with findings from theory 
regarding development and disaster recovery.  
 
Having described the development of a conceptual framework for urban 
disaster resilience, the next chapter will present the methodological 
approach for this research, including how the conceptual framework will 
guide the research.  
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Chapter four 
Methodological approach  
 
 
Introduction 
This chapter addresses the question, ‘what is an appropriate methodology 
for analysing urban disaster resilience in low-income neighbourhoods?’ 
Firstly, it opens with an explanation of the meta-theories from which this 
research finds its grounding. Secondly, the overall research design is 
explained, including how each of the individual objectives have been met. 
Thirdly, a methodological framework is given for the types of data that 
were collected, the methods that were used for collection and the 
methods of analysis. Fourthly, a justification for utilising case studies is 
made, followed by an explanation of the case study selection. Fifthly, an 
explanation is given of how the analytical tool introduced earlier in 
Chapter Three assists with data analysis, specifically through the 
intersections between CAS and morphology. Sixthly, methods for 
validating the findings are discussed, first from the perspective of the case 
studies and then in terms of the generalisability of the conceptual 
framework. Finally, the chapter closes with an explanation of the strengths 
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and limitations of the study, and the ways in which the results will be 
disseminated.  
     
4.1 Meta-theories  
This section explains the research’s inductive approach and its 
epistemological underpinnings in interpretivistism.  
 
4.1.1. Inductive research approach 
This research takes a primarily inductive approach because it collects data 
with the intention of seeing what patterns emerge from it and what 
meanings can be extracted (Silverman, 2004).  An inductive approach 
creates space for ‘frequent’, ‘dominant’ and ‘significant’ themes to be 
identified within the raw data (Thomas, 2006, p.238). For example, case 
study data has been collected and significant patterns within it have been 
identified.  
 
4.1.2. Interpretivism 
The epistemological position of this research is interpretivist. The research 
is positioned in the belief that reality is made and remade by people, and 
therefore subjective (Mason, 2005). Within the interpretivism perspective 
there are three layers of interpretation: the first when individuals perceive 
reality; the second when the researcher interprets an individual’s 
perception of reality; and a third when the researcher’s understanding is 
interpreted through the concepts and theories used by his or her discipline 
(Mason, 2005).  
 
4.2 Research design   
This section aims to explain the research design and its links to the five 
objectives described in the introduction of this thesis. A research design is 
a logical structure of inquiry; it is a plan that systematically links the 
research questions with the evidence that is collected and analysed (Yin, 
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2014). It differs from a research method, which is the modality through 
which data are collected. The logic of the research design is not influenced 
by methods from which data is collected (Yin, 2014).  
 
This research design is qualitative. Yin defines qualitative research as, ‘a 
large body of research, embracing a variety of highly contrasting methods’ 
that study the meaning of people’s lives in real world conditions (2011, 
p.7). Based on the research question and aim, a qualitative approach was 
selected in order to explore, describe and explain urban disaster resilience 
through methods that are flexible, allow for data collection rich in detail 
and interpretive analysis that seeks to reflect participants’ perspectives 
(Creswell, 2007). The qualitative methods for research through a case 
study approach will be explained in the section 4.3 below.  
 
The structure of this research is guided by five objectives set out in the 
introduction. Collectively, the five objectives enable an answer to the 
research question: What is an appropriate approach for understanding 
urban disaster resilience in low-income settlements? The research 
question is the driving force for this study and was formulated after 
analysis of the research problem (related to challenges with rapid 
urbanisation and the increase in frequency and severity of disasters in 
cities) presented in the introduction.  
 
The first objective, to develop a conceptual framework for urban disaster 
resilience, was achieved through a literature review undertaken in Chapter 
Two, which resulted in a synthesis of systems and morphology approaches 
that formed the basis of the conceptual framework presented in Chapter 
Three.  
 
The second objective, the development of a methodology, is developed 
and explained in subsequent sections of this chapter. The third objective, 
to apply the methodology to a case study, is carried out at a city-scale in 
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Chapters Five and Six (analysis of Bangkok), then again at a neighbourhood 
scale in Chapters Seven, Eight and Nine (analysis of three 
neighbourhoods).  
Objective four, to propose dimensions of urban disaster resilience, is 
described in Chapter Ten, when key dimensions of resilience are 
identified. Objective five – to validate and revise the conceptual 
framework and key findings – is presented in Chapter Eleven when 
methods of validation are discussed. A graphic of the research design and 
process is shown below in Figure 4.2. 
Having explained the research design and the ways in which the research 
objectives logically correspond with the chapters, the next section 
discusses the types of data required, methods for collection and methods 
for analysis.  
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Figure 4.2: An overview of research design demonstrates how each chapter 
contributes to the fulfillment of a research objective. Source: the author 
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4.3 Research methods 
This section explains the methodological framework used to explore urban 
disaster resilience within the case studies. Firstly, the required data types 
are outlined. Secondly, the methods for data collection are described and 
justified. Thirdly, methods of data analysis are explained.  
  
4.3.1 Data types  
Different types of data including visual data, documents and observations 
were used to triangulate information in order to confirm reliability 
(Bryman, 2008). Primary data (data gathered by the researcher) and 
secondary data (data gathered from other reputable sources, 
organisations or institutions) were used in the research. The types of 
primary information required included perceptions of risk, vulnerability 
and capacity. It also included perceptions of development and disaster 
related activities as well as relationships within the neighbourhood and 
external to the neighbourhood.  
 
Secondary information gathered included maps that recorded public open 
spaces major and minor transportation networks, rivers and canals, land 
use, building use, flood impact and topographical/elevation levels. 
Photographs provided by neighbourhood residents who had recorded the 
flood and its impact were also analysed. Neighbourhood plans of housing 
registration, land sharing agreements, drainage and electricity lines as well 
as pedestrian lanes and alleyways were analysed. Housing models used to 
support the incremental home upgrading were also reviewed. In the case 
of documentation, three academic theses on the Bang Bua Canal were 
reviewed covering topics including, social capital and participatory 
upgrading (Archer, 2009); place making and participatory upgrading 
(Wungpatcharapon, 2012); and architecture for poorer urban people 
(Supitcha, 2010). Journal articles about the Bang Bua Canal were also 
analysed alongside a number of student research projects that were 
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published online. The author’s notes from participant observations and 
journals entries were also included for analysis.    
4.3.2 Methods of data collection 
Six methods for collecting data were used, which were: 1.) participatory 
appraisal tools; 2.) semi-structured interviews, including those with key 
informants; 3.) focus group discussions (FGDs); 4.) workshops; 5.) 
participant observation; and 6.) journal entries. Table 4.3.2a summarises 
the types of methods and number of participants engaged in each. A 
summary of how each methods was used is explained below. A ‘purposive 
sampling’ approach was taken when selecting participants for the research 
with the aim of seeking samples of participants who will advance the goals 
of the research and assist the research question to be answered (Bryman, 
2008).  
1. Participatory appraisal tools
Many development and humanitarian actors favour participatory appraisal 
tools because of a ‘bottom up’ approach to data collection whereby local 
people are viewed as experts, and priority is given to their views and 
perceptions (Pretty et al., 1995; World Bank, 2013; Chambers, 1994). The 
key tenets are participation, flexibility, triangulation, and mutual learning 
between researcher and community (IFRC, 2007b). In order to gain an 
overview of each neighbourhood, the research used five participatory 
tools to collect spatial, social and political data, namely transect walks, 
household vulnerability assessment, timelines, historical profiling and 
Venn diagrams, each of which is explained below.  
a. Transect walk: A transect walk with neighbourhood residents
allowed the researcher to observe a slice of each ‘zone’ or area of
the neighbourhood to get a feel of the physical environment and
the social relationships within in (Geilfus, 2008).  One transect walk
was done per neighbourhood, and was lead by local residents.
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b. Historical profile: A historical profile was used to track changes in
the social, political, economic and physical context in order to shed
light on causal links between the changes. Historical tracing asks
individuals or groups to begin with current experiences and to go
back in time (IFRC, 2007b). One historical profile was done for each
neighbourhood, and was lead by local residents.
c. Venn diagrams: A diagram of circles was drawn to represent
different actors and their influence based on the size of the circle
and its position in relation to other circles. The activity was used to
understand relationships between actors and institutions as well as
their similarities and differences (Chambers, 2002). One Venn was
done by two leaders.
d. Household vulnerability assessment: Used as a means for
neighbourhood residents to self identify levels of vulnerability in
the community through the collective creation of criteria (IFRC,
2007b), considering physical, social, economic and political aspects
of vulnerability. One assessment was done for each neighbourhood
with eight people participating overall.
e. Timeline: Timelines were drawn to depict events that occurred in
the 2011 flood. Participants drew a line on paper and indicated
with words and pictures, the events that occurred during a specific
time frame (Theis and Grady, 1991). One timeline was done for
each neighbourhood with eight people participating overall.
2. Semi-structured interviews with key informants
Semi-structured interviews, where open ended questions are asked so 
that the issues raised by the interviewee can be followed upon (IFRC, 
2007b), were used as a data collection method. Interviews covered broad 
topics including the history of the area, development processes that 
occurred before the flood and the types of activities that took place in the 
neighbourhood during and after the flood.  
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Semi-structured interviews were conducted with key informants. A key 
informant is defined in this research as someone who has an opinion or 
perception of the case under study (de Vaus, 2001), and can provide 
valuable information about the construction of their social reality 
(Bryman, 2008).  
In total, 141 semi-structured interviews were undertaken. Of these, 50 
were with key informants. Interviewees were drawn from one of the 
following six groups: aid agencies (international and local, UN agencies), 
26 interviews undertaken; journalists, one interview undertaken; 
academics/think tanks, six interviews undertaken; business people, three 
interviews undertaken; the government (at various levels), nine interviews 
undertaken; and key people from each of the three case studies (four of 
the neighbourhood leaders were interviewed and categorised under the 
non-neighbourhood key informants list in order to protect their identity). 
A total of 91 semi-structured interviews were undertaken with people 
from the three neighbourhoods. A complete list of the key informants is 
included in Appendix A. The questions used in the semi-structures 
interviews are included in Appendix B. A sample of the interview 
transcriptions is included in Appendix C (the remaining transcripts are 
appended to this thesis in a CD). The literature review in Chapter Two 
informed the choice of key informants by identifying key groups of people 
who make decisions in the city and hold different degrees of power.  
To protect the identity of key informants, a coding system was used. 
Neighbourhood residents from Bang Bua Neighbourhood for example 
have been coded ‘BB’ followed by a number e.g. BB1, BB2, BB3 and so on. 
The same system has been applied to key informants from Saphan Mai 
using ‘SM’ as the code followed by a number e.g. SM1, SM2, SM3 etc. and 
in Roi Krong the code used is ‘RK’ and a number e.g. RK1, RK2, RK3 etc. 
Non-neighbourhood key informants have been coded ‘KI’ followed by a 
number e.g. KI1, KI2, KI3 and so on. At times the neighbourhood leaders 
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are also identified as KI to protect their identity. The abbreviation is always 
accompanied by a descriptive titled that indicates the key informant’s 
general background (such as government or aid agency) as well as their 
gender.  
3. Focus group discussions
Focus group discussions (FGDs) are small groups of knowledgeable people 
who gather together to discuss a common theme (Creswell, 2007). FGDs 
can be more relaxed than one-to-one interviews, and are useful for 
checking tentative conclusions (Marshall and Rossman, 2011). In this 
research FGDs were used as a way to collect information and identify 
problems. In total, seven FGDs took place; five in the neighbourhoods 
(three in Bang Bua Neighbourhood, one in Saphan Mai and one in Roi 
Krong); one with a large lending institution and one with a local aid agency 
in order to explore key aspects of development work in the 
neighbourhoods as well as prevention, response and recovery during the 
2011 floods. FGDs were also undertaken to validate findings (one FGD per 
neighbourhood, which will be discussed in section 4.6 (Methods of 
Validation) in this chapter). A sample of focus group discussion questions 
and transcripts are included in Appendix D. Transcripts of all FGDs 
undertaken can be found in the CD appended to the hard copy of this 
thesis.   
4. Participant observation
Participant observation was used as a tool to gain a more complete 
understanding of the neighbourhoods and the relationships in them. PRA 
tools were used for data collection and analysis by engaging participants in 
activities that communicated opinions and perceptions, in order to 
identify key capacities and vulnerabilities. Conclusions reached through 
the use of other tools were triangulated with participant observation 
(Geilfus, 2008).  
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5. Workshops
Following the data collection and analysis, three workshops were held 
with 69 participants to validate the conceptual framework and 
accompanying analytical tool (described below in section with a range of 
actors, including urban professionals (planners, architects and real estate 
developers) academics and aid workers. The workshops aimed to validate 
the generalisability of the conceptual framework and analytical tool with 
other international case studies, and are discussed further in section 4.5 
(Analytical tool) in this chapter.  
6. Journal
A daily and weekly journal was kept in order to track activities, lessons 
learned and reflections about the research. A diary is helpful in identifying 
re-occurring themes. 
Method Number Participants 
Participatory 
appraisal tools 
(Clermont et al.) 
a. Transect walk
b. Historical profile
c. Venn diagrams
d. Household
vulnerability
assessment
e. Timeline
a. 3 (1 per
neighbourhood)
b. 3 (1 per
neighbourhood)
c. 1 Venn diagram
d. 3 (1 per
neighbourhood)
e. 3 (1 per
neighbourhood)
a. 6 neighbourhood leaders/
upgrading
leaders/committee
members
b. 9 older people in the
neighbourhood
c. 2 leaders
d. 8 committee members
and residents
e. 8 committee members
and residents
Semi-structured 
interviews 
141 a. 50 with key informants
b. 91 with residents
FDGs 7 58 residents (36 from Bang 
Bua Neighbourhood, 9 from 
Sapham Mai, 13 from Roi 
Krong) 
Participant 
observation 
Daily Hundreds 
Workshops 3 workshops 69 participants from 15 
countries 
Journal Daily N/A 
Table 4.3.2a: A summary of the types of methods, number of participants and 
frequency of use (where appropriate). 
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4.3.3 Methods of data analysis  
Two primary methods of data analysis were employed. The first method, 
morphological analysis, was based upon the four layers of morphology 
used in the conceptual framework (Chapter Three), namely topography, 
roads and open spaces, plots, and buildings and services. Morphological 
analysis assists with understanding the inter-relationships between social, 
economic, historical, cultural, political and spatial aspects of a city (Bolio 
Arceo, 2012). The methodology is inter-disciplinary and reflects that fact 
that a city can be ‘read’ by its physical form (Moudon, 1997). Moudon 
writes that urban morphology is a globally proven methodology that has 
been applied in North America and Europe, but has yet to be used more 
widely in other regions of the world (1997).  
 
In this research, three key types of data were collected to assist with 
morphological analysis, namely maps, photographs and historical data. 
The types of maps included topographical, aerial, geographic information 
systems (GIS) and satellite imagery, which reflected the historical 
transformation of Bangkok, the recent upgrades of neighbourhoods in the 
Bang Bua Canal and the impact of the 2011 flood. Photographs were also 
collected. In particular, photographs of the Bang Bua canal and its houses 
before and after the flood were gathered, alongside photographs of the 
types of activities that took place during the three-month flood period. A 
range of documents were reviewed and analysed to construct an 
understanding of the historical context of Bangkok and the Bang Bua 
Canal. This included theses, government documentation (written policies 
and laws). Project reports, rapid assessments and programme evaluations 
from aid agencies were also analysed in order to understand gaps in the 
flood response and recovery process.  
 
The second method of analysis used was coding using NVivo software, 
which facilitates in-depth qualitative data analysis. Categories for analysis 
were developed based on the conceptual framework. For example, 
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morphological categories (topography, movement networks and public 
open spaces, plots and buildings and services) and CAS categories 
(economic, governance and social) were created. Information that fits into 
those categories was coded accordingly. Information that did not fit into 
those categories such as who was the most vulnerable was coded into 
separate categories, such as ‘most vulnerable’ in this example. Analysis of 
key informant interviews, FGDs, journal entries, PRA activities, participant 
observations and workshop notes was undertaken using NVivo software. 
The coding was organised by neighbourhood, differentiating between pre-
flood and post-flood data, with links between how one affects the other. 
The analysis sought to identify patterns and trends as well as links and 
causations.  
 
Although the researcher speaks a basic level of Thai, additional translation 
was required to navigate the complexities of the research topic. Therefore, 
eight translators were hired to assist from a nearby local university in 
Bangkok. The translators asked interviewees questions in Thai and then 
translated their answers into English. Notes were then taken in English 
based upon the translation given and coded using NVivo software.  
 
4.4 Case study approach   
A case study approach has been selected in order to understand ‘complex 
social phenomena’ following a rigorous methodological design strategy 
(Yin, 2014, p.4). The case study approach is the primary methodology used 
for understanding urban disaster resilience in low-income settlements. 
The proposition for this research is that appropriate development 
investments in physical infrastructure and economic, social and 
governance systems will reduce disaster risk for low-income 
neighbourhoods. A case study approach highlights cases where the 
proposition worked and did not work while underscoring commonalities 
and differences in each case.  
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4.4.1. Rationale for using a case study approach  
A case study approach is taken when analysis of the sum of all the parts 
offers a fuller, more complex understanding within a context than analysis 
of any of the single parts could offer on their own (de Vaus, 2001). In a 
case study, the primary question is how well the researcher is able to 
generate theory out of its findings; the secondary question is whether the 
findings can be generalised (Yin, 2003). Theory-building case studies begin 
with a question and a basic proposition, and then look at cases to establish 
a more specific theory, set of propositions or findings (de Vaus, 2001). 
Then, the conceptual framework will be revised based on the cases 
studied. 
 
To these ends, three idiographic case studies were conducted to compare 
and contrast the unique features of each case based on the premise that 
the three case studies ‘epitomise a broader category of cases’ that are 
representative of the subject of enquiry (Bryman, 2008, p.56). Within the 
three cases there are many units of analysis at different levels, which 
makes it important to provide thorough descriptions that reconstruct the 
history of each case in order to lead to good explanations and a holistic 
analysis of the units (Yin, 2014). Case studies make use of a wide variety of 
data collection methods that best suit the different units of analysis (de 
Vaus, 2001). The criteria for judging the quality of a case study design 
includes construct validity (measuring a set of subjective criteria by using 
multiple sources and a chain of evidence); internal validity (matching 
patterns between cases); external validity (demonstrating how the 
findings can be generalised beyond the study); and reliability (showing 
how the study could be replicated) (Yin, 2014).  
 
4.4.2. Identification of a case study city 
This case study design involves the strategic selection of cases that use 
real world situations in order to understand urban disaster resilience. 
Some cases are selected because it is assumed they will provide support 
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for existing theories; others are chosen because they might disprove the 
proposition (de Vaus, 2001).  
 
Criteria for selecting a case study city for this research included: the 
presence of development work; exposure to disaster risk; a disaster event 
having taken place in living memory; and the existence of disaster 
management policies and procedures. As a result Bangkok, Thailand’s 
capital city was chosen due to the presence of low-income, vulnerable 
neighbourhoods engaged in poverty reduction work; the existence of 
disaster management laws and coordination mechanisms; the occurrence 
of the 2011 flood disaster; and the city’s continued exposure to flood risk.  
 
A map of Bangkok is shown below in Figure 4.4.2a. Informal settlements in 
Bangkok are host to everyday and chronic risks described in Chapter One – 
inadequate housing, no secure tenure, inadequate access to public 
services such as electricity and water and public infrastructure such as safe 
roads, public open spaces and health care facilities.  
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Figure 4.4.2a: A map of Bangkok, the capital city of Thailand. Source: the author 
adapted from the (Department of City Planning, 2014c) 
 
 
Bangkok is a low elevation coastal city (Philip, 2011) and is a national 
economic hub (Center for Excellence in Disaster Management and 
Humanitarian Assistance, 2015). While it has been a mostly stable 
democracy, the city has had recent periods of civil unrest from 2006 when 
former Prime Minister Thaksin Shinawatra was ousted in a military coup 
(Peel, 2014) until the time of writing when a military government was in 
place having taken over government on April 15, 2015 (BBC News, 2015).  
 
Bangkok has a strong civil society. According to the Asian Development 
Bank, ‘Thai civil society is now varied and diverse, and coexists with strong 
constitutional guarantees of direct political participation, freedom of 
assembly, requirements for government consultation, and local 
determination of community rights’ (2011, p.2). In 2007 the government 
enacted the National Disaster Prevention and Mitigation Act, which 
designates key roles and responsibilities for different government agencies 
in the case of a disaster. Bangkok also has high exposure to annual flood 
risk (World Bank, 2010). The city has experienced flooding in living 
memory, the most recent being the 2011 flood (Koontanakulvong, 2012). 
Exact numbers of local and international NGOs working in Thailand, and 
more specifically Bangkok, are difficult to come by as there is no 
mandatory centralised registration mechanism, but a small number of 
international aid agencies keep a presence alongside a wide range of civil 
society organisations (Asian Development Bank, 2011).  
 
4.4.3 Identification of case study neighbourhoods  
Three neighbourhood case studies were chosen in order to validate the 
basic proposition that good development builds disaster resilience. While 
all three neighbourhoods had been badly impacted by the 2011 flood, they 
varied in the degree of developmental gains obtained before the flood 
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occurred. The first neighbourhood was selected because it had 
experienced strong development gains; a second was chosen for having 
experienced some developmental gains. The third was chosen for having 
experienced little improvements. 
The area where the neighbourhood case studies were undertaken is the 
Bang Bua Canal, located in northwestern Bangkok. Bang Bua 
Neighbourhood (Bang Bua is the name of the canal and also of one 
neighbourhood in the canal. To avoid confusion the former will be 
referred to as the Bang Bua Canal and the latter as Bang Bua 
Neighbourhood), Saphan Mai Neighbourhood and Roi Krong 
Neighbourhood are geographically located in a similar area – a three-
kilometer stretch of land as illustrated in Figure 4.4.3a, and have been 
exposed to a range of economic, social and political development 
interventions.  
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Figure 4.4.3a: A satellite image of the Bang Bua Canal in northwestern 
Bangkok. The three neighbourhoods chosen as case studies are located along 
a three-kilometre stretch of canal. The neighbourhoods are Saphan Mai, Bang 
Bua Neighbourhood and Roi Krong. Source: (Department of City Planning, 
2014b) 
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Three neighbourhoods were chosen because they meet seven criteria 
developed for understanding disaster resilience in low-income 
neighbourhoods (listed in Table 4.4.3a below). All three neighbourhoods 
are deemed low-income (KI13, a senior member of an aid agency; KI14, a 
local aid worker KI37; a district government officer) based on the fact that 
most people earn less than two USD per day, meeting the first criterion. 
All neighbourhoods host informal governance structures associated with 
an incremental upgrading project (discussed in Chapters Five and Six), 
fulfilling the second criterion. The third criterion is that of informality, and 
all three neighbourhoods have been informal at one time, or are still 
regarded as so today. All three neighbourhoods fulfill the fourth criterion 
of having experienced a flood disaster in living memory when the 2011 
flood impacted them.  The fifth criterion of the presence of settlement 
upgrading is met through the existence of an upgrading programme that 
started in 2004. The sixth criterion of aid agency presence is met through 
the upgrading project. Finally, the criterion of having neighbourhood 
leaders present is fulfilled through formal government elections and 
informal leadership elections for upgrading. Table 4.4.3a below provides a 
summary of the criteria. 
Neighbourhood Case Study Selection Criteria 
Bang Bua 
Neighbourhood 
Saphan Mai Roi Krong 
Low-income (less than $2 per 
day) 
X X X 
Informal governance 
structures 
X X X 
Informal settlement X X X 
Flood disaster in living 
memory 
X X X 
Slum upgrading X X X 
Aid agency interventions X X X 
Neighbourhood leaders X X X 
Table 4.4.3a: Criteria for selecting neighbourhood case studies in Bangkok, 
Thailand. Source: the author 
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Using the above criteria, the researcher traveled to Bangkok in search of 
neighbourhoods to conduct the study in. She was introduced to the Bang 
Bua Canal through a university lecturer who had conducted thesis 
research there. The author made the decision to conduct her research in 
the canal due to a positive and welcoming response by leaders within the 
Bang Bua Canal and a perceived sense of trust between the researcher and 
canal leaders who agreed to participate in the research. 
The following section gives a summary of the three case study 
neighbourhoods, starting with the Bang Bua Neighbourhood, selected for 
its strong development gains; Saphan Mai for its more moderate 
development gains; and Roi Krong for its lesser gains.  
Case study one: Bang Bua Neighbourhood 
Bang Bua Neighbourhood is well known for its upgrading success, and is 
often visited by other researchers as a study of good practice. There are 
229 households, most of which have been reconstructed within three 
years based on a collaborative community vision and a series of land 
sharing negotiations amongst residents. The neighbourhood formed a 
legal cooperative and has a 90-year lease agreement on the land. Figure 
4.4.3b below shows a photograph of Bang Bua Neighbourhood in 2014. 
Figure 4.4.3b: A view of Bang Bua Neighbourhood. Source: the author 
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Case study two: Saphan Mai 
Saphan Mai took approximately 14 years to reconstruct its 106 
households. It has had modest development gains. Part of this community 
did not trust the upgrading process, entrenching it in a deadlock until the 
2011 flood occurred and trust was built during the flood response. Since 
then, the remaining 45 homeowners have been granted access to loans to 
reconstruct their homes, resulting in an upgrading rate of 100 per cent. 
Saphan Mai is also a legal cooperative and has a 90-year lease agreement 
on the land. Figure 4.4.3c below shows a photograph of Saphan Mai in 
2014 while upgrading processes were still underway. 
Figure 4.4.3c: A view of Saphan Mai. Source: the author 
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Case study three: Roi Krong 
Roi Krong has had the least development success of the three 
neighbourhoods. It is divided between those who participate in the 
upgrading scheme (approximately 40 per cent) and those who oppose it 
(approximately 60 per cent). The neighbourhood has 126 houses, and is a 
mix of affluent and low-income people. Opposition to the upgrading 
comes primarily from wealthy property ‘owners’ and those whose main 
source of income comes from room rentals. Many of the upgrading 
opponents say they are prepared to be evicted rather than give up income 
and land. Roi Krong has a cooperative but it is currently too small and too 
undersubscribed to be able to afford to rent the land. Figure 4.4.3d below 
shows a photograph of Roi Krong in 2014 where a small amount of 
upgrading had taken place. 
Figure 4.4.3d: A view of Roi Krong (houses on the left). Source: the author 
The author spent a total of seven weeks in Bangkok, between February 8 
and March 29 in 2014. Fieldwork was undertaken sequentially in each of 
the three neighbourhoods: 14 days in Bang Bua Neighbourhood, 14 days in 
Roi Krong and 14 days in Saphan Mai with one week to follow up on gaps 
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in information from all three neighbourhoods. Initial contacts were made 
via a Thai doctoral graduate who had also done research in the Bang Bua 
Canal. To assist in data gathering, the author hired eight Thai researchers 
who assisted in note taking and in translation (while the author speaks 
Thai having lived in Bangkok previously, her level of fluency was not 
always sufficient). The schedule used for engaging the eight translators is 
included in the CD appended to this thesis.  
4.5 Analytical tool 
The data analysis was structured using the analytical tool presented in 
Chapter Three. The tool presents economic, governance and social 
complex adaptive systems across the horizontal axis and the built and 
natural environment into four morphological layers on the vertical axis. 
Data is then plotted on the matrix. The intersections between CAS and 
morphology identify dimensions of resilience. The tool can also assist with 
identifying patterns of strengths, weaknesses, opportunities and threats 
through the plotting of data. The analytical tool is shown below in Figure 
4.5. 
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Figure 4.5: An analytical tool for understanding urban disaster resilience. Source: 
the author  
 
  
Chapter four: methodological approach 
Page 139 
4.6 Methods for validation 
Findings were tested for validity on two levels. Firstly, specific findings 
regarding urban disaster resilience in the three neighbourhood case 
studies were tested through respondent validation, a process whereby a 
researcher provides respondents with an account of her findings and seeks 
to corroborate them (Bryman, 2008). One FGD was held in each 
neighbourhood to ascertain the validity of each set of case study findings. 
Eight to 13 men and women from each neighbourhood (including people 
in leadership roles) attended each meeting: eight men and five women in 
Bang Bua Neighbourhood; one man and seven women in Saphan Mai; and 
four men and eight women in Roi Krong.  
Once validated, the findings in each neighbourhood were merged into a 
final list that was tested against the conceptual framework seeking to 
answer: are these findings representative of the theories and categories 
developed in the conceptual framework? This final check is that of internal 
validity, which seeks to match a researchers observations with the 
theoretical ideas they develop (Bryman, 2008). The conceptual framework 
was then adjusted based upon the evidence in the case studies. Table 4.6a 
below gives a visual depiction of the overall process and methods for 
validating findings specific to the case studies.  
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Findings on urban disaster 
resilience 
Method of validation 
1. Case study one: Bang Bua 
Neighbourhood 
Focus group discussion in Bang Bua  
2. Case study two: Saphan Mai  Focus group discussion in Saphan Mai 
3. Case study three: Roi Krong Focus group discussion in Roi Krong 
4. Consolidated findings Tested against the conceptual 
framework 
 
Table 4.6a: A table listing the findings from each case study on the left and the 
method for validation on the right. Source: the author 
 
The second level of testing focused on the generalisability of the 
conceptual framework and analytical tool. Testing the conceptual 
framework and analytical tool challenged the research’s external validity 
by attempting to generalise, which can be difficult for ‘qualitative 
researchers because of their tendency to employ case studies and small 
samples’ (Bryman, 2008, p.377).  
 
However, in an attempt to test generalisability, workshops were held with 
academics, urban professionals (urban planners and designers, architects) 
and aid workers to see how relevant and applicable the framework is for 
collecting and analysing information about urban disaster risk in cities 
around the world.  
 
The validation process took place with 69 participants from 15 countries. 
Workshops were held with postgraduate students and staff in two 
universities (Oxford Brookes University (OBU), where the researcher is a 
student, and the Norwegian University of Science and Technology (NTNU), 
where the researcher was a visiting student researcher) and with one aid 
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agency (the British Red Cross, (BRC)), identified as an active urban focused 
humanitarian agency through the literature review in Chapter Two.  
The two universities and the BRC are engaged in research and practice 
based activities related to development and disasters. Students were 
asked to apply the urban disaster resilience conceptual framework and 
analytical tool to their research and/or projects respectively which 
spanned across a total of 15 different case studies, 13 of which were 
linked to a development or disaster themes.  
Table 4.6b below provides a summary of the institution where the 
validation process took place, the number of participants, the nationalities 
of the participants, the department represented by the participants and 
the case studies used.  
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Institution Participants Nationalities Departments Case studies 
Norwegian 
University of 
Science and 
Technology 
(NTNU) 
8 PhD 
candidates 
4 Masters 
students 
1 Teaching 
Assistant 
1 University 
Professor 
Norwegian 
Canadian 
British 
German 
Ethiopian 
Columbian 
Austrian 
Malawian 
Architecture 
Planning & Urban 
Design 
Geography 
Urban ecological 
planning  
IDPs in Nigeria 
Vanuatu cyclone 
Favelas in Brazil  
Conflict in Yemen 
IDPs in Kenya 
Oxford 
Brookes 
University 
(OBU) 
7 PhD 
candidates 
16 Master 
students 
5 Professors 
Iranian 
British 
Filipino 
German 
Iraqi 
Indonesian 
Italian 
Brazil 
Kenya 
Architecture 
Planning and 
Design 
Real Estate 
Philippines 
typhoon 
Haiti earthquake 
Malawi floods 
Syrian refugees 
Norwegian fire 
disaster 
Bicycle lane 
planning 
Sustainability of 
non-residential 
buildings 
British Red 
Cross (BRC) 
27 people Unknown West and Central 
Africa, East and 
South East Asia, 
Middle East and 
North Africa 
(MENA), West 
Asia, 
Performance and, 
Accountability, 
International 
Law, 
Humanitarian 
Policy, Logistics, 
DRR, Health and 
care, Water and 
Sanitation 
Haiti earthquake  
Philippines 
typhoon 
South Sudan 
conflict  
Other case 
studies unknown 
Total 69 15 16 15 
Table 4.6b: A summary of the participants engaged in the validation process, 
including the institution, participants’ nationalities, department and case studies 
used. Source: the author 
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4.7 Dissemination of results  
The results of this study will be shared with participants, and more 
generally with people who are interested in the topic of urban disaster 
resilience. Dissemination to participants will occur through different 
channels for different groups of key informants. Each key informant who 
has indicated on the consent form that they would like an electronic copy 
of the thesis will be emailed one. The thesis will ensure to preserve the 
anonymity of every individual interviewed. A summary of research findings 
will be translated and shared with neighbourhood leaders. Journals will 
also be targeted to disseminate the research more broadly. Journals such 
as Environment and Urbanization, PLoS Currents: Disasters and Disaster 
Resilience in the Built Environment journals will be pursued. Table 4.8 
below summarises the types of products for dissemination in the left 
column, the groups that will be targeted in the centre and the method of 
delivery in the right column.  
 
Product for 
dissemination 
Target group Method of delivery  
Full thesis Individual key 
informants who 
indicated on their 
consent forms that 
they would like a 
copy of the thesis 
 Email soft copy 
 Hand deliver hard copy of a 
summary of research findings 
to neighbourhoods with 
assistance from translators  
 Dedicated research web pages 
such as ResearchGate  
Journal articles 
(English) 
Journals such as 
Environment and 
Urbanization, PLoS 
Currents: Disasters 
and Emerald’s 
Disaster Resilience 
in the Built 
Environment 
Submit articles  
 
Table 4.8: The types of products for dissemination are listed in the left column, 
the groups that have been targeted in the centre and the method of delivery in 
the right column. Source: the author 
 
Chapter four: methodological approach 
Page 144 
The author presented tentative findings at a conference, ‘Design for urban 
Disaster’, held at Harvard University in May 2014, and was subsequently 
invited to submit a chapter for an edited book, ‘Urban Disaster Resilience: 
New Dimensions from International Practice in the Build Environment’, 
which is due for publication in the USA in 2016.  
Limitations within the research are discussed later in Chapter 12, the 
concluding chapter, where the methodological approach of the research is 
reflected upon.  
Conclusion 
This chapter explained the methodological approach that was used to 
achieve the overall aim of developing a conceptual framework for 
understanding urban disaster resilience. By outlining a research strategy, 
this chapter aimed to answer the question, ‘What is an appropriate 
method for analysing disaster resilience within low-income 
neighbourhoods?’  
The chapter began with the meta-theories from which the research is 
grounded in. It explained the research is inductive because it collects data 
in order to extract patterns and meanings. It also explained that it is 
interpretivist, believing that reality is subjective because it is made and 
remade by people. The chapter then explained the research design as a 
logical structure of inquiry that systematically achieves the research 
objectives through the collection of evidence based on the research 
question. The research is qualitative in its design and is based on a case 
study approach that embraces many methods of data collection and 
analysis. The case study approach provides an opportunity to study real 
world conditions and the meanings people attach to their lives.  
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The chapter then explained the research methods used to understand 
urban disaster resilience. It highlighted the need for primary and 
secondary data to be collected through PRA, semi-structured interviews 
with key informants, FGDs, workshops, participant observation and journal 
entries. It then explained that data analysis was carried out through 
morphological analysis of physical data collected from sources such as 
maps, plans and observations of the built and natural environment. 
Coding, using NVivo software was also used to categorise economic, 
governance and social data.  
The chapter then discussed the case study approach, underscoring that 
the case study was chosen because it allows for investigations of complex 
social phenomena. Moreover, it highlights where the proposition worked 
and did not work by analysing commonalities and differences within the 
data. The proposition in this research is that good development 
investments reduce disaster risk. Three neighbourhoods in Bangkok were 
chosen for study based on seven criteria, including that they were all 
affected by a flood in 2011, were all deemed low-income and had 
exposure to the same development opportunities with different 
outcomes. The three neighbourhoods were chosen because they were 
thought to both disprove and support the proposition.  
The chapter then explained that an analytical tool was developed to 
compliment the conceptual framework. The tool assisted with data 
analysis by enabling data to be plotted on CAS and morphological layers. 
The intersections between CAS and morphology identify dimensions of 
urban disaster resilience. The chapter then explained the process of 
validating its findings. Validity was tested at two levels; first at the 
neighbourhood level through a focus group discussion in each 
neighbourhood in order to test the findings and second, the 
generalisability of the conceptual framework and analytical tool. The 
validation of the conceptual framework and tool involved 69 participants 
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from 15 countries. Workshops were held with two universities and one aid 
agency whereby the framework and tool were applied to 15 case studies. 
The chapter closed with an explanation of how the study results will be 
disseminated, in particular through journal articles, emailing the full thesis 
to key informants who wish to receive a copy and sharing a hard copy with 
the neighbourhoods delivered by the research assistants.  
 
The next chapter analyses chronic stresses in the Bang Bua Canal using the 
conceptual framework introduced in Chapter Three.  
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Chapter five 
A systems and morphological 
analysis of chronic stresses in 
Bangkok and the Bang Bua Canal 
 
 
Introduction  
This chapter uses the theories from the conceptual framework introduced 
in Chapter Three to conduct analysis of the historical transformation of 
everyday risks in in the Bang Bua Canal, specifically in the three 
neighbourhood case studies introduced in Chapter Four. As with the 
conceptual framework, this chapter is structured according to four 
morphological layers: topography; movement networks and public open 
spaces; plots; and buildings and services.  
 
Firstly, the topography layer explains the Bang Bua Canal’s historical 
transition from an agricultural history dependent upon regular flooding to 
a market-driven present day that attempts to contain natural flood 
processes. Secondly, the movement networks and public open spaces 
layer explains the historical transformations of streets, roads and other 
mobility networks influenced by economic opportunities and historical 
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political battles for power. Thirdly, the plots layer interrogates the 
dramatic ways in which neighbourhood and individual plots along the 
canal have changed through an incremental housing and land upgrading 
programme facilitated by a local aid agency. The final morphological layer, 
buildings and services, explains the role of informal activities and formal 
planning regulations that shaped housing density and access to services, 
amongst other things. Importantly, each layer interrogates the ways in 
which economic, governance and social systems influence the built and 
natural environment prior to the 2011 flood, essentially asking, what 
development activities reduced everyday risks?  
This chapter therefore analyses the Bang Bua Canal and its struggle to 
exist in the face of eviction. The aim of analysing the canal’s overall 
physical and natural environment in relation to economic, governance and 
social systems is to identify patterns of systemic vulnerabilities and 
capacities that contribute to building and reducing the impact of everyday 
risks. 
Introduction to the Bang Bua Canal 
The section of the Bang Bua Canal bordered by Phahonyothin and Chaeng 
Wattana Road (see Figure 5.0b), at approximately three kilometers long, is 
host to 12 neighbourhoods with an estimated population of 17,000 people 
(Wungpatcharapon and Tovivich, 2012b). Situated on the northwest side 
of Bangkok, the canal straddles the administrative border between Bang 
Khen and Lak Si district governments. There are seven communities in 
Bang Khen district and five in the Lak Si district. The map of Bangkok’s 
municipal boundaries shown below in Figure 5.0a illustrates Bang Khen 
District on the right and Lak Si on the left. Figure 5.0b indicates the 
location of each neighborhood along the canal. 
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Figure 5.0a: A map of Bangkok indicating the location of the Bang Bua Canal 
straddles two administrative districts: Lak Si on the left and Bang Khen on the 
right. Source: BMA (Department of City Planning, 2013d) 
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Figure 5.0b: A map of the Bang Bua Canal, depicting Saphan Mai at the bottom, 
Bang Bua neighbourhood in the middle and Roi Krong neighbourhood at the top. 
Source: (Department of City Planning, 2014b) 
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5.1 Topography layer 
This layer analyses the natural landscape of Bangkok, seeking to 
demonstrate the ways in which the land and water have changed over 
time. The analysis aims to show that historical Bangkok has a 
topographical pre-disposition to flooding thereby creating a complex web 
of risk and exposure in present day Bangkok.  
 
5.1.1 Agricultural economy   
Bangkok is rooted in an agricultural past of rice farming (Roachanakanan, 
1999), and became the capital of Thailand in 1767 (Webster, 2004). Much 
of the delta city is below sea level (World Bank, 2010), with some parts as 
low as -1.5 meters (Philip, 2011). This results in seasonal flooding, which 
was traditionally utilised in annual rice farming. In 1953 Bangkok covered 
67 square kilometers, and the area where the Bang Bua Canal was located 
was surrounded entirely by rice fields (Roachanakanan, 1999). One elderly 
woman from Saphan Mai Neighbourhood recalls that in the 1950s land 
use was dominated by rice farming. She said, ‘We were very poor when I 
grew up here. The rice farmers were rich. My father worked for one … The 
walkways were mud. I used to take my shoes off a lot’ (SM8, 2014).  
 
The elevation map of Bangkok in Figure 5.1.1a below indicates elevation 
levels within Bangkok as low as -1.3 meters (lighter shade) and as high as 
3.7 meters (darker shade). The Bang Bua Canal is historically less prone to 
flooding due to its location on the edge of the higher elevation zone.  
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Figure 5.1.1a: An elevation map of Bangkok with the locations of the neighbourhoods 
depicted. Neighbourhood one is Bang Bua neighbourhood. Neighbourhood two is 
Saphan Mai. Neighbourhood three is Roi Krong. Source: (Department of City Planning, 
2013a). 
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Throughout Bangkok’s history, its canals were used in a variety of ways, 
such as, as a domestic water source, a method of irrigating paddy fields 
and as a means of transportation (Roachanakanan, 1999). In the 20th 
century, existing canals were maintained and new ones were built. In 
1902, King Rama V established the ‘Canals Department’ to conduct canal 
maintenance for transportation and storage of agriculture products (Royal 
Irrigation Department, 2015).  
 
In 1914, King Rama VI replaced it with the ‘Barges Department’ in order to 
focus on irrigation works (Royal Irrigation Department, 2015). Later, in 
1927, King Rama VII focused on new canal excavation, water distribution 
and water pumping for cultivated land under the auspices of a new ‘Royal 
Irrigation Department’, which remained operational at the time of writing 
(Royal Irrigation Department, 2015). Over the years, new canals were 
accompanied by dikes and levees designed for flood prevention 
(Roachanakanan, 1999). The government map in Figure 5.1.1b below 
identifies canals that exist in present day Bangkok. 
 
When Bang Bua Canal residents were asked to recall the historical ways in 
which they interacted with the canal and surrounding land for this 
research, older interviewees who were children between the mid 1930s to 
the early 1950s described a time when people relied on the canal for a 
daily subsistence diet of shrimp and fish (BB14, an elderly woman; RK29, 
an elderly man; RK31, an elderly man; SM17, an elderly man). The 1968 
historical map of Bangkok in Figure 5.1.1c below reflects that the area 
around Bang Bua Canal was a primarily rural landscape with rice fields and 
forests. The black dots indicate few houses existed along the canals.  
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Figure 5.1.1b: A map of the rivers, canals and waterways in present day Bangkok. 
Neighbourhood 1 is Bang Bua. Neighbourhood 2 is Saphan Mai. Neighbourhood 3 is Roi 
Krong. Source: (Department of City Planning, 2013c) 
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The major roads and highways however, have remained the same as what 
is reflected on the 1968 map in Figure 5.1.1c below. During that time, 
people from provinces outside of Bangkok began to migrate to the Bang 
Bua Canal in search of jobs and an improved quality of life. An 88 year-old 
man from Roi Krong remembers moving to the area as a young child so his 
father could take up a job as a gardener at Phranakhon Rajabhat 
University that shares a property line with the canal (RK29). In more 
recent years, people evicted from other areas of Bangkok have also 
migrated to the area (Wungpatcharapon, 2012).  
 
Modernisation and rapid economic growth accompanied by a lack of 
environmental regulations or the implementation of regulations left the 
Bang Bua Canal heavily polluted with large amount of rubbish lining the 
water, untreated sewerage and grey water draining into the canal as well 
as other toxic agents.  
 
According to key informant interviews and focus group discussions with 
middle-aged and elderly people in the canal (BBFGD1, BBFGD2, BB1, BB13, 
BB9, BB10), the relationship between canal residents and the natural 
environment gradually changed; today it is no longer possible to rely on 
the canal for drinking or bathing water, nor is it safe to eat the fish or 
shrimp due to high levels of toxins. In a meeting with the central 
government’s Ministry of Natural Environment, several community leaders 
(BBFGD1) identified 1989 as a point in time when they themselves realised 
the canal had became dirty, that buildings had overtaken the prevalence 
of rice fields and that subsistence food production stopped.   
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Figure 5.1.1c: A 1968 map of Bangkok reflects a primarily rural landscape with vast 
rice fields. Black dots indicate few houses existed along the canals, including the 
Bang Bua Canal. Major roads and highways have remained the same. A black arrow 
indicates the Bang Bua Canal. Source: (Royal Thai Survey Department, 1968) 
Source: (Royal Thai Survey Department, 1968)  
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5.1.2 The politics of water management  
Over the years, Bangkok’s natural environment has been shaped by 
systems of governance networks that have increased exposure to floods. 
For example, a significant number of canals, historically built as 
transportation means, are now home to poorer people encroaching on 
canal banks or have been filled with land and turned into roads (UNESCAP, 
2014). Urbanisation has decreased the percentage of permeable surfaces 
that can absorb rainfall. Decades of weak urban planning and lack of 
enforcement of land use regulations has led to uncontrolled growth of 
under-serviced neighbourhoods such as informal settlements (UNESCAP, 
2014).  
 
Upstream from Bangkok, integrated watershed management has been 
neglected; deforestation and wetland destruction has occurred, all of 
which impact the natural environment within Bangkok (UNESCAP, 2014; 
World Bank, 2012b). The shift from a primarily agricultural nation to a 
more industrial one has led to two competing water management 
challenges, namely water storage during the dry season and flood 
minimisation during the wet season (Haraguchi and Upmanu, 2014) in 
urban centres.  
 
Water storage was particularly important to politics when in 2011 
President Yingluck's Pheu Thai Party won the national election with a rice-
buying subsidy scheme that eventually accumulated US$4.46 billion (GBP 
2.9 billion) in losses and President Yingluck’s own impeachment in 2015 
(Aljazzera, 2015; BBC, 2015a). The rice scheme saw the government 
purchasing rice from farmers at higher than global market prices, resulting 
in stockpiles of rice and damage to Thailand’s rice exports (BBC, 2015b).  
 
The rice scheme was significant because the Shinawatra family (Thanksin 
then his sibling Yingluck) has been in power since 2001, and are ‘hugely 
popular among Thailand's rural poor, but are hated by an urban and 
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middle-class elite who accuse them of corruption and abuse of power’ 
(BBC, 2015a, np).  
 
Climate change, rising sea levels, coastal and soil erosion, as well as 
shifting clay soil are all modern ecological threats that suggest Bangkok’s 
exposure to flood risk will continue to grow (Philip, 2011). Since the 
establishment of Bangkok, the city has faced exposure to high tides, storm 
surges, heavy rainfall and riverine flooding (UNESCAP, 2014). Bangkok’s 
largest river, the Chao Phraya, decreases in depth as it moves 
downstream, which makes the land around it more prone to flooding 
(Haraguchi and Upmanu, 2014).  
 
Urban growth and infrastructure has replaced former natural waterways 
and wetlands, and developers and planners alike have failed to prepare for 
persistent and reoccurring flooding (Philip, 2011). Moreover, Bangkok is a 
natural drainage basin for water running from the northern mountains 
towards the sea. Severe floods have been recorded in Bangkok since 1785 
(Aon Benfield, 2012).  
 
Table 5.6 below provides a list of historical floods compiled by the 
Bangkok Metropolitan Authority (BMA), which shows that flooding occurs 
frequently at a once-in-30-years and a once-in-10-years scale. The losses 
recorded are from within Bangkok alone and have not been adjusted for 
inflation or economic growth.  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Chapter five: analysis of chronic stresses in Bangkok and the Bang Bua Canal 
 
 
 Page 160 
Year Flood description Economic 
Cost (THB) 
Economic 
Cost  
(USD) 
1785 4.25 meter flood height N/A N/A 
1819 3.20 meter flood height N/A N/A 
1831 Floodwaters reached the top of protective 
walls 
N/A N/A 
1917 All roads underwater for at least one 
month 
N/A N/A 
1942 1.50 meter flood height for two months N/A N/A 
1975 Floods caused by tropical depression 1.1 billion 36.2 million  
1980 Four days of excessive rainfall; 
widespread flooding 
700 million 23.1 million  
1982 Heavy rainfall prompts flooding 1.1 billion 36.2 million  
1983 3-5 months of flooding due to multiple 
cyclones 
6.6 billion 217.5 million 
1995 Chao Praya measured 2.27 meters above 
sea level 
3.0 billion 98.8 million 
1996 Water levels reach 2.14 meters; dike 
overflowed 
1.5 billion 49.4 million 
 
Table 5.1.2: An adaptation by the author from the Bangkok Metropolitan 
Authority cited in Aon Benfield, 2012 of the historical flood events in Thailand. 
Source: the author 
 
 
Thailand is exposed to a number of natural hazards, which as well as flood 
includes typhoons, tropical storms, landslides and tsunamis. Thailand’s 
policy environment for disaster management stems from two key laws: 
the National Economic and Social and Development Board (NESDB) Act 
enacted in 1978 and the Disaster Prevention and Mitigation (DPM) Act 
enacted in 2007 (ADPC, 2013a; ASEAN Inter-Parliamentary Assembly, 
2012).   
 
The first law provides advisory services to the prime minster and cabinet 
on issues relating to social and economic development. The second law 
focuses on disaster management planning and response in Thailand 
through the establishment of the Department of Disaster Prevention and 
Mitigation (DDPM) under the Ministry of Interior. The DDPM has 18 
regional centres and 76 Disaster Preparedness and Mitigation Provincial 
Officers, and works with policies created by the National Committee on 
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Disaster Prevention and Mitigation, which serves as the policy making 
body for disaster management, chaired by the Prime Minister and 
comprised of members from ministries and government agencies (ASEAN 
Inter-Parliamentary Assembly, 2012).  
 
Gaps in the laws identified by the ASEAN inter-parliamentary Assembly in 
a report titled Thailand: Country Report on Disaster Management (2012) 
include a lack of specific operational procedures and holistic approaches 
to disaster management at all levels; a shortage of budget and basic 
equipment; a lack of research; a lack of integration and cooperation 
amongst agencies.  
 
5.1.3 Social connectedness 
After years of living alongside the Bang Bua Canal, a relationship of 
dependence by its dwellers on the natural environment grew. Although 
most of the neighbourhood key informants complained about the high 
levels of environmental pollution that exist today, a significant number of 
fish farms can be found in the canal and poorer respondents still 
supplement their diet with Morning Glory, a plant that grows within the 
canal. 
 
When eviction threatened to break existing social connections a large 
number of people fought to stay in the canal, citing a sense of rootedness 
and belonging. As one middle-aged woman said: ‘People don’t want to 
leave the canal because for many of us our parents grew up here, and so 
did we. Years of memories were made here, and we don’t want to leave 
those behind. We work here, take our kids to school here, and go to the 
temple here. We don’t like apartment style living. We don’t want to go’ 
(BB2, 2014). 
 
Memories also influenced the way people from the Bang Bua Canal 
perceive flood risk. Most people from the canal remember one flood in 
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the early 1980s that lasted for a few days. Since flooding has occurred only 
once in living memory, most people in the canal did not perceive flooding 
as a high risk before the 2011 flood.   
 
The significant historical changes to land and water in the topography 
section demonstrate that Bangkok was built on an agricultural economy. 
Moreover, systems of governance created for managing water add an 
additional dimension of flood risk through the potential for human error. 
The analysis also showed that after decades of living next to the Bang Bua 
Canal, local people became dependent on the natural environment of the 
canal.  
 
5.2 Movement networks and public open spaces 
This section explores first the historical transformations of mobility 
networks and second, the evolution of public open spaces in the Bang Bua 
Canal. When examining the historical transformation of movement 
networks it is useful to start with the fall of the previous capital of 
Thailand – Ayutthaya. Ayutthaya, the previous capital city of the Siamese 
Kingdom that existed from the mid 14th to the mid 18th century, was 
attacked by the Burmese in the mid 1760s (Roachanakanan, 1999). After 
the fall of Ayutthaya, Bangkok became the new capital in 1767, prompting 
the need for greater municipal security and economic trade freedom. 
Investments in mobility infrastructure were henceforth made with the first 
railway introduced in 1893, a tram service in 1894 and motor vehicles in 
1902 (Roachanakanan, 1999).  
 
In 1895, a railway was built parallel with the Bang Bua Canal, and only two 
kilometers away from it (Roachanakanan, 1999). The line was used to 
transport goods and passengers from Bangkok to its northern cities, 
particularly Ayutthaya, the previous capital of Thailand. In 1914, the 
Ministry of Defense established the Don Mueang Airport, and its first air 
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defense (Roachanakanan, 1999), a mere six kilometers away from the 
Bang Bua Canal. In 1928 the airport served as both military and civilian 
infrastructure (Roachanakanan, 1999), and in 1952 the Don Mueang 
Airport became an international flight hub (Roachanakanan, 1999). 
Phaholyothin Road, the largest roadway built during the 1930s, was built 
in parallel with the railway and only two kilometres away from it 
(Roachanakanan, 1999).  
 
The map in Figure 5.2a below provides a historical perspective of mobility 
networks in Bangkok in 1968. The railway line, Phaholyothin Road and 
Chaeng Watthana Road are annotated as ‘hard surface roads with two 
lanes or more’. Small roadways with ‘loose ground’ are also indicated next 
to the railway line. There are two military bases, a university, a temple and 
an international airport nearby. As the legend indicates, much of the 
surrounding land was a rice field.  
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Figure 5.2a: A historical perspective of mobility networks in Bangkok. Rice fields are 
abundant amongst road and railway infrastructure. Source: (Royal Thai Survey 
Department, 1968) 
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Today, Bangkok can be divided into a street hierarchy of thanons (main 
streets), sois (side streets with vehicular access) and troks (pedestrian 
lanes) (Wungpatcharapon, 2012). Below is a photograph of Phaholyothin 
road, an eight-lane highway that crosses the Bang Bua Canal, shown in 
Figure 5.2b. Phaholyothin Road is the starting point for Roi Krong 
neighbourhood, barely two kilometres away from the airport.  
 
 
Figure 5.2b: A view of Phaholyothin Road, an eight-lane highway that crosses the 
Bang Bua Canal. Source: the author 
 
The focus of the mobility networks analysis is on pedestrian lanes, the only 
form of road within the Bang Bua Canal. The small pedestrian lanes in 
Bang Bua Neighbourhood are large enough to accommodate motorcycles. 
They are used for economic and social activities, and as is common with 
other such pedestrianised lanes in Bangkok, it is precisely here where 
‘hierarchy, ownership and access become ambiguous and the boundary 
between public and private becomes blurred’ (Wungpatcharapon, 2012, 
p.24). The use of pedestrian lanes and street networks changes based 
upon time of day or night. The various appropriations and occupations of 
space create tensions between authorities whose job it is to enforce 
spatial law and residents whose economic and social life depends on such 
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fluidity (Wungpatcharapon, 2012). Below, Figure 5.2c shows a selection of 
photographs that illustrate the pedestrian lanes that run through the Bang 
Bua Canal. All of the lanes are narrow but are able to accommodate small 
motorcycles. Some of the lanes have humps to prevent motorcycles from 
moving too quickly.  
 
 
Pedestrian lane in Bang Bua (case 1) 
 
Saphan Mai back alley way (case 2) 
 
 
Pedestrian lane in Roi Krong (case 3) 
 
Pedestrian lane under Phaholyothin Rd. 
bridge (case 3) 
 
 
General photo of roads in Bang Bua 
Canal 
 
General photo of roads in Bang Bua 
Canal 
 
Figure 5.2c: Types of roads within each neighbourhood. Source: the author 
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Public open spaces 
From a historical perspective, spaces in cities have served as social 
meeting spaces to share information; market places to exchange goods 
and services; and connection spaces through city streets (Gehl, 2007). 
Carmona et al. write that public open spaces should link to movement 
networks, and are particularly important in dense environments because 
they offer recreational activities, host special events and are a place for a 
‘city to breathe’ (Carmona, Heath and Tiesdell, 2003, p.188). In the Bang 
Bua Canal, public open spaces are used to share information and as 
market places. Two types of public open spaces common to the Bang Bua, 
and are discussed in this section – outdoor spaces connected to 
community centres and public open canal space. 
 
The community centres have public open spaces connected to them for 
people to freely enjoy. In Bang Bua Neighbourhood there is some exercise 
equipment and a small statue for worship outside the community centre. 
However, most open space over the canal is primarily used for building 
houses, which is further discussed in the building layer section (5.4). 
Photographs of the open spaces connected to community centres and the 
canal are pictured below in Figure 5.2d.  
 
 
Open public space at the Bang Bua 
Community Centre (case 1) 
 
Open space under the orange tent roof 
in Saphan Mai (case 2) 
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Figure 5.2d: Photographs of the public open spaces that exist within each of the 
three case studies. Source: the author 
 
 
 
 
Open space at a second community 
centre enclosed by a fence in Saphan 
Mai (case 2) 
 
 
Development of new open space in the 
process in Saphan Mai (case 2) 
 
Open space at the Roi Krong 
community centre (case 3) 
 
 
Open space at the Roi Krong under a 
highway bridge (case 3) 
 
 
Open canal space now occupied by 
housing (general photo of Bang Bua 
Canal) 
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5.2.1 A new international airport and economic opportunity  
The Don Muang airport’s global presence acted as an economic driver, 
rapidly populating the surrounding area with migrant workers, 
transforming paddy fields into highways and selling land for residential 
and commercial use. The areas around the Bang Bua Canal flourished with 
migrant workers looking for job opportunities that did not require 
specialist skill sets required to work in nearby factories, shopping centres, 
hotels, universities and the military. Today, many of those living along the 
canal are daily wage earners, such as vendors, labourers, shop assistants 
(Wungpatcharapon and Tovivich, 2012b), and to a lesser extent, 
government, military and office workers.  
 
Many of the pedestrian lanes throughout the Bang Bua Canal used to be 
small, winding roads where economic transactions occurred (KI30, 
architect). Today the roads have been widened in two out of three of the 
case studies – in Bang Bua Neighbourhood and Saphan Mai 
Neighbourhood. The lane has become the backbone of the 
neighbourhoods with smaller alleyways connecting to it. Vendors are able 
to sell a range of food and non-food items on the main lane. Some 
residents use the area to store goods such as recyclable bottles and cans. 
Others store vending carts outside their homes and sometimes open for 
business, depending on the time of day. Vendors benefit from the 
temporary arrangement because they do not have to pay rent or tax 
(Wungpatcharapon, 2012). A selection of photos in Figure 5.2.1a, Figure 
5.2.1b and Figure 5.2.1c below demonstrates the different economic uses 
of public open space.  
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Figure 5.2.1a: A vendor parks her tea 
and coffee cart on the pedestrian lane 
outside her home, and opens for 
business when customers arrive. 
Source: the author 
 
Figure 5.2.1b: Bottles and other 
recyclable goods are stored on the 
pedestrian lane. Source: the author 
 
Figure 5.2.1c: A vendor pushes a food cart through Bang Bua Neighbourhood 
(case study one). Source: the author 
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Public open spaces 
Open public spaces have also been used for economic gain in the canal. 
For example, fish farms have been set up in various locations in the canal 
pictured below in Figure 5.2.1d. Others go fishing in the canal to 
supplement their daily diet as shown in Figure 5.2.1e. In Saphan Mai, open 
public space has been taken over by a restaurant that caters to residents 
as show in Figure 5.2.1f and Figure 5.2.1g. The NGO World Vision Thailand 
(KI17, an aid worker) donated the tent covering the public open space. 
While some neighbours contest the use of this space for personal gain 
(SM11, SM12, SM14), the community leadership appears to accept it.  
 
  
Figure 5.2.1d: Fish farms are located 
against the canal wall on the right side 
of the photo. Source: the author 
 
Figure 5.2.1e: Residents fishing along 
the canal to supplement their diets. 
Source: the author 
 
  
Figure 5.2.1f: The public open space 
under the orange roof tent has been 
appropriated by a restaurant owner. 
Source: the author 
 
Figure 5.2.1g: The open public space 
under the orange roof hosts a food 
stall. Source: the author 
 
 
  
Chapter five: analysis of chronic stresses in Bangkok and the Bang Bua Canal 
 
 
 Page 172 
5.2.2 Political battles transform mobility networks and public open 
spaces  
After the fall of Ayutthaya and the establishment of Bangkok as the new 
capital of Thailand in 1767, a greater need for municipal security 
flourished. By the 1930s Bangkok was a military town surrounded by 
paddy fields (Roachanakanan, 1999). In 1933 a coup was staged and 
troops took over the airport. After that a second military camp was set up 
a few kilometers from the airport. Railway lines combined with large 
roadways provided the air force with the ability to completely control 
access to Bangkok from the north of Thailand (Roachanakanan, 1999). 
 
Public open spaces  
As noted above, much of the open space around the canal has been taken 
over by housing due to a lack of enforcement of planning laws. Today, the 
Bangkok Metropolitan Authority (BMA) considers the space along the 
Bang Bua Canal ‘open space’ but recognises that due to complex power 
dynamics, they are not able to enforce the regulations. Figure 5.2.2a 
below is a map of open spaces in Bangkok, as determined by the BMA. The 
map outlines five types of open space categories of which the Bang Bua 
Canal fits into the category of ‘open space for environment conservation 
along the roadside, riverfront and canal’.  
 
When asked about the contradiction between the map and reality, one 
key informant from the BMA (KI4, 2014) said, ‘We know slum dwellers live 
along the canals. We don't want them to stay. We try to remove them, but 
it's quite difficult. Elections play a big role in deciding the fate of the slums 
in terms of who stays and who goes.’ 
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Figure 5.2.2a:  A map of the official open spaces in Bangkok. The Bang Bua Canal is 
indicated on the map as open space, demonstrating the contraction between 
government master plans and reality. Neighbourhood 1 is Bang Bua. Neighbourhood 
2 is Saphan Mai. Neighbourhood 3 is Roi Krong. Source: (Department of City 
Planning, 2013b). 
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Despite the Bang Bua Canal being categorised formally as open space, 
district governments offer services such as waste collection and canal 
maintenance to the neighbourhoods, regardless of their formal tenancy 
status. Figure 5.2.2b below shows a waste collection system in Bang Bua 
where district government boats collect waste on a weekly basis. Figure 
5.2.2c shows government boats doing regular maintenance on the canals 
by clearing weeds.  
 
  
Figure 5.2.2b: Waste removal 
services available in Bang Bua 
neighbourhood (case one). Source: 
the author 
Figure 5.2.2c: Canal maintenance 
services provided by the government. 
Source: the author 
 
 
5.2.3 Social grounds for information sharing   
The pedestrian roads in the canal are places where social activities take 
place. For example, sometimes open spaces have been occupied for 
private use as outdoor sitting areas with a placement of a bench or even a 
couch, as picture in Figure 5.2.3 below. Residents also use the small lanes 
for parking their motorcycles on a temporary basis when they visit on 
another, which can also be seen in Figure 5.2.3. Over the years, 
improvements in the roads in the canal have led to a reported increase in 
safety and security as well as a reduction in conflict.  
 
Key informants from Bang Bua Neighbourhood also reported a significant 
decrease in the amount of drugs being traded in the area (BB3, a middle-
aged woman; BB11 an elderly woman). While other factors may have 
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influenced the perceived decrease, lighting and a more open public view 
of the roads were thought to play a role. The photo in Figure 5.2.3 below 
also shows lighting, humps to slow motorcycles down and loud speakers 
to make public announcements.  
 
 
 
Figure 5.2.3: Pedestrian roads in Bang Bua Neighbourhood are places for 
socialising and for temporarily parking motorcycles.  Lighting, humps and loud 
speakers contribute to overall safety.  Source: the author 
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Public open spaces 
Socialising and information sharing also occurs in open public spaces in 
the canal. For example, in the open spaces around the community centres 
people gather formally and informally. Sometimes while a meeting is 
taking place in a community centre, there are others meeting in the open 
space for private conversations. The playground area where adults go to 
watch their children play is also an important area and time of day for 
information sharing.  
 
5.3 Plots 
This section seeks to explain how a decade of incremental settlement 
upgrading transformed neighbourhoods and individual plots through a 
national Baan Mankong’s national ‘secure housing’ scheme. 
 
People who live next to the Bang Bua Canal have been squatting on land 
owned by the National Treasury Department (Wungpatcharapon and 
Tovivich, 2012b). Long-term canal residents (BBFGD1, BBFGD2, BB1, an 
elderly man, BB2, an elderly woman) spoke about a time in the early 1960s 
when people began illegally buying, selling or squatting on plots of land 
around the canal. The landowner, the Thai Government’s National 
Treasury Department, was unable to retain control over the sprawl of 
houses that sprung up. 
 
According to canal residents, rumours of eviction started in the late 1990s, 
but the most serious threat came in 1999 when the government 
announced plans to build a new road through the area. In a focus group 
discussion between neighbourhood leaders within the Bang Bua Canal and 
the National Department for the Environment (BBFGD1), canal leaders 
explained that houses built on the canal bank were blamed for flooding in 
areas nearby. Neighbourhood leaders explained that embankments in 
some areas were collapsing, causing the canal to become shallower, and 
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with permanent homes on the canal bank it was impossible to dredge and 
clear the canal (BBFGD1). Leaders also cited increasing levels of water 
pollution due to the practice of dumping untreated sewage and household 
wastewater directly into the canal as another reason given for eviction 
(BBFGD1). 
 
Essentially, the canal was viewed as a ‘slum’ with a widespread drug 
trafficking problem (KI15 district government; BB2, a middle-aged woman; 
KI30 professor). Gambling, an illegal activity in Thailand, was also a main 
feature of life (BB2 a middle-aged woman; BB20, a middle-aged woman; 
BB1, an elderly man). One middle-aged man reflected that, ‘this canal was 
a ghetto that nobody wanted to come to, but now the houses look better 
so people aren’t afraid to come here’ (BBFGD1, 2014).  
 
Having explained the historical transformation of the plots, the following 
section will illustrate more recent activities that have transformed the 
plots layer starting with the introduction of a neighbourhood savings 
structure.  
 
5.3.1 Neighbourhood savings structures and plot transformation  
Ultimately, the neighbourhoods in the Bang Bua Canal avoided eviction by 
joining Baan Mankong, the national government’s long-term solution to 
complex land and housing for poorer urban people (Wungpatcharapon 
and Tovivich, 2012b; Boonyabancha, 2005). The Baan Mankong 
programme successfully advocated to the Bangkok Metropolitan Authority 
that settlement upgrading instead of eviction was in the best interest of 
canal residents and the city itself as long as the following three conditions 
were agreed to: land rental was paid; houses move off the canal bank and 
onto proper land; and environmental pollution was reduced. The 
programme helps neighbourhoods upgrade through the provision of low 
interest infrastructure subsidies as well as housing and land loans to 
neighbourhood cooperatives.  
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The national government’s implementing partner, the Community 
Organisations Development Institute (CODI) is responsible for facilitating 
the upgrading process by setting up mechanisms that build trust and form 
a system of accountability (Boonyabancha, 2005). CODI is a public 
organisation under the Ministry of Social Development and Human 
Security. A neighbourhood savings group is one such mechanism. Each 
neighbourhood savings group is registered as a legal cooperative that is 
then granted low-interest rate loans from Baan Mankong.  
 
Neighbourhood savings group members are charged a five per cent 
interest rate on the loans they take out. Two per cent is paid back to Baan 
Mankong; one per cent is used for savings in case people default on their 
loans; one per cent is used to pay the savings club secretary and one 
percent is used towards social welfare assistance such as funeral costs, 
school fees and community events. The savings groups build trust within 
neighbourhoods and the financial capital needed to secure loans. In Bang 
Bua, monthly land rental rates range from 40-60 Baht (GBP 0.74-1.11) per 
individual plot of land, depending on the size of the plot (RK27 an elderly 
woman; SM9, an elderly man; BB4, a middle-aged man; BB1, an elderly 
man). Home reconstruction loans are granted to the cooperatives for a 
maxim of up to 15,000 Baht (GBP 288), with a ten per cent down payment 
provided to the savings club.  
 
Failure to repay the loan over a protracted period has resulted in the 
neighbourhood cooperative taking defaulting individuals to court. As a 
way of managing the overall upgrading of the plots, each participating 
neighbourhood cooperative elected a leader and a committee to guide its 
activities.  
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5.3.2 Neighbourhood governance structures  
Neighbourhood governance structures follow a democratic election 
model. In each neighbourhood a leader and a committee are elected to 
guide the upgrading process, accountable to the members of the savings 
group. In some neighbourhoods, the leader and committee are the same 
as the government-elected leader and committee (accountable to the 
district authority), and sometimes they are different. CODI community 
development workers also shape the process by assisting neighbourhoods 
to develop partnerships with the local government, built environment 
professionals, universities, aid agencies and other Baan Mankong 
networks within the 277 cities where the programme is operating 
(Wungpatcharapon and Tovivich, 2012b). Usavagovitwong et al. (2013) 
write that in Thailand low-income settlements are organised into 
‘communities’, and that when recognised by their local district office, the 
communities are required to hold elections, according to 1991 regulations.   
 
Participants in Baan Mankong decide the criteria for participation. Below a 
CODI employee explains how the criterion for participation was 
established: ‘We [CODI] had a meeting with the communities to set a 
definition of low income in Thailand so together we could determine the 
kind of communities that could join. Part of that definition includes a lack 
of security in house or land in dense communities. Household income is 
not more than 30 Baht per day. Neither CODI nor the government set this 
definition. In my opinion, a whole community is never entirely under this 
standard because they are mixed. But we accept a community when the 
majority faces these problems’ (KI7, 2014).  
 
The programme moved ahead incrementally in each neighbourhood in the 
Bang Bua Canal, working with the support base it had because not 
everyone wanted to join it at the start. After witnessing the progress, 
oftentimes more people joined in, adding another phase to the planning 
and construction work (KI30 professor; KI31 academic, BB4, a middle-aged 
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man). In a meeting with the central government, one leader said 
enthusiasm and momentum occurred because, ‘respected people in the 
community started to mobilize people from all over the canal like a spider 
web’ (BBFGD1, 2014).  
 
Legal status of the land 
With the support of CODI and the upgrading process described above, 
Bang Bua was the first canal in Bangkok to successfully negotiate a lease 
on the land with the National Treasury Department (Wungpatcharapon 
and Tovivich, 2012b). An memorandum of understanding (MOU) between 
the government and the canal network was signed formalising an 
agreement that each of the 12 neighbourhoods would form a cooperative 
and rent the land from the National Treasury Department on a 30-year 
renewable lease for a period of up to 90 years (BB4, a middle-aged man; 
BB2, a middle-aged woman; SM9, an elderly man; RK27 an elderly 
woman).  
 
The negotiation resulted in a land rental agreement of one Baht per 
square meter, per month with adjustment for inflation every five years 
(Wungpatcharapon and Tovivich, 2012b). Two out of three of the case 
studies in this research, Bang Bua Neighbourhood and Saphan Mai, are 
renting the land. The third neighbourhood, Roi Krong, does not have 
enough people in its savings group to be able to pay the land rental cost. 
The primary reason Roi Krong is not renting the land is due to conflict over 
land sharing. People who ‘own’ larger properties or houses do not want to 
lose any portion of their assets because it results in direct loss of income. 
Further discussion of this point will take place in the case study on Roi 
Krong Neighbourhood in Chapter Nine.  
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5.3.3. Social dynamics and aspirations  
While all 12 neighbourhoods were given the same upgrading 
opportunities, some demonstrated the ability to work together in the 
interest of community welfare more than others. Diverse needs, 
backgrounds, opinions, skills, income levels and opportunity has proven to 
be a strength and a challenge for canal dwellers as summarised in the 
following statement by a senior director of a local NGO that works in the 
area: ‘The challenge is you have a mixed group of people. People who live 
on the land part of the neighbourhood have been there for a long time, 
maybe even 50 years ago now. The people who encroach on the canal and 
live on the canal are very poor. So you have a mix of not so poor and the 
very poor. You have rental rooms because Bang Bua is a central location. 
You have a lot of subdivided rooms. The room renters come and go so 
they don’t have a lot of attachment to the community. They just want 
their room and to leave again in the morning’ (KI13, 2014).  
 
Many social activities have taken place to build trust, relationships and 
understanding amongst neighbours. As mentioned earlier, drug trafficking 
used to be widespread within the canal, but there has been a social 
impetus to eliminate the trade. Local initiatives such as the placement of 
lights in dark public areas, the hosting of drug prevention activities for 
children, and the formation of volunteer police teams (RK27, an elderly 
woman) have had varying degrees of success in trust building, depending 
who was asked. However, most participants agree that the canal is safer 
today than it was ten years ago. A march against drugs is organised on a 
yearly basis between the nearby military base and the Bang Bua Canal 
network. Different communities are represented by small signs with their 
names on them. Many of the groups have chosen to wear a specific colour 
to represent their neighbourhood. Food and drinks are provided by the 
military; children from the communities offer entertainment by playing 
football matches; and the local government provides health care workers 
to do tests on blood pressure and other basic health check ups. As seen in 
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Figures 5.3.3a and 5.3.3b below, the military, government staff and 
neighbourhoods from around the canal march together through one 
another’s neighbourhood as a sign of solidarity against drugs.  
 
  
Figure 5.3.3a: Government and 
military personnel giving anti-drug 
speeches to the canal residents. 
Source: the author 
Figure 5.3.3b: Military, government staff 
and canal residents from different 
neighbourhoods (adults and children) 
march in solidarity against drugs through 
different neighbourhoods. Source: the 
author 
 
Aspirations 
Leaders from the Bang Bua Network hold high economic and social 
aspirations for the future. Firstly, the Bang Bua Network wanted to 
develop a floating market for tourists, and believe they can do so with 
technical support from a nearby university (BBFGD1). However, before 
such a large undertaking can begin, one middle-aged woman in the 
network said they first needed to, ‘improve all the houses and the quality 
of the water to make this a prettier place’ (BBFGD1). Secondly, there was a 
desire to develop a safe and pollution free environment. One leader in the 
network said he desired an environment that was free from drugs and 
pollution (BBFGD1).  
 
Thirdly, the need for further social bonding was mentioned by another 
leader who said it was important to have ‘people connecting to each other 
and participating in the community’ (BBFGD1). A continuation of the 
savings group was mentioned as important example of this. Many of the 
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network leaders explained that belonging to the savings group required 
‘discipline’ from its members. Fourthly, it was expressed that the lack of 
youth leadership was a current gap. One leader said, ‘the next generation 
needs to take on these responsibilities because there are no kids are 
helping out right now’ (BBFGD1). One of the many reasons listed for 
bringing youth into the leadership fold is the potential for using 
technology to mobilise people. As one neighbourhood leader observed, 
‘we don’t use computers, but our kids do’ (BBFGD1). 
 
5.4 Buildings and services  
This section seeks to explain the ways in which economic, governance and 
social CAS have shaped buildings and services.  
 
5.4.1 Building typologies  
Over 90 per cent of the individual buildings along the canal are residential. 
This section will first discuss the residential buildings and the community 
centres, followed by public facilities.  
 
Residential buildings 
The majority of the upgraded residential homes are a mix of single unit 
housing and semi-detached housing made of concrete or wood or a 
mixture of both. Many are two to three stories. Between 5-10 per cent of 
the buildings are apartments constructed of concrete. Through direct 
observation, a building pattern has been identified throughout the canal 
whereby wooden buildings on stilts are erected over the canal, while 
homes on the landside are often made with a concrete foundation. 
Exceptions to this pattern can be found with a few homes on the landside 
having dirt floors. Wooden homes are vulnerable to fire because of the 
wood used to construct them, while single storey units on the canal are 
more vulnerable to flooding because of their location over the canal. 
Figure 5.4.1a below illustrates the range of residential building typologies 
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that can be found in the canal ranging from apartments to double storey 
terraced houses, single and double storey wooden houses on stilts, 
dormitories and single storey cement homes.  
 
  
Apartments Double storey terraced house 
 
  
Single storey wooden stilt homes Double storey wooden stilt homes 
 
  
Dormitories Single storey cement homes 
 
Figure 5.4.1a: A mix of single unit housing and semi-detached housing 
made of concrete or wood or a mixture of both. A number of building 
typologies that can be found in the canal range from apartments to 
double storey terraced houses, single and double storey wooden houses 
on stilts, dormitories and single storey cement homes. Source: the author 
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Community centres 
All three neighbourhoods have a community centre built with funding 
from the district government, aid agencies or private donations. Roi Krong 
neighbourhood also has a health centre. The community centres and 
health clinics were developed in the late 1990s to the early 2000s (RK27, 
and elderly woman, SM9 an elderly man). There are two types of 
community centres. The first is built of cement. The second is an outdoor 
gazebo structure, often seen in hotter climates. The community centres 
are pictured below in Figure 5.4.1b.  
 
  
Bang Bua community centre (case 1) Saphan Mai Community Centre  
(case 2) 
 
  
Roi Krong Community Centre A (case 3) Roi Krong Community Centre B  
(case 3) 
 
Figure 5.4.1b: There are two types of community centres. The first is built 
of cement as shown in the top left and right photo and bottom left photo. 
The second is an outdoor gazebo structure, often seen in hotter climates 
as shown in the bottom right photo. Source: the author 
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Public facilities 
Public facilities such as health clinics are dispersed throughout the canal, 
and are mostly made of concrete. Roi Krong has a health clinic. Saphan 
Mai’s office doubles up as a health clinic. Bang Bua Neighbourhood does 
not have one but can access one several hundred meters away. Pictures of 
the health clinic are featured below in Figure 5.4.1c.  
 
 
 
Figure 5.4.1c: A health centre a few hundred metres from Bang Bua 
Neighbourhood. The clinic is a single storey building made of cement. 
Source: the author 
 
Bang Bua Neighbourhood has a library for children. It is a pilot project 
funded by the Bang Khen district government. The salary for one staff 
member is provided. Children from Bang Bua Neighbourhood and only one 
of its next door neighbourhoods have access to a new, but modest range 
of books and as well as a TV. Figure 5.4.1d shows the library’s exterior and 
interior.  
 
 
Chapter five: analysis of chronic stresses in Bangkok and the Bang Bua Canal 
 
 
 Page 187 
  
Bang Bua library – exterior view  
(case 1) 
Bang Bua library – interior view  (case 1) 
 
Figure 5.4.1d: A library shared between two neighbourhoods. The building is 
constructed of cement. The exterior of the building is shown on the left and the 
interior on the right. Source: the author 
 
 
5.4.2 Renters 
While the upgrading scheme provided a unique opportunity for people to 
become homeowners, it seems to have marginalised renters. When the 
upgrading first occurred, neighbourhoods agreed that people who had not 
been renting in the area for more than five years would not be offered the 
opportunity to build a home. Furthermore, those who joined Baan 
Mankong were not allowed to rent their homes or parts of their homes. 
While Bang Bua Neighbourhood and Saphan Mai residents agreed to this 
criteria, a majority of residents in Roi Krong (approximately 60 per cent) 
did not agree to abolish renting, and thus refused to take part in the 
upgrading (RK13, an elderly woman; RK14, an elderly woman; RK17, a 
middle-aged woman; RK29, an elderly man).  
 
5.4.3 Planning regulations and access to services  
Policies towards the urban poor have changed throughout the years. From 
the 1940s to the 1990s there was a general reluctance to using community 
driven approaches to improving low-income settlements and housing 
(Usavagovitwong et al., 2013). In 1960 the Slum Clearance Act was passed 
by the Thai government; after then the First City Plan for Bangkok 
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determined that ‘740,000 (46 per cent) of the 1.6 million people in the city 
lived in areas described as deteriorated housing (laeng suam som) that 
needed to be rebuilt’ (Johnson, 2009, p.30). In 1972 the National Housing 
Association (NHA) formed  and in 1975 the Bangkok Metropolitan 
Authority’s Division of Social Welfare, Bureau of Social Benefits took over 
responsibility for the provision of housing for poorer urban people 
(Usavagovitwong et al., 2013). In 1980 ‘enabling strategies’ for low-cost 
housing for poorer urban people began to appear through private sector 
construction (Archer, 2009). However, the 1997 economic crisis led to 
government policies of self-sufficiency and decentralisation, and by the 
early 2000s community based organisations began to appear 
(Boonyabancha, 2005; Archer, 2009). Usavagovitwong et al. (2013) write 
that in 1980, 15 per cent of households in Bangkok could afford the 
cheapest housing provided by the private sector. By 1994 the number had 
increased to between 70 to 80 per cent (Usavagovitwong et al., 2013). 
 
The density of low-income settlements is determined by Thai authorities 
based on the number of housing units per area, rather than by population 
density. For the BMA a low-income settlement equates to 15 houses per 
rai (One rai is equivalent to 1,600 square meters) or 47,000 people per 
square kilometer; for the NHA it is 30 houses per rai (or 94,000 people per 
square kilometer calculated based on the assumption of five people per 
dwelling). Both include a description of dilapidated buildings and harmful 
health conditions in their criteria (Usavagovitwong et al., 2013).  
 
In a study on housing density and preference in Bangkok’s low-income 
settlements undertaken by the International Institute for Environment 
and Development (IIED) (2013), it was noted that projects under the Baan 
Mankong programme ‘failed to comply with the spatial requirements of 
the Building Control Act of 1979 and of the Comprehensive Plan Act 1992’  
due to ‘financial constraints of the urban poor and the high cost of land’ 
(Usavagovitwong et al., 2013, p.5). The Ministry of Interior accepted a 
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proposal by the NHA and CODI to relax the laws, resulting in a reduction of 
the minimum distance between houses, waiving of regulations for on-site 
sanitation systems and the overriding of the Comprehensive Plans’ land-
use controls (Bangkok’s masterplan) (Usavagovitwong et al., 2013). 
 
Access to services in the Bang Bua Canal  
Usavagovitwong et al. (2013) write that access to services such as utilities, 
public schools and voting rights are only provided to houses legally 
registered with a local government district. However, that has not always 
been the case. Some neighbourhoods, such as Saphan Mai, have had 
electricity since 1974, regardless of their informal status at that time. 
According to one leader in the canal (KI34, an elderly man), politicians 
traded the offer of services in return for votes. According to 
neighbourhood leaders, when the Baan Mankong upgrading began, 
district governments shifted their policy and provided water for domestic 
use and electricity to registered houses only (KI34, an elderly man; KI36, 
an elderly woman). Drinking water continues to be purchased from stores 
or a distribution machine, which is located at the centre of many 
neighbourhoods. Wealthier houses own their own washing machines, 
refrigerators and air conditioners. The district government in all three case 
studies collects rubbish once a week. Housing participants in the 
upgrading received an 800-1,000 liter sewerage treatment tank. Those 
who did partial home reconstruction or did not participate at all continue 
to dump sewerage directly into the canal (RK27, an elderly woman; BB2, a 
middle-aged woman). Today, all registered houses along the canal have 
access to services such as electricity and water. 
 
5.4.4 Social dynamics expressed through building usage 
In 1981 the government changed its use of the word ‘slum’ to ‘densified 
communities’ (chumchon ae at in Thai) to neutralise negative connotations 
and to emphasise ‘the physical conditions of the housing and its 
consequences for human life’ (Johnson, 2009, p.31). The most recent 
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statistics for the total number of people living in low-income settlements 
or densified communities in Bangkok come from the NHA’s 2001 statistics, 
which counted 1,604 ‘poor and informal communities’ comprising 283,566 
households (Usavagovitwong et al., 2013; Archer, 2009). One middle-aged 
woman from Bang Bua neighbourhood also described the neighbourhood 
as a ‘slum’ before a decade of home and neighbourhood upgrading 
occurred. She said: ‘a slum is something you just know. You can tell by the 
way people look, how they speak, the quality of their houses and the fact 
that they fight with each other a lot. Before the upgrading, people called 
Bang Bua a slum. They didn’t socialise with us and looked down on us. So 
we improved our houses, our education and the whole way we lived so 
people wouldn’t look down on us’ (BB2, 2014). 
 
Where possible, the houses in the canal are designed with outdoor space 
to socialise in. More about the nature of social space and patterns and 
trends regarding the houses is discussed in subsequent chapters 
comparing neighbourhood case studies. The ways in which the community 
buildings are used and who uses them also explains a great deal about the 
social dynamics in each neighbourhood, which is also shared in 
subsequent case study chapters.  
 
Conclusion  
In conclusion, this chapter aimed to conduct an analysis of the historical 
transformation of everyday risks in the Bang Bua Canal through 
investigation of the ways in which economic, governance and social CAS 
influence four different morphological layers.  
 
Analysis of the topography layer suggested that natural, political and social 
pre-conditions were set for a flood to have a great impact. As stated 
earlier, Bangkok is located in an area with a pre-disposition to seasonal 
flooding, which was an advantage to the area when it was predominately 
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an agricultural based society, but is a risk now that the area has urbanised. 
Institutional shortcomings in water and disaster management seem to 
have set up a political backdrop of a lack of preparedness, coordination, 
integration, research and budget for adequately managing water and 
disaster risk within the government. Moreover, most people in the Bang 
Bua Canal did not have a living memory of a flood before 2011, and 
therefore did not perceive flooding as a genuine risk. 
 
The movement networks and public open spaces layer reveals that 
migrant workers without specialised skillsets settled in the Bang Bua Canal 
in search of jobs directly or indirectly linked to the arrival of Bangkok’s first 
airport, and settled as renters or home owners in the area. This layer also 
concludes that historically, political battles transformed mobility networks 
around Bangkok through the need to protect the city from security threats 
and the desire to control trade. Finally, the layer explains how public open 
spaces host a range of diverse and changing economic activities within the 
neighbourhoods, depending on the time of day or night. It also explains 
that public open spaces and pedestrian lanes are used as spaces for 
information sharing, communication and social connectedness. 
 
Analysis of the plots layer suggests that many plots dramatically 
transformed through Baan Mankong’s upgrading programme, which 
attempted to introduce positive change in economic, governance and 
social structures that influence neighbourhoods. Through Baan Mankong, 
neighbourhoods in the Bang Bua Canal were given the opportunity to rent 
land owned by the National Treasury Department for a period of up to 90 
years with individual plots paying GBP 0.74-1.11 per month. The savings 
groups within each neighbourhood played a crucial role in building trust 
between members in order to save and qualify for a cooperative loan from 
CODI. Baan Mankong also introduced new governance structures with a 
leader and a leadership committee to manage the upgrading in each 
neighbourhood. Furthermore, it assisted neighbourhoods to establish links 
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with external stakeholders such as universities, district governments and 
other groups in the Baan Mankong upgrading network. Finally, analysis of 
the plots layer revealed that individuals and neighbourhoods aspired to 
further transform their plots and communities by hosting a floating 
market, reducing pollution and stopping drug-trafficking as well as 
creating further bonding exercises to include youth in the hopes that 
younger generations will continue with upgrading activities in the future.   
 
Lastly, analysis of the building and services layer suggests that based upon 
the range of building typologies in the canal there is a great diversity in 
socio-economic status within the canal, which creates different view 
points on upgrading. In Roi Krong Neighbourhood where the number of 
renters is high there are more people against the upgrading programme 
than for it. In Bang Bua and Saphan Mai Neighbourhoods, where renters 
are lower in number, canal dwellers felt more comfortable with the home 
ownership programme. Moreover, this layer identified that the municipal 
government adapted its planning regulations to accommodate the unique 
context of the canal by permitting houses to be built more closely together 
than is usual. It also found that access to services such as piped water and 
electricity had occurred in the canal in some places up to as early as 30 
years before the upgrading programme began; however, access was 
reported to have improved with the upgrading programme.  
 
Each of the morphological layers provides evidence that suggests 
modernisation and rapid economic growth has led to the proliferation of 
unplanned settlements and the growth of the informal economy in the 
Bang Bua Canal, impacting the types of daily risks canal dwellers face due 
to inadequate infrastructure, low-incomes, illegal tenure and low-quality 
housing. Failure to address everyday risks further complicates disaster risk 
with underlying unaddressed vulnerability. The next chapter will focus on 
disaster risk and the impact of the 2011 flood on the Bang Bua Canal. 
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Chapter six  
A systems and morphological 
analysis of the 2011 flood in 
Bangkok and the Bang Bua Canal 
 
Introduction  
This chapter interrogates the 2011 flood, asking: what preparedness, 
response and recovery actions were prioritised in Bangkok and the Bang 
Bua Canal before, during and after the flood? The analysis explains how 
systems of economic flows, governance networks and social dynamics 
influence different morphological layers in order to identify drivers that 
affect disaster resilience.  
 
Firstly, the topography layer presents a history of the 2011 flood, 
explaining the ways in which poorer people struggled to survive a lengthy 
period of unemployment; how national flood disaster management 
systems performed at a sub-standard level; and how after the flood there 
was a great emphasis on the social re-framing of disaster and 
development priorities. Secondly, the movement networks and public 
open spaces layer explains the impact of the floods on transportation and 
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mobility patterns, emphasising the importance of free and accessible 
public transportation and the way in which the canal (and Bangkok more 
broadly) was prepared to deal with impassible roads and flooded public 
open spaces.  
 
Thirdly, the plots layer provides an analysis of the ways in which land 
rental agreements and other such financial mechanisms in the canal 
diversified coping mechanisms for dealing with economic pressures 
resulting from the flood. The plots layer also explains the importance of 
the Bang Bua Canal Network as a way of self-organising help that is 
targeted to specific needs. Fourthly, the last morphological layer – building 
and services – explains how poorer people were disproportionately 
affected because of the low-quality buildings they inhabit, and the ways in 
which district authorities were limited in their capacity to help 
neighbourhoods in the Bang Bua Canal.  
 
 The methodological approach for this chapter includes a review of 
secondary documents such as assessments and evaluation reports of the 
2011 flood from a range of agencies including the World Bank, the 
Association of South East Asian Nations (ASEAN), Save the Children, Asian 
Disaster Preparedness Centre (ADPC) and others, which are referred to 
later in this chapter. Additionally, 40 key informant interviews were 
conducted with neighbourhood leaders; international and national aid 
agencies; officials from the district, municipal and national government; 
academics and think tanks. Focus group discussions were also conducted, 
including six FGDs with canal dwellers; one with five people from the 
World Bank and one with four people from CODI, a local NGO. Multiple 
maps from Bangkok’s master plan were analysed for physical data. Each 
neighbourhood’s unique history and composition is interrogated in the 
following chapters, Six, Seven and Eight.  
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6.1 Topography  
Analysis of the topography layer provides a summary of how the 2011 
flood occurred and the extent of its impact. The layer then focuses on 
Thailand’s national flood response explaining how the country was largely 
underprepared, and the way in which it is adapting its national disaster 
management systems and policies. The ways in which Thailand is re-
framing its disaster and development priorities as a result of the 2011 
flood is then presented. The topography layer closes with an explanation 
of the economic impact of the flood on poorer people in the canal and in 
Bangkok more broadly.  
 
6.1.1 Summary of the 2011 flood 
The worst flooding Thailand had seen since 1996, started in late July 2011 
(Aon Benfield, 2012). An uncommon number and strength of five 
consecutive tropical storms deposited unusually large amounts of rainfall 
from July to October 2011. Subsequent dam breaches and a high tide in 
the Gulf of Thailand (Olarn, 2011; World Bank, 2012b) contributed to 
widespread flooding that affected 65 out of 77 provinces (Aon Benfield, 
2012).  
By January 2012, more than 800 people had been killed (Phongnonsung 
and Borchard, 2012; Aon Benfield, 2012), six million hectares of land 
inundated with flood water and 13 million people affected (World Bank, 
2012b). The World Bank (2012b) estimated the cost of rehabilitation and 
reconstruction at THB 1.5 trillion (GBP 2.7 billion), with the manufacturing 
industry accounting for 80 per cent of the total.  
The damaged inflicted by the 2011 flood has been attributed to a 
combination between nature, poor governance and weak land-use 
planning (Pongsudhirak, 2011; Haraguchi and Upmanu, 2014; UNESCAP, 
2014; Boonyabancha and Archer, 2011). Figure 6.1 below shows images of 
national flooding from August until November 2011 underscoring the 
Chapter six: analysis of the 2011 Flood in Bangkok and the Bang Bua Canal 
 
 
 
 
Page 196 
extreme nature of the flood, not only in Bangkok but nation-wide. The full 
spatial peak of the floodwater has been marked on the map in gray by 
UNITAR/UNOSAT overlaid with colour in order to provide a month-by-
month comparison of the coverage.  
The first map indicates floodwater in yellow during mid-August 2011. The 
second map depicts floodwater with the colour orange in mid-September, 
showing the water travelling further south. The third map shows that 
floodwater had reached Bangkok by mid-October (depicted in red) and 
had become more widespread in an east to west direction.  
The fourth map illustrates the floodwater mid-November in purple 
showing floodwaters receding in the north and to some extent in the 
south near Bangkok. When UNITAR/UNOSAT published the graphics, it 
warned that floodwaters had likely been ‘systematically underestimated 
along highly vegetated areas along main river banks, and within built-up 
areas within Bangkok’ due to limitations of the satellite data used 
(UNITAR/UNOSAT, 2011, np).  
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Figure 6.1.1a: The four graphics above illustrate the flood water moving from 
northern Thailand down to the Gulf of Siam through Bangkok. The first map 
illustrates floodwater (marked in yellow) in mid-August. The second map shows 
floodwater (marked in orange) in mid-September. The third map indicates 
floodwater (marked in red) in mid October. The fourth image depicts floodwater 
(marked in purple) in mid-November. The full spatial peak of the floodwater is 
marked in gray in all of the maps as a source of comparison. Source: 
(UNITAR/UNOSAT, 2011).  
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Having explained how the flood occurred and its extensive impact, this 
chapter will now examine the ways in which the flood response was 
handled at a national level and the way it impacted Bangkok and the Bang 
Bua Canal.  
 
6.1.2 National flood management    
Thailand, and more specifically Bangkok, was largely unprepared for the 
2011 flood, for several reasons related to governance. In July 2011, nearly 
one month before the flood started, a change in national government 
occurred bringing with it new staff to new posts. Government 
coordination was cited as one of the biggest challenges in the 2011 flood 
with preparedness and response frameworks believing to have achieved 
little of what they were designed to do (Barber, 2012), despite having a 
national Department of Disaster Prevention and Mitigation (DDPM)  
(established in 2002) and as stated earlier, a Disaster Prevention and 
Mitigation Act that was passed in 2007 (UNESCAP, 2014; ADPC, 2013b) 
dedicated to shaping disaster management.  
 
Pongsudhirak (2011), a journalist from the UK newspaper The Guardian, 
pointed to government ministers for issuing different and conflicting 
messages that resulted in inter-agency conflicts within the government 
and a lack of policy coordination. Water analysts note that the 24 dams 
operating in Bangkok’s Chao Phraya River should have released water 
earlier than they did to compensate for the heavy monsoons (IRIN, 2012; 
Koontanakulvong, 2012). A lack of coordination and inaction between 
various central and local government agencies is believed to have resulted 
in the overflow of several dams (Pongsudhirak, 2011). 
 
Experts on low-income housing, Somsook Boonyabancha and Diane Archer 
(2011), posted in a blog for the UK International Institute for Environment 
and Development (IIED) that water management in Thailand is a ‘sensitive 
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political matter’ and cited weak coordination between 16 organisations 
from four ministries as a key factor for increasing the severe impact of the 
flood (2011). Boonyabancha and Archer (2011) believe that effective 
collaboration in Bangkok was especially hindered due to the tenuous 
relationship between the governing Democratic opposition party and the 
Pheu Thai central government, giving rise to what they described as 
‘political games’.  
 
One key informant from a local NGO interviewed for this research said the 
impact of the flood was greater because of the political divide in the 
following statement: ‘The central government gives money to a certain 
ministry or agency, and in many cases they go directly to the affected 
community to distribute goods. Thailand is like that. The local authority is 
always being bypassed by the central government. Sometimes there is 
collaboration and the central government department links with the local 
authority. But when the politics are tight, the central government tends to 
bypass to link with the community directly in order not to give credit to 
the local authority because the local government is from one party and 
the central government is another’ (KI3, 2014, a senior NGO leader). 
 
Powerful politicians and other influential actors were accused of 
protecting their constituencies at the cost of redirecting floodwater into 
other areas. At times their actions resulted in protests that led to the 
dismantling of flood protection barriers (Pongsudhirak, 2011; KI2, 2014, a 
national government informant; KI4, 2014, a BMA informant; KI9, 2014, 
journalist). Humanitarian news and analysis agency, Integrated Regional 
Information Networks (IRIN), writes that complicated water management 
structures allowed powerful governors to redirect flood waters to poorer 
areas, and recommended a single command management authority take 
over to avoid abuse of power (IRIN, 2012).  
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The 2011 flood has been described as a re-enactment of the urban-rural 
divide, (whereby the previous national government was popular with the 
rural poor, but strongly disliked by the urban middle-class and elite) as 
demonstrated by floodwaters submerging poorer provinces along the 
Chao Phraya river basin in order to save the more affluent city of Bangkok 
(Boonyabancha and Archer, 2011). Flood prevention in Bangkok was 
prioritised by the national government, although some surmise that if 
flood waters had been permitted to exit through Bangkok where water 
historically and naturally exits, the flood would have dissipated more 
quickly (Pongsudhirak, 2011; KI2, national government informant; KI6, 
municipal informant). Pongsudhirak contends that a quick exit through 
Bangkok would have also alleviated political woes between rural and 
urban groups, writing that: ‘if Bangkok shares some of the flooding, 
economic damage will mount but a sense of equality and justice will 
prevail (Pongsudhirak, 2011, np). 
 
A humanitarian response review by the NGO Save the Children and the 
Agreement for Disaster Management and Emergency Response (AADMER) 
Partnership Group (APG), a group within the Association of South East 
Asian Nations (ASEAN), found that while the Thai government set up a 
centralised Flood Relief Operations Center (FROC) to support affected 
provinces and allocate financial assistance for relief and recovery 
operations, it was headed by the Ministry of Justice and operated by staff 
whose expertise did not match the task (Barber, 2012). The report also 
states that at the national level, response capacity was low and 
preparedness planning was under-utilised (Barber, 2012).  
 
After the flood, steps were taken to address policy related disaster 
management gaps. Four key national plans summarised below directly 
address gaps such as water management, coordination and the 
development of standard operating procedures (SOPs). The national plans 
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focus on strengthening institutional capacity; addressing challenges 
related to climate change and natural hazards; issues around water 
resource management and coordination by instating a single command 
structure; and integrating disaster prevention, mitigation, preparedness 
and emergency management within relevant sectors of the national 
government.  
 
An assessment report on disaster management planning, policies and 
responses in Thailand by the Asian Disaster Preparedness Centre (ADPC), 
the NGO HelpAge International and APG suggests disaster management 
policy is being taken more seriously at a national level with the 
development of new national plans since, post 2011 floods (ADPC, 2013a).  
The four key national plans that were developed post-2011 floods are 
(ADPC, 2013a):  
 
I. The Eleventh National Economic and Social Development Plan, 
(2012-2016) aims to develop people and strengthen institutions and 
build a secure natural resource and environmental base, which 
requires reducing vulnerability to climate change and natural hazards 
in order to meet a vision of ‘A happy society with equity, fairness and 
resilience’ (ADPC, 2013b, p.2). 
 
II. The Master Plan on Water Resource Management (2012) outlines 
short and long-term actions for effective water management, 
integrates participation of all water management stakeholders and 
provides a framework for Single Command Water Management for 
planning and effective response, developed by the Strategic 
Committee on Water Resource Management (SCWRM).  
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III. National Disaster Prevention and Mitigation Plan (2010-2014) 
outlines principles and procedures for disaster management of 
natural hazards and security threats (ASEAN Inter-Parliamentary 
Assembly, 2012). There is a focus on prevention, preparedness, 
emergency management and post-disaster management at all levels 
and within all relevant sectors.  
 
IV. Strategic National Action Plan (SNAP) on Disaster Risk Reduction 
(2010-2019) mainstreams disaster risk reduction into governmental 
agency planning and response. It is a national framework and 
strategic plan that aligns with the Hyogo Framework for Action 
(HFA), AADMER’s strategic plan and Thailand’s DDPM. 
 
While the presence of the national plans suggests progress, this alone 
cannot be a measurement of success. Assessment of their effectiveness is 
required to better understand the implications of each of these four plans.  
 
This section on national disaster management explained key gaps in the 
flood response by the national government and its partners such as local 
authorities and a range of government agencies. It then discussed the 
ways in which the government is working with its partners to address 
policy gaps within disaster management. The next section will explain the 
ways in which Thailand is seeking to re-frame its disaster management and 
development priorities from a social vulnerability perspective.  
 
6.1.3 The social re-framing of disaster and development priorities 
The reconstruction phase of the flood was an opportunity for the 
government to re-frame and re-prioritise economic and political 
development policies in a way that addresses social vulnerability. In 
October 2011, a rapid assessment of the impact of the flood was 
conducted in 26 provinces across 18 sectors, led by the Ministry of Finance 
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in cooperation with the World Bank and other development partners. 
Post-disaster recovery and reconstruction needs were established for 
short, medium and long-term periods in a report titled Thai Flood 2011: 
Rapid Assessment for Resilient Recovery and Reconstruction Planning 
(World Bank, 2012b). The rapid assessment report recommended that the 
Thai Government take care to ensure a ‘comprehensive social 
accountability framework’ be put in place at a cost of THB 1 billion (GBP 
5.1 million), highlighting the importance of accountability and 
transparency in light of recent political tensions (2012b, p.7). The World 
Bank (2012b) further recommended that such a framework ensures timely 
access to information on recovery programmes is available to the general 
public, including the resources and levels of assistance being offered; that 
a complaints mechanism be established; a rigorous validation processes 
for cash transfers and participants for public work schemes is put in place; 
and that partnerships are established with civil society, research institutes 
and the media to monitor the recovery process. 
 
Furthermore, the World Bank’s Rapid Assessment Report (2012b) 
recommended balancing investment in physical infrastructure to adapt to 
and mitigate against future climate risks in conjunction with activities that 
build the capacity of civil society. The report also recommended that social 
systems be supported and grown through activities such as publicly 
accessible mapping and modeling of geographically distributed risk; public 
trainings with risk maps to increase flood preparedness in 
neighbourhoods; establishment of an effective early warning system 
based on accurate, timely data that takes into account geographic and 
infrastructure details from hazard mapping; and clear messaging regarding 
disaster management that can be trusted by the public (World Bank, 
2012b).  
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At the time of writing (2015) the military was in power and re-writing the 
constitution. No documentation was found regarding how many of the 
recommendations from the World Bank’s Rapid Assessment were taken 
forward, nor were any key interviewees able to offer any insights. Having 
outlined some of Thailand’s key social vulnerabilities and the potential 
ways in which the Thai Government can act to assert a new 
comprehensive social accountability framework, this layer will now explain 
the economic impact of the flood on poorer people.  
 
6.1.4 Economic impact on poorer people  
The World Bank (2012b) estimates that 129 THB billion (GBP 2.3 billion) in 
wages were lost due to the floods, including from poorer and marginalized 
households with limited social protection. Suspended livelihoods activities 
and challenges finding short-term, temporary, alternative forms of work 
resulted in the loss of income for poorer urban people. Daily wage earners 
were one of the worst affected groups (Phongnonsung and Borchard, 
2012; UNESCAP, 2014); their primary coping strategy involved heavy 
reliance upon borrowing money to meet basic needs (World Bank, 2012b). 
With a lack of access to formal lending and credit sources, poorer urban 
people turned primarily to informal lenders with daily interest rates as 
high as 20 per cent (World Bank, 2012b). A leader of one of the 
neighborhoods (KI34) echoed the World Bank’s findings, stating that many 
people from the Bang Bua Canal borrowed money from friends and 
informal lenders, most of who charged daily interest rates of 20 per cent.  
 
Acknowledging the importance of livelihood support after a disaster, the 
World Bank’s Rapid Assessment Report recommended to the Thai 
government that more livelihoods programmes be offered with a strong 
emphasis on ‘principles of equity, beneficiary and community 
participation, transparency and accountability’, particularly for two 
vulnerable groups (including migrants): able-bodied labourers who could 
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participate in cash for work and a separate programme for people who 
could not provide labour such as the sick, the elderly, disabled persons and 
children (2012b, p. 12). Furthermore, the World Bank’s Rapid Assessment 
Report (2012b) recommended social assistance to be provided by the 
government in the form of one off ‘supplemental cash transfers’ of THB 
4,000 (GBP 74) per household and three months of supplementary income 
support for the elderly and disabled, which would see an increase from 
THB 500 (GBP 9) to THB 1000 (GBP 18).  Their final recommendation was 
to increase access to credit institutions for poorer urban people through 
non-profit organisations and community/neighbourhood savings groups to 
prevent downward spirals into debt. It is not known if these 
recommendations were acted upon; however, almost every person 
interviewed from one of three Bang Bua neighbourhoods reported 
receiving cash from the government of 5,000 Baht (GBP 92) for flood 
damage to their houses, regardless of whether or not their houses were 
registered.   
 
This topography layer has highlighted the impact the 2011 flood had on 
poorer people in Bangkok due to a poorly coordinated national and 
municipal flood response, and how as a result, the national government 
has made attempts to improve disaster response frameworks and policies. 
It has also highlighted recommendations for reframing disaster and 
development programmes from a social equality approach. The 
topography layer then highlighted the economic impact of the flood on 
poorer people. Subsequent case study chapters will provide specific details 
on manifestations of the social, economic and physical impacts of the 
flood. The next section will explain how the flood impacted the movement 
networks and public open spaces.  
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6.2 Movement networks and public open spaces  
Overall, the flood damaged or destroyed portions of 1,700 roads, 
highways, and bridges across Thailand costing the Department of 
Highways and the Department of Rural Roads an estimated THB 139 billion 
(GBP 2.5 billion) in road repairs alone (Aon Benfield, 2012). Bangkok’s 
secondary airport, Don Mueang, closed down from October 2011 until 
March 2013 due to flood water entering a terminal building and damage 
to a runway (Aon Benfield, 2012), reducing the number or flights going in 
and out of Thailand. Import and export businesses were impacted and 
supply chains were disrupted.  
 
Leaders in the Bang Bua Canal prioritised mobility and transportation in 
their preparedness efforts. Before the flood struck, CODI provided a 
75,000 Baht (GBP 1390) grant to the Bang Bua Canal Network to enable 
them to preposition food and other essential supplies. The Bang Bua Canal 
Network built 12 boats – one for every neighbourhood in the network as 
part of its preparedness measures (BB4, a middle-aged man; BB20, a 
middle-aged woman).  
 
6.2.1 City-scale risk reduction, preparedness and mitigation and the 
impact on local neighbourhoods 
Before the 2011 flood occurred, people within the Bang Bua Canal tried to 
remove rubbish from the canal in coordination with the local government 
in order to increase the canal’s water carrying capacity and decrease the 
risk of flooding. One senior person working for a local aid agency said, ‘The 
city didn't clean the canal. We cleaned the canal. We tried to dig up the 
canal because it became very shallow…. A lot of garbage was sinking and 
piling up in the middle of the canal. The people coordinated with the 
district to bring the garbage trucks. I cannot remember the number of 
trucks but it was a very dramatic number - 50 or something. They tried to 
show that the community is not the one who makes the flood happen. 
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The community is not the one who makes the pollution. We are the ones 
who protect the canal’ (KI3, 2014).  
 
In spite of the risk reduction measures taken by residents of the Bang Bua 
Canal, flooding still occurred. The military tried to protect city 
infrastructure by creating walls out of sandbags. The erection of the walls 
determined which neighbourhoods flooded. The canals in Bangkok were 
some of the first locations in the city to flood (UNESCAP, 2014). When the 
flood became imminent, local leaders in the Bang Bua Canal used existing 
public speaker systems to warn the elderly, immobile, sick and young to 
evacuate immediately. The speaker systems were subsequently used to 
provide flood updates, except for in Roi Krong neighbourhood, where the 
speakers were not elevated and were inoperable due to water damage. 
 
6.2.2 Free public transport and income generation  
Military forces were instrumental in opening up access to free public 
transportation via heavy-duty equipment that could easily maneuver 
flooded roadways and highways (Figure 6.2.2a). The large transport 
equipment enabled the army to conduct search and rescue and distribute 
essential food and non-food items in areas severely affected by the flood, 
and inaccessible to other emergency responders. Access to public 
transportation was crucial in enabling poorer urban people to continue 
working. Some people from the Bang Bua Canal said they used free 
transportation to travel to a market 23 kilometres away to purchase fresh 
food for local resale on donated plastic boats (Figure 6.2.2b) or small, 
homemade rafts made from plastic and bamboo materials (SM24, a 
middle-aged woman; RK13, an elderly woman) pictured below in Figure 
6.2.2c.  
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Figure 6.2.2a: Heavy-duty military trucks offered free public transportation to 
people from the Bang Bua Canal during the flood. Source: Pattawan Lamjiek 
 
 
 
Figure 6.2.2b: An example of the small plastic boats donated to canal dwellers to 
increase their mobility. Source: Pattawan Lamjiek 
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Figure 6.2.2c: An example of the homemade rafts used by canal dwellers. Plastic 
barrels, styrofoam and bamboo were commonly used materials. Source: 
Pattawan Lamjiek 
 
People who were unable to work or who begged for food before the flood, 
continued to do so during the flood. Key informant interviewees reported 
sharing food and water with needy people who travelled on rafts (SM26, a 
middle-aged woman).  Compassion and the philanthropic spirit of Thai 
people was commented on by a senior monk who said, ‘we found one 
thing in the floods among Thai people: people helping each other and 
showing compassion. You could see cars driving around giving rides to 
people, even if the driver didn’t know who the person was. That was the 
generosity of people. Background didn’t matter then’ (SM33, 2014). Free 
public transport and makeshift devices such as rafts therefore were crucial 
to opening up economic access for financially vulnerable groups of people. 
 
6.2.3 Public open spaces 
Public open spaces are spaces that are accessible to all. During the flood 
most of the public open spaces flooded except for elevated areas such as 
bridges. Bridges were used to store motorcycles (Figure 6.2.3a). They were 
also the place were aid agencies distributed survival items and some local 
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politicians ran food kitchens. A public health system run by the district 
government was implemented in all the neighbourhoods in the canal 
whereby different coloured flags were used to identify various vulnerable 
groups in order for the district to provide appropriate assistance such as 
diapers for babies (BB20, an middle-aged woman; RK27 a middle-aged 
woman). The system was not taken up by other flood response 
stakeholders and due to the low capacity of the government to respond to 
the needs of survivors, the flag system appears to have made little 
difference in the response.   
 
 
Figure 6.2.3a: An example of how people used public open space on elevated 
bridges to store their privately owned goods such as motorcycles. The open 
space on the bridge was also used by aid agencies to distribute goods and by 
local politicians to set up food kitchens. Source: Pattawan Lamjiek 
 
 
Analysis of the public open spaces layer is minimal due to the limited use 
of public open spaces during the flood. Therefore, having explained the 
impact of the flood on movement networks and public open spaces, the 
analysis will shift to an explanation of the flood impact on the plots layer.  
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6.3 Plots 
Analysis of the changes to the plot patterns in the canal before, during and 
after the flood provides insight into the ways in which economic, 
governance and social CAS interact to shape plots. During the flood 
individual plots were entirely submerged in water restricting socio-
economic activities within individual plots and the larger plot of the entire 
neighbourhood. This layer of analysis will focus on how economic, 
governance and social systems adapted to the new challenges posed by 
the flood. 
 
 
6.3.1 Financial pressures related to plots 
While it can be argued that the plots received flood damage, most of the 
focus was on the damage to buildings. The financial systems developed 
within each neighbourhood plot (explained in the plots section of Chapter 
Five) were tested during the flood. Many of the canal dwellers were 
without work for several weeks and sometimes months, therefore it was 
difficult to pay mortgages and land rental costs associated with the 
upgrading. After negotiations with CODI and the Bang Bua Canal Network, 
the landowner (the National Treasury Department) took a decision to 
delay land rental payments for one year, allowing people more time to 
replenish their income (BB2 neighbourhood leadership, SM9 
neighbourhood leadership). Some of the Baan Mankong savings groups 
made cheaper loans available to struggling households (KI34 
neighbourhood leader, KI36 neighbourhood leader).  
 
However, the details of such arrangements will be discussed in each of the 
case study chapters. Canal dwellers were also given cash grants from the 
government to repair their homes – illegal or not because status did not 
matter – but further discussion of this will take place in the buildings and 
services layer.  
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6.3.2 Flood management through the canal network  
Before the flood struck Bangkok, neighbourhood leaders and other 
volunteers from the Bang Bua Canal travelled more than 230 kilometres to 
assist with the flood response in the northern Thai city of Nakhon Sawan. 
Bang Bua Canal dwellers put the experiential learning into practice less 
than a month later when their own neighbourhoods began to flood. 
Leaders said they felt experienced in flood preparation and response, 
including how to set up and run a network ‘help centre’ that managed 
donations for all neighbourhoods in the network.  
 
When the flood reached the Bang Bua Canal, water remained for three 
months, reaching one meter high for nearly a month (SM9 neighbourhood 
leadership). The Bang Bua Canal network quickly set up its own help 
centre with assistance from CODI. The help centre received donations and 
coordinated distributions. It shared information updates, including data on 
neighbourhood needs and the trajectory of the flood. Individuals in the 
network came up with innovative ways to harness new potential from old 
relationships with various external stakeholders developed over the past 
ten years of upgrading. For example, local politicians donated food and 
money; universities sent students with specialised skills such as medical 
practitioners and engineers to advise on ways to prevent electrocution. 
Some neighbourhood leaders had wealthy friends who drove supplies into 
the neighbourhood from cities and towns outside of Bangkok.  
 
Those employed by the military used their network to access information, 
food, and transportation. Most donations were dropped off at the help 
centre where items were sorted and redistributed according to differing 
needs within the various neighbourhoods. Smaller neighbourhood 
kitchens were also set up in spaces with minimal flooding such as bridge 
ways, public roads or community offices. Volunteers cooked and served 
food purchased from neighbourhood savings funds or local distributions.  
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At times the network rivaled the district in terms of effectiveness of its 
flood response as evidenced by the fact that during the crisis the Bang Bua 
Canal Network grew its membership from 17 to 38 neighbourhoods (KI33, 
a neighbourhood leader).  
 
One man said the network aspired to run its own fully functional 
evacuation centre if future events like this occurred (KI32, a 
neighbourhood leader). However, not all neighbourhood leaders 
preferred working through the peer network. One leader who was not 
active in the Baan Mankong upgrading programme felt support should 
have been directly given to elected neighbourhood leaders in order to 
ensure it was distributed fairly. All leaders interviewed were very clear 
that aid should be given to the government as a last resort due to the fact 
that it reached the neighbourhoods too slowly.  
 
6.3.3 Self organisation at the neighbourhood level 
The ability to self organise was paramount to an effective flood response 
in the canal. Reflecting on the experience of setting up the help centre, 
one leader from the canal network explained that because relationships 
were tightly knit it was easier to set up the help centre (KI32). One leader 
explained that the ability to self organise is important during times of 
crisis, saying, ‘our process is run by our community. We know best what 
we want, how to manage it and what we are facing’ (KI33, 2014, 
neighbourhood leadership). He then said, ‘the lesson we learned from the 
flood was the importance of being a part of the [Bang Bua Canal] Network 
instead of trying to survive as a neighbourhood on its own. This network 
offers power and support for negotiation. We get assistance to people 
who really need it. The network has been good for both the giver and the 
receiver’ (KI33, 2014, neighbourhood leadership). Other members within 
neighbourhood leadership roles said that the network prevents conflict 
and avoids unfair and unequal treatment of individuals, and that 
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whenever a network is available, it is advisable to use it, not to distribute 
goods directly to individuals (KI34, a neighbourhood leader; KI36, a 
middle-aged woman).  
 
Having discussed the economic, governance and social influences on the 
plots layer during the flood, the following section analyses the buildings 
and services layer.  
 
6.4 Buildings and services  
The buildings and services layer provides analysis of urban form at a small 
scale, giving insights into key economic, governance and social dimensions 
that helped build resilience. This layer specifically focuses on explaining 
how poorer urban people were disproportionately affected by the floods 
due to the low quality of the buildings they lived in. This section also 
explains how the government district authorities were limited in their 
capacity to respond to the needs related to shelter and services within 
many neighbourhoods.  
 
6.4.1 Poor quality housing and vulnerability to flooding 
Figures from the National Housing Authority (NHA) show that the flood 
disproportionately affected poorer urban people. Out of an estimated low-
income population of 624,640 in Bangkok, the NHA estimates that 457,805 
people (approximately 73 per cent of Bangkok’s low-income population) 
were affected through data collected by GIS mapping and ground surveys 
before and after the flood (UNESCAP, 2014).  
 
Table 6.4.1 below offers a comparison between the total population of 
Bangkok and the total population of urban poor.  
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Total population of Bangkok  Total population of urban poor in 
Bangkok 
Population of Bangkok:  
8,249,117 
Total number of low-income 
population: 624,640 
Total number of flood affected 
people: 1,766,931  
Total number of low-income flood 
affected people: 457,805 
Percentage of flood affected 
people: 21 per cent  
Percentage of flood affected: 73% 
 
Table 6.4.1: The total population affected by the flood in Bangkok compared with 
the total population of low-income people affected by the flood. Source: this 
table uses information drawn from (UNESCAP, 2014). 
 
Many of the low-income homes are located in open spaces along canals 
and rivers, and are primarily single storey homes constructed with light 
timber or bamboo and corrugated iron, therefore making poorer urban 
people one of the most affected groups during the flood (UNESCAP, 2014). 
Flooding in the canals tended to linger the longest. Figure 6.4.1a below 
shows a map of flood-affected low-income neighbourhoods in Bangkok, 
depicted by red dots. Low-income neighbourhoods not affected by the 
flood are indicated in green. The map shows that the flood affected a lot 
of low-income neighbourhoods in northern Bangkok, including the Bang 
Bua Canal.  
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Figure 6.4.1a below shows a map of flood-affected low-income neighbourhoods in 
Bangkok, depicted by red dots. Low-income neighbourhoods not affected by the 
flood are indicated in green. Source: (National Housing Authority of Thailand, 2011). 
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In the Bang Bua Canal, the most vulnerable people were those who lived 
in one-storey homes; people who were unemployed; illegal migrant 
workers; or people who generally required more protection such as 
children, the elderly, or those with mobility challenges. People living in 
two-storey homes had a second floor to evacuate to, but those in one-
storey homes were particularly vulnerable because there was nowhere to 
escape the floods. Moreover, homes constructed of low-quality materials 
such as wooden flooring and walls, rotted during the three months of 
flooding. Stilt houses built over the canal were reported by people to be 
sinking in the mud due to subsidence (RK20, a middle-aged man; RK13, an 
elderly woman). Moreover one-storey homes had limited places to store 
valuables such as beds, TVs and motorcycles out of the reach of 
floodwater. Figure 6.4.1b below is a photograph of a series of single storey 
homes surrounded by floodwater. Many of them are made of wood and 
corrugated iron, which quickly rusted when the floodwater receded.  
 
 
Figure 6.4.1b: The Bang Bua Canal during the 2011. The most vulnerable houses 
in this photograph are single-storey homes made out of wood and corrugated 
iron. Single storey homes received a significant amount of damage to their floors, 
walls and valuable household items that could not be elevated out of the reach of 
the floodwater. Source: Pattawan Lamjiek 
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Figure 6.4.1 below shows the inside of one woman’s single storey home. 
The walls are covered over in rusted corrugated iron. The home has 
limited space to store valuables. There are a few elevated planks of wood 
on the right hand side of the photo to store things. The canal has flooded 
and is waist height in the photograph. It remained at this level for over a 
month.  
 
 
Figure 6.4.1c: One-storey homes left people vulnerable to flooding. Source: 
Pattawan Lamjiek 
 
After the flood the central government gave a grant of 5,000 Baht (GBP 
92) to each household as compensation for flood damage. Key informant 
interviews with canal dwellers and district authorities confirmed that 
homes did not require formal registration to receive the government 
grant; rather the existence of a home qualified the owner to receive the 
grant. Most people interviewed in the Bang Bua Canal received the grant 
but said it was not enough to cover the cost of the total flood damage to 
their homes.   
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Financial burdens were further lightened through a period of grace 
granted to residents with home reconstruction loans. Negotiations 
between the neighbourhoods and CODI over land repayment resulted in a 
one-year freeze on repayments (RK27, a middle-aged woman; SM9, an 
elderly man). 
 
6.4.2 Evacuation centres and vulnerable people 
The NGO Plan Thailand reports that at the peak of the flood, more than 
2,600 evacuation shelters housed over 165,000 people in need of 
temporary accommodation (Phongnonsung and Borchard, 2012). Nearly 
900 schools were turned into flood evacuation shelters (Phongnonsung 
and Borchard, 2012). Save the Children found that well meaning, well 
intentioned people who do not have disaster management experience 
were often in charge of evacuation centres (Barber, 2012). A number of 
residents from the Bang Bua Canal evacuated to the nearby temple Wat 
Pra Si where a group of 60 monks were providing food and 
accommodation to some 300 people. The monks described their key 
challenge during that time as ‘taking care of people’. One senior monk 
went on to explain that although not permitted, youth were found 
drinking; minor vandalism occurred; and disputes between families over 
equitable distribution of relief items were frequent.  
 
The flood damaged an estimated 2,934 schools and delayed the school 
term by more than 21 days, affecting over 1.4 million children 
(Phongnonsung and Borchard, 2012). To make up for lost time students 
studied for one extra hour during their daily schedule and for additional 
time on Saturdays. One school teacher explained that the school year was 
also extended into summer holidays to complete the full curriculum 
(SM26, a middle-aged woman).  
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A Save the Children assessment report of the flood response in Thailand 
noted that no formal provisions for migrant workers were made by the 
disaster management authorities who did not see the needs of migrant 
workers as their area of concern (Barber, 2012). Also, the stress of the 
flood took its toll on mental health. The Ministry of Public Health reported 
that psychosocial issues amongst flood-affected people included high 
levels of stress, depression and suicide risk (Watts, 2011).  
 
Evacuation centres were often considered a last resort. Most people in 
Bang Bua neighbourhood and many in Saphan Mai neighbourhood did not 
have to evacuate because they were able to live in the second storey of 
their homes. They also had access to basic services such as water and 
electricity. According to the leader of Roi Krong, approximately 40 per cent 
of the people in the neighbourhood evacuated. One middle-aged woman 
interviewee who stayed in an evacuation shelter for the duration of the 
flood said her family went there because there was ‘food’, a ‘place to 
sleep’ and that ‘life was better there’ (KI32, 2014). Key informants said 
they employed a number of coping strategies in relation to food security, 
including reducing the amount and quality of food they ate, as well as 
moving between their homes and evacuation shelters to pick up donations 
at both locations (RK28, a middle-aged man; BB8, a middle-aged woman).  
 
6.4.3 Government district authorities and local neighbourhood needs 
The district authorities have primary responsibility for providing flood 
relief services, but were limited in their capacity to adequately respond to 
local needs. Government staff in Lak Si district cited a lack of knowledge, 
funds and coordination as some of their key challenges (KI37, a middle-
aged man; KI15, a middle-aged woman). The Bang Bua Canal acts as a 
boundary line between the district of Bang Khen and Lak Si. Both districts 
governing the canal said they were inexperienced in preparation and 
response for large-scale flooding. The Lak Si district government stated 
that it was problematic for them to procure funding for food and non-food 
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items during the emergency as well as cleaning supplies and equipment 
after floodwaters receded (KI37, a Lak Si district government officer). 
According to Lak Si government key informants there was limited access 
to the federal emergency response system, which left the local 
government not knowing who to coordinate with and where to request 
supplies. The same district officer said, ‘we are supposed to be the official 
authority, but in reality we are not’ (KI37, 2014, a government officer from 
Lak Si District). The Bang Bua Canal Network is comprised of 
neighbourhoods from both Bang Khen and Lak Si districts, and therefore 
coordinated activities with both district offices. 
 
Having explained the ways in which poorer urban people were 
disproportionately affected by the flood due to the types of buildings they 
lived in, this chapter ends with a summary of the issues raised and draws 
some key conclusions.  
 
Conclusion 
This chapter provided an analysis of how different morphological layers 
were impacted by the 2011 flood with a focus on the Bang Bua Canal and 
its link to systems within municipal Bangkok and Thailand more broadly. 
Analysis of the four morphological layers provides a framework for 
assessing the ways in which economic forces, governance networks and 
social dynamics interacted to shape events and activities before, during 
and after the flood. 
 
The topography layer discussed key facts about the flood impact, 
suggesting that while the unusual number of tropical storms created the 
potential for the flood, governance factors related to a lack of 
preparedness and an inability to coordinate a flood response at multiple 
levels played a major role in the widespread impact. The national flood 
management response was then analysed, concluding that poor 
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coordination was a result of ineffective preparedness frameworks at a 
national level, conflict between municipal and national levels of 
government and bypassing of local authorities. Four national plans were 
then presented suggesting efforts were being made to address policy gaps 
revealed by the floods on areas that include strengthening economic and 
social development, water management, and disaster prevention, 
mitigation and risk reduction activities. The layer concluded with analysis 
of the economic impact of the flood, concluding that daily wage earners 
were one of the most impacted groups, and that greater livelihood 
support was necessary to assist poorer people to meet basic needs.  
 
The movements and public open spaces layer analysed the use of roads 
and pubic open spaces during the flood, concluding that transport mobility 
was essential for enabling income generation to continue. A number of 
key informants in the Bang Bua Canal travelled to functioning markets to 
buy goods for resale within their local neighbourhoods via home-made or 
donated rafts. While many of the public open spaces flooded, bridges 
untouched by the floodwater provided space for neighbourhood services 
to be carried out such as food kitchens and distribution centres. Valuables 
such a motorcycles were also stored in public open spaces. 
 
The plots layer analysed how the impact of the upgrading on individual 
and neighbourhood plots. Mortgages and land rental debts were frozen 
for one year, alleviating the financial pressures on people in the Bang Bua 
Canal, crucially reducing some of the financial risks associated with 
upgrading. In terms of governance, the plots layer highlighted how 
development mechanisms such as the Canal Network were essential to 
managing an efficient and effective response. The network became so 
important that it grew in membership from its original 17 neighbourhoods 
to 38 by the end of the flood. Linked to the success of the network is 
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leadership and the ability to self-organise in a way that is inclusive and 
participatory.  
 
The buildings and services layer analysed the ways in which the quality of 
a building determined vulnerability to flooding and the role of government 
in meeting basic needs during the flood. One of the key conclusions from 
this layer is that low-income people in the canals were one of the worst 
affected groups because flooding first began in the canals and lingered 
there the longest. The most vulnerable groups included people who lived 
in one-storey homes, were unemployed, illegal migrants or had mobility 
challenges such as the elderly, children and PLWD.  
 
A primary coping strategy for such people was to move to evacuation 
centres to access services and meet basic needs; however, ‘hidden’ 
populations such as migrants were not assisted through evacuation 
centres and were at risk of being forgotten by response agencies.  
 
Finally, the building and services layer concluded that while district 
government authorities were primarily responsible for looking after the 
needs of the neighbourhoods in their areas, they lacked experience in 
disaster response, resources to meet needs and were often not 
coordinated with when agencies and private individuals provided 
assistance.  
 
This analysis in this chapter highlights that preparedness and response 
actions within the Bang Bua Canal were more coordinated and effective 
than those by the government at the district, municipal and national level. 
The evidence supporting this conclusion is found at the different 
morphological layers, suggesting that over a decade of development work 
targeting social, economic and governance structures enabled canal 
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dwellers to adapt their systems to a flood event with an overall degree of 
success.  
 
However, the actions and activities of individual neighbourhoods differ 
from one location to the next, depending on the neighbourhood’s history, 
its social dynamic, governance structures and economic arrangements. 
How and why do they differ?  
 
The next three chapters focus on individual case studies of upgrading 
actions before the flood and how the systems adapted during and after. 
The case studies seek to answer understand the drivers of resilience within 
each individual neighbourhood. 
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Chapter seven  
Case study one – analysis of Bang 
Bua Neighbourhood 
 
 
Introduction 
The next three chapters will analyse individual case studies, starting with 
the Bang Bua Neighbourhood in this chapter. This chapter specifically 
seeks to analyse ways in which economic, governance and social CAS 
influence different morphological layers in order to establish dimensions 
of resilience before, during and after the flood in Bang Bua 
Neighbourhood.   
 
The chapter begins with a profile of Bang Bua Neighbourhood. It then 
seeks to explain how economic, governance and social systems interacted 
at four morphological layers before, during and after the 2011 flood. 
Concerning the topographical layer it is explained that, due to the small 
geographical space of the case studies, typological analysis for all three 
neighbourhoods can be found in Chapters Five (everyday risks in the Bang 
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Bua Canal) and Six (the impact of the 2011 flood). Regarding the 
movement networks and public open spaces layer, analysis shows the 
importance of investment before and after a disaster in order to ensure a 
basic level of functionality occurs during a crisis. The plots layer 
demonstrates the value of transparent and accountable economic and 
governance systems, and how high levels of trust are at the centre of 
making economic and governance systems work well. The buildings and 
services layer analyses the ways in which a strong built environment 
supports people during a disaster and aids in their economic and social 
recovery. Lastly, this chapter explains how the key findings were tested 
with the neighbourhood residents in order to validate the dimensions of 
resilience as perceived by residents in the Bang Bua Neighbourhood.  
 
Methodological approach of this chapter 
The methodological approach for the analysis of the Bang Bua 
Neighbourhood consisted of two main methods: morphological analysis, 
and coding (using of NVivo software). Maps with information about 
building use, upgrading plans, roads, electrical grids and pipelines for 
water and sewerage were the primary morphological tools used. Systems 
analysis was conducted primarily through coding with NVivo software to 
analyse key informant interviews and focus group discussions. 
Furthermore, where possible, contextual information gathered through 
key informant interviews, participant observation, PRA tools such as 
timelines of the flood and a household vulnerability assessment was also 
coded. Transect walks with residents were undertaken in order to 
triangulate information, and key observations were documented through 
journal writing.  
 
7.1 Neighbourhood profile 
Bang Bua Neighborhood is well known for its upgrading success, and is 
often visited by other neighbourhoods participating in upgrading and 
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researchers as a study of good practice. It registered as a formal 
neighbourhood in 1993 (BB4, an middle-aged man). There are 229 
households, most of which were reconstructed during the upgrading 
programme within three years, of which one year consisted of building a 
collaborative community vision and land sharing negotiations. The 
neighbourhood agreed to join the Baan Mankong programme, to form a 
savings group and to legally register as a cooperative. The cooperative 
negotiated a 90-year lease agreement for the land. As shown in Figure 
7.1.2 below, the neighbourhood shares a property line with a military 
base. Bang Bua Neighbourhood residents come from a range of 
backgrounds. Approximately ten per cent of the people work for the 
government, ten per cent as employees in businesses and 70 per cent as 
daily wage earners (KI20, a middle-aged woman on the leadership team, 
confirmed by other interviewees). A total of 20 households were 
interviewed in the research resulting in a baseline survey of eight per cent. 
Three focus group discussions were also conducted; the first with 18 
people on 21 February 2014, the second with 13 people on 2 March 2014 
and the third on Aug 10 2014 to test findings with 13 people.  
 
Before the 2011 flood affected the Bang Bua Canal, people from the 
leadership committee traveled to the north of Thailand to support peer 
groups from the Baan Mankong Network, who were already experiencing 
the flood. Interviews with local residents determined that the flood lasted 
for three months in Bang Bua Neighbourhood. The water started off at a 
level of approximately 0.6 meters, and after a month reached between 1-
1.5 meters before it began to slowly recede (BBFGD2). Seven days passed 
before external assistance arrived in the neighbourhood (BB4, a middle-
aged man in leadership; BBFGD2). Ensuring people had enough food was 
one of the key issues raised by residents (BBFGD2). The other most 
frequently raised issue was finding money after the flood to pay debt, 
restart livelihoods and repair homes. Figure 7.1.1 below is a photograph of 
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Bang Bua Neighbourhood in 2014, three years after the flood event took 
place. Figure 7.1.2 is a building use map from the Bangkok Metropolitan 
Authority that shows Bang Bua Neighbourhood located between a military 
base and the Bang Bua Canal. Having described Bang Bua’s 
Neighbourhood profile, the chapter will next analyse the topography layer.  
 
 
 
Figure 7.1.1 Bang Bua Neighbourhood shows no signs of the 2011 flood, three 
years after the event took place. Source: the author  
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Figure 7.1.2: A building use map from the Bangkok Metropolitan Authority that 
shows Bang Bua Neighbourhood located between a military base and the Bang 
Bua Canal. Residential buildings are indicated in yellow. Source: (Department of 
City Planning, 2014a).  
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7.2 Topography 
Due to the small geographical location of the research of three kilometres, 
the topographical analysis of the entire Bang Bua Canal was conducted in 
Chapters Five and Six through a systems and morphological analysis of 
Bangkok, and will therefore not be repeated in this chapter. This chapter 
will now focus its discussion on Bang Bua Neighbourhood’s movement 
networks and public open spaces in order to investigate dimensions of 
resilience.  
 
 
7.3 Movement networks and public open spaces 
Analysing movement networks and public open spaces creates further 
understanding of how Bang Bua Neighbourhood links with wider mobility 
and public open spaces in Bangkok. During the flood, roads, streets, 
pedestrian lanes and public open spaces used by residents from Bang Bua 
Neighbourhood were submerged in water. While movement networks and 
public open spaces did not play a large role during the flood, they were 
significant in building resilience before and after the flood.  
 
7.3.1 Road accessibility  
The roads in Bang Bua Neighbourhood received little to no damage during 
the flood due to robust, sustainable construction techniques used in the 
neighbourhood upgrading as shown earlier in a photo in Figure 7.1.1. 
Therefore, when the water receded, residents were able to immediately 
access parts of the city to purchase food and water, resume employment, 
attend school and carry out daily life.  
 
Before the upgrading occurred, one key informant, an academic, described 
Bang Bua Neighbourhood’s pedestrian lanes as ‘narrow and twisted’ 
(KI30). Today, Bang Bua’s main pedestrian lane is made of concrete, is 
three meters wide and 629 meters long, and is situated parallel to the 
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canal (as shown below in Figure 7.3.1a). The lane is covered with 
intermittent humps to protect pedestrians from motorcycles traveling too 
quickly. The canal-based pedestrian lane was built after houses moved 
from the canal bank onto land. The sides of the canal were reinforced to 
prevent subsidence and an elevated pedestrian lane was built. This lane is 
a source of pride for the Bang Bua Neighbourhood, and was often 
mentioned as an indicator of success by residents from Saphan Mai and 
Roi Krong Neighbourhoods.  
 
The smaller alleyways, also made of concrete, are two meters in width and 
537 meters in length, and are built around mini blocks to further open up 
access as shown in Figure 7.3.1a below. The main entrance to the 
neighbourhood is from Phaholyothin Road, Soi 49/2, through a military 
base. It is a shortcut into the neighbourhood negotiated by a former 
neighbourhood leader and a local politician (Wungpatcharapon and 
Tovivich, 2012b). Figure 7.3.1b below is a photograph of the new 
entranceway to Bang Bua neighbourhood via the military base shortcut. 
Prior to the development of the shortcut, access to Bang Bua 
Neighbourhood was through a much longer walk via a road on the 
southern side of the canal.   
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Figure 7.3.1a: This map of Bang Bua Neighbourhood indicates primary pedestrian 
lanes (with motorcycle access) in red and alleyways in yellow. Source: (Bang Bua 
Neighbourhood, nd-d) 
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Figure 7.3.1b: This photograph shows a pedestrian size entrance to Bang Bua 
Neighbourhood via the shortcut through the military base. Source: the author  
 
7.3.2 Public open spaces  
Public open spaces such as playgrounds and open green spaces around the 
library and community building were flooded and therefore unusable for 
the duration of the flood. However, they were essential for 
neighbourhood residents to access during their recovery as a means of 
‘returning to normal’. For example, at the centre of the neighbourhood 
lies a designated open space next to a sacred Tamarind tree shown on a 
map in Figure 7.3.1c and in a photograph in Figure 7.3.1d below. Usually 
20-25 children up to the age of 12 play together in this open space 
between 17:00-19:00 on a daily basis. The children use the tops of bottles 
or their own shoes to play games, oftentimes supervised by a group of 
socialising adults. A child returning to his or her regular routine is an 
important way to establish a sense of stability after a disaster 
(Phongnonsung and Borchard, 2012). A second public open space often 
used is the compound around the community centre where adults tend to 
meet and have conversations while children play with outdoor 
recreational equipment (shown in the map in Figure 7.3.1c below). A third 
space is in front of the library, also indicated in Figure 7.3.1c below.    
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Figure 7.3.1c: This map of the planned reconstruction in Bang Bua 
Neighbourhood indicates houses in orange and public open spaces located in 
front of the library in blue (top), at the community centre (middle) and next to 
the Tamarind tree (bottom). Source: (Bang Bua Neighbourhood, nd-e)  
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Figure 7.3.1d: A photo of the open public space that was cleared for children to 
play safely in the centre of the neighbourhood instead of in parking lots. Source: 
the author 
 
 
Having discussed the influence of economic, governance and social CAS on 
roads and public open spaces, several key dimensions of resilience stand 
out. Firstly, improvement in the quality of roads and public spaces resulted 
in a safer environment. Secondly, social identity was enhanced through 
feelings of pride for having achieved a pedestrian lane that runs parallel to 
the canal. Thirdly, construction of safer roads and public open spaces 
arose from the neighbourhood’s ability to take collective action. Fourthly, 
a sense of social cohesion assisted the neighbourhood with taking 
collective action to build safer lanes and new public open spaces. This 
chapter will now focus on the way in which plots in Bang Bua 
neighbourhood were influenced by CAS before, during and after the flood.  
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7.4 Plots  
Having explained the key dimensions of Bang Bua Neighbourhood’s 
movement networks and public open spaces before, during and after the 
flood, this section on plots will now interrogate the ways in which the 
plots layer changed over time.  An analysis of the way in which CAS shaped 
and transformed plots in Bang Bua Neighbourhood are presented.  
 
A land rental agreement was secured for Bang Bua Neighbourhood in 
2004, allowing residents to make significant investments in economic, 
governance and social systems that seemingly contributed to a more 
effective response to the flood and a quicker recovery time. Before the 
flood struck, architects, planners and development workers from CODI 
collaborated with Bang Bua Neighbourhood residents to re-order 
neighborhood plots. The neighborhood developed categories such as a 
‘pet friendly zone’, which was far away from the ‘party zone’ because 
animals tended to get upset by the noise from party makers (BB20, a 
middle-aged woman). Families and friends were given the option to 
remain where they were or to shift plots in order to live near one another. 
Figure 7.4a below shows the categories that were used as the basis for re-
blocking plots through participatory planning. Purple is people who were 
willing to sacrifice their land; pink for a group of people that liked 
gambling; yellow for ‘landlords’ who rented out rooms in their homes and 
were the last ones to join the upgrading; blue for another group of owners 
that identified itself differently from the yellow group; green for vendors; 
and orange for relatives of people living in the next neighbourhood. Not all 
residents in the neighbourhood agreed to participate at the start, but the 
programme went ahead with the belief that others would participate once 
they saw physical evidence of positive change. Figure 7.4b shows how the 
plots looked after 100 per cent of the re-blocking took place. Each 
household agreed to pay 50 Baht per month towards the cost of renting 
the land (BB1, an elderly man; BB20, a middle-aged woman).  
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Figure 7.4a: A map of Bang Bua Neighbourhood before the re-blocking of plots 
took place. Each colour signifies a group of houses that shifted their plots to live 
next to each other. Source: (Bang Bua Neighbourhood, nd-a)  
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Figure 7.4b Bang Bua Neighbourhood after 100 per cent of the re-blocking. 
Source: (Bang Bua Neighbourhood, nd-e)  
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7.4.1 Savings groups 
The neighbourhood savings group was active before, during and after the 
flood. Years before the flood occurred groups such as a women’s catering 
enterprise, a construction workers group and a youth club were formed 
during the upgrading process. The groups gave an otherwise economically 
vulnerable group of people an opportunity to build social capital, earn 
extra income and learn new skills. One academic key informant said, 
‘during the neighbourhood construction they [CODI and its partners] 
engaged a lot with jobless youth and women. Residents became skillful 
builders after the programme, and that has become an occupation for 
former jobless residents. I think it was a very rich experience for residents’ 
(KI30, 2014).  
 
During the flood, money saved for welfare activities enabled basic needs 
to be met through the establishment of a food kitchen. After the flood 
receded, access to loans through the savings group made it possible for 
people to repair damage to their homes or use cash in hand to re-start 
their small businesses such as food vending. An overwhelming majority of 
people interviewed said one of the biggest challenges during the flood was 
unemployment, but received supplementary income from some of the 
livelihood activity groups started up years before the flood.  
 
After the flood some people said they went back to their previous jobs but 
relied on supplementary income from the livelihood groups that were set 
up during the upgrading (BB6, a middle-aged woman; BB18, a middle-aged 
woman). Therefore, livelihood skills and activities that were started before 
the flood occurred proved to be a financial cushion for people who needed 
to diversify their income generation strategies after the flood. The 
livelihood groups provided a flexible way for people to earn additional 
cash to supplement their individual income earning activities.  
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7.4.2 Governance structures  
Due to the large size of the neighbourhood, sub-committees were initially 
set up to collect census data about the households to assist with 
upgrading activities. During the flood, the data census sub-committee 
system started back up but adapted itself to the flood by collecting 
information about needs in relation to food and non-food supplies such as 
medicine and hygiene products. It therefore became an important 
mechanism for monitoring and responding to needs. One sub-committee 
leader was assigned responsibility for tracking information related to four 
to five nearby households (BB18, middle-aged woman). The sub-
committee leader was expected to attend a small number of community 
meetings in order to update information on needs and people evacuating 
or returning to the neighbourhood. The sub-committee leaders were also 
asked to be present when aid was delivered and divided in order to 
establish an additional layer of transparency and accountability (BB18, 
middle-aged woman; BB4 middle-aged man). Therefore, evidence of pre-
existing neighbourhood governance structures adapting to guide the flood 
response of the neighbourhood can be seen. 
 
Strong leadership was cited as a factor for increasing the efficiency of the 
flood response. As was stated earlier, people within the leadership team 
volunteered their time in a flooded area north of Bangkok to gain 
experience from their peers and set up a response system locally before 
the flood arrived. One academic key informant (KI30) believes that Bang 
Bua Neighbourhood’s strong leadership in the flood comes from ten years 
of problem solving chronic stresses together before the flood. He said, 
‘Because of Baan Monkong they [Bang Bua Neighbourhood] kept 
practicing problem solving together and became united at a deeper level. I 
think this was achieved not only by the group work, but also by the 
community leader himself. He contributed a lot’ (KI30, 2014).  
 
Chapter seven: case study one – analysis of Bang Bua Neighbourhood 
 
 
 
 
Page 241 
The elected leader of Bang Bua Neighbourhood was also selected to lead 
the Baan Mankong upgrading programme. The overlap in leadership is 
seen as a strength by most residents interviewed because it aligns the 
elected committee, recognised by the government, and the upgrading 
committee, ultimately improving the way they work together. According 
to one academic key informant (KI30), the leader demonstrated faith in 
the upgrading process, was the first to remove and rebuild his home, and 
exemplified selflessness by giving up seven personal plots of land for other 
people to occupy. As a result of his actions, the leader was viewed with 
great respect. The academic key informant said, ‘He [the leader] was the 
one who tore down his house first. That was one of the key triggers that 
convinced people. They had no excuses for backing out because the leader 
had assumed all the risk. He was smart enough to give people jobs to do in 
the design and construction phase … he has strategic thinking. The people 
he was leading were busy with their regular jobs. It's very skillful thing to 
lead people into extra work’ (KI30, 2014). 
 
Evidence of Bang Bua Neighbourhood’s strong leadership is also 
demonstrated by the strategic planning of their social welfare system. It 
soon grew beyond assisting with funeral costs and school fees into 
providing free social housing in low-rise apartment blocks for elderly 
tenants, the only neighbourhood in the canal known to provide this level 
of support for the elderly. 
 
However well people in leadership positions preformed, there were still 
suspicions of corruption (BB2 a middle age-woman; BB20 a middle-aged 
woman). As one member of the leadership committee said, ‘People are 
suspicious when we buy something new. We have to prove that the 
cooperative’s account balances and be open to answering questions about 
finances from anyone’ (BB2, 2014).  
 
Chapter seven: case study one – analysis of Bang Bua Neighbourhood 
 
 
 
 
Page 242 
Politics reflecting the political unrest in in Bangkok in 2014 were described 
as having the potential to cause a deep divide in this neighbourhood. 
While vote buying has been present in Bang Bua Neighbourhood for a long 
time, the political stakes were high in 2014 as protestors tried to remove 
the government from power. Supporters from the opposition and 
governing parties reside in Bang Bua Neighborhood, and reflected the 
political divisions in the country at the time. As one middle-aged man in a 
leadership role said, ‘Twenty years ago we used to be cousins and friends, 
but now we are separated by political differences because politicians buy 
votes here’ (BB4, 2014). He went on to describe the importance of putting 
politics away in order to achieve progress in the neighbourhood, ‘If we are 
strong enough we can be one in balance with politicians, not waiting 
around for them to support our development work’ (BB4, 2014).  
 
7.4.3 Social dynamics  
A high level of trust appeared to be evident throughout the 
neighbourhood before the flood. When asked why people trusted one 
another one middle-aged woman responded by saying, ‘we have trust 
here because certain people are strong and patient. To build trust you 
have to craft your words carefully, participate in activities to get to know 
one another and work together on important issues’. She cited the 
celebration of Mother and Father’s Day, and the use of the neighbourhood 
boat as special events that encouraged people to meet and build 
relationships.   
 
Physical progress from the Baan Mankong upgrading programme appears 
to have also developed trust amongst Bang Bua Neighbourhood residents. 
When one middle-aged woman was asked how she felt about the impact 
of the neighbourhood upgrading she said, ‘progress cannot cease; it makes 
me proud so I keep doing it’ (BB2, 2014, a middle-aged woman). Feelings 
of pride, respect and dignity were common words used to describe the 
progress of the upgrading work. Another middle-aged woman said, ‘I’m 
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proud of what we’ve done, even if I didn’t make any money from it’ (BB18, 
2014). Rewards of recognition were given to people who went beyond 
what was expected of them. For example, individual waste management 
awards can be seen on placards on the front doors of some houses, 
incentivizing families to continue with wise waste management processes. 
Another middle-aged woman reflected that there was less conflict now 
that plot boundaries were clear. She said, ‘in the past there were daily 
fights about who could access and use certain areas’ (BB20, 2014). 
 
Overall, the ability to self organise appeared to be empowering for Bang 
Bua Neighbourhood. As one focus group discussion concluded (BBFGD2), 
children have more protection now that they play in the protected public 
space instead of parking lots, people have more and better jobs, some 
homes can afford the Internet and there has been a reduction in social 
problems such as fewer arguments and less drug trafficking. In summary, 
social dynamics within Bang Bua Neighbourhood improved as levels of 
trust increased between residents.  
 
Having explained the influence of different economic, governance and 
social CAS in the plots over time, several key dimensions of resilience can 
be identified. Firstly, the presence of land tenure made investment in 
individual and neighbourhood infrastructure and systems a secure 
investment. Secondly, a transparent and accountable savings group made 
it possible for residents to access affordable loans.  
 
Thirdly, an effective neighbourhood governance structure managed the 
upgrading process and other day-to-day neighbourhood issues. Fourthly, a 
high degree of social capital was developed through collective activities.  
The next section discusses the ways in which CAS shaped buildings and 
access to services over time.  
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7.5 Buildings and services  
Effective economic, governance and social processes created strong 
buildings and services that were able to withstand the flood and allowed 
the community to ‘bounce back’ quickly. This section explains the qualities 
of the homes and their access to electricity and water as well as the way in 
which the community centre was at the heart of the flood response and 
remains important to this day.  
 
7.5.1 Robust homes  
Most of the residents in Bang Bua Neighbourhood remained in their own 
homes when the flood hit. Almost all of the houses have at least two 
stories (as shown in Figure 7.5.1b), giving families a place to retreat to 
from the floodwater. As discussed in the plots section above, basic needs 
were met through voluntary work carried out by sub-committee leaders. 
Ultimately, conditions within Bang Bua Neighbourhood were better than 
those in the evacuation centres.  
 
After the floods, houses received minimal damage due to strong, concrete 
foundations and good overall construction. Floodwater damaged 
household items such as beds, furniture and doors, but none of the houses 
collapsed, as was the case in other neighbourhoods. Residents spent their 
own savings and government flood compensation money to repair the 
damage to their homes.  
 
Prior to the flood, housing radically changed in Bang Bua Neighbourhood. 
Since 2004 many of the wooden shanties have transformed into to well-
constructed homes. Most of the homes now have two stories; wealthier 
families have three stories. While the design may differ, the structures all 
have concrete floors and walls as shown in Figure 7.5.1a below. Nearly all 
of the homes in the neighbourhood measure five meters by ten meters 
squared, and were built with loans of up to 150,000 Baht (GBP 2,779). 
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Families with more than eight people have homes that are seven and a 
half meters by ten meters squared with loans of up to THB 186,000 (GBP 
3,445). Loans were granted to people who could provide a ten per cent 
down payment.  
 
Size Cost in Baht  Total Cost 
GBP 
Yearly Cost Daily Cost 
5x10 150, 000 
Baht 
£2,779.00 £185.00 £0.50 
7x10 186,000 Baht £3,445.00 £230.00 £0.63 
 
Table 7.5.1: A table of the size of houses built in Bang Bua Neighbourhood and 
the costs associated. Source: the author 
 
 
Terraces and balconies are common across most of the houses. Groups of 
friends meet and socialise on their terraces or ‘sala’, a Thai word used to 
denote a gazebo-like structure that provides shade from the sun. Elderly 
people socialise together on the ‘sala’ while they look after young 
children. Several of the ‘sala’ are located on the canal bank, not having 
moved during the redesign or having been built subsequent to the 
reconstruction of the neighbourhood. 
 
Making vulnerable homes safe 
When asked to explain what a strong, safe house looked like, eight people 
in a focus group discussion (BBFGD2) were asked to draw houses (Figure 
7.5.1a) indicating qualities that are frequently seen in the neighborhood 
(Figure 7.5.1b). Their perceptions of ‘strong’ and ‘safe’ were for the most 
part realised by the reconstruction of houses through Baan Mankong’s 
upgrading.  
 
Many of the values of a strong house related to flood risk reduction. For 
example, a cement foundation was prioritised because it was able to 
withstand flood damage better than wood; it also made a house safe from 
fire. Having a house with two stories was valued because it permitted the 
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storage of valuables out of reach of floodwater. A toilet on the first floor 
was also prioritised because it ensured continued use of a toilet in the 
event of a future flood.  
 
A terrace for outdoor living was also listed as important because it was a 
primary place for socialising as shown in Figure 7.5.1c. Lastly, mobile 
furniture instead of the type of furniture built in into the wall was deemed 
crucial for avoiding flood damage. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
  
Figure 7.5.1a: A drawing of strong, safe houses, created during a focus group 
discussion (BBFGD2) with eight Bang Bua Neighbourhood residents. The drawing 
highlights the difference between perceptions of a strong home (blue) and a weak 
one (red). Source: Bang Bua FGD2 on 2 March 2014 
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Figure 7.5.1b: Qualities described in the picture created by participants in the 
focus group discussion mentioned above can be seen in the actual houses in Bang 
Bua Neighbourhood. For example, two and three storey homes with cement 
foundations and frames as shown in this photo of Bang Bua Neighbourhood. 
Source: the author 
 
 
 
 
Figure 7.5.1c: A terrace or ‘sala’ for outdoor socialising was listed as an important 
quality of a house. Source: the author  
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Making vulnerable people safe – the role of welfare homes  
Older people with mobility constraints live on the bottom floor of two 
apartment blocks built for people who were previously renting rooms in 
Bang Bua Neighbourhood and who continue to do so today. The rules that 
govern the upgrading process state that people who have been renting in 
Bang Bua for a period of five years or longer have the right to stay in the 
neighbourhood by renting an apartment in one of two low-rise blocks of 
flats. After ten years the tenants are given the right to own the apartment. 
A total of 10 families currently rent (BB20, a middle-aged woman). The 
income from the rental payments in combination with an initial small 
grant from CODI (Wungpatcharapon and Tovivich, 2012a) finances the 
welfare homes occupied by the elderly.  
 
The process of building safer, stronger homes has fundamentally changed 
the way people in Bang Bua Neighbourhood see themselves. One 
academic key informant said, ‘Bang Bua is different from other 
communities like Roi Krong, because 100 per cent of the people moved 
their homes from the water. This process of reconstruction has changed 
the identity of the people from the core, and in the best of ways’ (KI30, 
2014).  
 
7.5.2 Access to services  
Access to running water and electricity was available to those who had 
two storey homes. Electricity was shut off on the bottom floor only. Toilets 
however, were much more problematic, as many people had toilets on the 
ground floor, and not on the second storey. After the floodwater receded, 
water, electricity and sanitation facilities worked as efficiently as they had 
before the flood.  
 
Electricity and water have been available in Bang Bua since 1985, but the 
upgrading enabled the development of an improved system whereby each 
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registered household now has a meter that monitors its consumption 
(BBFGD1; Bang Bua focus group discussion; BB1, an elderly man; BB2, an 
elderly woman; BB4, a middle-aged man) as shown in Figure 7.5.2a below. 
Each household also has access to water and a drainage system. The main 
water supply is a pipe 1.5 meters in diameter and 650 meters long. A sub-
water line one meter in diameter has been laid to reach the houses in the 
back of the neighbourhood as shown in Figure 7.5.2b. The main drainage 
system is 0.6 meters in diameter and 538 meters long. There is a smaller 
sub-drain that runs through the back portion of the houses as shown in 
Figure 7.5.2c. Each house has a septic tank that filers waste water before it 
enters the canal, thereby reducing the neighbourhood’s pollution 
footprint.  
 
 
 
Figure 7.5.2a: Meters for water and electricity (right) monitor consumption for 
individual households. Source: the author 
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Figure 7.5.2b: A map of Bang Bua Neighbourhood’s water supply shows the main 
pipe (indicated in solid green) is located on the canal side, and that smaller pipes 
(indicated in dotted green lines) have been laid to service houses further from 
the canal.  Source: (Bang Bua neighbourhood, nd-b)  
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Figure 7.5.2c: A map of Bang Bua Neighbourhood’s drainage system shows the 
primary drainage pipe (indicated in solid blue) is located along the canal, and that 
smaller pipes (indicated in dotted blue lines) have been laid to service houses 
further from the canal. Source: (Bang Bua Neighbourhood, nd-c) 
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As a result of formalising land tenure, daily garbage collection services 
have become available by a Bang Khen district government boat that 
empties bins placed on a small jetty that extends from the canal sidewalk 
(see Figure 7.5.2d). Residents are responsible for placing rubbish in one of 
several central collection points. On a weekly basis the Bangkok 
municipality clears the canal of weeds in order to improve the water flow 
and reduce flood risk (see Figure 7.5.2e).  
 
 
Figure 7.5.2d: The upgrading included a waste collection service by the district 
government. A government boat accesses the waste from a jetty. Source: the 
author 
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Figure 7.5.2e: Weekly weed collection by the municipal government improves 
canal water flow. Source: the author 
 
7.5.3 The role of the community centres 
Bang Bua Neighbourhood has two community buildings – a library and a 
community centre. The community centre was essential to coordination 
and collaboration throughout the flood response. Donations for Bang Bua 
Neighbourhood and the wider canal arrived at the community centre to be 
sorted and shared. Flood response meetings were held at the community 
centre throughout the three-month flood period. Furthermore, the 
community centre was a place where information such as census data and 
needs was stored and shared with response stakeholders. 
 
Prior to the flood, the community centre was essential to the growth and 
development of the economic and governance systems seen in the 
neighbourhood today. The community centre is a large multi-purpose 
building, funded partially by the community and partially by donations 
from different organisations and individuals (KI20, a middle-aged woman). 
It is located next to the main entranceway to the neighbourhood. 
Residents pass the community centre on a regular basis, and are free to 
use the garden and shrine located in the public open space that envelops 
the immediate parameter. Figure 7.5.3a below indicates the community 
centre is located next to the main entrance in blue. 
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Figure 7.5.3a This map shows Bang Bua Neighbourhood’s community centre 
(blue) is located near the main entrance. Source: (Bang Bua Neighbourhood, nd-
e) 
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The community centree in Bang Bua Neighbourhood is the biggest and 
most elaborate among the three neighbourhoods studied, so much so that 
it serves as the Bang Bua Canal Network’s meeting location. The centre is a 
two-storey building with the capacity to hold meetings for over 100 people 
in the lower level and up to 30 people in an air-conditioned room on the 
second storey. While the building is not yet finished, it has a small kitchen 
and toilet with running water on the second floor, and is in the process of 
building a large kitchen on the bottom level. The community centre is used 
by livelihoods groups discussed at the plots layer such as a woman’s small 
catering business and a youth group who use the rooftop to grow 
vegetables to sell to local schools. It is also used by the Bang Bua 
community network to host network meetings; by the community to 
update savings group members; and by children who use it as a 
playground. There is a plan to construct a nursery and a learning centre for 
children on the bottom floor (BBFGD1). Construction for such projects 
recommences when and as the neighbourhood can afford to expand. 
 
The second community building, shown in Figure 7.5.3b below, is a public 
library and is shared between Bang Bua Neighbourhood and its 
neighbouring community, Roonmai Pattana. The library has been built by 
the Bang Khen district authority as a pilot project. The district pays the 
equivalent of a GBP 132 per month salary to staff the library on a full time 
basis (Wungpatcharapon and Tovivich, 2012b). The library was not often 
frequented by children while the research was carried out because 
children were at school or seemed to prefer playing in the designated 
open space next to the sacred Tamarind tree.  
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Figure 7.5.3b: The façade of the public library in Bang Bua Neighbourhood (top) 
and the inside (bottom) showing a child friendly environment with books and 
table to read at. Source: the author 
 
Having explained the influence of economic, governance and social CAS in 
the building and services layer, several key dimensions of resilience can be 
identified. Firstly, robust homes reduced vulnerability to floods and other 
disaster risks. Secondly, the presence of welfare homes suggests strong 
welfare values were acted upon through good governance mechanisms 
and transparent savings groups at the plots layer. Thirdly, the 
formalisation of the neighbourhood and its buildings resulted in an 
improvement in the of quality services provided by the government such 
as electricity and water. Fourthly, community buildings offered a place for 
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neighbourhood collaboration, coordination and learning to take place. This 
chapter will now explain how the dimensions of resilience identified at 
different layers were validated.  
 
7.6 Validating findings  
As discussed in the morphological layers above, the relationship between 
CAS systems and different morphological layers revealed key dimensions 
of resilience within each layer. To test the validity of the dimensions, a 
focus group discussion was held with 13 residents in order to ascertain 
how strongly residents agreed or disagreed with the dimensions, and their 
reasons for doing so. Testing for contradictory or confirmatory 
observations (Eckstein, 2000) is important to ascertain the relevance of 
findings. The dimensions identified at the end of each morphological layer 
were shared in an FGD where neighbourhood participants were asked to 
agree or disagree, sharing reasons why. As a result of the original analysis 
and validation, four key conclusions stand out regarding Bang Bua 
Neighbourhood, and are presented below. 
 
Conclusion  
This chapter aimed to identify CAS patterns of influence at different 
morphological layers in order to establish dimensions of resilience before, 
during and after the flood in Bang Bua Neighbourhood. The chapter began 
with a neighbourhood profile of Bang Bua. It then analysed information in 
four layers covering topography; movement networks and public open 
spaces; plots; and buildings and services. From the original analysis and 
validation through FGDs four key conclusions stand out.  
 
Firstly, formalisation of the neighbourhood and its structures gave 
residents an opportunity to invest in their homes, social relationships and 
governance structures. When the flood struck, the neighbourhood had 
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stronger homes that could withstand the floodwater. However, the 
stronger homes were a symptom of a deeper cause of resilience, which 
leads to the second point.  
 
Secondly, Bang Bua Neighbourhood demonstrated that its economic 
systems could support residents during a crisis and provide welfare during 
periods of chronic stress. The emergency food kitchen and social welfare 
homes for the elderly are two such examples. The livelihoods groups 
organised before the flood gave some people supplementary income after 
the flood, providing a slight financial cushion.  
 
Thirdly, the process of reconstruction transformed Bang Bua’s social 
identity from its core. Investment in social events provided an opportunity 
for people to get to know one another. Problem solving chronic issues 
such as pollution, poor quality housing, access to better livelihoods gave 
people an opportunity to self organise, to connect and to participate in 
causes that can directly benefit them in the short and long-term.  
 
As the neighbourhood improved, a sense of pride in the changes grew. 
Awards of recognition were given for exceptional achievements such as 
waste management, which appeared to be as effective as offering a cash 
incentive. The ability to self organise arguably reduced the social problems 
in the neighbourhood because of the ability to adapt neighbourhood 
economic and political structures to meet evolving needs.  
 
Fourthly, transparent and accountable governance systems allowed the 
neighbourhood to protect and grow its economic investments. For 
example, the neighbourhood found it had a bigger political voice when it 
negotiated a shortcut through a nearby military base. The leadership in 
Bang Bua Neighbourhood is more decentralised than any of the other case 
studies. Before the flood, sub-committee leaders participated in collecting 
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and analysing neighborhood census date. During the flood this 
transferable skill helped people’s needs to be met and ensured the 
distribution of goods was carried out in a transparent and fair way. The 
leader took personal risks by giving away property, which built trust 
amongst residents. The leadership’s decentralised structure of involving 
several layers of people at different levels of activities seems to contribute 
towards Bang Bua Neighbourhood’s effective governance strategy.  
 
Having discussed the dimensions of resilience and drawn key conclusions 
in Bang Bua Neighbourhood, the next chapter will provide an analysis of 
the second case study – Saphan Mai Neighbourhood.  
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Chapter eight  
Case study two – analysis of Saphan 
Mai Neighbourhood 
 
Introduction  
This chapter seeks to understand how CAS systems influence and shape 
different morphological layers in Saphan Mai before during and after the 
2011 flood. It is similar to the last chapter where analysis of the specific 
ways CAS influence different morphological layers in Bang Bua 
Neighbourhood were analysed in order to identify dimensions of resilience 
before, during and after the 2011 flood. At the end of each morphological 
layer key dimensions of resilience in the second neighbourhood, Saphan 
Mai, are identified.  
 
The chapter starts with a profile of Saphan Mai Neighbourhood (known as 
Saphan Mai from here on) to give the reader key background details. It 
then moves to the topographical layer, reminding the reader that the 
topographical analysis was conducted in Chapters Five and Six because 
topographical analysis is most appropriate at a city scale. The chapter then 
discusses the movement networks and public open spaces layer, 
explaining the importance of mobility and its links to income generation. 
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Public open spaces are then analysed to determine their value in flood and 
non-flood times. Then, analysis of CAS patterns of influence at the plots 
layer explains the importance of transparent financial mechanisms, the 
flawed nature of Saphan Mai’s governance system and the social tensions 
within the neighbourhood. Analysis of the buildings and services layer, is 
then presented, identifying the buildings in Saphan Mai that were most 
vulnerable to flooding and the types that experienced less flood damage. 
Analysis is also carried out regarding Saphan Mai’s access to services and 
how that shaped the neighbourhood’s resilience. The chapter then 
explains the methodology undertaken for validating the dimensions of 
resilience with residents in Saphan Mai. 
 
Methodological approach of this chapter 
As with the first case study in Chapter Seven, the methodological approach 
for analysis of data from Saphan Mai consisted of two main methods: 
morphological analysis and coding (through the use of NVivo software). 
Coding through NVivo software was used to analyse key informant 
interviews and focus group discussions. Meanwhile, information from 
participant observation, transect walks, key informant interviews, and 
participatory mapping was used to conduct a context analysis. At the end 
of each day, observations were documented through journal writing.  
 
8.1 Neighbourhood profile  
Located in Lak Si District along the west side of the Bang Bua Canal, 
Saphan Mai is one of the smallest neighbourhoods along the Bang Bua 
Canal with 106 households located on land that is 235 meters in length 
and approximately 25 meters in width. The group of houses became an 
official neighbourhood in 2006 (SM9, an elderly man) when it registered 
with the district government. During the time Saphan Mai registered as a 
neighbourhood Lak Si district was encouraging houses in groups larger 
than 100 to register as a formal neighbourhood. New neighbourhoods 
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were then asked to elect a leader and a committee to govern the 
neighbourhood so the district authority had a clear partner to work with 
on its development aims (KI37, Lak Si District Authority). 
 
The neighbourhood took approximately 14 years to reconstruct all of its 
households through Baan Mankong. Part of this community did not trust 
the upgrading process or the leadership that guided it, entrenching it in a 
deadlock until the 2011 flood occurred. A total of 37 households were 
interviewed for this research (meaning 35 per cent coverage of 
households). The elected leader estimates that 35 per cent of people are 
daily wage earners; 30 per cent motorcycle taxi drivers; 10 per cent 
vendors; 10 per cent work at a shopping mall; 10 per cent are unemployed 
and five per cent are business owners. Saphan Mai is a legally registered 
cooperative and has a 90-year lease agreement on the land. Figure 8.1.a 
below shows Saphan Mai in the process of re-blocking and reconstructing 
the last phase of houses. Figure 8.1.b below shows a municipal building 
use map with Saphan Mai indicated by a black dotted line.   
 
 
Figure 8.1.a: Saphan Mai in the process of reblocking and reconstructing the last 
phase of houses. Source: the author 
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Figure 8.1b: A municipal building use map shows Saphan Mai residential buildings 
in yellow. Saphan Mai neighbourhood is indicated by a black dotted line. Source: 
(Department of City Planning, 2014d)   
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In preparing for the flood, the leader of Saphan Mai says the 
neighbourhood was able to prepare food for 10 days, although external 
assistance arrived within seven. The public announcement system was 
used to warn people that the floods were coming. Residents were advised 
to leave the area and live with relatives or friends, and to prioritise the 
evacuation of the disabled, sick people and children. The savings group 
offered to pay transportation fees for persons who needed to evacuate. 
Residents were also advised to prepare food and shut off electricity. Help 
was sought from a nearby monastery, from other neighbourhoods and 
from the Bang Bua Network. Local aid agencies provided food and non-
food items. The leader relied on his personal networks and arranged for 
friends to bring a pick-up truck of supplies from Roi Et, a city 500 
kilometres away.  
 
The main challenges faced in this neighbourhood were related to food and 
toilets. After the floodwater receded, the biggest challenge raised by most 
residents was making money to repair their homes, re-start their 
livelihoods and send their children to school. Today, according to a 
number of residents, the buying and selling of drugs is still the number one 
problem in Saphan Mai (SM1, a middle-aged woman; SM2, a middle-aged 
woman; SM3, an elderly woman; SM4, an elderly woman; SM 12, a 
middle-aged woman; SM 14, a middle-aged woman; SM16, a middle-aged 
woman;). While interviews were taking place, six police arrested an 
accused drug dealer.  
 
Having described Saphan Mai’s neighbourhood profile, this chapter will 
now focus on the topography layer.  
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8.2 Topography 
Due to the small geographical area of the case study, analysis of the 
topographical layer relating to Saphan Mai has already been covered in 
Chapters Five and Six where the economic, governance and social 
influences on the topography were explained in relation to the entire Bang 
Bua Canal. Therefore, the movement networks and public open spaces will 
be presented next for analysis.  
 
8.3 Movement networks and public open spaces 
After the flood, Saphan Mai expanded its road networks and invested in 
the development of open public spaces after all residents in the 
neighbourhood agreed to join the upgrading process. This section will 
explain the transformation of roads and public open spaces, including 
after the flood.   
 
8.3.1 Road accessibility 
There are three ways to access Saphan Mai. The first is by a wooden 
bridge that connects the neighbourhood to a nearby highway as shown in 
Figure 8.3.1a, and is accessed by pedestrians only. The second is through 
an apartment parking lot into Saphan Mai as show in Figure 8.3.1b. The 
third is around the back of the apartment block shown in Figure 8.3.1c. 
Before the upgrading occurred, one main road ran through the centre of 
the neighbourhood (as show in Figure 8.3.1d) with a collection of small, 
squiggly footpaths used to access houses beyond the main road.  
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Figure 8.3.1a: A wooden bridge from a main road offers pedestrian access to 
Saphan Mai. Source: the author 
 
 
Figure 8.3.1b: One entrance to Saphan Mai through an apartment parking lot. 
Source: the author 
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Figure 8.3.1c: A third entrance to Saphan Mai along the backside of an apartment 
block.  Source: the author  
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Figure 8.3.1d: There are three entrance points to Saphan Mai, starting with the 
bridge on the left, and two entrances through an apartment parking lot located in 
the centre of the map. Source: (Department of City Planning, 2014d) 
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The roads in Saphan Mai were completely submerged with water during 
the flood, and therefore transportation was primarily by boat. However, 
after the flood some residents agreed to shift their plots, giving Saphan 
Mai the opportunity to widen its main pedestrian lane and build several 
secondary lanes to improve accessibility to houses.   
 
Part of upgrading or ‘building back better’ after the flood meant expanding 
the length of the main road as people agreed to move their houses and 
change their plot shape and size. Smaller alleyways were introduced as the 
plots of the neighbourhood aligned into rows. Today the primary 
pedestrian lane is wide enough to accommodate a small motorcycle. 
Neighbourhood residents say they will request the BMA to construct a 
waterfront sidewalk like the one in Bang Bua Neighbourhood once the 
demolition of canal-based housing is complete (SM9, an elderly male 
engaged with leadership; SM22, an elderly male). The sidewalk can be 
seen as a potential social connector because it was desired by all 
interviewees, but for different reasons. One elderly woman wanted the 
sidewalk because it would make the neighbourhood look ‘beautiful for 
tourists’ (SM5, a young woman); others wanted it because it was scenic 
and prestigious like Bang Bua (SM10, an elderly woman; SM22, and elderly 
man; SM36, a young man); others expressed a perceived sense of reduced 
risk to flooding because the government has promised to build a retaining 
wall for the canal bank in addition to the sidewalk (SM14, a middle-aged 
woman; SM9, an elderly male). A map of the primary pedestrian lane and 
smaller alleyways is shown below in Figure 8.3.1e. Roads are indicated in 
gray.  
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Figure 8.3.1e: The main pedestrian lane runs through the centre of the 
neighbourhood, and is illustrated in gray. Although the map shows building use 
as recorded by the municipal government in 2009, the larger roads remain 
relatively unchanged. A more updated map was not available. (Department of 
City Planning, 2014d) 
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8.3.2 Public open spaces  
There is only one public open space in Saphan Mai, and it was not used 
during the flood because it was submerged. Instead, many of the 
distributions and flood related activities were arranged from the leader’s 
house at the centre of the neighbourhood (SM14, middle-aged woman; 
SM1, middle-aged woman; SM11, elderly woman).  
 
Some residents believed the use of the leader’s home for neighbourhood 
activities suggested corruption (SM11, elderly woman) while others who 
were more supportive of the leader felt it was an appropriate use of space 
(SM14, middle-aged woman; SM1, middle-aged woman). 
 
However, since before and after the flood, public open spaces were key 
spaces for people to earn money, make political decisions and to socialise 
in. The public open space is located at the centre of the neighbourhood, 
and is a place that was designed for children to play in, much like the 
space in Bang Bua Neighbourhood.  
 
The new space offers children safety and protection away from the 
apartment parking lot where they normally play. However, children do not 
use the open space and continue to play in the parking lot for reasons 
unknown to the adults interviewed. Instead, the space more frequently 
hosts neighbourhood meetings by the savings group or more general 
neighbourhood meetings such as the one picture below in Figure 8.3.2a.  
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Figure 8.3.2a: A photo of public space located at the centre of Saphan Mai is used 
for a meeting between residents regarding a funding proposal to the district 
authority for development activities. Source: the author 
 
 
Having discussed the influence of economic, governance and social CAS on 
movement networks and public open spaces, several key dimensions of 
resilience stand out. Firstly, from a governance perspective, the 
neighbourhood was made safer after it invested in new pedestrian lanes 
that made the neighbourhood more permeable, accommodating 
economic and social activity.  
 
Secondly, the central location of the public open spaces created space for 
hosting social and governance activities. This chapter will now present 
analysis of the key influences on the plots layer.  
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8.4 Plots  
Saphan Mai has been a legal cooperative renting land from the National 
Treasury Department since 2009, which has been the largest incentive to 
invest in the overall improvement of the neighbourhood and its plots. 
Before the flood struck 61 houses had gone through the reconstruction 
process. After the flood, an increase in trust in the governance system and 
growth in social capital influenced newcomers to join Baan Mankong 
(SM10, an elderly woman; SM14, a middle-aged woman).  
 
Today, all residents of Saphan Mai lease four Rai of land (1.6 acres / 6,400 
square meters) for 32,040 Baht (GBP 592) per year (SM9, an elderly man 
involved in leadership). Each household pays 18 Baht (GBP 0.33) per 
month, regardless of the size of their plot of land.  
 
The plot structure of Saphan Mai rapidly changed when the upgrading was 
set in motion in 2009. Some of the houses moved from the canal to the 
landside, and some did not. The map in Figure 8.4a below shows the 
neighbourhood before upgrading occurred. It identifies registered houses 
in brown and non-registered houses in orange. It also shows houses 
encroaching on the canal.  
 
After the flood 45 houses joined the upgrading process. As of 2014 the 
municipal government recorded building use as seen in Figure 8.4b 
however (which follows Figure 8.4a) many of the houses have since moved 
from the canal and re-organised on the landside.  
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Figure 8.4a: A map of Saphan Mai before the upgrading process began. Source: 
(Saphan Mai, 2004)  
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Figure 8.4b: building use as recorded by the municipal government in 
20091. This map depicts more houses on the canal than are actually 
present. However, a newer map reflecting the current position of all the 
houses was not available. 
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While development of the built environment has largely been achieved in 
Saphan Mai, it appears that the social fabric has been negatively affected 
in some places by the process. The neighbourhood is divided into two 
groups, and one of the consequences has been a decreased capacity for 
cooperation between the two. The conflict began with the introduction of 
Baan Mankong. There are three reasons why people did not want to join 
the programme. Firstly, some people were already happy with the 
condition of their homes. One person interviewed said knocking her home 
down would undo years of investment and improvement (SM10, an 
elderly woman). Secondly, some people did not trust the leader because a 
majority of the neighborhood is related to him, and supports his decisions 
automatically.  
 
Thirdly, others did not trust the Ban Mankong programme and the kind of 
debt it built; some people had migrated to the canal specifically because 
they did not have to pay for land or rent. Conflict also arose over how to 
treat renters, although people who had been renting in the area for longer 
than five years had the right to eventually own property (SM9, an elderly 
man on the leadership committee; SM19, a young woman). A local 
development worker from the area summarised the conflict as between a 
‘feudalist leader and those that don’t want Baan Mankong because they 
do not have the money to rebuild their homes’ (KI14, 2014, a local aid 
worker). Approximately 17 families (16 per cent of the neighbourhood) did 
not want to move ahead with the upgrading plans (SM9, KI14).  
 
8.4.1 Savings structures  
According to a local development worker (KI14), Saphan Mai was one of 
the last neighbourhoods along the canal to set up a savings group due to 
internal conflict and fear of debt. The savings group visited other 
neighbourhoods in the network to learn good practice before the group 
became active in 2009 (SM9, an elderly man; KI14, a aid worker). There 
Chapter eight: case study two – analysis of Saphan Mai 
 
 
 
 
Page 277 
are now 159 people in the savings group (SM9, an elderly man). The group 
is governed by a committee of 11 people, half of who must be present in 
order for a meeting to run. Loan requests must be submitted before the 
20th of every month; the committee meets to discuss the requests on the 
25th. When asked about the transparency of application approvals one 
person said,  ‘In this community everyone knows each other and who 
needs help in what way’ (SM16, 2014, a middle-aged woman). It appears 
there could be a better system for approving loans, such as establishing 
clear criteria and publicly announcing successful applicants in the interest 
of accountability. 
 
During the flood, the economic savings structures that were set up 
became a crucial element of survival. The neighbourhood savings group 
purchased food and water and set up a neighbourhood kitchen. 
Volunteers offered to cook, and residents from Saphan Mai and its 
surrounding areas accessed the kitchen (SM9, an elderly man). A 
government party also set up a food kitchen on a highway bridge near to 
Saphan Mai (SM22, an elderly man).  
 
Residents stressed that access to loans after the flood was key to 
restarting their jobs. One key informant from the leadership committee 
said 30-40 people borrowed money from the savings group at a reduced 
rate of five per cent instead of eight. The same person estimated that 
approximately 20 per cent of people seeking loans used a ‘Muslim loan 
shark’ that offered a rate of 20 per cent interest and that the others used a 
motorcycle mafia group offering loans at 24 per cent with a history of 
violence in response to unpaid loans (SM9, an elderly man). People who 
did not get access to government grants for home repairs were especially 
financially vulnerable, requiring money to fix their homes, pay school fees 
and restart their livelihoods.  
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While 45 homes were upgraded after the floods, residents did not report 
the start up of new livelihood groups like those formed in Bang Bua 
Neighbourhood during reconstruction. Income earning potential did not 
appear to increase with the re-blocking of plots and the reconstruction of 
houses as paid labourers did most of the reconstruction. In comparison to 
Bang Bua Neighbourhood, Saphan Mai residents have not taken the same 
opportunity to upgrade individual skill sets or form groups in the interest 
of better economic earning power. A large number of people continue to 
have a limited ability to meet basic needs due to low paying jobs (SM12, a 
middle-aged woman; SM11, an elderly woman). 
 
8.4.2 Governance structure  
Neighbourhood governance structures set up during the upgrading guided 
the flood response and the way in which resources were shared amongst 
residents. For the most part, residents felt the resources were shared 
equitably, and that the systems for sharing instilled newfound trust, so 
much so that one woman said that after witnessing the selflessness of the 
leadership she joined Baan Mankong because she trusted the leader (SM6, 
a young woman). Most residents interviewed stated that donations were 
announced on a public loud speaker before they took place. When the 
location changed, many said notifications were made. However, a small 
minority of people who were displeased with the leadership before the 
flood said they were unhappy with the way the donations were handled 
(SM10, elderly woman; SM11, elderly woman; SM12, middle-aged 
woman). The women reported that the neighbourhood leadership 
announced distributions late at night, requiring people to wade in deep 
water in the dark, giving an unfair advantage to people unable or unwilling 
to do so until daylight.  
 
Much can be said about the governance structures contributing towards 
the capacity for conflict in Saphan Mai. To begin with one family holds 
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some of the most crucial leadership roles within the governance structure. 
While the elected committee and the Baan Mankong committee are two 
entirely different structures, the same people are involved in strategic 
leadership positions in both. The leader of the Baan Mankong upgrading 
programme is married to the elected leader. Both were the first to take on 
their respective positions and are still the leaders today. In addition, the 
accountant for both committees is the daughter of the married leaders. 
The disenfranchised group of people in Saphan Mai say it is relatives and 
friends that keep the current team in power, and that the group of people 
who do not hold the same opinions as the leadership has been silenced 
(SM5, a young woman; SM10, an elderly woman; SM22, an elderly man; 
SM36, a young man). One development worker from the area confirmed 
that power rests with the Baan Mankong leader who grew up in Saphan 
Mai and ‘therefore has more connections, power and votes from relatives’ 
(KI14, 2014). Figure 8.4.2a presents a diagram that represents the 
governance structure in Saphan Mai that creates conflicts of interest.  
Figure 8.4.2a: A diagrammatic representation of the overlaps between a 
husband, wife and daughter who hold key leadership positions in Saphan Mai. 
Source: the author 
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According to one local aid worker key informant, the previous governance 
structure was uprooted when the Baan Mankong programme started 
(KI14). When asked about the history of the power dynamics in Saphan 
Mai, the aid worker said, ‘Before Baan Mankong there was another 
organisation doing work there [Saphan Mai]. Then Baan Mankong came 
and set up a new structure with a new person in power’ (KI14, 2014).  
 
8.4.3 Fluidity of social tensions 
The disaster became an opportunity for two disparate groups to work 
together towards a single cause: survival. One middle-aged woman spoke 
about how people became more ‘connected’ and had the chance to get to 
know each other because they were all in the same dire situation (SM1, a 
middle-aged woman). A spirit of volunteerism and sharing was essential to 
well-being as expressed by one middle-aged woman who had been against 
the upgrading process for years and changed her mind after the flood.  
 
She said, ‘Flooding taught me so many things. Money didn’t help me get 
food or friends, but friends shared their food, sadness and happiness. 
Living with other people during the flood made me realise I could share 
and sacrifice things like the area around my house’ (SM6, 2014).  People 
who could not cope with the flood at home moved to evacuation centres 
at a nearby temple and to Don Meuang airport, among other places. 
Families in extreme poverty said they relied upon loans from friends and 
employers as well as food donations from the nearby temple in crisis and 
non-crisis times (SM12, an middle-aged woman).  
 
Before and after the flood, social divisions were apparent from a spatial 
perspective. Those closest to the open spaces at the centre of the 
neighbourhood are supporters of the current leadership. The houses at 
the back of the community bordering Saphan Mai II, a different 
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neighbourhood, are home to families in opposition of the current 
leadership. Disenfranchised by the upgrading process, one long-term 
resident of Saphan Mai claimed that while the physical façade of the 
neighbourhood has improved, key relationships remain broken, a root 
cause of much of the social tension. The middle-aged woman said, ‘some 
of the houses changed after the flood. People had to rebuild parts of their 
houses; sometimes their whole house, but the same old issues and 
personalities remain. Some people do not have very giving hearts’ (SM16, 
2014). In summary, the 17 houses that opposed Baan Mankong were 
faced with an ultimatum: to leave if they could not afford to participate or 
begin to trust the process if they wanted to stay. One elderly man from 
the leadership committee said, ‘in a way the co-operative forced people to 
join: the cooperative sued people who don’t join because they were 
trespassing.  We threatened with action but in the end didn’t do it 
because we were able to settle through mediation’ (SM9, 2014).  
 
Therefore, after the flood, everyone in Saphan Mai began working 
together through participation in a savings group and a cooperative. 
However, conflict between Baan Mankong and non-Baan Mankong 
supporters remains. After the flood, it appears that social capital and trust 
increased for the 80 per cent who support the current leadership while 
approximately 20 per cent languishes in complaints about corruption and 
transparency, particularly during the flood.   
 
The plots layer explained the ways in which economic, governance and 
social CAS influenced changes in the built and natural environment at the 
scale of the plot. Based on the discussion it can be concluded that there 
are four key dimensions of resilience. The first is the presence of Saphan 
Mai’s secure land tenure, which has created stabile conditions for 
individuals to invest in neighbourhood infrastructure and systems.  
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The second is Saphan Mai’s moderately effective savings group, which 
struggled with transparency and accountability for many years before it 
became functional. The third driver is Saphan Mai’s moderately effective 
governance mechanism, which is built upon conflict of interests.  
 
The fourth is Saphan Mai’s limited ability to self-organise due to social 
tensions arising between the upgrading group and the opposition to it. 
The next layer will present analysis of the ways in which CAS transformed 
buildings and services in Saphan Mai.  
 
8.5 Buildings and services  
The flood interrupted existing tensions and processes within the 
neighbourhood. Ultimately, homes that did not participate in the 
upgrading process were most affected by the flood, demonstrating the 
long-term economic tradeoffs of upgrading physical infrastructure with 
the shorter-term financial burden of reconstruction. 
 
8.5.1 Strong homes versus vulnerable homes  
The homes most vulnerable to the impact of the flood were built of 
inexpensive, locally available materials that are climatically responsive to 
hot weather. Many such houses are built on wooden stilts on the canal. 
When the flood occurred, the stilts holding up the houses sunk and the 
wooden floorboards, walls and doors were water logged and rotted after 
being immersed in floodwater for three months.  
 
Canal-based houses were most often single storey, reducing the space for 
storing valuables out of the reach of the floodwater. Figure 8.5.1a shows 
an example of a vulnerable single storey wooden home built on stilts in 
Saphan Mai. 
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Figure 8.5.1a: A single storey wooden home built on stilts in Saphan Mai 
neighbourhood. This type of housing is vulnerable to flooding. Source: the author 
 
 
Homes less vulnerable to flooding were constructed from a mix of 
concrete, wood and brick with two stories as shown in Figure 8.5.1b. 
Before the flood struck, 65 such homes were built.  
 
The new houses typically have shingled roofs. Many of the houses in 
Saphan Mai do not have outdoor terraces due to space restrictions; those 
that do have noticeably smaller ones (Figure 8.5.1b).  
 
Many of the homes have worship shrines connected to them. The 
reconstruction of all the houses in the neighbourhood began in 2009 and 
by 2014 construction of the last seven homes was underway.  
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Figure 8.5.1b: Homes less vulnerable to the floods were the ones that were 
constructed from a mix of concrete, wood and brick as shown in the photo of a 
house frame on the left. Less vulnerable homes have two stories as shown in the 
photo on the right. Source: the author 
 
 
After the flood 45 houses were reconstructed. Some of the residents 
chose to participate in the upgrading because they saw the long-term 
economic gains of investing in a robust home (SM14, a middle-aged 
woman; SM16, a middle-aged woman; SM20, a young woman). For others, 
the ultimatum from the cooperative forced them to invest if they wanted 
to stay in Saphan Mai (SM9, an elderly man).  
 
The smallest house offered by the Baan Mankong programme is 3 x 7 
meters; the largest is a duplex of 3.5 x 9 meters, which is often co-owned. 
Loans over 300,000 Baht (GBP 5547) per house are not granted by CODI. 
Table 8.5.1a shows the yearly and daily cost of a loan in relation to the size 
of a house in Saphan Mai. 
 
 
Size Cost in Baht  Total Cost 
GBP 
Yearly Cost Daily Cost 
3 x 7 162, 171 
Baht 
£2,999.00 £200.00 £0.55 
3 x 9 186,763 Baht £3,454.00 £230.00 £0.63 
3.5 x 9 400,262 Baht £7,401.00 £493.00 £1.35 
 
Table 8.5.1a: Housing sizes and costs in Saphan Mai. Loans are calculated to a 15-
year period. Source: the author 
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8.5.2 Access to services  
During the flood, houses with two storeys had access to a basic level of 
electricity and running water. However, most houses were unable to use 
their toilets. Four portable toilets were donated by BMA, but were not 
used much because no one was responsible for cleaning them (SM 22, an 
elderly man).  
 
Black bags were used to store human waste and then thrown into the 
canal because waste removal services halted for three months. Drinking 
water was donated or purchased from the store. Some of the smaller 
shops nearby ran out of supplies. Larger grocery stores still carried bottled 
water but the journey there was often difficult, expensive and time 
consuming (SM2, a middle-aged woman).  
 
However, access to services such as electricity and water was not an issue 
before the flood or after. Running water came to Saphan Mai in 2002 after 
an arrangement was made with politicians who promised the service 
would be provided to the area if they won office (SM9, an elderly man). 
Before that time people used water from the canal or purchased it (SM9, 
an elderly man). Today, drinking water is purchased, either from stores or 
from a vending machine located at the centre of the neighbourhood. 
Wealthier individuals own their own washing machines, refrigerators and 
air conditioners.  
 
According to a member of the leadership committee, Saphan Mai has had 
access to electricity since 1974 (SM9, an elderly male). Due to the fact that 
all the homes in the neighbourhood are now registered, they therefore 
have the legal right to access water and electricity. Each house is equipped 
with its own meter. Sewerage tanks (as shown in Figure 8.5.2a) have been 
installed in the new homes, regulating sanitation practices and therefore 
reducing the amount of pollution entering the canal. The district 
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government collects rubbish from communal bins on a weekly basis. 
Figure 8.5.2b shows the rubbish collection point next to the tent in the 
public open space at the centre of the neighbourhood.  
 
 
 
Figure 8.5.2a: Sewerage tanks pictured in front of the community building are 
fitted into the newly reconstructed homes. Source: the author 
 
 
 
 
 Figure 8.5.2b: A rubbish collection point next to the tent at the centre of the 
neighbourhood. Source: the author 
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8.5.3 Access to community centres  
There are two community centres in Saphan Mai. Neither was used during 
the flood as a central hub for response activities, perhaps because they 
were not possible to reach by vehicle. The way in which the first 
community centre was used after the flood further reflects the social 
divisions within the neighbourhood.  
 
The community centre is indeed used for community activities, but by a 
selective group of people who manage the administrative side of the 
upgrading and neighbourhood development work, making the usage of 
the building seem exclusive. The building is dual purpose. Saphan Mai 
residents refer to it as ‘the office’, however the neighbourhood received 
donations of 100,000 Baht (GBP 1,849) from World Vision Thailand, a 
national NGO, to build a health centre (KI17, a local aid worker). The 
district government contributed 150,000 Baht (GBP 2,774) to build a 
community centre (KI34, a person in a neighbourhood leadership role).  
 
The two-storey concrete building has a chain link fence around its 
perimeter and a locked gate. Inside it hosts three desks, two computers 
and paperwork related the upgrading. The upstairs area of the building is 
used to store goods because it is too hot to use as a workspace during the 
day without air conditioning, which is not installed.  
 
At the time of research an elderly woman was living on the top floor for 
several months while she awaited the completion of her new home. The 
courtyard inside the compound is approximately three meters by four 
meters and at the time of research was storing equipment for the 
reconstruction of the seven remaining homes.  
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Figure 8.5.3a: A two-storey community building where administrative work takes 
place. Source: the author 
 
The second community centre (shown in Figure 8.5.3b) is a tented area 
situated next to the open public space where meetings are held. The tent 
was donated by World Vision Thailand, and provides a respite from the 
sun. However, a member of the leader’s extended family, for personal 
economic gain, appears to have appropriated the space by setting up a 
permanent food stand with two tables to serve customers as shown in 
Figure 8.5.3c. A chain and lock is used to close the space when the food 
stand owner is not present. Motorised toys belonging to the leader’s 
toddler grandchild are also stored in the area when it is locked up. When 
different key informants were asked what the intended use of the tent 
space was, several different answers were given.  
 
A key informant from an NGO working in the area said (KI17) said the 
space was for neighbourhood gatherings and activities; a relative of the 
leader’s family (SM8, elderly woman) said the was space for households to 
park their motorcycles (although no evidence of this was observed by the 
researcher); others said the space was claimed by a relative of the leader 
who set up a food stall to earn money (SM6, a young woman; SM10, an 
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elderly woman; SM11, an elderly woman; SM16, a middle-aged woman). 
The misappropriation of space has created a sense of mistrust and 
suspicion for some residents unrelated to the leader, and is part of the 
reason some residents delayed their participation in the Baan Mankong 
upgrading.  
 
 
Figure 8.5.3b: A view of the World Vision Thailand tent intended to be used as a 
community building but is instead host to a food stall for personal economic gain. 
Source: the author 
 
 
Figure 8.5.3c: Saphan Mai residents frequent the food stall that is set up in an 
area designed as a community building. Source: the author 
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Having explained the influence of economic, governance and social CAS in 
the building and services layer, several key dimensions of resilience can be 
identified. Firstly, only some of the housing was flood resistant. Many 
people evacuated their homes in order to find adequate shelter and 
access to services during the flood. Secondly, the community building use 
was not equitable with exclusive access given to office space for 
neighbourhood committee personnel.  
 
The people in power limited economic opportunities arising from building 
use to those who were relatives or friends. Thirdly, the inequitable use of 
space created tensions within the neighbourhood limiting growth of social 
capital. The next section will explain how the dimensions of resilience 
identified at different layers were validated.  
 
8.6 Validating findings  
The dimensions that were identified at the different morphological layers 
of Saphan Mai were validated with eight neighbourhood residents in a 
focus group discussion.  
 
The discussion assisted to clarify which of the dimensions within the CAS 
were the most influential before, during and after the flood in Saphan Mai. 
A statement about the dimensions was read out loud, and residents were 
asked to agree or disagree with the statement and provide reasons for 
their perceptions. The discussion validated the dimensions and higher 
level concepts under discussion. Key conclusions regarding resilience in 
Saphan Mai will be presented next in the conclusions section below.   
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Conclusion  
This chapter aimed to identify dimensions of resilience at different 
morphological layers based upon patterns of influence formed by CAS 
within each layer. Analysis was conducted before, during and after the 
flood struck Saphan Mai in order to account for the specific details within 
the complex inter-dependent and overlapping relationships between 
systems and morphology.  
 
To begin with the chapter gave a neighbourhood profile of Saphan Mai. It 
then explained that topographical information about Saphan Mai was 
already explained in Chapters Five and Six and was therefore not included 
in this analysis to avoid duplication. The chapter then presented analysis 
of the movement networks and public open spaces layer; the plots layer; 
and the buildings and services layer. A synthesis of the original analysis 
and the feedback from the validation process can be summarised in four 
key points.  
 
Firstly, the flood interrupted existing tensions and upgrading processes in 
Saphan Mai, offering an opportunity to test economic and governance 
structures with a development focus in a time of crisis. Overall, these 
mechanisms worked well. The savings group was essential during the flood 
by setting up a food kitchen and after the flood by providing access to 
loans with lower rates due to the crisis. The governance mechanisms were 
also adapted to meet crisis needs. Most people in Saphan Mai felt 
donations were share equitably and succeeded in building trust.  
 
Secondly, while the built environment has become physically less 
vulnerable with the incremental upgrading, tears in the social fabric 
prevent the entire neighbourhood from developing to its fullest capacity. 
When the cooperative gave the opposing households an ultimatum to 
participate or leave they set up a structure for reluctant participation to 
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occur. People who oppose the upgrading or dislike the leader are unlikely 
to participate in neighbourhood scale activities.  
 
Thirdly, the use of public open spaces and community buildings explains 
the monopoly of power the leadership committee has on the 
neighbourhood. The governance structures also support this finding due 
to the conflict of interests of a husband, wife and daughter holding key 
positions of power.  
 
Fourthly, the most vulnerable homes were the ones that were not 
upgraded. The legitimate right to occupy the land meant households were 
more willing to invest in high quality infrastructure that improves the 
overall livability and well-being of the neighbourhood by adding public 
open spaces, community buildings and stronger homes.  
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Chapter nine 
Case study three – analysis of Roi 
Krong neighbourhood 
 
 
Introduction  
This chapter analyses the specific ways in which economic, governance 
and social CAS influence four different morphological layers in order to 
establish dimensions of resilience before, during and after the flood in Roi 
Krong Neighbourhood.  
 
To do this, the chapter begins with a neighbourhood profile of Roi Krong, 
giving background to the neighbourhood. It then moves to the topography 
layer, reminding the reader that topographical analysis was conducted in 
Chapters Five (everyday risks) and Six (the impact of the 2011 flood). It 
then discusses the movement networks and public open spaces layer, 
explaining the economic and social opportunities that roads and open 
spaces created and the dimensions of resilience that can be observed. 
Interrogation at the plots layer explains the dimensions of resilience seen 
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in the relationships between economic, governance and social systems. 
Meanwhile, the buildings and services layer explains building usage and 
access to services, highlighting how conflict over Baan Mankong has 
shaped the buildings in the neighborhood. Finally, this chapter explains 
how the key findings were tested with residents of Roi Krong to validate 
the key dimensions of resilience identified in each layer.  
 
Methodological approach of this chapter 
This chapter uses the same methodological approach for analysis as was 
used in Bang Bua Neighbourhood and Saphan Mai. The methodological 
approach in Roi Krong Neighbourhood consisted of two methods: 
morphological analysis and coding (through the use of NVivo software). 
Maps with information about building use were the primary morphological 
tools used for Roi Krong. NVivo software was used to code analysis from 
key informant interviews and focus group discussions. Further information 
for coding was gathered through participant observation, key informant 
interviews and transect walks. Journal writing was used as a method for 
documenting observations and drawing connections between key themes.  
 
 
9.1 Neighbourhood profile 
Roi Krong is a Neighbourhood that developed under an eight lane highway 
and bridge; the neighbourhood runs adjacent to the highway, parallel to 
the canal. According to the elected leader, Roi Krong has 135 houses (125 
registered and 10 unregistered) living on eight Rai (1.28 hectares or 3.2 
acres) of land. It is 150 meters long and 25 meters wide, double the size of 
Saphan Mai with only 20 more households.  In 1986 the neighbourhood 
was formally registered with the Bang Khen district government, according 
to the leader of the Baan Mankong programme who has been living in the 
area for almost 60 years. A total of 28 households were interviewed, 
equating to approximately 22 per cent of the neighbourhood. Based on 
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direct observation of the houses and assets inside the homes, Roi Krong 
has more affluent families than Bang Bua and Saphan Mai. The elected 
leader estimates that approximately 50 per cent of the residents are daily 
wage earners working as vendors or labourers; 30 per cent work in office 
jobs and 10 per cent in governmental positions. Roi Krong is a 
neighborhood divided between those who participate in the Baan 
Mankong upgrading scheme (approximately 40 per cent) and those who 
oppose it (approximately 60 per cent).  
 
Figure 9.1a below is a photograph of Roi Krong. Low quality homes on the 
canal block the view of more affluent homes built on the landside of the 
neighbourhood. Figure 9.1b is a building use map that shows Roi Krong’s 
location along the canal perpendicular to the main highway.  
 
Figure 9.1.a: Roi Krong neighbourhood (left). Low quality homes on the canal 
block the view of more affluent homes built on the landside of the 
neighbourhood. Source: the author 
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Figure 9.1b: A building use map that shows Roi Krong’s location along the canal 
perpendicular to the main highway. Source: (Department of City Planning, 2014d) 
 
 
When the 2011 flood occurred, the floodwaters came at a gradual and 
steady pace. The leader of Baan Mankong had joined the Bang Bua Canal 
Network trip to the north to learn about flood preparedness and response. 
In a separate event, the elected leader in Roi Krong also volunteered in the 
north for flood response activities through his political affiliation. News of 
the flood came by word of mouth as well as from the TV and radio 
because Roi Krong’s public announcement speaker was not working. 
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Advice was given to prepare by stocking up on food and water, which was 
a challenge for people living day to day and could not afford to stock 
items. More people evacuated from Roi Krong than in the other two case 
studies. However, like the other two case studies, food, sanitation and 
unemployment were three of the biggest challenges during the flood.   
 
Having described Roi Krong’s neighbourhood profile and key aspects of 
the flood, an explanation of the topography layer will be provided next.  
 
9.2 Topography 
As stated in case one and case two, analysis of the topography layer was 
conducted in Chapters Five (covering everyday risk) and Six (covering the 
impact of the flood), and therefore will not be included in this chapter. 
Next, an explanation of the transformation of movement networks and 
public open spaces in Roi Krong is provided.  
 
9.3 Movement networks and public open spaces 
All of the lanes and public spaces in Roi Krong flooded. People primarily 
used boats to get around, and as a last resort waded through the water by 
foot using the neighborhood lane network. The state of the lanes and 
public spaces before the flood offers insights into a neighborhood conflict 
over Baan Mankong’s upgrading, which is much more entrenched than the 
one in Saphan Mai. Changes in the use of public open space suggest that 
since the flood each side has became further intent upon not engaging 
with the other.  
 
9.3.1 Movement networks 
Roi Krong has one narrow pedestrian lane that runs through the centre of 
it as shown in Figure 9.3.1a. The lane is wide enough to accommodate a 
small motorcycle. Several smaller alleys have been created in one pocket 
of the neighbourhood where re-blocking has occurred. Those who 
Chapter nine: case study three – analysis of Roi Krong 
 
 
 
 
Page 298 
participate in the upgrading programme would like to see a pedestrian 
lane built on the canal bank as has been done in Bang Bua Neighbourhood 
and is currently being undertaken in Saphan Mai, however houses on the 
canal prevent such infrastructure from being built. There are three 
entrances to Roi Krong as shown in in a map in Figure 9.3.1b. The first is 
from Chaeng Watthana highway, the second via a bridge in the middle of 
the canal, and a third from the Rajabhat university campus. There has 
been very little change in the road system since it first came into 
existence. An eight lane highway that narrows into a four lane bridge is the 
entrance of Roi Krong (see Figures 9.3.1c and 9.3.1d) . 
 
 
Figure 9.3.1a: Roi Krong has one narrow pedestrian lane that runs through the 
centre of it as shown in the photo above. Source: the author 
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Figure 9.3.1b: There are three pedestrian entrances to Roi Krong as shown in the 
building use map of Roi Krong above. Source: (Department of City Planning, 
2014d) 
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Figure 9.3.1c: An eight-lane highway is the primary entrance to Roi Krong. Source: 
the author 
 
 
Figure 9.3.1d: Access to Roi Krong is gained through a narrow lane that runs 
parallel to the bridge incline. Source: the author 
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9.3.2 Public open spaces  
Under the bridge incline there is a pocket of open space used for 
socialising and income generation. Stands selling vegetables, shoes and 
other merchandise experience heavy footfall due to residential homes to 
the left and right of the bridge (see Figures 9.3.2a and 9.3.2b). Directly 
underneath the bridge is a space where people gather to drink alcohol and 
play cards (Figure 9.3.2c). However, safety and security became a concern 
when the narrowest point of the bridge incline began to host drug users 
and homeless people seeking shelter for the night (RK13, an elderly 
woman). The Bang Khen district government has put up a mesh wire fence 
to prevent people from occupying the space under the bridge incline (see 
Figure 9.3.2d).  
 
 
 
Figure 9.3.2a: A view to the left of the bridge of the fruits and vegetables stands 
that are hosted in the open public space within the movement network in Roi 
Krong. Source: the author 
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Figure 9.3.2b: A view to the right of the bridge of the fruits and vegetables stands 
that are hosted in the open public space within the movement network in Roi 
Krong. Source: the author 
 
 
Figure 9.3.2c: The space under the narrow incline of the bridge is used for storing 
goods and socialising in Roi Krong. Source: the author  
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Figure 9.3.2d: A mesh wire fence has been put up to prevent homeless people 
and drug users from accessing the public open space in Roi Krong. Source: the 
author 
 
 
Having explained the use of movement networks and public open spaces 
in Roi Krong several dimensions of resilience can be identified. Firstly, a 
road network with narrow pedestrian lanes that do not permeate the 
neighbourhood contributes to a lack of safety. Secondly, narrow lanes 
limit space for socialising and economic activity. Furthermore, the 
presence of public open space presents opportunities for small-scale 
businesses and social gatherings to take place.  The fourth dimension 
identified is that the quality of the public open spaces influences the level 
of safety within those spaces driven by the types of activities carried out – 
such as drug use and drinking. This chapter will now present analysis of 
the dimensions of resilience within the plots layer.  
 
9.4 Plots 
Roi Krong spans an estimated 25 meters from the canal to the property 
line it shares with Rajabhat University. Within that space exists two rows 
of houses and a pedestrian lane. Generally speaking, the plot 
arrangements in Roi Krong achieve more privacy than Bang Bua 
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Neighbourhood and Saphan Mai due to taller fences made of concrete or 
closely slated wood, providing maximum privacy. Plots that cannot afford 
such expensive boundary indicators have used corrugated iron, bamboo 
sticks or rope to outline private property as shown in the photos in Figure 
9.4a below. Behind the gates and fences, many homes have a terrace or a 
private outdoor open space. Those on the canal have a terrace facing the 
water and those on the land have built their terrace looking onto the 
pedestrian lane, facing the canal based homes. 
 
  
Figure 9.4a: The blue cement fence (left) and the corrugated iron fence (right) are 
examples of the fences that surround outdoor living space in Roi Krong. Source: 
the author 
 
Land tenure has not been secured in Roi Krong. Figure 9.4b below is a map 
that shows the current layout of the plots, indicating registered and 
unregistered houses. Residents have not been able to work through Baan 
Mankong or their own mechanisms to reach a consensus about renting 
the land. Conflict exists around the ways in which the land should be 
shared and redistributed. At the core of the land disputes are complex 
economic, governance and social dynamics, which are explained in this 
layer.   
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Figure 9.4b shows a map of the current layout of the plots, indicating registered 
(brown) and unregistered (orange) houses. Source: (Roi Krong Neighbourhood, nd)  
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9.4.1 Parallel governance systems 
The flood highlighted two governance systems operating in parallel. Both 
structures sought to achieve the same goal of survival but chose different 
approaches. Within each system people reported that the flood gave them 
a chance to bond, build relationships and prove they could work together. 
For example, several people interviewed described sharing food, with 
people who belonged to either the elected leader and his supporters or to 
the Baan Mankong group. The Roi Krong’s Baan Mankong group was 
highly dependent on the larger Bang Bua Canal Network for assisting with 
procuring food and non-food survival items. Their savings mechanism was 
not strong enough to support the neighbourhood on its own, and 
therefore they relied on the larger canal network’s social safety net.  
 
The flood gave the newest form of leadership  – Baan Mankong – an 
opportunity to prove it was competent, efficient and trustworthy to the 
entire neighbourhood. One middle-aged woman from the upgrading group 
said, ‘I had never experienced helping people in this way. We loved each 
other a lot during that time and helped one another. People who were 
quarrelling stopped their quarrels and put them aside during the flood. I 
think the flood created bonds, but we were very stressed when the water 
receded’ (RK27, 2014). Through skills training and networking, Baan 
Mankong also empowered individual people who had had never held any 
formal leadership role to step into leadership positions. For example, the 
leader of Baan Mankong reflected that during the floods she, ‘felt so 
proud, so appreciated. God damn it, no one knew me in the past or 
respected me! They thought I’m an uneducated woman but then saw all I 
was capable of. I went to the police office and got unemployed people 
food and supplies even after the floods were over. I took everything, no 
matter how little I was offered’.  
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Disagreement between the leaders about how survival items should be 
distributed was noted. The elected leader during the flood is different to 
the elected leader at present. Many people felt the flood exposed the 
previously elected leader as corrupt and voted in a new person (RK13, an 
elderly woman; RK14, an elderly woman; RK25, an elderly woman; RK27, 
an elderly woman; RK28, and middle-aged man). The current elected 
leader felt it was important to distribute supplies directly through 
neighbourhood leaders because they are familiar with the neighbourhood 
demographics and will ensure people do not get double. Meanwhile, the 
Baan Mankong leader felt sending donations through a network like Baan 
Mankong was better because it allowed the pooling of resources and 
contacts and the division of supplies when there is not enough for 
everyone.  
 
9.4.2 Social obstacles within the savings group 
Financial benefit from ‘owning’ land and buildings is the primary source of 
conflict in Roi Krong. While people do not own the land, they view 
themselves as owners or informal custodians. According to the elected 
leader, the social composition of the neighbourhood is such that 
approximately 30 per cent are renters; 30 per cent belong to a more 
affluent category and 40 per cent can be considered urban poor. While 
poorer people in the neighbourhood have mobilised to create a financial 
structure to help them better survive chronic stresses and shocks through 
Baan Mankong, approximately 60 per cent of the neighbourhood felt it 
would be financially harmed by the savings programme, which aimed to 
change ownership of plots and buildings. Therefore, the savings group was 
too small and undersubscribed to be an effective financial mechanism for 
renting the land before the flood and for providing a high level of financial 
security during the flood. As a consequence, both governance structures 
described passively awaiting donations more frequently than they would 
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have liked, unlike Bang Bua and Saphan Mai who were active in seeking 
and managing resources.  
 
The heterogeneity of income levels in Roi Krong meant that using 
economic mechanisms as the primary method of engaging disparate 
groups did not work as an incentive for cooperation for the majority of the 
neighbourhood. Moreover, not unlike concerns aired by poorer urban 
people in case one and two, some of the most economically vulnerable 
believed they could not afford debt or were not comfortable with the idea 
of it. An additional obstacle to the success of the savings group is social 
vulnerability. For example, drug use is a widespread problem in the canal. 
One opponent of the upgrading (RK16, a middle-aged woman) said she 
moved to the neighbourhood because it was free to build her house, and 
worried that future generations would not be able to repay housing loans 
due to financial drains like drug addiction. She (RK16, 2014) said, ‘Looking 
ahead, what if parents join with children who are hooked on drugs? How 
will the children pay off the loan if their parents die? It’s better not to risk 
losing the house.’  
 
Meanwhile, others perceived the upgrading governance structure as 
legally risky. Another middle-aged woman (RK15) who works as 
housecleaner expressed concern over being embroiled in a legal battle, an 
unacceptable risk for her. She said, ‘There are 14 people in Bang Bua 
getting sued because they’ve defaulted on their loans. People here cannot 
afford to participate in Baan Mankong’ (RK15, 2014). According to 
information shared by the Bang Bua leadership committee there are four 
people being sued, all of whom allegedly work in the drug trade. The 
concerns expressed above by people who are currently not participating in 
Baan Mankong reflect that economic and social vulnerability are factors 
that prevent the savings group from succeeding in Roi Krong.  
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9.4.3 Land conflict 
While the flood improved intra-social relations within each group, conflict 
over land remains at the root of genuine change at a neighborhood scale. 
As one middle-aged woman observed, ‘after the (2004 Asian) tsunami, 
people helped entire communities to rebuild. It’s too bad that couldn’t 
happen here to really change things for the better. Instead, the floods left 
us with a mess and no money to clear it up’ (RK27, 2014).  
 
Those who support Baan Mankong in Roi Krong tend to be people who are 
low-income earners, have poor quality houses, live on the canal and work 
as daily wage earners. This demographic is poised to gain the most 
through the upgrading programme: quality housing, reduced risk of 
flooding, and potentially new skills such as financial management and 
construction. One small block of houses has been able to negotiate space 
in order to carry out complete reconstruction of 25 houses (RK27, middle-
aged woman). One middle-aged woman (RK16, a middle-aged woman) 
contends that success was based on a group of relatives working together 
to share a common space, indicating the social dynamics in this 
neighbourhood are strongest between relatives. For those who could not 
negotiate reconstruction, the second best option for building the physical 
resilience of their homes was to access loans to repair weak infrastructure 
(RK8, a middle aged man). A total of 12 houses used the loans to repair 
existing structures (RK27, middle-aged woman).  
 
Meanwhile, according to residents from the neighbourhood, those who 
oppose the upgrading programme are often more affluent and tend to 
have more influence and power (RK17, a middle-aged woman; RK22, an 
elderly man; RK23, an elderly man; RK28, a middle-aged man; RK29, an 
elderly man; RK30, an elderly man; RK32, a middle-aged woman). More 
affluent people are described as working in office jobs for the government 
or as landlords within the neighbourhood. The most active opponents to 
Chapter nine: case study three – analysis of Roi Krong 
 
 
 
 
Page 310 
Baan Mankong appear to be on the elected committee, operating 
separately to the Baan Mankong committee. The elected committee 
members take regular social trips together (RK13, an elderly woman), 
affording them the opportunity to bond but further isolating the group 
from the Baan Mankong committee. Other active opponents to the 
upgrading are those who have invested in strong, robust homes over the 
years and do not want their investments to go to waste. One middle-age 
woman said that as the owner of an expensive home, she felt the potential 
loss of years of investment was unacceptable: ‘If you join Baan Mankong 
you have to rebuild your house, but if you already have a good house, 
what’s the point of going into debt and rebuilding it again?’ (RK17).  
 
A low level of trust amongst residents was also apparent when another 
middle-aged woman, who described herself as neither rich nor powerful, 
but ardent in her opposition to Baan Mankong, said she believes the 
programme is corrupt and does not negotiate with all parties involved in 
the process: ‘The committee is not honest. People don’t get real benefits. 
People don’t cooperate with Baan Mankong because it tries to tell people 
where to live and where not to live’ (RK11, 2014). Such comments suggest 
that improving the physical resilience of the neighbourhood is taking place 
at a social cost. Moreover, some feel that economic vulnerability should 
be prioritised over the physical vulnerability of houses. One such elderly 
woman observed that: ‘people here need better jobs, need someone to 
teach them to make a living, how to pay loans’ (RK13, 2014). The same 
elderly woman asserted that the neighbourhood needs ‘community 
dialogue and to really understand what they are signing up for and if they 
can really afford it’ (RK13, 2014). Analysis of activities at the plots layer 
points to a gap in communication, trust and a disagreement over 
prioritisation of development activities as potential reasons the Baan 
Mankong methodology is not working well in Roi Krong. 
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The analysis at the plots layer identified several dimensions of resilience 
based on the overlapping and interdependent CAS relationships and their 
influence on the layer. Firstly, while land tenure was not secured in Roi 
Krong, the security of tenure in neighbourhoods located up and 
downstream from Roi Krong seems to have reduced the risk of eviction for 
Roi Krong. Secondly, even though conflict exists in the neighbourhood, 
power is shared and parallel governance systems appear to operate in a 
healthy and democratic environment. Thirdly, economic and social factors 
have limited the success of the savings group through fear of participation. 
Fourthly, land conflict has reduced social capital and increased tensions 
between people in the neighbourhood.  
 
9.5 Buildings and services  
Homes in Roi Krong are built from a mixture of concrete and wood. The 
homes on the landside often have bigger plot sizes, are frequently made of 
concrete, and are generally larger than canal-based homes. Canal-based 
homes are built on stilts, have wooden or bamboo frames, floors and 
walls. The roofs are usually made of corrugated iron. If a portion of the 
canal based home is resting on solid ground, then residents will often use 
concrete to construct the floor. Pictures of the King decorate the inside of 
most of homes. It is common to see mosquito nets in poorer households 
and air conditioners in more affluent ones.  
 
As was the case in Saphan Mai, the buildings most vulnerable to the flood 
were single storey wooden homes built on stilts over the canal. According 
to the leader of Roi Krong, approximately 40 per cent of the people in the 
neighborhood evacuated due to the poor quality of their homes. One 
poorer resident who stayed in an evacuation shelter for the duration of 
the flood said her family went there because there was food, a place to 
sleep and that ‘life was better there’. Roi Krong residents said they 
employed a number of coping strategies such as reducing the amount and 
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quality of food they ate, as well as moving between their homes and 
evacuation shelters to pick up donations at both locations.  
 
The departure of families to evacuation centres severely affected the 
rental market. One landlord reported offering free rent for one to two 
months to prevent the permanent loss of tenants (RK17, a middle-aged 
woman). Meanwhile, people who owned single storey wooden homes on 
the canal reported that their homes were severely damaged and the 
biggest challenge was finding enough money to carry out repairs. 
Unemployment during the three-month duration of the flood occurred for 
the majority of people in Roi Krong. Like in Bang Bua and Saphan Mai, daily 
wage earners required access to loans to restart their businesses before 
they could begin home repairs.  
 
9.5.1 Rental property income 
As suggested earlier, one of the reasons Baan Mankong is contested so 
widely in Roi Krong is because of the high levels of income generated 
through room rentals. The leader of the Baan Mankong group reported 
that the neighbourhood has the potential to rent between 97 to 177 
rooms. Many of the rooms are located in large houses and dormitories 
abandoned by Rajabhat University 30 years ago, now taken over and 
managed by ‘landlords’. The university built eight dormitories with 10-20 
rooms on land owned by the government. Approximately 30 years ago it 
was asked to respect the property lines put in place by BMA, delineating 
public open space around the canal. In the process of withdrawal from 
government land the university did not demolish the original buildings and 
people took them over.  
 
Today the market rate for a room rental is between 700-800 Baht (GBP 13-
15) per month (RK17, a middle-aged woman). Making space for houses on 
the canal to move onto land would require property ‘owners’ to give up 
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significant amounts of income from room rentals. One dormitory owner of 
a 20-room building stated that the economic benefits of the current 
property motivated her to oppose neighborhood upgrading. While 
acknowledging the land does not legally belong to her, she said she 
preferred to risk eviction, making as much income as she could until then. 
Figure 9.5.1a, Figure 9.5.1b and Figure 9.5.1c are photographs of three 
different dormitories that rent rooms. The photographs show that the 
dormitories have large, pleasant outdoor spaces for people to socialise in. 
Figure 9.5.1d shows a photograph of a room rental within one of the 
houses.  
 
 
Figure 9.5.1a: A dormitory with large, pleasant outdoor spaces for people to 
socialise in. Source: the author 
 
 
Figure 9.5.1b: A second dormitory with large private open space with a table and 
an outdoor bed. Source: the author 
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Figure 9.5.1c: A third dormitory with large private open space with a table. 
Source: the author 
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Figure 9.5.1d: A photograph of a room rental within one of the houses in Roi 
Krong. Source: the author 
 
 
9.5.2 Access to services 
Electricity and piped water has been available in Roi Krong since 1974 
(RK27, an elderly woman). However, a small number of unregistered 
homes currently do not have access to either because they are not 
registered. The drive to formalise land tenure and housing has resulted in 
new buildings being denied access to water and electricity unless they are 
officially registered with the district government. The enforcement of this 
law angers some of the unregistered houses that blame Baan Mankong 
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programme for disrupting the informal system (RK29, and elderly man; 
RK32, an elderly woman). The neighbourhood is in the process of filling in 
paper work to get the district authority to move land-based electricity 
poles into the canal. Inland electricity poles are impeding some of the 
home reconstruction because people do not want to build their homes 
around a pole; instead they prefer to wait until the poles are relocated. 
The Electricity Generating Authority of Thailand, believed to be the 
relevant authority, was unresponsive to neighbourhood requests to move 
them. The neighbourhood now has an application in with the district 
authority to move the poles (RK27, an elderly woman). 
 
Household waste currently drains directly into the canal. Roi Krong does 
not have water treatment facilities or sewerage tanks; however, some of 
the newly reconstructed homes have their own sewerage filters (RK27, an 
elderly woman). One active member of the Baan Mankong programme 
said tanks would be installed when all the houses are constructed, 
however that seems to be a long way off with the current social divisions.  
 
Even though Roi Krong does not pay rent for the land, the district 
authority has collected rubbish since 2004, from bins at the entrance of 
the neighbourhood. The district pays two women a monthly stipend of 
2,500 Baht (GBP 46.00) each to collect rubbish (RK13, an elderly woman; 
RK14, an elderly woman; RK16, a middle-aged woman). Households prefer 
to do their own recycling to supplement household income (RK27, and 
elderly woman). 
 
9.5.3 Community buildings and social divisions 
There are three community buildings that have shared use: the health 
centre, the community centre and the sala or gazebo. All community 
buildings are based in the centre of the neighbourhood, and are within 
hearing access of the public speaker system. The health clinic and 
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community centre share a plot boundary as shown in Figure 9.5.3a. Those 
who are strongly opposed to Baan Mankong do not often frequent the 
health clinic or community centre. The district pays a small sum to a health 
volunteer to coordinate activities and manage the use of the building. The 
volunteer is also the head of the Baan Mankong programme. Baan 
Mankong uses the community centre for its meetings.  
 
 
Figure 9.5.3a: Roi Krong’s health centre (left) and community centre (right) used 
by Baan Mankong supporters. Source: the author 
 
 
The third community building is the sala. There appears to be a tacit 
understanding that the sala is used by non-Baan Mankong supporters. 
Such was the case when the author validated findings in this 
neighbourhood. Baan Mankong supporters were not originally present and 
subsequently joined the meeting. 
 
The sala is a large, metal structure with a corrugated iron roof. This area is 
used as a play space for children and as a location for meetings with the 
elected committee and its leader. Fold up tables and plastic chairs are 
Chapter nine: case study three – analysis of Roi Krong 
 
 
 
 
Page 318 
stored elsewhere and set up for meetings in this space. However, when 
the flood occurred people from both groups reported using the spacious 
sala to sort and distribute flood relief items. Figure 9.5.3b below shows a 
photograph of the sala used by the elected leader and his supporters.  
 
 
 
Figure 9.5.3b: Roi Krong’s sala used by supporters of the elected leader. Source: 
the author 
 
Funding for all three structures came from the district authority. In 
principle, access to these facilities is open to everyone; however in 
practice, use of the structures is restricted and reflects the 
neighbourhood’s social divisions. Figure 9.5.3c shows all three community 
buildings share a plot boundary.  
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Figure 9.5.3c: A diagram of the community buildings in Roi Krong shows that all 
three buildings share a plot boundary, each with their own separate user groups. 
Source: the author 
 
There is a notice board inside the community centre for posting updates to 
primarily Baan Mankong users of the centre. However, notices are also 
posted outside the community centre, on a cement fence, presumably to 
provide information to those who do not enter the area. Figure 9.5.3d 
shows a photo of the notice board inside the community centre and Figure 
9.5.3e shows notices posted on the cement fence of the community 
centre.  
 
 
Figure 9.5.3d: A notice board inside the Roi Krong community centre. Source: the 
author 
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Figure 9.5.3e: Important notices posted outside the Roi Krong community centre 
on its fence. Source: the author 
 
While some people feel that community buildings are an opportunity to 
share and improve neighbourliness, others do not. When asked if the 
neighbourhood has improved its social dynamics after the flood one 
middle-aged man said, ‘Nothing here has changed since the floods. There 
are good people and bad people in this area. We know each other and 
who can be trusted. We know who is a thief and who we need to be 
suspicious of’ (RK20, 2014, a middle-aged man). This quote reflects the 
deep social divisions in Roi Krong.  
 
Having explained the ways that CAS shaped and influenced the plots layer, 
several dimensions of resilience can be identified. Firstly, the homes 
reflect economic conditions of affluence and poverty. Secondly, income 
from rental properties creates social divisions, and is the root cause of 
opposition to upgrading. Thirdly, community building usage reflects the 
social divide within the neighbourhood. The next section will explain the 
way in which the dimensions of resilience within the different 
morphological layers were validated with people from Roi Krong.  
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9.6 Validating findings  
The dimensions of resilience identified at the different morphological 
layers above were validated with 12 people from Roi Krong through a 
focus group discussion. Originally, supporters of the upgrading programme 
were not present at the focus group discussion. Validating the findings 
required the presence of both groups – supporters and non-supporters of 
the upgrading; therefore actions were taken to ensure the group had a 
balanced number of each. Once that was achieved the participants were 
read statements about the dimensions of resilience and asked to share 
why they agreed or disagreed.  
 
Tensions in Roi Krong were higher than in other neighbourhoods so care 
was taken to ‘do no harm’ by giving both sides the opportunity to respond 
to the statements. Throughout the FGD discussion and original analysis 
three conclusions can be drawn regarding the most influential dimensions 
of resilience, and are presented below in the conclusions section.  
 
Conclusion  
This chapter identified the ways in which CAS shaped and influenced 
different morphological levels in order to identify key dimensions of 
resilience before, during and after the flood in Roi Krong. The chapter 
began with a neighbourhood profile of Roi Krong. It then provided analysis 
of four morphological layers including topography; movement networks 
and public open spaces layer; the plots layer; and the buildings and 
services layer. It then explained how key dimensions of resilience were 
validated with people living in Roi Krong through a focus group discussion. 
Three conclusions can be drawn regarding governance, economic and 
social dimensions of resilience within Roi Krong.  
 
Firstly, power is concentrated in two key nodes, that is, those who support 
upgrading and those who oppose it. The group opposed to the upgrading 
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is largely more affluent and yields more power than the upgrading group 
and are therefore better able to obstruct any attempts at formalisation or 
change within the neighbourhood.  
 
Secondly, remaining informal best suits the affluent and some of the poor. 
Large plots provide a lucrative source of rental income to the most 
affluent group in the neighbourhood. Poorer people seek out free land 
and cheap rent in Roi Krong’s centralised location. To many people in Roi 
Krong, Baan Mankong offers little benefits. Afraid of debt or unable to 
afford debt, some financially vulnerable people prefer to stay with the 
current arrangement. Access to services such as running water and 
electricity were available to Roi Krong over 35 years ago. Community 
buildings and a health centre also exist without the need to formalise.  
 
Thirdly, the development mechanisms used by Baan Mankong are not well 
understood or trusted. Therefore, with an underwhelming subscriber 
base, the savings group appeared to have limited success supporting 
people during and after the flood. The flood affected governance 
structures by revealing leadership interests and capabilities. For example, 
the Baan Mankong leader was viewed as a major contributor, while the 
elected leader was ousted in the next election cycle for not meeting 
expectations. The flood inconvenienced poorer residents in Roi Krong and 
set them back financially, but the political will and financial desire to build 
physical resilience into vulnerable homes is negated by the fact that floods 
in this area occur on a low frequency even thought they carry high risk.  
 
In summary, examining the impact of the flood in Roi Krong demonstrated 
the disaster entrenched an existing conflict with each of the two sides 
working together perhaps more than they normally would, but overall 
quite separately. Each group relied on its own existing contacts, networks 
and economic mechanisms for surviving and recovering after the flood. A 
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lack of ability to negotiate and lead at a neighbourhood scale fragmented 
the flood response and recovery. Having identified key dimensions of 
resilience at four morphological layers within each of the neighbourhoods, 
it is useful to compare and contrast in order to understand what can be 
generalised about all three of cases.  
 
The next chapter will seek to highlight key findings across all three case 
studies and identify where it is possible to generalise about key 
dimensions of resilience.  
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Chapter ten 
Key findings from the case studies  
 
 
Introduction 
This chapter consolidates and re-interprets key findings from each of the 
individual case studies in order to establish cross-case dimensions of urban 
disaster resilience. Complex adaptive systems, known as CAS throughout, 
and urban morphology have been combined to interrogate humanitarian 
and development dimensions of urban disaster resilience within each of 
the three case studies, to demonstrate that the two urban analysis 
approaches can be combined to create intersections that define patterns 
of urban resilience. Dimensions of resilience indicate the point where 
human systems influence the built and natural environment and how they 
affect people.  
 
Furthermore, the intersections of CAS and morphology, where the 
dimensions of resilience can be found, reflect the ‘urban’ aspects of 
disaster resilience by accounting for understandings such as complexity, 
fluidity and, importantly, the interdependencies that arise within and 
between the various layers and systems. 
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There are two parts to this chapter. Part I re-interprets the findings from 
previous individual case study chapters in order to determine key 
dimensions of resilience within each case study. To this end, key patterns 
of vulnerability and capacity within economic, governance and social CAS 
are revisited in order to enrich and validate the findings. The key 
dimensions of resilience are then allocated to the morphological layers 
they most influenced and conclusions about the dimensions of resilience 
are drawn. These layers encourage thinking about a checklist of issues that 
might not otherwise be thought about.  
 
The intersection between CAS and morphology is where dimensions of 
resilience are identified. Identifying dimensions of resilience is important 
because they mostly influence the neighbourhood as a whole, enabling 
the neighbourhood to ‘bounce back’ from shocks and stresses. At times 
the dimensions of resilience may be positive or negative depending on the 
different perspectives as will be demonstrated in the re-interpretation of 
each of the cases. 
 
Part II seeks to identify common dimensions of resilience across all three 
cases by comparing and contrasting the case studies at different 
morphological layers in order to generate links between the empirical 
findings and broader theory. These links allow the research to generalise 
its findings. Table 10.0 below summarises the two parts of this chapter.  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Chapter ten: key findings of the research 
 
 
 Page 327 
 
Structure for identifying urban disaster resilience dimensions 
Part I Re-interpreting 
individual case study 
findings to establish 
key dimensions of 
urban resilience  
Key patterns within CAS are allocated to 
morphological layers and re-interpreted 
in order to determine key dimensions of 
resilience within individual case studies.   
 
Part II Establishing cross-
case urban resilience 
dimensions 
Generalisations about the key 
dimensions of resilience are made after 
a comparison between the three case 
studies.  
 
Table 10.0: Chapter structure for identifying urban disaster resilience dimensions. 
Source: the author 
 
Part I: Re-interpreting findings from individual 
cases 
 
10.1 Bang Bua Neighbourhood 
This section re-interprets findings from the Bang Bua Neighbourhood case 
study in order to determine patterns of CAS and identify key dimensions of 
resilience at four morphological layers.  
 
10.1.1 Patterns of CAS  
The economic flows that most influenced the resilience of Bang Bua 
Neighbourhood began with the formalisation of tenure security of the 
land. Secure land tenure made it possible to rebuild safe, robust homes 
through collective savings, loans and livelihoods skills building 
programmes. Economic investments protected people in Bang Bua 
Neighbourhood when the flood occurred by having a welfare fund that 
covered needs for things such as food, water and medicines during the 
flood. People in Bang Bua Neighbourhood did not need to evacuate to 
safer living areas because their upgraded homes provided a second storey 
retreat from the flood. After the flood, successful investments in economic 
measures could be seen in the limited damage to housing, which was 
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improved through savings and loans mechanisms. In terms of governance 
networks the new governance mechanism put in place during the 
upgrading proved to be an accountable and transparent mechanism, 
which laid the foundation for successful adaptation to a range of risks. 
With strong leadership, a decentralised structure and high levels of 
participation, the neighbourhood was skilled at working collectively to 
address chronic stresses and acute shocks. Overall road safety was 
increased through the use of collective problem solving. During the flood 
the governance mechanism adapted itself and its processes to continue to 
meet the needs of neighbourhood residents in an accountable and 
transparent manner. After the flood the neighbourhood continued 
working on collective problem solving and sharing their learning with 
other neighbourhoods endeavoring to upgrade around the country.  
 
In terms of social dynamics, activities within the economic and governance 
systems built up a highly functioning social system within Bang Bua 
Neighbourhood. Relationships and trust between residents were 
developed through collective activities such as the savings groups and the 
problem solving of a range of chronic stresses. The success and scope of 
the social welfare system indicates the neighbourhood’s capacity to build 
flexible mechanisms that meet the needs of a range of vulnerabilities. 
Essentially, the upgrading transformed the neighborhood’s social identity 
in a positive way. During the flood, Bang Bua Neighbourhood residents 
significantly contributed to the capacity of the Canal Network and its 
ability to rival district governments in efficiency. By the end of the flood, 
the Bang Bua Network had grown significantly through the skills 
developed during activities undertaken before, during and after the flood. 
After the flood, social dynamics were perceived to have returned to pre-
flood conditions. Table 10.1.1a below summarises the key findings from 
each CAS discussed in this section.  
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Table 10.1.1a: A summary of the key patterns that arose from analysis of 
economic, governance and social CAS before, during and after the flood in Bang 
Bua Neighbourhood. Source: the author 
 
 
Bang Bua (Case 1): Patterns of CAS  
Economic Flows Governance Networks Social Dynamics 
Before the flood 
Formalisation of land 
resulted in upgrading 
New governance 
mechanism deemed 
accountable and 
transparent 
Developed a social 
welfare system and 
greatly invested in it  
Upgraded houses are 
robust and disaster 
resistant  
Collective problem 
solving skills developed  
Organised social events 
to build relationships 
Savings, loans and 
livelihoods mechanisms 
were successful 
More permeable roads 
increased safety though 
a neighbourhood watch 
approach to crime and 
violence 
Upgrading transformed 
social identity 
During the flood 
Savings group funded 
food kitchens 
Sub-committee used to 
manage flood needs 
Bang Bua Canal Network 
competed with district 
government regarding 
efficiency of flood 
response 
Evacuation an elective, 
not a necessity because 
people lived in their 
second storey 
 Used Bang Bua Canal 
Network and 
neighbourhood 
partnerships secured 
donations 
  Distribution hub for the 
Bang Bua Canal Network 
set up in Bang Bua 
Neighbourhood 
  High levels of trust in the 
processes of managing 
distributions 
After the flood 
Access to 
supplementary income 
through livelihood 
groups and loans 
Focus on collective 
problem solving of 
chronic stresses 
continued  
Bang Bua Canal Network 
expanded significantly  
Homes received flood 
damage but were not 
destroyed 
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Based on the patterns presented above, a summary of the dimensions of 
resilience within CAS in Bang Bua Neighbourhood is presented in Table 
10.1.1b below. These nine elements significantly influenced the urban 
form of Bang Bua neighbourhood and the ways in which people’s lives 
were affected by the built environment, which will be explained in the 
next section.  
 
Bang Bua Case 1: Key Dimensions of Resilience Within CAS 
Economic Governance Social 
Secure land tenure Governance structures Network and 
partnerships 
Savings group Agency Social capital  
Flood resistant housing Safety Social welfare fund 
 
Table 10.1.1b: a summary of the key findings from each CAS discussed Bang Bua 
neighbourhood. Source: the author  
 
 
10.1.2 Dimensions of resilience  
This section presents an analysis of the dimensions of resilience within 
Bang Bua Neighbourhood, starting with topography and moving down to 
the buildings and services layer. Allocating resilience dimensions within 
CAS in table 10.1.1b to the morphological layer they most influenced 
offers a full picture of how CAS interact with the built environment to 
create dimensions of resilience. Dimensions are highlighted in italics when 
mentioned within each layer. Overall, all of the dimensions identified in 
Bang Bua Neighbourhood were positive and enabled the neighbourhood 
to adapt and transform as required in different circumstances. Before the 
flood these dimensions were integral to the neighbourhood’s capacity to 
deal with chronic stresses. During the flood, the dimensions were adapted 
in order to ensure various parts of the neighbourhood maintain a basic 
functioning, which is responsible for the survival of Bang Bua residents. 
After the flood, the dimensions significantly impacted the rate of recovery 
and quality of life. Figure 10.1.2a below shows the dimensions of resilience 
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located at the intersections of CAS and morphology. Not all of the 
intersections are filled because only the most prominent dimensions were 
prioritised in the discussion.    
 
Topography 
Most of the CAS at the topographical layer were operating at city and 
national levels and therefore while the neighbourhood was greatly 
impacted by them, the neighbourhood itself exerted minimal impact on 
larger topographical systems. However, Bang Bua Neighbourhood did 
demonstrate impact and high level change by working with city-scale 
actors (primarily urban planners and the National Baan Mankong 
Upgrading Network) to adapt planning policy leveraging their networks 
and partnerships. 
 
Movement networks and public open spaces  
At the movement networks and public open spaces layer, governance 
mechanisms influenced the degree of safety, primarily by increasing the 
permeability of the road networks and developing public open spaces for 
children to play in and adults to socialise or sell merchandise.  
 
Plots 
Unsurprisingly, the plots layer in Bang Bua Neighbourhood was the layer 
most affected by newly introduced economic, governance and social CAS. 
The Baan Mankong programme targeted change at the plot layer by 
assisting the neighbourhood to achieve secure land tenure through the 
introduction of development mechanisms such as a savings group, and the 
new governance structures for the upgrading process, all of which 
contributed to building social capital.  The savings group was able to 
achieve a small contingency of money that could be used as a welfare 
fund, resulting in a strong social welfare safety net. Together, the 
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development mechanisms at the plot layer resulted in a stronger sense of 
neighbourhood agency.  
 
Buildings and services  
At the buildings and services layer flood resistant housing was achieved 
through the dimensions of resilience introduced at the plots layer (savings 
mechanisms, governance mechanisms and social capital), resulting in an 
investment of money and reducing the risk of damage due to natural 
hazards such as fire and flooding.  
 
Figure 10.1.2a below summarises the dimensions of resilience described 
above, plotting them on the relevant intersection between CAS and 
morphology.  
 
 
 
Figure 10.1.2a: The conceptual framework with dimensions of resilience from 
Bang Bua neighbourhood plotted at different intersections between CAS and 
morphological layers. Source: the author 
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10.2 Saphan Mai Neighbourhood  
This section re-interprets findings from the Saphan Mai Neighbourhood 
case study in order to determine patterns of economic, governance and 
social CAS and identify key dimensions of resilience at four morphological 
layers.  
 
10.2.1 Patterns of CAS 
The economic flows that influenced the most change in Saphan Mai began 
with the legalisation of land. Secure land tenure enabled the 
neighbourhood to invest in a savings group that was moderately 
successful due to an initial lack of trust in the economic systems and 
mechanisms governing them. The flood served as an opportunity to build 
trust in the economic systems that created additional welfare funds to 
support neighbourhood residents with supplementary food. Due to a lack 
of safety during the flood, a significant number of people had to evacuate 
from their homes. However, soon after the flood all the homes managed 
to upgrade. For some this occurred due to an increase in trust in the 
economic systems and governance mechanisms; meanwhile a small 
minority agreed to upgrade because of the threat of a lawsuit and 
potential eviction if they did not cooperate.  
 
Governance networks influenced Sapan Mai primarily because they were 
built on a conflict of interest, which reduced overall levels of trust. The 
lengthy time it took for the neighbourhood to upgrade demonstrates a 
moderate ability to self organise. That moderate ability was also apparent 
in the floods where there was a low-level of dissatisfaction regarding the 
way distributions were managed. However, the moderate degree of self-
organisation has resulted in an ability to upgrade roads and therefore the 
overall level of neighbourhood safety. The imbalance of power continued 
after the flood and is reflected in the use of public open space and 
buildings. The social dynamics within the neighbourhood improved when 
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people saw financial mechanisms built a degree of redundancy into the 
social welfare system, enabling vulnerable families to be supported by it. 
The action of working together during the flood to manage social welfare 
activities built a level of trust in the governance systems for some. Table 
10.2.1a provides a summary of the key themes that arose from the 
analysis of Saphan Mai.   
 
Saphan Mai (Case 2): Patterns of CAS 
Economic Flows Governance Networks Social Dynamics 
Before the flood 
Growth of savings group 
hindered by lack of trust 
New governance 
mechanism built on a 
conflict of interest 
Minimally reliant upon 
external partnerships 
and link with the Bang 
Bua Canal Networks  
Lack of trust in 
economic systems 
limited the number of 
flood resistant houses 
built  
Moderate ability to self 
organise for meetings 
and activities 
Upgrading created high 
social capital in the 
upgrading group 
Formalisation of land 
enabled upgrading for 
some 
More permeable roads 
resulted in increased 
safety 
 
During the flood 
Savings group funded 
food kitchens, which 
built trust 
Low-level dissatisfaction 
of distribution of 
donations 
Flood became an 
opportunity to work 
together 
Single storey homes 
evacuated due to lack 
of safety 
 Moderately reliant upon 
external partnerships 
and link with the Bang 
Bua Canal Networks 
After the flood 
All homes upgraded to 
flood resistant homes 
Imbalance of power 
reflected in use of public 
open space and buildings 
Built environment 
upgraded but with tares 
in social fabric 
 Legal structures forced 
participation in 
upgrading 
 
 
Table 10.2.1a: A summary of the key patterns that arose from analysis of 
economic, governance and social CAS before, during and after the flood in 
Saphan Mai. Source: the author 
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Based on the themes presented above, a summary of the dimensions 
within CAS in Saphan Mai is presented in Table 10.2.2b below. The eight 
dimensions significantly influenced the urban form of Bang Bua 
neighbourhood and the ways in which the built form affected people, 
which will be explained in the next section.  
 
Saphan Mai (case 2): Key Dimensions of Resilience Within CAS 
Economic Governance Social 
Secure land tenure Governance structures Network and 
partnerships 
Savings group Self-organisation Social capital 
Flood resistant housing Safety  
 
Table 10.2.1b: A list of key dimensions of resilience within economic, governance 
and social CAS in Saphan Mai. Source: the author  
 
10.2.2 Dimensions of resilience  
After more than a decade of upgrading, Saphan Mai managed to build the 
physical resilience of people in the neighbourhood by enabling residents 
to invest in homes that are safe and robust. For the greater part of a 
decade a minority of people did not see their financial and social 
capacities grow because they resisted participation in the mainstream 
activities of the neighbourhood. Some chose resistance to upgrading 
because their physical and economic resilience was already high with 
adequate income earning potential and robust homes. Individuals with 
low-income earning potential and low-quality homes were less resilient 
and benefitted most from the identified dimensions of resilience.  
 
As a whole, the neighbourhood is physically more resilient after the 2011 
flood than it was before the flood occurred. Figure 10.2.2a below shows 
the dimensions of resilience at different intersections between CAS and 
morphological layers. A description of each of the dimensions is given in 
the section below with dimensions identified in italics.  
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Topography  
Much like Bang Bua, Saphan Mai’s primary influence at the topographical 
layer was through networks and external partnerships with the Lak Si 
district government and other city-scale actors to adapt planning policies 
that resulted in legal and safe construction within the neighbourhood.  
 
Movement networks and public open spaces 
At the movement networks and public open spaces layer wider roads that 
better permeated the neighbourhood created a greater sense of safety 
due to high levels of footfall and greater visibility of public open spaces.   
 
Plots 
In the plots layer the greatest degree of change can be seen, because like 
Bang Bua, Saphan Mai was able to negotiate secure land tenure through 
the formulaic Baan Mankong saving group and governance structures. 
While there was a minimal degree of conflict in Saphan Mai, most of the 
neighbourhood was able to self-organise before the flood and during. 
Improvements to the ways in which the neighbourhood works together 
occurred after the flood when levels of social capital increased after 
people worked together to survive.  
 
Buildings and services  
In the buildings and services layer, it can be concluded that before the 
floods, a majority of the physical infrastructure was upgraded but at the 
cost of tearing holes in the social fabric. However, those who did not 
participate in home reconstruction before the flood did so after, because 
to a greater or lesser degree, the benefits of flood resistance housing were 
realised during the flood.  
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Figure 10.2.2a below summarises the dimensions of resilience described 
above, plotting them on the relevant intersection between CAS and 
morphology.  
 
 
 
 
Figure 10.2.2a: The conceptual framework with dimensions of resilience from 
Saphan Mai neighbourhood plotted at different intersections between CAS and 
morphological layers. Source: the author 
 
 
10.3 Roi Krong Neighbourhood  
This section re-interprets findings from the Roi Krong Neighbourhood case 
study in order to determine patterns of economic, governance and social 
CAS and identify key dimensions of resilience at four morphological layers.  
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10.3.1 Patterns of CAS  
The economic flows in Roi Krong are the least similar of all the 
neighbourhoods. To begin with, an informal land status best suits the 
affluent people in the neighbourhood who earn income from room rentals 
in dormitories that have been abandoned by Rajabhat University. It also 
suits poorer people who do not want to go into debt or believe they 
cannot afford to. Due to an inability to negotiate a land sharing agreement 
throughout the neighbourhood via Baan Mankong, only 25 houses have 
been upgraded and 12 repaired out of total of 135 homes. The lack of 
support for Baan Mankong has resulted in a limited interest in the savings 
group. A lack of large support based means the savings group is limited in 
its ability to offer social welfare and to financially support people before 
and after the flood. During the flood approximately 40 per cent of the 
neighbourhood evacuated, primarily people from single storey homes 
(including renters). Access to loans after the flood was a challenge for 
people living in Roi Krong.  
 
In terms of governance networks Roi Krong also stands out as different in 
the systems it hosts. When Baan Mankong arrived two nodes of power 
formed, each with its own governance mechanism (one node is organised 
under the Baan Mankong scheme, the other is through official election 
channels). The Baan Mankong governance structure does not seem to be 
well understood or widely trusted in Roi Krong. During the flood the Baan 
Mankong governance structure seemed to prove itself as capable and 
trustworthy. Meanwhile, the past elected leader was perceived within the 
neighbourhood as corrupt. After the flood, healthy democratic processes 
were demonstrated when the elected leader was replaced in the next 
election cycle. Meanwhile, the use of public spaces and buildings reflects 
the power dynamics with each governance structure having its own 
communal space to meet in.  
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In terms of social dynamics, each governance structure created its own 
partnerships and network. For example, the Baan Mankong upgrading 
group relied on support from the Bang Bua Canal Network while the 
elected leader sought support from his political party connections. During 
the flood, the two governance structures reported to work together more 
than they normally would have; however, after the flood the tensions 
resumed and the upgrading conflict remained entrenched. Table 10.3.1a 
provides a summary of the key patterns of CAS interactions that arose 
from the analysis of Roi Krong.  
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Roi Krong (Case 3): Patterns of CAS 
Economic Flows Governance Networks Social Dynamics 
Before the flood 
Remaining informal 
best suited the affluent 
and some of the poor; 
25 houses out of 135 
were reconstructed and 
12 repaired through 
Baan Mankong 
The upgrading created two 
governance structures: 1.) 
Baan Mankong and 2.) 
Elected leadership 
recognised by the district 
authority 
External partnerships 
and networks created 
for governance structure 
Undersubscribed 
support base for 
savings group limited 
the group’s ability to 
create impact 
Development mechanisms 
such as savings groups and 
governance structures used 
by Baan Mankong were not 
well understood or trusted 
 
Affluent people had 
flood resistant homes 
  
During the flood 
Poorer groups 
inhabited single storey 
homes, which had to be 
evacuated (about 40% 
of the neighbourhood) 
Leadership of Baan 
Mankong governance 
structure proved itself; 
elected leadership 
perceived as corrupt and 
later voted out 
Baan Mankong group 
relied heavily on the 
network; elected leader 
relied on political party 
connections  
 Leaders were more passive 
than active in receiving and 
managing aid assistance  
During the flood the two 
governance structures 
worked together more 
than they normally 
would have 
 Lack of ability to lead a 
neighbourhood scale 
response due to leadership 
fragmentation  
 
After the flood 
Access to loans 
required 
Each governance structure 
used different public open 
spaces and buildings 
The existing community 
tensions related to 
upgrading remained 
entrenched after the 
flood 
Income from room 
rentals highly valued 
and therefor the rental 
market was shielded 
from change 
Healthy, democratic 
processes enabled a 
turnover in elected 
leadership due to 
perceived corruption  
 
Table 10.3.1a: A summary of the key patterns that arose from analysis of 
economic, governance and social CAS before, during and after the flood in Roi 
Krong. Source: the author 
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Based on the themes presented above, a summary of the four dimensions 
of resilience identified in Roi Krong is presented in Table 10.3.1b below. 
The limited dimensions of resilience reflect low levels of overall resilience 
in Roi Krong compared to the other case studies and will be further 
explained in each layer below. The dimensions that are listed in the table 
below are plotted on the conceptual framework at the layer where they 
had the most influence in Figure 10.3.2a. The plotting of the dimensions 
reflects the interaction of CAS with the morphological layers.  
 
Roi Krong (case 3): Key Dimensions of Resilience Within CAS 
Economic Governance Social 
Room rentals  Healthy democracy  Network and 
partnerships 
 Safety  
 
Table 10.3.1b: A list of key dimensions of resilience within economic, governance 
and social CAS in Roi Krong. Source: the author 
 
 
10.3.2 Dimensions of resilience  
Overall, Roi Krong Neighbourhood managed to resist major changes to its 
built environment due to a small group of people who occupy land and 
buildings critical to transformation. Currently, that group of people is the 
most resilient because they have control over land, a scarce resource in 
Roi Krong. Meanwhile, poorer people remain physically and economically 
vulnerable to disaster shocks and chronic stresses because of the state of 
their homes, lack of earning potential and a lack of access to loans. The 
observation that there are ‘winners’ and ‘losers’ in every neighbourhood 
in regards to resilience is reflected in the following statement by Bahdur 
and Tanner who write that: ‘Trade-offs between different groups seeking 
resilience become particularly accentuated in densely populated urban 
contexts where an increase in one household’s resilience can lead, very 
quickly, to the enhanced vulnerability of another’ (2014, p.204). In Roi 
Krong, resilience is about negotiating ‘social and economic fault lines’ 
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(Bahadur and Tanner, 2014, p.206) within the neighbourhood. As with the 
other case studies, the dimensions of resilience in Roi Krong are indicated 
at the intersections between CAS and the morphological layers where the 
most influence was evidenced, and presented in Figure 10.3.2a below.  
 
Topography  
Like Bang Bua neighbourhood and Saphan Mai, Roi Krong did not have 
much influence at the topographical layer until the neighbourhood joined 
networks and partnerships as it did when the neighbourhood upgrading 
group linked with the Bang Bua Canal Network and the elected leadership 
group linked with political parties.  
 
Movement networks and public open spaces 
At the movement and public open spaces layer only one dimension of 
resilience was identified. The aspect of safety within Roi Krong did not 
change and remained tenuous. This is an example of ‘bouncing back’ to an 
undesirable state. Perhaps this is because as stated earlier, the upgrading 
caused a split in the neighbourhood resulting in the inability for the 
neighbourhood to work together as one. Therefore, upgrading roads and 
adding lights for safety did not occur in Roi Krong as it did elsewhere 
because without security of tenure, people were not willing to invest in 
neighbourhood infrastructure, including roads and public open spaces.  
 
Plots 
At the plots layer neighbourhood upgrading was rejected because 
remaining informal best suited both more affluent people and some of the 
poorest. Affluent houses did not need or want to upgrade; nor did they 
want to lose the extra space used for room rental income. In terms of 
governance, a separation of power can readily be seen at the plots layer as 
a direct result of the Baan Mankong upgrading. However, the existing 
governance mechanisms were willing to share power with the newly 
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formed Baan Mankong mechanism that governed the upgrading 
programme, signaling a healthy democracy. Moreover, after the flood the 
neighbourhood held elections and voted in a new leader based on 
dissatisfaction with the way the previous leader managed the flood 
response.  
 
Buildings and services 
In the building layer, room rentals were a key dimension of resilience. The 
room rentals were a source of contention and one of the primary reasons 
land sharing agreements – and most likely the other development 
mechanisms – did not have a high success rate in Roi Krong. Room rentals 
further highlight that resilience for one group, for instance the controllers 
of property and buildings, does not equal resilience for another group 
such as people living over the canal in shanty homes who want to upgrade. 
 
It is important to note that the presence of room rentals is not a wholly 
negative dimension of resilience in Roi Krong; a number of urban poor in 
the neighbourhood require affordable rental housing in a central location 
in order to access higher paying work. Therefore, the rental properties are 
an important asset to renters and could offer greater physical resilience to 
natural shocks if they were constructed more robustly.  
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Figure 10.3.2a: Dimensions of resilience from Roi Krong neighbourhood indicated 
at the intersections between CAS and the morphological layers where the most 
influence was evidenced. 
 
 
In summary, each neighbourhood has its own unique complex economic, 
governance and social CAS patterns. Bang Bua Neighbourhood and Saphan 
Mai had the most similar patterns while Roi Krong stood out for having 
fewer patterns that stray from the established patterns of the other two 
cases as shown below in Figure 10.3.2b. Reasons for the patterns and 
deviations will be provided in Part II of this chapter where cross-case 
dimensions of resilience are explained.  
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Dimensions of Urban Disaster Resilience 
Bang Bua 
Neighbourhood 
Saphan Mai 
Neighbourhood 
Roi Krong 
Neighbourhood 
Economic flows 
Secure land tenure Secure land tenure Rental properties 
Savings group Savings group  
Flood resistant housing Flood resistant housing  
Governance Networks 
Governance mechanism Governance mechanism Healthy democracy 
Agency Self-organisation Safety  
Safety Safety  
Social Dynamics 
Network and 
partnerships 
Network and 
partnerships 
Network and 
partnerships 
Social capital  Social capital  
Social welfare    
 
Table 10.4: An overview of the key dimensions of resilience within economic, 
governance and social CAS in Bang Bua, Saphan Mai and Roi Krong 
neighbourhoods. Source: the author 
 
 
Therefore, Part I of this chapter re-interpreted findings of individual case 
studies in terms of the patterns of economic, governance and social CAS as 
well as how they were articulated as dimensions of resilience when 
plotted on different morphological layers. Next, Part II of this chapter will 
establish cross-case dimensions of resilience by comparing the case 
studies in order to identify what can be generalised.  
 
Part II: establishing cross-case urban resilience 
dimensions 
   
Within each morphological layer key dimensions of resilience have been 
identified. Not all of the dimensions of resilience are positive, or are seen 
as positive by everyone. Some of the dimensions identified within the 
different layers helped neighbourhoods to ‘bounce back’ and stay in a 
relatively similar state to before a shock or stress occurred. However, 
other dimensions of resilience have helped neighbourhoods and 
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individuals to ‘bounce forward’ or transform into a state that allows them 
to better cope with shocks and stresses. Analysis of the cross-case 
dimensions of resilience within each layer looks at patterns of the 
identified dimension of resilience before the flood, during and after, 
before drawing conclusions about the dimension of resilience, including 
whether it is positive or negative and for whom.  
 
10.5 Dimensions of resilience within the 
topographical layer 
 
The topography layer illustrates that civil society networks and 
partnerships became an important source of support to poorer people. 
Two key networks were revealed at the topographical layer. The first was 
the Bang Bua Canal Network of 12 neighbourhoods. The second was the 
National Baan Mankong Upgrading Network of 1,546 communities in 277 
cities (Wungpatcharapon and Tovivich, 2012b). This topography layer 
explains how urban poor networks were effective in the collective 
production of knowledge; their ability for self-representation; and filling in 
gaps when governments were ineffective.  
 
10.5.1 Urban poor networks and the collective production of knowledge  
Through networks, groups of urban poor people were capable of 
collectively producing knowledge (Reed et al., 2014) and learning from one 
another. The Bang Bua Canal Network enabled 12 participating 
neighbourhoods to share good practice.  For example, Saphan Mai 
Neighbourhood had difficulty operationalising its savings group and 
drawing in a large membership base, so its leadership committee visited 
Bang Bua Neighbourhood and others to share ways of overcoming savings 
group start up difficulties (KI14, a local aid worker; KI34, a neighborhood 
leader). Neighbourhoods in the network also worked together on 
strategies and mechanisms to reduce pollution. For example, a ‘grease 
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trap’ was designed in one neighbourhood and distributed throughout the 
entire canal network as an inexpensive way to treat wastewater. Although 
the grease trap is no longer in use today, it succeeded in creating 
relationships and bonds within a group of people united by a single cause 
(FGDBB1). Meanwhile the larger, nation-wide Baan Mankong Upgrading 
Network aided in flood preparedness for the 12 neighbourhoods that 
volunteered to travel to flood-affected neighbourhoods in northern 
Thailand in order to learn about flood readiness and response as a means 
of preparing their own neighbourhoods and systems. The exchange of 
learning was especially helpful because information regarding when the 
flood would arrive and where it would hit was often conflicting, which 
made it difficult for people to prepare.  
 
10.5.2 Urban poor networks demonstrate a capability for analysis, self-
representation and agency 
 It is argued here that an increased capability for analysis, self-
representation and agency can be seen through examining the two 
networks’ response to shocks and stresses.   
 
Capability for analysis  
The Bang Bua Canal Network increased its capacity to collectively analyse 
problems through repeated attempts to solve wide-spread problems such 
as pollution. As a network the group cleaned the water and worked with 
the government to dredge the canal (KI3, a senior leader in a local aid 
agency; FGDBB1).  
 
Further examples of analysis can be found during the disaster. After 
leaders returned from their learning exchange in other flood-affected 
areas, they decided that each neighbourhood required its own boat for 
distributions and sought funding from CODI to purchase boats (KI33, a 
neighbourhood leader).  
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Self-representation and agency 
Once the flood occurred, the Bang Bua Canal Network actively sought 
support from its external partners, i.e. the military, aid agencies, 
universities and politicians. The network had the capability and 
importantly, the trust by its members and partners to manage the 
distribution of donations. It is at this juncture where we begin to see 
examples of agency, a term often used to describe those who act 
independently and are freely to make their own choices (Brown and 
Westaway, 2011). One of the consequences of ineffective government 
disaster management policies is that assistance did not arrive in Bang Bua 
Canal for seven days. During that time the network created its own food 
kitchens, having the financial means and social ability to self organise to 
support the basic needs of large numbers of people. Agency can also be 
seen in 2004, when the Bang Bua Canal first formed the network and 
worked together to avoid eviction by the government (discussed in 
Chapter five, section 5.4).  
 
10.5.3 Where government actions came up short, networks and their 
partners fill the gap  
The Bang Bua Canal’s upgrading network engaged with a range of city and 
national scale stakeholders to build resilience. During the upgrading, the 
network partnered with architects, planners, district authorities, the 
municipality, aid agencies and universities. For a period of ten years 
relationships grew between the canal network and the previously 
mentioned stakeholders. When the 2011 flood occurred, the network and 
its partners adapted the ways in which they worked together. For 
example, medical students from universities provided health care advice 
and engineering students taught people how to prevent electrocution.  
In fact, the Bang Bua Canal Network rivaled Bang Khen and Lak Si district 
governments in terms of having the ability to quickly procure aid and 
effectively distribute it (KI33, a neighbourhood leader; KI36, 
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neighbourhood leader; KI38, an officer from Bang Khen district). 
Moreover, because the district governments were perceived as less 
effective than the Bang Bua Canal Network, neighbourhood membership 
in the canal network had grown from 18 to 38 neighbourhoods (KI33, a 
neighbourhood leader; KI32, a neighbourhood leader) by the end of the 
flood.  
 
In conclusion, the generalisable key finding within the topography layer is 
that in crisis situations where government policies and frameworks are 
ineffective, networks and partnerships take on a more active role, 
especially within poorer urban populations. Having said that, resilience 
thinking at the national level must not expect populations to replace the 
role of government. Therefore national level governance and policy 
contexts ought to be taken into account in order to reduce political 
vulnerability (Bahadur and Tanner, 2014) in addition to building social 
resilience. Therefore, networks should engage with national and municipal 
level disaster management and urban planning policies to build a greater 
degree of resilience.  
 
 
10.6 Dimensions of resilience within the 
movement networks and public open spaces 
layer 
 
Economic and social use of movement networks and public open spaces 
offer insights into power dynamics. Who is included in the social and 
economic interactions that take place on roads and in public open spaces 
demonstrates that power is a relational effect, an outcome of social 
interaction. Allen (2003) notes that the ways in which spaces are 
constructed, their layout and uses, serve as a resource of power and a 
means through which power is exercised. He therefore argues that 
‘particular places may play host to a variety of cross-cutting arrangements 
Chapter ten: key findings of the research 
 
 
 Page 350 
of power’ and that ‘…if power has a presence at all, it has it through the 
interplay of forces established in place’ (Allen, 2003, p.11). This movement 
networks and public open spaces layer reveals three dimensions of 
resilience: safety, inclusivity and income generation.  
 
10.6.1 Safety  
The upgrading process prioritised the creation and improvement of roads 
and public open spaces, which contributed to an overall greater sense of 
safety and security in the Bang Bua Canal. For example, major pedestrian 
lanes were introduced and expanded creating more permeability while the 
installation of lights provided better visibility. Smaller alleys were designed 
with a high degree of connectedness to the major pedestrian lane in two 
of the neighbourhoods, arguably contributing to safety by increasing 
footfall in previously isolated areas. Jacobs (1961b) writes that public 
peace is kept not by police, but by the public itself through people having 
‘eyes on the street’ when there is ‘continuous use’, which turns human 
activity into interesting activity to watch. In terms of public open spaces, 
children’s right to play in safe, child-friendly spaces was prioritised through 
the design of public open spaces at the centre of all three 
neighbourhoods. Prior to the upgrading children used to play in parking 
lots, at risk of vehicular related accidents and within reach of strangers. 
Assimilating children through safe places to play in their neighbourhood 
creates spatial autonomy for social interaction, and turns public open 
spaces into grounds where children can develop and test their identity in 
relation to their peers (Travlou, 2007).  
 
10.6.2 Inclusiveness  
Social inclusion is the second dimension of resilience identified within the 
movement networks and public open spaces layer. The increased coverage 
of the pedestrian lanes also increased the capacity for socialising. Canal 
dwellers parked their motorcycles in pockets of open space when visiting 
one another and were observed sitting outside watching activities taking 
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place on the pedestrian lanes. However, examination of public open 
spaces also reveals findings about the experience of inclusion in the Bang 
Bua Canal. As discussed above, children are included through the 
intentional creation of open space. Their caregivers, usually elderly 
relatives, are also included because the space is within a short walking 
distance of all neighbourhood homes and is a pleasant area for adults to 
gather, socialise and supervise younger children. In Saphan Mai adults 
used the open space for formal neighbourhood meetings. In Roi Krong a 
big public open space existed before the flood, but since tensions have 
become further entrenched the two governance groups have further 
segregated themselves by using separate public open spaces to conduct 
meetings.  
 
10.6.3 Income generation  
The roads are enablers for people to generate income; therefore income 
generation is included as the third dimension of resilience at the 
movement networks and public open spaces layer. In Bang Bua 
Neighbourhood the creation of a canal-based pedestrian lane resulted in 
an increase of vendors accessing the area with goods to sell. Small 
portions of the road in Bang Bua and Saphan Mai are used for storing 
goods related to income generation, such as vending carts or goods for 
recycling. In Roi Krong the main road remains narrow and accommodates 
few vendors.  
 
When the 2011 flood struck, roads and other public open spaces were 
completely submerged, and therefore of little use to residents. 
Neighbourhood leaders participating in Baan Mankong prioritised mobility 
in their preparedness efforts through the decision to preposition one boat 
per neighbourhood in order to assist with the distribution of aid. Free 
public transportation offered at a city-level enabled some poorer people 
to continue working at their regular jobs or to innovate ways to earn 
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money by travelling great distances to markets and reselling goods on 
rafts. Overall, mobility was underscored as extremely important to 
residents because they needed to access different parts of the city to 
access to food, education, health care, jobs and other such daily routines 
that enable survival and well-being. After the floodwaters receded, Bang 
Bua Neighbourhood resumed patterns of economic and social activities 
that took place before the flood. The robust roads sustained little to no 
damage, resulting in a quicker recovery. Meanwhile, Saphan Mai placed 
great emphasis on rebuilding roads after the flood, having the opportunity 
to widen parts of the primary pedestrian lane and create smaller alleys 
that increased the permeability of the neighbourhood when 45 additional 
houses agreed to land share and reconstruct their homes through Baan 
Mankong.  
 
In summary, thoughtfully designed and well maintained roads and public 
open spaces become a panoply of social and economic activities that 
promote safety, inclusivity and income generation for users.  
 
 
10.7 Dimensions of resilience within the plots 
layer 
 
The incremental upgrading of individual and neighbourhood plots within 
the Bang Bua Canal is an example of a development methodology that has 
been tested by disaster. The primary observation is that development 
mechanisms founded on social capital can be a reliable neighbourhood-
scale response system during and after a disaster. However, this finding 
does not mean that the systems should work in isolation, instead they 
should consider horizontal links with multi-sectoral actors within each of 
the different morphological layers (such as architects who helped design 
buildings and city planners who made planning regulations flexible enough 
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to suit the context in Bang Bua). Kropf (2009) argues that analysis of those 
who control the use of plots and those who use them can provide 
essential insights into the nature of socially defined relationships. In the 
case of the Bang Bua Canal, analysis of the users and the ways in which 
plots are controlled reveal four key dimensions of resilience that 
transformed plots.  
 
10.7.1 Land tenure  
The first dimension is secure land tenure, and the ways in which chronic 
stresses and sudden disaster shocks prompted the need for canal 
residents to rethink tenure security. In 2000 the looming threat of eviction 
instigated a multi-sectoral approach to upgrading between 12 
neighbourhoods to quiet the conflict potentially brewing between the land 
owner (the national government) and canal dwellers. Hardoy and 
Satterthwaite (1989) write that where there is no conflict between 
landowners and the inhabitants, governments are less likely to bulldoze 
illegal developments, citing Bangkok as an example of illegal sub-divisions 
of land often escaping demise. Individual financial investments in 
buildings, roads and public spaces are risky without tenure security. Bang 
Bua Neighbourhood seized the opportunity to secure land tenure and 
reconstructed all of its homes within two years after a year of planning 
had taken place. In Saphan Mai, having tenure security was also important 
before people invest in buildings and common infrastructure. However, 
the process of securing tenure took nine years in Saphan Mai due to a 
number of factors including lack of trust in financial mechanisms and 
governance mechanisms. After the 2011 flood, more trust appeared to 
have been built amongst the residents and a majority of the 45 houses 
that had not undergone construction, began to engage in the upgrading 
process. Moreover, a legal mechanism had been put in place to potentially 
sue 17 houses that were living on cooperative land without paying rent 
(see Chapter Eight). Meanwhile, in Roi Krong while people desired tenure 
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security in principle, formalization was resisted partly because of 
unwillingness for more affluent people to participate in land sharing in 
addition to fragmented social capital.  
 
10.7.2 Savings groups  
The second dimension of resilience within the plot layer is financial 
mechanisms. Through cross-case analysis it can be concluded that for 
poorer urban individuals financial access is often dependent upon social 
capital at the neighbourhood level. As was explained in Chapter Five, 
savings groups were important mechanisms for poorer people to 
collectively pool resources in order to access low interest loans. Such loans 
were then used to reblock plots, reconstruct homes, invest in common 
urban infrastructure as well as initiate a social welfare fund (discussed in 
Chapter Five, section 5.3). After the 2011 flood, neighbourhood savings 
groups provided small loans with an even lower interest rates to members 
who needed money to invest in activities such as restarting livelihoods or 
paying school fees. The savings group worked as a mechanism for building 
social capital because of the collective way in which people worked 
together to manage their money. Transparent and accountable processes 
and management committees earned trust amongst members and formed 
relationships and bonds.  Those who did not participate in savings groups 
either had alternative means of accessing finances (through loans from 
employers or family members, for example) or felt they could not afford to 
participate because the investment cost was too high. However, the 
evidence across all three case studies shows that poorer people who 
participated in collective financial mechanisms were able to afford to 
transform their individual plots and associated infrastructure.   
 
10.7.3 Governance structures 
The third dimension of resilience within the plots layer is governance 
structures. Cross-case study analysis found that democratic formal and 
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informal governance mechanisms are amenable to power sharing and 
adaptable to crisis and non-crisis situations. Seeliger and Turok (2014) 
argue that adaptive governance is an appropriate framework for building 
resilience by strengthening local capabilities beyond ‘managing’ informal 
settlements to positively integrating into the wider city. Adaptive 
governance involves increasing security and social cohesion; reducing 
vulnerability arising from spatial patterns; increasing employment 
opportunities; and encouraging innovation (Seeliger and Turok, 2014) 
amongst other such activities witnessed at the plot level in all three 
neighbourhood case studies.  
 
The case studies showed that governance structures are most successful 
when they are transparent, accountable and equitable, regardless of 
whether they are formal or informal. In Bang Bua Neighbourhood there 
appeared to be a large level of satisfaction with the elected leader’s ability 
to manage the formal neighbourhood duties as well as the upgrading 
activities. Bang Bua Neighbourhood’s governance structure was 
decentralised and therefore enjoyed high levels of participation in 
activities such as census data collection. When the 2011 flood occurred, 
the method for collecting census data was adapted for assessing needs 
and monitoring distributions with what was described as a satisfactory 
method by most people in Bang Bua neighbourhood.  
 
In Saphan Mai, the new upgrading governance structure displaced an old 
power structure and was built on a conflict of interest with a husband 
standing as the elected leader, his wife as the leader of the upgrading 
activities and their daughter as the accountant of both structures. The 
governance structure in Saphan Mai can be described as lacking 
transparency and accountability. However, it was chosen through 
democratic means because most of the residents in the neighbourhood 
are relatives or friends of the family in power (discussed in Chapter Eight).  
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In Roi Krong the introduction of Baan Mankong created two governance 
structures. When the flood struck each structure relied on its own 
previously established network of peers for support. After the flood the 
leader was replaced in the next neighbourhood election cycle due to 
dissatisfaction with his performance, demonstrating the existence of a 
healthy democracy.  
 
10.7.4 Social capital  
The fourth dimension of resilience identified at the plots layer is social 
capital. Here Archer’s (2009) theory of three levels of social capital – 
bonding, a function of intra-communal relations; bridging, inter-communal 
relations; and linking, a function of community relations with the state – 
offers a framework for understanding the ways in which social capital 
impacted the plots layer. The first level of social capital, ‘bonding’, is 
evidenced most when neighbourhoods attempted to create equity 
amongst social and financial inequities. For example, through the 
upgrading neighbourhoods engaged in a number of collective activities 
such as the celebration of Mother’s and Father’s Day. Neighbourhoods 
worked together to plan new roads, redistribute plots of land and develop 
public open spaces. Each neighbourhood has its own social welfare system 
(as described in Chapter Five, section 5.5) to assist families whose financial 
assets were depleted. When the 2011 flood struck, neighbourhood 
welfare systems funded small food kitchens until outside assistance 
reached the neighbourhoods. In Bang Bua Neighbourhood, the 
decentralised and participatory system used to manage distributions 
contributed to an overall feeling of trust in regards to how distributions 
were handled. In Saphan Mai, a connection was built between opposing 
groups with some understanding and trust generated through a leadership 
structure that was reportedly top down in nature, yet largely equitable in 
its approach to assisting the neighbourhood, according to the majority of 
key informant interviews. In Roi Krong, the two governance structures 
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worked together temporarily during the floods but returned to their 
entrenched positions and existing tensions after the flood.  
 
The ‘bridging’ form of social capital, a horizontal linkage between 
neighbourhoods within the canal and more broadly across the country, is 
demonstrated through the Bang Bua Canal Network. As stated earlier 
leaders in the Canal Network deployed to flooded parts of northern 
Thailand to gain flood preparedness and response experience. The Bang 
Bua Canal Network was especially utilised by Roi Krong due to the fact that 
it was the weaker, smaller governance structure in the neighbourhood and 
therefore relied more heavily on the connections and partnerships 
harnessed by the whole canal. Even before the flood occurred there was 
evidence of inter-communal relationships through anti-drug trafficking 
efforts such as the annual drug-prevention day (discussed in Chapter Five) 
and canal-wide attempts to reduce pollution (also discussed in Chapter 
Five).  
 
Evidence of the ‘linking’ form of social capital can be observed before the 
flood at a minimal level when the neighbourhood leaders worked with 
Bang Khen district (where Bang Bua and Roi Krong neighbourhoods are 
located) and Lak Si district (where Saphan Mai is located) to move 
electricity poles from the land side into the canal and during negotiations 
for a retaining wall that prevents the canal bank from collapsing once 
houses have moved to the land side. When the flood occurred one key 
informant from the Bang Khen district office said that the Bang Bua Canal 
Network regularly sent one representative to attend district flood 
response meetings. Interviewees from Bang Khen and Lak Si districts said 
that their main source of frustration was that they were not as equipped 
and well-resourced to provide flood assistance as the Bang Bua Canal 
Network (KI 37, Lak Si district officer; KI 38, Bang Khen district officer). 
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Upon examining the plots layer through the lens of Archer’s three types of 
social capital (bonding, bridging, linking) collaboration across multiple 
sectors with a range of stakeholders can be observed. The collaboration 
patterns in crisis and non-crisis times in the Bang Bua Canal infer that an 
area-based approach to disaster resilience is taking place. Parker and 
Maynard (2015) define area based approaches as ‘geographically 
targeted’; ‘multi-sectoral’; and ‘participatory’. Presently, there is a call for 
a shift in paradigm in humanitarian assistance by agencies like ISAC, 
USAID, OFDA, ECHO and the Global Shelter Cluster (GSC) to assist entire 
neighbourhoods, rather than individual households (Parker and Maynard, 
2015). The generalisable key finding from the plots layer is that the 
humanitarian sector is retrofitting proven development tools and 
methodologies such as settlement upgrading into humanitarian 
frameworks. While there are barriers to using development 
methodologies in humanitarian contexts, especially during the relief phase 
when time frames for savings lives is short, from an early recovery stage 
development approaches have been observed in the Bang Bua Canal and 
perceived as worthy by key informants interviewed for this research.  
 
 
 
10.8 Dimensions of resilience within the 
buildings and services layer 
  
The quality of buildings and overall degree of disaster risk within the built 
environment is affected by the potential to access loans at a micro level 
and planning and reconstruction processes at a macro level, both of which 
are identified as dimensions of resilience in the buildings and services 
layer.  
 
10.8.1 Building quality and the politics of participation   
In all three case studies lower quality homes were most affected by the 
flood. In neighbourhoods, housing accounts for the majority of the 
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typologies of buildings (Arendt and Alesch, 2015). In the Bang Bua Canal, 
homes that were single storey, built on stilts with wooden flooring and 
walls were at best heavily damaged by the flood, and at worst completely 
destroyed. The poor quality of building construction can be traced back to 
financial vulnerability – inexpensive building materials such as bamboo, 
corrugated iron and timber were deliberately used to best cope with the 
weather, offer privacy and accommodate construction on marginalised 
land, which in this case is the unstable bank of the Bang Bua Canal.  
 
Meanwhile, well constructed two-storey homes that met planning 
regulations and risk reduction measures, were instrumental in enabling 
flood survivors to live at home, very often with access to running water 
and electricity. Other high quality buildings included community and 
health centres in all three neighbourhoods. The location of community 
centres heavily influenced their usefulness. In Bang Bua Neighbourhood, a 
two-storey community centre enabled the neighbourhood to manage 
flood distributions for its residents from one centralised location. In fact, 
the high quality of the building, the centrality of the neighbourhood plot 
within the canal and the efficiency of the governance structure resulted in 
Bang Bua Neighbourhood becoming a central hub for the Bang Bua Canal 
Network’s activities. In Saphan Mai, the community centre was well built 
and had two stories but was out of the reach of vehicular access and 
therefore was not used to manage distributions. Instead, the leader’s 
home was used as a distribution point. In Roi Krong, the community centre 
and health centre were both single storey buildings that flooded, and were 
therefore not viable locations to manage the neighbourhood flood 
response from. Therefore, it can be observed that reducing flood risk in an 
urban environment is best approached through the construction of higher 
quality buildings that have multiple stories.  
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Additionally, access to financial mechanisms that enable poorer people to 
construct homes of adequate quality is important (Satterthwaite, 2014). 
Moreover, it is crucial to create space for important economic and social 
neighbourhood level processes to take place before the actual building 
process begins (Boonyabancha, 2004). Crucially, savings groups can be 
established, a new system of governance developed to manage the 
building process and social capital fostered was through bonding, bridging 
and linking activities.  
 
However, the process for reconstructing buildings after the flood risks 
excluding large, fluid populations of renters. While the boundaries for who 
qualifies to access land and housing loans needed to be drawn 
somewhere, it is observed that the building process in the Bang Bua Canal 
included a small number of renters in Bang Bua Neighbourhood and 
Saphan Mai Neighbourhood, but did not proceed on a large-scale in Roi 
Krong because room rental was a primary income generation activity with 
90-200 rooms available for rent. The Baan Mankong programme requires 
people to invest in the neighbourhood by committing to 15 year loan 
payments; it requires collective action; high levels of trust; and 
governance mechanisms that operate like ‘gate keepers’ to enforce rules 
of participation and sometimes exclusion. For instance, a home cannot be 
bought, sold or willed without prior approval of the committee. Therefore, 
it can be argued that the current building model’s intolerance for the 
continuation of healthy and vibrant rental markets enforces a rather rural 
approach to the dynamic, diverse and fluid housing needs of cities.   
 
10.8.2 Inclusive planning and reconstruction processes    
Planning policies at a city-scale and neighbourhood scale are the last two 
dimensions of resilience that greatly influenced the buildings and services 
layer. A lack of enforcement of planning regulations at a city level resulted 
in the construction of vulnerable buildings in the Bang Bua Canal. 
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According to key informant interviews and secondary data, the canal is at 
risk of a range of climate and non-climate related disasters including 
increased severity and frequency of flooding, environmental deterioration, 
political risks and economic shocks. Although national and city scale 
frameworks and policies exist, it is worth noting that such policies 
sometimes require contextualisation or adaptation at a neighbourhood 
scale in order to take into account specific risks in specific areas. For 
example, flexible planning policies were applied to houses in the Bang Bua 
Canal that enabled people to legitimately build their homes closer 
together, waiving on-site sanitation regulations and making an exception 
to Bangkok’s Comprehensive Plan’s land-use controls (Usavagovitwong et 
al., 2013).  
 
Flexibility in the planning process was important and directly contributed 
to a more effective building process. All the neighbourhoods experienced 
incremental housing upgrading, which allowed people to join when they 
felt ready to. For example, Bang Bua Neighbourhood began its upgrading 
with its leader tearing down his houses and giving away six out of seven of 
his plots. Saphan Mai started with 65 houses before the process 
stalemated. However, reconstruction activities recommenced again after 
the 2011 flood when the disaster became an opportunity to change the 
social dynamics in the neighbourhood, resulting in the upgrading of 45 
more houses. In Roi Krong only 25 houses were reconstructed and 12 
repaired since the upgrading began in 2004, but perhaps more houses will 
join the programme as the context in the neighbourhood changes over 
time. Importantly, neighbourhoods and individuals have the flexibility to 
manage the planning process in a way that best suits them.  
 
In summary, analysis of the three case studies at the building layer 
demonstrates that access to pro-poor financial mechanisms and flexible 
planning mechanisms and processes at a neighbourhood and city-scale are 
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dimensions for resilience within the building layer. However, the building 
layer also illustrates that Baan Mankong’s financial mechanisms exclude 
an important part of the housing market: renters, thereby neglecting to 
respond to an urban need that housing for poorer urban people must also 
address.  
 
In summary the dimensions of resilience identified at the four different 
morphological layers can be summarised in one table as shown below in 
Table 10.8.2a.  
 
 
 
Summary table of the dimensions of resilience in different morphological 
layers 
 
Topography  Civil society networks and partnerships that 
collectively produce and share knowledge 
 Civil society networks and partnerships that 
demonstrate a capability for analysis, self-
representation and agency 
 Civil society networks and partnerships that fill 
the gap where government polices and 
frameworks are not effective 
Movement networks 
and public open 
spaces 
 Safety 
 Inclusiveness 
 Income generation 
Plots 
 
 Land tenure 
 Financial mechanisms 
 Governance structures 
 Social capital 
Buildings and 
services 
 Building quality and the politics of participation  
 Inclusive planning and reconstruction processes  
 
Table 10.8.2a: A summary table of the dimensions of resilience in four different 
morphological layers. Source: the author 
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Conclusion 
Part I of this chapter sought to re-interpret case study findings by revisiting 
general conclusions from each of the neighbourhoods and identifying key 
patterns formed by the interaction between economic, governance and 
social CAS.  Those patterns were then plotted on the morphological layer 
where they had the greatest impact, at which point the intersections 
between systems and morphology enabled the identification of key 
dimensions of resilience.  
 
In Bang Bua neighbourhood nine dimensions of resilience were identified 
with the majority of the dimensions found in the plots layer where the 
greatest degree of positive transformation took place due to security of 
land tenure, effective savings groups and governance structures, a strong 
sense of group agency, high levels of social capital and a thriving welfare 
structure. The dimensions of resilience identified in the Bang Bua 
Neighbourhood were mostly positive.  
 
In Saphan Mai neighbourhood eight dimensions were identified, and like 
in Bang Bua Neighbourhood, most of the dimensions were found in the 
plots layer, and were mostly positive. Saphan Mai also negotiated security 
of tenure, had moderate success with its savings group, improved levels of 
personal safety and developed the ability to self-organise. However, a low-
level conflict in the governance structures meant that a minority of people 
who resisted upgrading were marginalised in the neighbourhood and only 
part of the neighbourhood ‘bounced forward’ or transformed physical, 
economic and social aspects until the flood occurred, at which point all 
individual in the neighbourhood signed up for upgrading.  
 
However, in Roi Krong neighbourhood only four dimensions of resilience 
were identified with a mix of positive and negative impact, depending on 
the who was impacted. Overall, the dimensions of resilience identified 
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mostly built resilience for affluent holders of power in the neighbourhood, 
but increased vulnerability for poorer residents. Therefore the dimensions 
of resilience in Roi Krong were negative for the majority of people. For 
example, neighbourhood safety has not changed after the minimal 
upgrading or the flood. Today pedestrian lanes remain poorly lit and are 
not well connected, so much so that it prevents police officers from 
entering at night unless accompanied by neighbourhood residents. The 
resistance to change at the movement networks and public open spaces 
level has prevented the neighbourhood from seeing positive 
transformation. Additionally, the same resistance to change can be 
observed at the building layer where a high number of room rentals are 
offered by powerful property owners who resist entering a land sharing 
agreement with poorer individuals.   
 
At the end of the discussion of Part I, a table that summarises the key 
dimensions of resilience in each case study was presented. 
 
Meanwhile, Part II of this chapter established connections and common 
themes between the cases by identifying urban resilience dimensions that 
can be generalised within each morphological layer. The first layer, the 
topography layer, found networks and external partnerships were 
important sources of support when government policies and frameworks 
were ineffective or failed altogether. The second layer, movement 
networks and public open spaces, found roads and public open spaces 
were primarily used for social and economic purposes, and that when 
positive changes occur within this layer it resulted in higher levels of 
perceived safety, social inclusion and income generation. The third layer, 
the plots layer, concluded that when development mechanisms were 
introduced and well-received by a neighbourhood, it was likely that those 
mechanisms could be adapted during a crisis situation. Securing land 
tenure was found to be the first step in transforming plots. Lastly, the 
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buildings and services layer found that access to loans was essential to 
helping the poor reconstruct robust infrastructure. Moreover, the 
planning of houses and the reblocking of the plots layer was most 
successful when it was done inclusively.  
 
In summary, the dimensions of resilience in the case studies reflect many 
of the principles of development, disaster response, urban design and 
planning discussed in Chapter One including a participatory process, 
inclusiveness, engagement with local actors and the importance of 
accountable systems. The next chapter will explain linkages between the 
generalisable findings from the case studies and their link to the 
conceptual framework and broader theories from the literature. 
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Chapter eleven 
Generalisable key findings 
 
Introduction 
This chapter aims to identify generalisable and transferrable principles 
for urban disaster resilience as a concept that exists both in practice and 
in theory. It uses analysis from multiple cases as a useful method for 
making comparisons between the cases in order to link practice to a 
generic body of theory (de Vaus, 2001). The chapter also seeks to 
evaluate the conceptual framework’s generalisability by explaining the 
ways in which urban stakeholders from academia and practice validated 
it. This chapter is structured in three sections.  
 
Section 11.1 seeks to identify generalisable conclusions about the case 
studies and their link to the conceptual framework. The aim of section 
11.1 is to explain key practical lessons that arise as a result of combining 
CAS and morphological approaches that have the potential to assist 
neighbourhoods and urban professionals to operationalise resilience.  
 
Section 11.2 seeks to establish connections between the conceptual 
framework and general body of theory. Here, four generalised key 
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findings regarding the validity of the conceptual framework are 
identified. The chapter then demonstrates the generalisability of those 
findings by making connections between the conceptual framework and 
theories raised in the literature review in Chapter One. A refined 
definition of resilience is then proposed based on the revised conceptual 
framework.  
 
Section 11.3 is an evaluation of the conceptual framework. The process 
for validating the framework and accompanying analytical tool is 
described. The process of refining the conceptual framework and 
analytical tool is then explained followed by a description of their 
strengths and limitations. Table 11.0 below summarises the three section 
of this chapter.  
 
Structure of chapter eleven 
Section 
11.1 
Establishes 
connections 
between the case 
studies and the 
conceptual 
framework  
Generalisable conclusions about the 
connections between dimensions of 
urban disaster resilience in the case 
studies and the conceptual framework 
are identified for practical application 
in other contexts. 
 
Section 
11.2 
Establishes 
connections 
between the 
conceptual 
framework and 
general bodies of 
theory  
 
Generalisable conclusions about the 
conceptual framework are made in 
relation to general bodies of theory. A 
refined definition of resilience is 
proposed.  
 
Section 
11.3 
Evaluates the 
conceptual 
framework and 
accompanying 
analytical tool 
 
The process for validating the 
conceptual framework and analytical 
tool is described and reflected upon. 
 
 
 
Table 11.0: Provides a summary of the structure used to establish connections 
between theory and practice in Chapter 11. Source: the author 
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11.1 Connections between resilience 
dimensions and the conceptual framework  
 
This section interrogates the dimensions of resilience identified in the 
three case studies in order to understand what can be generalised 
beyond this particular study (de Vaus, 2001), especially in regards to 
practice.  
 
When the key dimensions of resilience identified in the previous chapter 
are plotted on the conceptual framework, three generalisations can be 
made that apply to this study and beyond specifically regarding a.) social 
CAS; b.) the plots layer; and c.) the rate of change within the built and 
natural environment with regards to disaster recovery. Figure 11.1 below 
is an illustration of the conceptual framework with key dimensions of 
resilience identified in Chapter Ten (Part II) plotted at the intersections 
between CAS and morphology. The dimensions were identified through a 
cross-case analysis.  
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Figure 11.1: the conceptual framework with key dimensions of resilience 
plotted at the intersections between CAS and morphology. The dimensions 
were identified in Chapter Ten through a cross-case analysis. Source: the author  
  
 
a.) Social dynamics are the most influential complex adaptive system  
As show in Figure 11.1a above, social dynamics played an important role 
in influencing the built and natural environment at every morphological 
layer where formal policies, procedures or frameworks failed to support 
poorer people. In the absence of money, collective social dynamics or 
‘collectivism’ works as a kind of social wealth (Boonyabancha, Carcellar 
and Kerr, 2012). This section describes the role of social dynamics and 
their influence at four different morphological layers.  
 
Topography layer 
At the topographical layer civil society networks and partnerships 
became strong and responsive to local needs when disaster management 
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policies and frameworks were ineffective. For example, disaster 
management policies failed to prevent the 2011 flood from reaching 
Bangkok, and later from reducing the flood’s impact (discussed in 
Chapter Six and Chapter Ten). Johnson and Blackburn write that cities 
have the responsibility to see themselves as part of a ‘global network to 
reduce disaster risk reduction’ (2014, p.29). Reducing disaster risk aligns 
with governmental mandates to protect citizens. 
 
Movement networks and public open spaces layer 
At the movement networks and public open spaces layer new roads and 
public open spaces gave neighbourhoods increased channels for 
socialising and improving their income generating opportunities by 
increasing the permeability of the roads within the neighbourhoods, and 
by creating inclusive, safe spaces for people of different age groups and 
demographics to socialise in. Jacobs (1961a) notes that successful city 
neighbourhoods make safety an asset through clear demarcation of 
public and private space and a high level of footfall and visual monitoring 
by the proprietors of the street. In a disaster the protection of vulnerable 
groups such as women, children, the elderly and PLWD amongst others is 
often achieved through safe roads and public spaces such as child 
friendly spaces (Phongnonsung and Borchard, 2012) and community 
centres where information can be shared.   
 
Plots layer 
At the plots layer, the higher the level of social capital in terms of trust 
and ability to work collectively towards a goal, the better the financial 
and governance mechanisms were able to fulfill their functions. This 
aligns with de Soto’s (2000) theory  that the poor often have access to 
the assets they need, but because they are held in defective forms, the 
assets do not advance them. At times of stress or shock, retreating into 
small groups to share social and economic forms of support enhances 
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coping mechanisms and minimises risk to the group members (Pelling, 
2003). In the Bang Bua Canal, the actions taken at the plot layer helped 
to build social capital and minimize the risk through collective action. 
However, access to secure land tenure (Tarbatt, 2012) and loans through 
savings groups (Jabeen, Allen and Johnson, 2010) is also important for 
building disaster resilience. In the Bang Bua Canal secure land tenure 
made it more likely that individuals viewed investments in financial and 
governance mechanisms as low-risk because of their right to access the 
land. Loans were also an essential resource for developing high quality 
buildings and obtaining access to adequate services (Boonyabancha, 
2005). Moreover, they were important ways for the poor to juggle 
complex financial portfolios (Moser, 2008) that balance long-term 
investments in things such as  disaster resistant housing versus short-
term needs such as food and school fees. Lastly, resilience at the plots 
layer raised important governance questions, namely who should be 
resilient and to what (Lebel et al., 2006).  
 
Building and services layer 
At the building layer, inclusive and participatory upgrading processes 
developed the resilience of the social fabric alongside the physical 
components of buildings. De Soto writes that buildings used to lead an 
‘invisible parallel life alongside their material existence’ implying that a 
lack of legal right to access land resulted in buildings that were unable to 
be turned into capital connected within the broader formalised economy 
(de Soto, 2000, p.7). Thus, it is here where links between the 
morphological layers and social processes become especially important. 
In many ways dimensions of resilience from the plots layer influenced 
activities at the building layer. For example, collective social action 
achieved access to land at the plots layer in order to proceed with 
building construction and improvement of services. Furthermore 
governance structures and savings groups from the plots layer enabled 
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the reconstruction of homes and neighbourhood buildings through 
access to affordable loans. Such loans were only available to people who 
formed strong social ties and worked together.  
 
Meanwhile, flexible building and planning policies that are designed to 
include poorer urban people have been shown to increase coping 
mechanisms for individuals, households and neighbourhoods (Wamsler 
and Brink, 2014).  At the building layer it became apparent that policies 
could only be changed by urban actors such as planners who needed to 
be involved in the amendment of housing policies and regulations where 
necessary (Usavagovitwong et al., 2013). Through partnerships with 
technical experts, people from the Bang Bua Canal upgraded in ways that 
improved the robustness of the buildings and access to public services 
and utilities for the entire neighbourhood.  Overall, inclusive planning 
can provide a level playing field for stakeholders, strengthening 
transparency and accountability (Habitat III, 2015h).  
 
The dimensions of resilience related to social CAS are highlighted in 
Figure 11.1b. The presence of social dimensions of resilience at every 
layer suggests that social dynamics is an important CAS for poorer urban 
people, and with the support of theory, is identified as generalisable 
beyond this case study.  
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Figure 11.1a: The conceptual framework with key dimensions of resilience 
plotted on it. Social dynamics were identified as influential at every 
morphological layer, therefore suggesting that social dynamics an important 
CAS for poorer urban people. Source: the author  
 
b.) The plots layer: the most influential morphological layer 
The plots layer demonstrated that multi-sectoral investment in 
neighbourhood scale complex adaptive systems could result in a more 
holistic, collaborative approach for building resilience to chronic stresses 
and disaster shocks. Feedback loops (Holling, 2001) exist between 
financial mechanisms, governance mechanisms and social capital with 
each one influencing the other. The emphasis on multi-sectoral 
stakeholders draws from the research findings and theory that urban risk 
is often ‘created or exacerbated by local government’s incapacity to act 
in the public good, guide urban growth and ensure infrastructure and 
service provision’ (Dodman et al., 2013, p.26). A systems approach to 
resilience provides an emphasis on complexity and cross-sectoral 
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collaboration (Bahadur and Tanner, 2014), which arguably made 
investments at the plots layer sustainable.  
 
The four dimensions of resilience – savings groups, land tenure, 
governance structures and social capital – identified at the plots layer 
reflect a multi-sectoral approach to resilience that is also found in 
development and disaster literature. For instance, Boonyabancha (2009) 
writes that collective land ownership is key to transitioning 
neighbourhoods from informal to formal, which in turn provides 
protection against eviction and market forces that drive poorer people to 
sell. Moreover, the collective ownership of land encourages collective 
responses to problems. Meanwhile, savings groups are noted by 
Satterthwaite (2014) to work well when there is trust between people 
and accountable governance systems, which is most readily seen at the 
plots layer in the Bang Bua Canal. In terms of government structures, 
broader theories within development and geography observe that 
governance works best when it is transparent, accountable, shares 
power, is inclusive in decision-making processes and just (Allen, 2003; 
Siisiainen, 2000). Finally, Archer (2009) writes that social capital increases 
through collective action against threats such as eviction or disaster 
shocks (such as a flood).     
 
Moreover, actions taken at other morphological layers also affected the 
success of investments at the plots layer. The learning and sharing of 
knowledge (Reed et al., 2014) that results from civil society networks and 
partnerships can benefit an entire neighbourhood. Likewise, flexible 
planning policies that can be adjusted to suit specific neighbourhood 
contexts can also ensure successful sharing of land at the plots layer. 
Access to loans that factor social security funding into interest rates can 
be of great benefit to some of the poorest people in the neighbourhood 
(Satterthwaite, 2014).   
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The interaction between the plot and the three other layers enabled 
input from different actors such as: the local district government, city 
planners, the loan lender, the land lessee and planners assisting with re-
blocking of plots and reaching land sharing arrangements. Development 
strategies and tools tend to label such collaborative multi-stakeholder 
interactions as Area Development Approaches (ABAs), currently coming 
back into fashion in the humanitarian sector (Parker and Maynard, 2015). 
Figure 11.1c below shows four dimensions of resilience at the plot layer: 
secure land tenure, financial mechanism, governance mechanisms and 
social agency. The dimensions spread across all three CAS highlighting 
that multi-sectoral investment at the plots layer has a high influence on 
resilience.  
 
 
Figure 11.1b: Four dimensions of resilience are identified at the plot layer: 
secure land tenure, financial mechanism, governance mechanisms and social 
agency. Source: the author  
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c.) The rate of change that occurs within each layer and disaster recovery 
time  
The third connection between the cases and the conceptual framework 
is that the rate of change that occurs within each layer impacts recovery 
time after a disaster. Evidence from the case studies and general body of 
theory suggests that the fastest rate of change occurs at the building 
layer (Bolio Arceo, 2012; Whitehand, 1987; Moudon, 1997) and the 
slowest occurs at the topography layer (Bolio Arceo, 2012; Moudon, 
1997). It can be helpful to urban actors to understand the rate of change 
in the built environment, especially after a disaster in order to develop 
appropriate recovery timelines and funding for each morphological layer 
of the city. 
 
The topography layer of the conceptual framework has traced changes in 
land and water over hundreds of years. The topography layer is useful for 
long-term forecasting and planning policies on how to sustainably 
manage land and water by national governments. For example, Thailand 
submitted its first National Communication report to the United Nations 
Framework Convention on Climate Change (UNFCC) in 2000 where it 
highlighted adaptation priorities for agriculture, water management and 
coastal regions (Gass, Hove and Parry, 2011). In its Second National 
Communication in 2011, it highlighted progress, changes and constraints, 
and reaffirmed that climate variability and extreme weather events are 
Thailand’s greatest challenges (Gass, Hove and Parry, 2011). Other key 
policies that came up at the topography layer include progress reports 
and commitments to the MDGs (Inter-Agency and Expert Group on MDG 
Indicators, 2015; United Nations Development Group, 2014) , which have 
ended and are now the SDGs (United Nations, 2015b) and the Hyogo 
Framework (UNISDR, 2005b), which has also ended and has been 
replaced with the Sendai Framework for Disaster Risk Reduction 2015-
2013, adopted in March 2015 in Sendai, Japan (UNISDR, 2015c). 
However, the formation of policies alone cannot protect the topography 
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layer from negative changes. As was seen in the Bangkok flood case 
study, when policies are not effective or enforced, negative 
consequences can occur. Other aspects that compliment policy are 
important, too, such as financial investment in infrastructure in order to 
manage long-term infrastructure risks as well as investment in civil 
society and social development.  
 
The movement networks and public open spaces layer sees an increase 
in pace of change slightly, but transformation still occurs in this layer 
rather slowly and in incremental stages. A comparison between 
movement networks around the Bang Bua Canal in 1968 and today (as 
demonstrated in Chapter Five) reveals that major roads and streets have 
remained relatively the same. Smaller scale roads and alleyways change 
much more quickly as was reflected in the individual neighbourhood case 
studies. Likewise, large, public open spaces such as temple and university 
gardens around the Bang Bua Canal have largely maintained the same 
shape and size they held in 1968 as they are today (as discussed in 
Chapter Five).  
 
The plots layer changed rather quickly in the three case studies 
presented. In Bang Bua neighbourhood the plots changed almost as fast 
as the building layer. Nevertheless, changes to plots can also move rather 
slowly as it did in Saphan Mai Neighborhood where the plots layer saw 
transformation take place over a 14-year period of time. Furthermore, in 
the case of Roi Krong neighbourhood the plots have seen even slower 
rates of change where the majority of the neighbourhood plots resist any 
change at all. In summary, the large surface area of a neighbourhood 
encompasses more decision makers to negotiate outcomes within a 
larger area of land, and therefore changes often occur more quickly at 
the plots layer than the topography layer and the movement networks 
and public opens spaces layer. This research suggests that urban disaster 
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recovery professionals should consider the benefits of investing in land 
tenure, financial and governance mechanisms alongside social capital 
before they design interventions, particularly for aid agencies taking an 
area-based approach.  
 
The buildings and services layer is the smallest scale and therefore the 
easiest of all the layers to modify. Under the right financial conditions 
buildings can be modified or reconstructed, regardless of legal access to 
land. For humanitarians this means that buildings are one of the easiest 
layers to intervene in, especially because the outcome is concrete and 
tangible, therefore, arguably more appealing to donors than intervening 
in ‘soft’ areas such as financial or governance mechanisms observed at 
the plot layer. However, this research demonstrates that interventions in 
buildings alone do not improve the resilience of a neighbourhood. 
Investment is also required in social, economic and governance aspects 
of neighbourhood living.  
 
11.2 Connections between the conceptual 
framework and theory 
 
This section reflects on the conceptual framework and existing bodies of 
theory, seeking to demonstrate that the new framework is sound, valid 
and provides a logical way of interrogating disaster resilience. Five key 
generalisable conclusions are drawn that suggest the confluence of 
morphology and systems approaches can in fact be combined as a new 
conceptual framework for understanding urban disaster resilience.  
 
a.) A people-centred approach 
Perhaps most importantly, this conceptual framework puts people at the 
centre of building urban disaster resilience. It prevents actors from 
making the assumption that interventions in the built or natural 
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environment alone will improve urban disaster resilience. Instead, the 
framework highlights the ways in which the built form interacts with 
three complex adaptive systems – economic, governance and social. For 
example, an intervention at the building layer of the framework 
illustrates that constructing a building has economic, governance and 
social implications. Conversely, it also shows the importance of a quality 
built environment and the ways in which the built environment affects 
people’s lives.  
 
b.) Simultaneous analysis of disaster and development risks 
The literature review in Chapter One suggested that risk is often analysed 
in silos: humanitarians approach analysis from a disasters perspective 
while development practitioners view risk from a development 
perspective (Collins, 2009). This conceptual framework analyses disaster 
and development risk together, recognising that the separation of types 
of risk – chronic versus disaster – is largely an academic exercise, and 
that in reality people from low-income neighbourhoods do not separate 
the two (Bene, 2013). Therefore, the when analysing urban disaster 
resilience it is imperative everyday risks and disaster risks are considered 
together.  
 
c.) Scalar and temporal analysis  
Using morphology to interpret the qualities of human interaction with a 
city’s urban fabric allows a flexible approach for analysing different scales 
of the built and natural environment (Moudon, 1997).  Meanwhile, a 
systems approach that analyses access to power and the distribution of 
resources at a range of scales is crucial for understanding factors internal 
and external to the scale of analysis (Tyler and Moench, 2012).  
 
However, because the quality of human interaction within a city’s urban 
fabric is always evolving, it is important to be able to take a snapshot in 
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time in order to have a ‘baseline survey’ of vulnerability, risk, capacity 
and dimensions of resilience at a specific point in time in order to 
compare states of existence across time (Walker et al., 2004). For 
example, a snapshot could be taken before, during and after a disaster, 
in order to assess the state of power, equity and quality of life. A 
snapshot in time is a helpful way to determine changes that have taken 
place and the primary dimensions responsible for the change. 
Morphology and CAS approaches analyse links with history, which are 
often reflected in the present structure of a system (Juarrero, 2000), 
suggesting morphology and CAS are useful approaches to analyse scale 
and time.  
 
d.) Using intersections between morphological layers and CAS to identify 
dimensions of resilience 
The conceptual framework seeks to demonstrate that intersections 
between CAS and morphology identify dimensions of resilience at a 
range of scales across disaster and development contexts. The 
intersections between the built and natural environment and the CAS 
systems are where dimensions emerge as key influencers of change. 
Resilience dimensions are identified through interrogating complex 
interactions between CAS and morphology by deconstructing 
complicated feedback loops (Juarrero, 2000) with fuzzy boundaries (Bar-
Yam, 1997b) about where interactions begin and end and analysing 
seemingly chaotic and non-linear patterns of behavior that have inter 
and intra-dependent causal relationships (Wallace and Wallace, 2008). 
Analysis of feedback loops provides the opportunity to draw conclusions 
about the basins of attraction (Walker et al., 2004) at each morphological 
layer; much like humanitarian aid workers strive to develop a baseline 
survey of key elements of an environment. The basins of attraction are 
useful because they allow qualitative judgments about the overall state 
of a neighbourhood to be made. The basin of attraction may need to be 
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altered to reduce risk and build resilience; or, it may have reached a 
threshold that requires transformation (Pelling and Manuel-Navarrete, 
2011) because it holds high levels of risk or a transfer of power is taking 
place. In order to interpret what the feedback loops in the conceptual 
framework tell us, we must first clearly define resilience for whom and to 
what.  
 
Furthermore, the intersections in the conceptual framework assist to 
identify issues for intervention at different morphological layers from an 
economic, governance and social perspective. Identifying key issues at a 
particular morphological layer has the potential to assist with the 
identification of appropriate actors to collaborate on the issue, be it at a 
practical level or through policy-based work. Such actors can include 
urban planners and designers, architects, politicians, governments 
(district, city and national levels), the private sector, universities, 
emergency personnel (police, fire and ambulance), the army and aid 
agencies. 
 
e.) Resilience is built before and after a disaster  
Dimensions of risk are created through human design (Arendt and 
Alesch, 2015) and therefore can be countered through a lens that 
considers how humans interact with the designs of built form and natural 
environments that host the built form.  
 
Before a disaster 
It is worth recapping that vulnerability in cities and towns arises when 
people have limited access to income and employment; inhabit 
inadequate and insecure homes on insecure land; are unable to access 
adequate infrastructure and services; are at risk of natural hazards or 
environmental health risks; have limited mobility or access to 
transportation or face discrimination due to issues of exclusion (Moser, 
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2008). It is therefore important to mitigate these chronic and disaster 
risks and to prepare for uncertain events that might surprise us (Boin, 
Comfort and Demchak, 2010). Essentially, it is crucial to build a fail-safe 
environment (Jha, Bloch and Lamond, 2012). In other words, it is 
important to create an environment that is able to fail safely by 
maintaining its basic functions without causing the entire system, be it a 
neighbourhood or a city, for example, to collapse. Therefore, this 
research concludes that building resilience takes place before a disaster 
occurs as is indicated in Figure 10.5.2a where arrows along the four 
morphological layers indicate activities before a disaster.  
 
 
 
Figure 11.2e: An illustration demonstrating that resilience building occurs 
before a disaster strikes as indicated by the arrows on the left. The dotted lines 
in the graphic illustrate the four morphological layers where resilience building 
takes place. The middle section indicates that the disaster event serves as a test 
of resilience. Source: the author 
 
 
 
The disaster event 
The disaster event tests the ways in which CAS and their components 
adapt to maintain basic function without causing the whole system to 
fail. Essentially, the scale of resilience under interrogation – be it a 
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household, a neighbourhood, or a city, for example – is considered 
resilient if there is little difference between pre and post shock states of 
affair (Alfani et al., 2015). As analysis of CAS in this research has shown, 
there are many ways components of a system adapt to shocks and 
stresses, depending on the system and morphological layer under 
examination. Some examples may include networks and how they adapt 
mechanisms for managing information, coordinating needs assessment 
and cooperating to distribute supplies at the topography layer.  
 
At the movements and open public spaces layer mechanisms for 
transportation may adapt from pedestrian or motorized access to boats, 
as seen in the 2011 Bangkok flood. The importance of public open spaces 
during a disaster may change from very important to not at all 
important. For example, during the 2011 Bangkok flood public open 
spaces were submerged and therefore not important. However, 
immediately after an earthquake public open spaces may become 
important places for sheltering people whose homes have been 
damaged or destroyed.  
 
At the plots layer adaptation may include the ways in which financial 
mechanisms such as savings groups support member needs during and 
after the flood. The plots layer may also give consideration to 
governance systems and how they adapt to support needs during a crisis 
in terms of who they include in decision-making, how decentralised 
management structures are and the ways in which they demonstrate 
accountability.  
 
At the building layer the ways in which use of community buildings is 
adapted is also a test of resilience – are the most vulnerable protected by 
having access to adequate shelter and services? It is worth noting that 
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the concept of adaptation within systems is the reason great value is 
placed on complex adaptive systems (Levine, 1998).  
 
After a disaster 
The disaster will have exposed weaknesses and strengths, vulnerabilities 
and capacities that when analysed through a CAS and morphological 
framework will identify dimensions of resilience at different scales. The 
disaster will highlight development mechanisms that worked effectively 
and those that did not, providing an opportunity to build back better in 
the truest sense, if analysis is carried out before and after the disaster to 
draw a comparison during the post-disaster recovery phase.   Figure 
10.5.2b below is an illustration demonstrating that resilience building 
occurs before a disaster strikes and again during recovery from a 
disaster. The disaster event in essence serves as a test of resilience.  
 
 
 
Figure 11.2f: An illustration demonstrating that resilience building occurs before 
a disaster strikes and again after the disaster as indicated by the arrows on the 
right and left. The dotted lines in the graphic illustrate the four morphological 
layers where resilience building takes place. The middle section shows that the 
disaster event serves as a test of resilience. Source: the author 
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11.3 Evaluation of the conceptual framework 
and analytical tool 
 
This section describes the process of validating the analytical tool 
(introduced in Chapter Four) and the conceptual framework (introduced in 
Chapter Three). It begins with an explanation of the analytical tool then 
discusses the process of validating the framework and tool, key 
refinements that were made as well as identified strengths and 
limitations. Figure 11.3a below is an illustration of the conceptual 
framework and Figure 11.3b depicts the corresponding analytical tool 
under discussion in this section.  
 
 
 
Figure 11.3a: A conceptual framework that blends CAS and morphological 
approaches into a single framework for interrogating urban disaster resilience. 
Source: the author 
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11.3.1 Analytical tool  
As introduced in Chapter Three, and subsequently used as the basis for 
analysis in the case studies, the analytical tool has been devised to 
translate the conceptual framework into practice. This urban derived tool 
is a matrix that can be used in disaster management practice by 
populating it with information before or after a disaster at a 
neighbourhood, city or national scale. This tool has particular utility 
because it employs urban approaches that analyse disaster and 
development risk simultaneously at different periods of time.  
 
The names in the tool are as jargon free as possible in order to allow 
people with a range of backgrounds to use it with ease. The names of the 
complex adaptive systems are presented in the top of the matrix 
alongside a brief description that translates the title. For example, the 
economic CAS heading ‘economic forces’ is described as ‘things that 
provide economic benefit such as money, markets, businesses, rent, jobs, 
savings, loans, credit, ownership and skills’, giving a number of examples 
for the practitioner. The morphological layers presented on the left side of 
the matrix also have short descriptions. For example, the ‘plots’ layer is 
described as a ‘parcel of land’.  
 
Uses of the analytical tool  
The tool translates theory into practice by allowing the practitioner to 
document patterns formed by CAS and plot them on the morphological 
layer where the greatest amount of impact is seen. If significant CAS 
patterns form within multiple layers, then it is appropriate to record them 
at each layer. The intersections between CAS and morphology can be 
viewed as dimensions of resilience. Further analysis of power is required 
in order to understand if those dimensions are positive or negative by 
analysing resilience for whom and to what.  
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This tool provides an opportunity to undertake context analysis and pre-
and post-disaster assessments. The matrix format reflects Anderson and 
Woodrow’s (1998) classic capacity and vulnerability assessment tool in 
that it creates simple categories for the user to populate information into. 
The tool can also be paired with the SWOT (strengths, weaknesses, 
opportunities and threats) analysis methodology as shown in Table 11.3.1a 
below. The same information can be added to as many boxes as 
necessary, recognising that reality is complex and the physical and natural 
layers overlap with various systems.   
 
 
Table 11.3.1a: The urban disaster resilience analytical tool paired with SWOT 
analysis methodology. Source: the author  
 
 
11.3.2 Validation of the conceptual framework and analytical tool  
The purpose of validating the conceptual framework and analytical tool 
was to identify generalisable aspects of both framework and tool beyond 
this research. The validation process took place with 69 participants from 
15 countries. Participants were from two universities and one aid agency. 
The first workshop occurred at the Norwegian University of Science and 
Technology (NTNU) with 14 participants; the second at the British Red 
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Cross (BRC) with 27 participants; and the third at the Centre for 
Development and Emergency Practice (CENDEP) at Oxford Brookes 
University (OBU) with 28 participants. Comments from the three 
workshops will be annotated in this chapter according to the institution 
the participant came from, for example CENDEP, NTNU and BRC. The 
university participants included students from Masters and PhD 
programmes as well as professors from the disciplines of development 
and humanitarian aid, urban planning and design, urban ecological 
planning, geography, architecture and real estate and construction. 
Participants from the British Red Cross were from 13 sub-sections of the 
international development department, many of them from regional 
desks (Asia, Africa etc.) and sectoral areas (health and care, accountability 
etc.).  
 
To validate the generalisability of the conceptual framework and analytical 
tool with the university participants, students were asked to apply the 
urban disaster resilience framework to their research. As part of ongoing 
academic work, Masters and PhD students from both of the university 
groups were conducting research on a total of 15 different case studies, 
13 of which were linked to a development or disaster themes. A 
presentation of the conceptual framework was given and then the 
university students were asked to apply the conceptual framework and 
analytical tool to their case studies. The most relevant case studies 
included urban violence, earthquake, cyclone, flood, fire, refugees and 
internally displaced persons (IDPs), and conflict.  
 
Meanwhile, the generalisability of the conceptual framework and 
analytical tool were validated with the British Red Cross through a seminar 
and discussion. All of the BRC participants were working on live 
development and disaster projects and were asked to discuss the 
transferability of the framework and tool to their own projects.  
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11.3.3 Refinements to the conceptual framework resulting from the 
validation process 
The definitions of the CAS systems and morphological layers were refined 
and nuanced based on discussions with the participants. For example, 
groups at NTNU suggested giving more examples in each of the 
morphological layers for those who are less familiar with urban 
morphology classifications. Participants from all three institutions 
suggested adding an ecological, environmental or natural category to 
accommodate factors like climate change or natural hazards such as 
earthquakes. While environmental change is already accounted for in the 
topography layer, further emphasis of this fact was added by retrofitting 
the definition of the vertical axis on the analytical framework to say ‘built 
and natural environment’. Participants from CENDEP reflected that many 
low-income countries do not use the term ‘plots’ and would better 
understand the analytical framework if the plots layer was titled ‘a parcel 
of land’, and thus the colloquial language was introduced into the 
analytical tool.   
 
11.3.4 Strengths  
The participants felt the conceptual framework and analytical tool had a 
number of strengths, including its usefulness for context analysis, its 
holistic approach and its adaptability to other contexts. Figure 11.3.4a is a 
sample of the comments from participants at NTNU regarding the overall 
usefulness of the framework and tool.  
 
Chapter eleven: generalisable key findings 
 
 
 Page 390 
 
Figure 11.3.4a: A sample of the comments from participants at NTNU regarding 
the usefulness of the conceptual framework and analytical tool. Source: the 
author 
 
Useful for context analysis 
In response to a question about the usefulness of the framework and tool, 
participants from all three groups felt both were useful for conducting a 
context analysis (CENDEP, NTNU, BRC). One participant from the British 
Red Cross said it was a ‘helpful framework that captures a snapshot of a 
city in time’. Another BRC aid worker said, ‘this helps with asking the right 
questions when you do context analysis’. A discussion within BRC was 
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then held between participants who suggested the framework could be 
used to do a vulnerability and capacity and SWOT analysis. One BRC 
participant who was working on a slum-upgrading project in post-
earthquake Port au Prince, Haiti, felt the tool could be used for monitoring 
and evaluation by using project indicators.  
 
‘Holistic’ and ‘comprehensive’ 
Participants from the university groups reflected that the conceptual 
framework and analytical tool were useful because they were ‘holistic’ 
and ‘comprehensive’, drawing links between the past and present (NTNU, 
CENDEP). One group said that cross-referencing physical and natural 
aspects with economic, governance and social systems was helpful in 
identifying ‘levers of change’ (NTNU). Another said that the focus on the 
physical changes of an area was a helpful way to understand an urban 
context, and how the social, economic and political CAS interact (NTNU). 
Some of the participants from CENDEP felt a broad range of urban actors 
such as neighbourhood residents, planners, architects, engineers and aid 
workers, could use the tool. They also suggested that the tool could be a 
useful basis for area-based programming (CENDEP).  
 
Easily adaptable to other contexts and case studies 
While initially developed to be used in low-income countries, specifically 
in low-income urban neighbourhoods vulnerable to flooding, three rounds 
of validating with participants has identified that by adapting some of the 
categories, the framework is applicable to a wider range of urban contexts 
and hazards – from urban violence to IDP movements to natural hazards. 
Nearly all of the student participants were able to populate the tool with 
information from their case studies (CENDEP, NTNU), except for the case 
study on bicycle land planning (NTNU). For example, in a Nigerian case 
study on IDPs (CENDEP), it was felt that the topography layer could 
include natural resources such as oil and gas in its definition.  
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One group that was working on a case study of slums in Addis Ababa, 
Ethiopia said analysis of the physical aspects in relation to key systems 
was helpful in understanding how slums came about (NTNU). In a BRC 
project on conflict in South Sudan, ethnicity is a big driver of risk and 
resilience in urban spaces, and British Red Cross aid worker, therefore 
suggested the inclusion of ethnicity in the definition of social dynamics. 
Another participant from BRC said the conceptual framework and 
analytical tool reflected ‘exactly what we are working on’ in Port au Prince 
after the earthquake. The following vignette expresses the transferability 
in the words of a British Red Cross aid worker:  
 
 
Figure 11.3.4b: A vignette from a British Red Cross aid worker about the 
transferability of the conceptual framework. Source: FGD BRC 
 
 
 
“We are finishing off our programme in Haiti. We did a lot of response and 
recovery work early on after the disaster, but then we focused on a 
community that is more of a slum environment in Port au Prince.  
 
“It’s been really interesting to see how the combination of all these points 
you say can really maximize resilience moving forward. The community 
where we work in used to flood yearly. It was surrounded by a canal that 
was a couple of meters wide. There were 4000 people living there. There 
was no sewerage clearing. There was no rubbish collection.... The flooding 
would come up to waist level, so people would stop working and going to 
school. There were really high levels of cholera and other diseases. It is 
very dense so safety was very poor with a lot of drug issues and crime.  
 
“We paved over the canal, which stopped the flooding and then we put in 
drainage so when it does flood the water drains off. This is all with the 
community’s input. It took nine months before we did anything because 
we were working with the community to find out what their problems 
were because it’s not always apparent what problems they suffer. If you 
visit them outside of the rainy season you might not see the impact of 
flooding or cholera. But then throughout the year you see massive change.  
 
“What you’ve presented is exactly what we are working on. It’s nice to 
see.”  
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11.3.5 Limitations  
There were several limitations with the framework that have been 
addressed. One person from BRC asked where the disaster event is 
reflected in the conceptual framework. After some discussion it was 
concluded that the framework is best used before or after a disaster 
because it captures risk, capacity, vulnerability, threats and opportunities 
at a specific point in time, but does not focus on assessment of basic 
needs (food, water, shelter), which is essential information for 
humanitarians focused on saving lives in a disaster (BRC).  
 
One group said their lack of historical knowledge about their case study on 
Haiti made it difficult to populate the matrix because they did not have 
enough information immediately at hand (NTNU). All three workshops had 
one person who felt the box format of the tool was problematic because it 
restricted thinking into linear categories and does not adequately show 
the overlaps that occur (CENDEP, NTNU, BRC). This concern is addressed 
by referring to the conceptual framework, which serves as a visual 
reminder that CAS are interdependent. Finally, one person from CENDEP 
felt that the tool would be more helpful if it was three dimensional to 
more accurately represent the time continuum. This limitation was not 
able to be addressed within the present format of the conceptual 
framework and analytical tool. Figure 11.3.5a below gives a sample of the 
comments from NTNU participants indicating what could be strengthened 
in the conceptual framework and analytical tool.  
 
Figure 11.3.5b below is a sample of the analytical tool applied to a case 
study of the 2010 Haiti earthquake by students from NTNU. Arrows are 
drawn in the boxes to show linkages between the morphological layers 
and CAS. The Figure shows the morphological layers described only as 
physical at the time of validating. They have since been changed and 
described as ‘layers of the built and natural environment’. 
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Figure 11.3.5a below is a sample of comments from participants at NTNU 
regarding the aspects of the conceptual framework and analytical tool that could 
be strengthened. Source: the author 
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Figure 11.3.5b: A sample of the analytical tool applied to a case study of the 2010 
Haiti earthquake by students from NTNU. Arrows are drawn in the boxes to show 
linkages between the morphological layers and CAS. Source: the author 
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Conclusion  
This chapter set out to explain key generalisable findings from the 
research. It began by explaining key connections between case study 
findings and the conceptual framework, noting three connections in 
particular. Firstly, the role of social dynamics was highlighted, concluding 
that living in an informal settlement and working in an informal economy 
requires an aspect of positive social dynamics at every morphological 
layer. Social dynamics affect activities within all other CAS. Secondly, the 
importance of a holistic approach at the plots layer was highlighted 
concluding that effective change at a neighbourhood or individual level 
requires strategies such as savings groups, security of tenure, good 
governance structures and high levels of social capital to achieve a 
transformative and lasting impact. Thirdly, knowing that different 
morphological layers change at different rates can inform urban 
professionals engaged in disaster reconstruction to develop appropriate 
timelines for recovery.  
 
The chapter then explained the connections between the conceptual 
framework and broader theory, illustrating key generalisable points of the 
framework, such as it is a people-centred approach; it attempts to bridge 
the gap between disaster and development paradigms; it considers time 
and scale; it identifies dimensions of resilience and risk; and lastly, it views 
disasters as a test of resilience, all of which align with broader theories in 
development and disaster studies.  
 
The last section of the chapter provided an evaluation of the conceptual 
framework and analytical tool used throughout the research. It began with 
an explanation of the analytical tool, noting that the tool is intended for 
use by practitioners wanting to identify entry points for interventions into 
a neighbourhood, whom first require an in-depth context analysis that 
considers the history of an area and the systems that shape it. The process 
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for validating the conceptual framework and analytical tool was then 
explained, highlighting that 69 urban professionals participated in the 
review process and 15 case studies were applied to both the framework 
and tool.  
 
Following the process of validation, the conceptual framework and 
analytical tool were both refined, primarily by clarifying definitions used to 
describe the morphological layers and CAS. The chapter then reviewed the 
key strengths of the framework and tool as listed by the urban 
professionals who reviewed them. The primary strengths articulated 
included the holistic and comprehensive nature of analysis; ease of 
adaptability to other contexts; and usefulness as a context analysis 
framework and tool. Some of the limitations listed were that the boxes 
limited visualisation of the overlaps between systems and morphological 
layers, which was addressed by encouraging users to add arrows and list 
pertinent information in every category, even if it results in doubling up on 
details. 
 
In summary this chapter focused upon drawing connections between 
cases, the conceptual framework and theory in order to demonstrate the 
generalisability of both the framework and tool at a theoretical and 
practical level. The next chapter will provide a conclusion to the overall 
research, reflecting on the problem statement and the ways in which the 
research achieved its aim and objectives. 
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Chapter twelve 
Conclusion 
 
Introduction 
This chapter reviews the process of meeting the research aim and 
objectives, in order to identify this thesis’s contribution to new knowledge 
and further opportunities for research. This chapter is organised into three 
sections. The first section identifies the ways in which the research meets 
its aim and objectives by reviewing the methodologies employed to 
achieve them and evaluating the strengths and weaknesses of the 
research method. The second section explains the research’s new 
contribution to knowledge from a conceptual and practical basis. The third 
section provides recommendations for future research.  
 
12.1 Meeting research aim and objectives  
 
The research began by identifying a research question. The assumption 
was that few theories, frameworks, tools and models adequately explore 
disaster resilience in cities (IFRC 2010). The new urban reality of density 
and dynamism is a mismatch for the rural assumptions and traditions that 
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underpin much thinking in humanitarian aid (Ramalingam 2012). 
Therefore, the question that formed the basis of this research is: What is 
an appropriate approach for understanding urban disaster resilience in 
low-income settlements? 
 
Based upon the research question, an overall aim to develop and validate 
a conceptual framework for understanding urban disaster resilience in 
low-income neighbourhoods was developed. To achieve the aim, the 
research set five objectives, namely: 
 
1. Objective one: to formulate a conceptual framework for exploring 
disaster resilience in low-income neighbourhoods.  
2. Objective two: to develop a methodology for analysing disaster 
resilience within low-income neighbourhoods.  
3.  Objective three: to apply the methodology in three low-income 
neighbourhoods to identify key findings and dimensions of 
resilience.  
4. Objective four: to validate findings and the conceptual framework 
with key actors.  
5. Objective five: to identify the generalisable results of the case 
studies and conceptual framework for building urban disaster 
resilience in low-income neighbourhoods.  
 
Respective thesis chapters correspond with meeting one of the five 
objectives. Objective one, to formulate a framework for exploring disaster 
resilience, was achieved through the research method of a literature 
review of key theories on urban, disasters and resilience (Chapter One). 
Having carried out a literature review, urban form was identified as a 
crucial lens for understanding vulnerability and resilience. Likewise, 
complex adaptive systems (CAS) were identified as a key approach for 
understanding how component parts of urban environments interact and 
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overlap to create the emergent behaviour of a neighbourhood as a whole. 
Therefore a conceptual framework for interrogating urban disaster 
resilience was developed based upon urban morphology and CAS 
approaches (Chapter Two). A strength of this research methodology was 
that it took a holistic approach to the literature review by focusing on 
theory and practice. Moreover, it reviewed literature from a number of 
disciplines including development and disaster theory, geography, urban 
design, urban planning, ecology and psychology. A challenge was to 
include all of the literature on resilience because it spans such a broad 
scope of disciplines. Another challenge was the fact that the review was 
conducted in English, thus omitting information on urban disaster 
resilience in other languages. Nevertheless, an in-depth literature review 
of theory and practice resulted in a sound conceptual framework for 
interrogating urban disaster resilience, achieving the first objective.  
 
The second objective was to develop a methodology for analysing disaster 
resilience within low-income neighbourhoods. This was achieved through 
a case study approach that utilised data collection methods such as semi-
structured interviews with key informants, morphological tools, PRA tools, 
FGDs, transect walks and review of secondary data (explained in Chapter 
Three). The research methods were chosen for several reasons. Firstly, the 
use of spatial tools, such as maps, was important for capturing 
morphological data. Secondly, methods such as PRA tools, FGDs and semi-
structured interviews with key informants recognised people who live in 
the areas as the most knowledgeable of their circumstance, and allowed 
for rich expression of diverse attitudes, perceptions and opinions. Lastly, 
transect walks and a review of secondary data allowed the author to 
triangulate information gathered through the other methods. The diverse 
range of qualitative methods was designed to ensure that data collection 
met the requirements set out in the framework’s morphological layers and 
CAS.  
Chapter twelve: conclusion 
 
 
 Page 401 
The third objective was to apply the methodology in three low-income 
neighbourhoods to identify key findings and dimensions of resilience. The 
methodology was applied to a study of the chronic and acute stresses at a 
city-scale in Bangkok and the overall Bang Bua Canal before the 2011 flood 
in Chapter Five, and during and after the flood in Chapter Six. In the 
interest of investigating a finer resolution of scale, the methodology was 
then applied to three case studies at a neighbourhood scale with analysis 
of Bang Bua Neighbourhood in Chapter Seven; Saphan Mai 
Neighbourhood in Chapter Eight; and Roi Krong Neighbourhood in Chapter 
Nine, examining events that took place before, during and after the flood. 
Patterns were examined in the case studies and key findings were 
developed by using three data analysis methods: morphological analysis 
for spatial data; context analysis and coding for other data collected 
through PRA; and semi-structured key informant interviews and FGDs 
along with other methods listed in the second objective. The coding 
assisted with identifying themes within a large amount of data.  
 
Meanwhile, the morphological data assisted with categorisation of data at 
relevant urban layers. Finally, the context analysis data assisted with a 
historical understanding of the factors that shaped the urban context of 
today. Coding was particularly helpful because it allowed the author to 
allocate evidence to multiple themes to develop a more realistic 
understanding of the overlapping and interconnected aspects of disaster 
resilience in urban centres.  The key findings were then plotted on the 
conceptual framework to identify dimensions of urban disaster resilience.  
 
The fourth objective was to validate findings and the conceptual 
framework for building urban resilience with key actors. This was achieved 
through validating initial key findings in a focus group discussion format 
within each of the three neighbourhoods as explained in Chapter Ten.  
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The findings were then reinterpreted by triangulating information 
provided by the neighbourhoods, key informant interviews and secondary 
data sources such as documents and maps. Dimensions of disaster 
resilience were then identified and plotted on the conceptual framework 
in order to make connections across the case studies.  
 
The fifth objective was to identify the generalisable results of the case 
studies and conceptual framework, therefore identifying findings relevant 
to contexts beyond this case study. To achieve this, Chapter Eleven made 
connections between the case study findings and the conceptual 
framework that concluded that three general observations could be made, 
including that social dynamics is the most influential CAS for poorer urban 
people; that the plots layer was the most influential morphological layer; 
and that the rate of change within the morphological layers and systems 
will influence disaster recovery timelines. Five generalisations were then 
made about the conceptual framework, based on support from theory. 
Firstly, the framework was found to be a people-centred approach. 
Secondly, it was felt to have bridged the gap between disasters and 
development paradigms. Thirdly, it provided an opportunity to conduct 
scalar and temporal analysis. Fourthly, It used the intersections between 
morphology and CAS to identify dimensions of resilience and risk. Fifthly, it 
approached the disaster event as a test of resilience.  
 
In Chapter Eleven the conceptual framework and accompanying analytical 
tool were validated through three workshops with a total of 69 
participants. Both were refined based on feedback from participants. 
Thus, the objective of to identify of identifying generalisable results of the 
analytical tool and conceptual framework were achieved in Chapter 
Eleven.  
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Thus, by seeking to meet each of the objectives, the overall aim of 
developing and validating a conceptual framework for understanding 
urban disaster resilience in low-income areas was achieved.  
 
12.2 Reflections on the research methodology  
Overall the research method used to develop a conceptual framework for 
building urban disaster resilience was relevant and sound. It employed a 
range of data collections tools and methods; allowed for triangulation of 
data; and enabled the author to validate key findings. Inevitably however, 
as is part of the research process where it is assumed approaches can 
always be improved upon, several limitations and strengths with the 
methodological framework can be identified.  
 
12.2.1 Limitations 
As within any piece of researcher, care must be taken to limit researcher 
bias as much as possible. To ensure credible research the investigator 
must demonstrate a true picture of the case study under investigation. 
Within the data collection phase, care was taken to remove bias by asking 
open-ended questions that did not lead the respondent and approached 
the topic neutrally. When listening to answers, care was taken to ensure 
that the investigator did not influence answers with facial expressions or 
body language. When answers were given that appeared to be answers 
that pleased the researcher but did not seem to ring true, the researcher 
politely challenged the interviewee in a friendly manner. Biased samples, 
where people are selected for interview who do not represent the 
majority of the population, were avoided by using random sampling as 
well as seeking out groups of people who were not power holders in the 
neighbourhoods and did not often voice their opinions. Finally, critical self-
reflection journals were used on a daily basis to sort through the 
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information collected and demonstrate transparency in the data collection 
process and overall research methodology.   
 
Two other key limitations within the research stand out.  
 
Availability of accurate maps 
Physical information about the neighbourhoods was important to this 
research, and maps can provide crucial data. However, maps with updated 
information were not widely available. BMA’s building use maps were 
highly detailed but despite obtaining maps with information from 2014, 
the map of Bang Bua Neighbourhood still shows houses encroaching over 
the canal, even though all of the houses had moved on land by 2007. The 
Roi Krong upgrading committee said it did not possess any of the maps 
that had been drawn for it by partner organisations. Saphan Mai had two 
versions of their neighbourhood plans but nether version reflects the state 
of the neighbourhood today. Even Google maps were out of date, showing 
Bang Bua Neighbourhood spread out over top of the canal.  
 
Use of PRA tools 
The PRA tools used in the research required tailoring due to the fact that 
activities such as drawing maps had been done during the upgrading as 
part of the negotiating process. Canal dwellers were not interested in 
carrying out activities they had already done with other partners or 
facilitators. They were however enthusiastic and committed to PRA 
activities related to the flood presumably because it provided the 
opportunity for reflection and learning regarding what is now a historical 
event.  
 
12.2.2 Strengths 
The following strength within the research methodology stood out.  
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Analytical tool enhanced communication 
The analytical tool became an immensely useful for communicating the 
conceptual framework to a range of urban practitioners. The tool 
translated concepts into everyday language in order to validate the 
generalisability of the conceptual framework.  
 
12.3 Contribution to knowledge 
The new contribution to knowledge embodied in this thesis is, it is 
believed, is that the conceptual framework and analytical tool are urban 
derived and use urban methodologies and approaches to interrogate the 
impact of urban disasters. The conceptual framework is theoretically 
informed on the one hand and the analytical tool is practically based on 
the other. The theoretical foundation of the framework is intended to 
helps researchers deconstruct a context, to identify key findings and to 
generalise them. The case study approach can also offer practice a new 
contribution, making theory operational in its use.  
 
12.3.1 Theoretical contribution  
The research makes a new contribution to knowledge through achieving 
its aim of developing a conceptual framework that understands resilience 
from a space-based systems approach. By analysing urban vulnerability 
and risk in the built form and recognising the complexity of overlapping, 
adaptive systems, the research was able to gain insights into the 
dimensions that build resilience and those that create risk. As systems and 
the urban environment co-evolve, adaptive behaviour on many scales 
takes place. Whether a neighbourhood, city or nation is on the edge of 
chaos depends upon many complex factors including the speed at which 
feedback loops occur and the ways in which they influence each other; the 
capacities that exist within a larger system and its component parts; the 
changing external and internal environmental conditions; and the 
threshold a particular system has before it collapses and transforms into a 
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new basin of attraction, and b  whether this is positive or negative. When 
combined with morphology, a complex adaptive systems approach 
recognises the context dependent nature of understanding an urban 
environment.  The conceptual framework seeks to contribute to new 
knowledge by using urban theories to define resilience before, during and 
after a disaster to identify patterns and the dimensions that build 
resilience. 
 
The patterns and dimensions have established that resilience is built 
before and after a disaster, and that the disaster itself is a test of how 
adaptive systems and the built environment are in terms of learning from 
historical shocks and stresses and having the capacity to maintain a basic 
level of functioning. Therefore, based on the conceptual framework, urban 
disaster resilience can be defined as the ways in which the built 
environment, complex adaptive systems and people interact to cope, 
adapt and transform in order to reduce disaster risk. 
 
12.3.2 Practice-based contribution 
The practice-based contribution is two fold. The first part is the analytical 
tool and the way it translates theory into practical means by conducting a 
context analysis, a capacity and vulnerability assessment or as an 
evaluation tool if paired with project indicators. It is anticipated that the 
tool can be used by a diverse group of urban practitioners, including low-
income neighbourhoods, aid agencies, urban planners, designers, 
architects or any other actor interested in assessing a component part of 
an urban area (or as a whole) and the scalar influences from a local to a 
national, regional or global level, depending on the type of information 
required.   
 
The second part is around the definition of resilience and the ways in 
which the concept can be operationalised by identifying dimensions of 
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resilience. After identifying dimensions of resilience, neighbourhood 
residents and their partners can then agree on activities that engage the 
dimensions of resilience. The co-evolution of urbanisation and risk has 
meant more density and diversity packed into smaller spaces. This means 
it is even more important to draw in key urban actors involved in shaping 
the built and natural environment into mainstream development 
processes. Moreover it is important to ensure the stakeholders engage in 
processes that are participatory, inclusive, foster social capital and good 
governance. Figure 12.3.2a below shows a graphical depiction of the 
practical and theoretical contributions to knowledge indicated with black 
arrows at the completion point of the research design. 
 
Chapter twelve: conclusion 
 
 
 Page 408 
 
Figure 12.3.2a: Practical and theoretical contributions to knowledge are indicated 
with black arrows in the research design above. Source: the author  
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12.4 Recommendations for future research   
The research process has identified three areas for potential future 
research, namely the role of technology, the quandary of how to assist 
renters, and the potential for using the conceptual framework within 
urban displacement contexts.  
 
12.4.1 The connection between technology and resilience  
Pursuing the way in which technology for social communication impacts 
resilience is an important area for research. In the case of the Bang Bua 
Canal during the 2011 floods, poorer people were using traditional modes 
of communication such as public loud speakers more than they used new 
forms of technology such as apps and websites to seek and share 
information.  
 
However, in the few years that have passed since 2011, including during 
the completion of this thesis, technology has rapidly developed, becoming 
cheaper and more accessible to poorer people. Cellphones for example, 
and, increasingly, smartphones are ubiquitous. While data collection was 
taking place by the author, residents from the neighbourhoods were also 
collecting data on the research project by documenting the dates and 
locations of the author’s work through group chat apps such as Line on 
tablet devices that were not affordable a few years earlier. This suggests a 
study of how urban settlements utilise technology during a disaster could 
provide some insight into further dimensions of resilience.  
 
12.4.2 The quandary of how to help renters 
The situation of renters could provide an interesting opportunity for 
further study. In general providing rental accommodation after a disaster 
is difficult due to the damage and destruction of homes. Further research 
into how to create more rental accommodation after a disaster would 
benefit both humanitarians and professionals who create the city such as 
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urban designers, planners, government officials and developers. 
Furthermore, research into the impact on rental markets after settlement 
and squatter upgrading could better inform upgrading processes, and 
especially the ways in which rental properties are dealt with. In Baan 
Mankong renters were sometimes given the opportunity to own their own 
homes. However, for many, home ownership is a burden and affordable 
rentals are key to survival in the city. Clearing settlements of rental 
properties is reminisce of rural development approaches. Upgrading must 
find a way to accommodate dynamic, fluid housing arrangements that suit 
a wide range of needs.     
 
12.4.3 A systems and morphological approach to urban displacement  
Urban displacement is rapidly becoming a new challenge for 
humanitarians and urban professionals to respond to. Further research 
could be carried out using an adapted version of the conceptual 
framework to better understand the humanitarian environment around 
urban displacement and the corresponding urban design and planning 
issues. For example, in December 2015, flooding in Chennai, India has 
displaced more than a million people (Lyengar, 2015). Host governments 
are buckling under the pressure to support waves of newly displaced 
groups. The conceptual framework could be used to investigate the 
vulnerabilities and capacities that result from hosting displaced persons by 
interrogating the relationship between the built form and CAS. The 
framework builds upon findings from the literature such as the need to 
invest in access to quality services in host communities, the importance of 
supporting local services rather than creating parallel ones, the benefits of 
area-based programming and addressing the negative social perceptions 
of the displaced population (NRC and IRC, 2014; IRC, 2014). Thus, the 
conceptual framework has the potential to be used to identify dimensions 
of resilience for displaced persons in urban settings.  
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Conclusion 
This chapter has sought to summarise the breadth and scope of the thesis. 
It began by explaining how the aim and objectives were met by aligning 
specific chapters with specific objectives. It then described the new 
contribution to knowledge through avenues of theory by viewing 
resilience from a space-based systems approach. It also explained the 
analytical tool and how the identified dimensions of resilience can be 
considered a new contribution to knowledge from practice because both 
are tangible ways to operationalise resilience.  
 
Evaluation of the research methodology is then presented with a 
reflection on the unavailability of accurate maps for conducting research 
on formal and informal settlements. A reflection on the PRA tools is also 
given, suggesting the importance of knowing previous research tools used 
in an area before carrying out new research.  
 
The chapter closes with three ideas for further research. The first is 
regarding the use of technology and how changes in information collection 
and sharing in the past few years can impact resilience. The second 
focuses on the question of how to support renters. The third focuses on 
urban displacement issues and the ways in which the conceptual 
framework could provide a rigorous context analysis to identify key issues 
between CAS and the built form, and from there, develop appropriate 
interventions. Likewise, similar research could be done on the usefulness 
of the framework for informing research agendas and prioritising urban 
activities for agencies working with multiple stakeholders at municipal, 
national and global levels.  
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Concluding statement 
This research aimed to develop and validate a conceptual framework for 
understanding urban disaster resilience in low-income neighbourhoods. 
The study found that resilience has the potential to unite a broad 
spectrum of urban actors because of its deep-rooted history and 
widespread use in other disciplines, crucial in urban work. It also 
concluded that at its core, resilience bridges development and disaster 
paradigms and can be seen as a political argument for increasing value for 
money in both development and disaster activities. Finally, it reaffirms 
that resilience is about building up and improving what already exists in 
order to thrive, which is a more positive concept than ‘reducing’ as is 
emphasised in disaster risk reduction. Ultimately, this research 
emphasised that resilience is most valuable when users of the word define 
resilience for whom, and to what.  
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Appendices 
Appendix A – Key informants  
 
1. Bang Bua Neighbourhood Key Informants  
 
Code name Gender Age Livelihood # of family 
members 
Date of 
interview 
BB1 M 63 Retired  2 24 Feb 2014 
BB2 F 53 Retired 2 24 Feb 2014 
BB3 F 41 Unemployed 4 24 Feb 2014 
BB4 M 47 Soldier 3 26 Feb 2014 
BB5 F 63 Unemployed 5 27 Feb 2014 
BB6 F 48 Vendor 5 27 Feb 2014 
BB7 F 32 Port authority 2 27 Feb 2014 
BB8 M 38 Unemployment 2 27 Feb 2014 
BB9 F 63 Shop owner 2 27 Feb 2014 
BB10 M 65 Shop owner 2 27 Feb 2014 
BB11 F 57 Unemployed - 28 Feb 2014 
BB12 F 49 - 4 28 Feb 2014 
BB13 M 70 Retired 4 28 Feb 2014 
BB14 F 67 Retired 2 28 Feb 2014 
BB15 M 41 Shop owner 5 28 Feb 2014 
BB16 M 36 Unemployed  - 28 Feb 2014 
BB17 M 45 -  -  28 Feb 2014 
BB18 F 51 Daily wage 
earner 
9 28 Feb 2014 
BB19 F 42 Daily wage 
earner 
9 28 Feb 2014 
BB20 F 38 Teacher  3 23 Mar 2014 
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2. Saphan Mai Neighbourhood Key Informants 
 
Code name Gender Age Livelihood # of family 
members 
Date of 
interview 
SM1 F 54 Beautician 4 6 Mar 2014 
SM2 F 48 Manicurist 6 6 Mar 2014 
SM3 F 71 Retired 5 6 Mar 2014 
SM4 F 73 Vendor 5 6 Mar 2014 
SM5 F 24 Hair dresser - 6 Mar 2014 
SM6 F 33 Shop owner 5 6 Mar 2014 
SM7 F 65 Vendor 4 6 Mar 2014 
SM8 F 60 - 2 7 Mar 2014 
SM9 M 63 - 2 7 Mar 2014 
SM10 F 65 Unknown  5 8 Mar 2014 
SM11 F 70 Massage 
therapist 
- 8 Mar 2014 
SM12 F 52 Labourer 10 8 Mar 2014 
SM13 F 20 Mother - 8 Mar 2014 
SM14 F 44 Unknown  3 8 Mar 2014 
SM15 F 85 Vendor 1 8 Mar 2014 
SM16 F 42 Labourer 6 8 Mar 2014 
SM17 M 70 Security  - 8 Mar 2014 
SM18 M 65 Ex-soldier 1 8 Mar 2014 
SM19 F 20 Student 4 9 Mar 2014 
SM20 M 18 Unemployed 4 9 Mar 2014 
SM21 M 18 Unemployed 3 9 Mar 2014 
SM22 M 60 Shop owner 7 9 Mar 2014 
SM23 F 60 Labourer 4 9 Mar 2014 
SM24 F 45 Labourer 6 9 Mar 2014 
SM25 F 40 Lawyer 1 9 Mar 2014 
SM26 F 44 Teacher 3 10 Mar 2014 
SM27 M 43 Moto taxi - 10 Mar 2014 
SM28 M 56 Moto taxi - 10 Mar 2014 
SM29 M 51 Moto taxi - 10 Mar 2014 
SM30 M 47 Mototaxi - 10 Mar 2014 
SM31 M 34 Monk - 13 Mar 2014 
SM32 M 42 Monk - 13 Mar 2014 
SM33 M 70 Monk - 13 Mar 2014 
SM34 F 66 Labourer - 13 Mar 2014 
SM35 M 44 Labourer - 13 Mar 2014 
SM36 M 21 Solider - 13 Mar 2014 
SM37 M 65 Ticket taker - 13 Mar 2014 
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3. Roi Krong Neighbourhood Key Informants 
 
Code name Gender Age Livelihood # of family 
members 
Date of 
interview 
RK1 F 54 Retired 7 18 Mar 2014 
RK2 F 74 Vendor 3 18 Mar 2014 
RK3 F 15 Unemployed 9 18 Mar 2014 
RK4 M 14 Unemployed 5 18 Mar 2014 
RK5 M 17 Unemployed 1 18 Mar 2014 
RK6 M 17 Unemployed 3 18 Mar 2014 
RK7 F 74 Shop owner 3 18 Mar 2014 
RK8 M 52 Factory  5 18 Mar 2014 
RK9 F 30 Restaurant 10 18 Mar 2014 
RK10 F 30 Restaurant 10 18 Mar 2014 
RK11 F 52 Restaurant - 18 Mar 2014 
RK12 F 57 Shop owner 5 19 Mar 2014 
RK13 F 60 Hairdresser 2 19 Mar 2014 
RK14 F 60+ Garbage 
collector 
- 19 Mar 2014 
RK15 F 50 Housecleaner 2 19 Mar 2014 
RK16 F 50 Garbage 
collector 
- 19 Mar 2014 
RK17 F 55 Landlord  - 19 Mar 2014 
RK18 M 60 Gardner 2 19 Mar 2014 
RK19 M 40 Unemployed - 19 Mar 2014 
RK20 M 40 Solider  4 22 Mar 2014 
RK21 F 25 Unemployed 4 22 Mar 2014 
RK22 M 80 Shop keeper 2 22 Mar 2014 
RK23 M 85 Retired - 22 Mar 2014 
RK24 F 37 Factory  10 22 Mar 2014 
RK25 M 60 Shop keeper 5 22 Mar 2014 
RK26 F 60 Retired 2 22 Mar 2014 
RK27 F 60 Upgrading 
leader 
- 17 Mar 2014 
RK28 M 50 - - 19 Mar 2014 
RK29 M 88 Retired 4 21 Mar 2014 
RK30 M 77 Landlord 1 21 Mar 2014 
RK31 M 65 Retired 4 21 Mar 2014 
RK32 F 59 Landlord 2 21 Mar 2014 
RK33 M 50 Company 4 21 Mar 2014 
RK34 F 39 Unemployed 4 21 Mar 2014 
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4. Other Key Informants 
 
Please note: names have been withheld to preserve anonymity. Where necessary, 
the title of the position of the person interviewed has also be withheld. 
 
Code  Gender Organisation Position Name Date 
KI1 M UNESCO Programme 
Officer 
Name withheld 23 Feb 
2014 
KI2 M Ministry of 
Interior (Office 
of Climate 
change 
convention, 
Department of 
Town and 
Country 
Planning and 
Public works) 
Architect Name withheld 18 Mar 
2014 
KI3 F Asian Coalition 
for Housing 
Rights (ACHR) 
Senior 
development 
worker 
Name withheld 18 Feb 
2014 
KI4  BMA 
Department of 
City Planning 
Urban planner Name withheld 19 Mar 
2014 
KI5 M King Mongkut’s 
Institute of 
Technology  
 
Professor Name withheld 22 Feb 
2014 
KI6 M Bangkok 
Metropolitan 
Administration, 
(BMA),  
Department of 
Water Drainage, 
Flood Control 
Center 
Staff member Name withheld 18 Mar 
2014 
RK7 F CODI Development 
worker 
Name withheld 25 Mar 
2014 
KI8 M Institute for 
Social and 
Environmental 
Transition (ISET) 
Scientist Name withheld 24 Feb 
2014 
KI9 M Deutsche 
Presse-Agentur 
Journalist  Name withheld 21 Feb 
2014 
KI10 M Chulalongkorn 
University 
Masters student Name withheld 24 Feb 
2014 
KI11 F BMA 
Department of 
City Planning 
Urban Planner  Name withheld 20 Mar 
2014 
KI12 F St. Louis College Professor Name withheld 18 Mar 
2014 
KI13 M Domnern 
Somgiat & 
Lawyer Name withheld 18 Mar 
2014 
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Boonma Law 
Office 
KI14 F CODI Community 
development 
worker 
Name withheld 11 Mar 
2014 
KI15 F Lak Si District Community 
Development 
Worker 
 
Name withheld 10 Mar 
2014 
KI16 M Lak Si District  Urban Planner Name withheld 10 Mar 
2014 
KI17 F World Vision 
Thailand 
Position 
withheld 
Name withheld 10 Mar 
2014 
KI18 F World Vision 
Thailand 
Position 
withheld 
Name withheld 21 Mar 
2014 
KI19 F ADPC Position 
withheld 
Name withheld 18 Mar 
2014 
KI20 M ADPC Position 
withheld 
Name withheld 21 Mar 
2014 
KI21 F ADPC Position 
withheld 
Name withheld 21 Mar 
2014 
KI22 M Architects & 
Associates Co., 
Ltd. 
Architect  Name withheld 18 Mar 
2014 
KI23 M Habitat for 
Humanity 
Thailand 
Position 
withheld 
Name withheld 18 Mar 
2014 
KI24 M World Vision 
East and South 
Asia 
Position 
withheld 
Name withheld 24 Feb 
2014 
KI25 M World Vision 
East Asia 
Position 
withheld 
Name withheld 27 Feb 
2014 
KI26 F World Vision 
International 
Position 
withheld 
Name withheld 26 May 
2014 
KI27 F UNESCAP Sustainable 
Urban 
Development 
Section 
Name withheld 25 Mar 
2014 
KI28 M World Vision 
Indonesia 
Position 
withheld 
Name withheld 18 Mar 
2014 
KI29 F Aga Khan 
Foundation 
Position 
withheld 
Name withheld 14 May 
2015 
 
 
KI30  M Sripathum 
University 
Professor,  Name withheld 20 Mar 
2014 
KI31  F Kasetsart 
University 
Position 
withheld 
Name withheld 18 Mar 
2014 
KI32 M Cura Kai 
neighbourhood 
Position 
withheld 
Name withheld 2 Mar 
2014 
KI33 M Bang Bua 
Neighbourhood 
Position 
withheld 
Name withheld 18 Feb 
2014 
KI34 M Saphan Mai 
Neighbourhood 
Position 
withheld 
Name withheld 7 Mar 
2014 
KI35 M Roi Krong Position Name withheld 19 Mar 
Appendix A 
 
 
 Page 441 
 
 
*Fo
ur 
key 
info
rma
nts 
wer
e 
incl
ude
d in 
the 
neig
hbo
urh
ood 
list 
and 
in 
the 
non
-
neig
hbo
urh
ood 
resi
dents list in order to protect their identity.  
 
  
Neighbourhood withheld 2014 
KI36 F Roi Krong 
Neighbourhood 
Position 
withheld 
Name withheld 17 Mar 
2014 
KI37 M Lak Si District 
Authority 
Position 
withheld 
Name withheld 13 Mar 
2014 
KI38 F Bang Khen 
District 
Authority  
Position 
withheld 
Name withheld 28 Feb 
2014 
KI39 M Central 
government 
planning 
department 
Position 
withheld 
Name withheld 21 Feb 
2014 
KI40 F 
World Bank 
Position 
withheld 
Name withheld 25 Feb 
2014 
KI41 M 
World Bank 
Position 
withheld 
Name withheld 25 Feb 
2014 
KI42 
M World Bank 
Position 
withheld 
Name withheld 25 Feb 
2014 
KI43 
M World Bank 
Position 
withheld 
Name withheld 25 Feb 
2014 
KI44 
F 
OCHA Position 
withheld 
Name withheld 7 Mar 
2015 
KI45 
F 
Save the 
Children 
Thailand 
Position 
withheld 
Name withheld 12 Mar 
2014 
KI46 F Plan Thailand Position 
withheld 
Name withheld 13 Mar 
2014 
KI47 F Plan Asia 
Regional Office 
Position 
withheld 
Name withheld 13 Mar 
2014 
KI48 M CODI Position 
withheld 
Name withheld 25 Feb 
2014 
KI50 F ALNAP Position 
withheld 
Name withheld 14 May 
2015 
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Appendix B – Key informant interview questions 
 
The following questions were selected for use in semi-structured interviews.  
 
 
 
1. Neighbourhood Key Informant Interviews Questions 
 
 
 
 
  
1. How many people live in your family? Adults? Children? Gender? 
2. What is your main job? Do you have another / second job? 
3. Do you rely on the natural environment?  
4. How much do you spend on food every month? School per year? 
House expenses/rental? 
5. What skills and talents do your friends say you have? 
6. Technology. Do you use the Internet? Radio? TV? Ipad? Use a smart 
phone or a regular phone? 
7. What kind of things could cause a problem in your house / community? 
(Hazards) 
8. Coping strategies. How did your life change after the flood – jobs, food, 
medical care. How did you cope? Did other people in your house 
change their behaviour? 
9. Humanitarian assistance. What did you receive during the flood? What 
would you like to have received? 
10. What were the top three challenges you faced during the flood? 
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2. Non-Neighbourhood Key Informant Interview Questions 
 
a) I/NGOs 
b) UN agencies 
c) Journalists 
d) Researchers / Academics 
e) Government 
 
a.) I/NGOs 
 
 
  
1. Define resilience, aspects of resilience. What makes urban resilience 
different? 
2. What vulnerabilities within Bangkok were revealed by the floods? 
3. (Human) How were specialist and generalist skills put to use in the 
community (?)? 
- What locally available skills did you use in your interventions? 
4. (Social) How did you take advantage of social networks? i.e. in what 
way did they become a programming opportunity?  
5. (Physical) What physical infrastructure did you prioritise in your 
resilience interventions? Why? What might you have included in 
hindsight?  
- How did you assist renters? Were they a different group than other 
community members? If so, in what ways? 
- How did you negotiate land issues? 
- How did urban planning factor in your response strategy? 
6. Financial  
- Was cash programming used, and how well did it address the needs of 
the urban poor?  
- Were you able to build on public-private partnerships? If so, how? 
- How was the market impacted by aid delivery? Was aid sourced 
locally? 
- Were local markets and private sector initiatives fully supported? 
What more could have been done? 
7. (Natural) How were natural assets protected? What does urban DRR 
look like in this context? 
8. (Political) What was the role of local authorities? What challenges did 
they face? How could they be better supported? 
- what community power structures did you deal with, if any (eg 
gangs, local leaders, other groups) 
9. (Technological) How was technology used, eg ? What opportunities 
and challenges did it create? 
10. Programme boundaries – when / how did you decide to leave / finish 
up? When does disaster recovery become development work? 
- would you have stayed if you could have?  
- To what degree do you think you contributed to greater resilience? 
Please explain.  
11. What tools did you use? Were they appropriate? Or, did you re-design 
them for use in an urban context? 
12. How has your organisation adapted to urban issues / urbanisation? 
What particular ‘urban challenges’ have you encountered? What did 
you do? 
13. How can we plan better for the next disaster? Who holds the power in 
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b.) UN Agencies 
 
 
 
c.) Journalists / academics / researchers 
 
 
1. What key institutions hold responsibility for flood prevention and 
recovery? How did they preform? Who is not involved but should be? 
2. What kind of public-private partnerships exist? How did they perform? 
3. What sort of short-term measures bring about resilience in low-income 
neighbourhoods? 
4. How would you define resilience in low-income neighbourhoods? Is it a 
useful concept? 
5. What policies need to be prioritised most urgently? What is the role of 
policy in resilience? 
6. What is the greatest barrier to building resilience? How should this be 
overcome? 
7. What kinds of private-public partnerships occurred during the floods? 
 
 
1. What are some of the positive and negative aspects of the 
government’s response to the 2011 floods? How was the municipal 
government perceived? 
2. What aspect of the floods seemed to get most coverage? 
3. How were low-income neighbourhoods covered in the media? What 
would motivate coverage of places like Bang Bua Canal and 
Rattanakosin?  
4. What vulnerabilities and capacities did the flood uncover? 
5. Did the flood response play a role in fueling the current political 
situation? 
6. What role did technology play? 
7. What agencies / institutions had the loudest voice? Which ones 
achieved the most?  
8. How can Bangkok be better prepared for future floods? 
9. Are there examples in your mind of people being stronger after the 
floods? 
10. How will the state of emergency effect my research? What cautions 
should I take?  
11. Is resilience a term that offers opportunity? Or, would you describe it 
as a buzzword? 
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d.) Government 
 
 
 
e.) Planners – how does planning help or hind resilience building in communities 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
1. What prevention measures were taken before the floods occurred? 
2. What does the current flood plan look like? Who helped develop it?  
3. How was flood information shared with the public? Through what 
channels? 
4. How did you link with the NDMA? 
5. What revisions to the plan have occurred as a result of the 2010-2011 
floods? What lessons were learned? 
6. Who are the most vulnerable people to the floods, and how does your 
plan account for them? 
7. What types of assistance did the government provide? Was cash a 
favoured method? What are the risks associated with cash? 
8. What does resilience look like to you? What are the key elements? 
 
1. How do you engage with NGOs? 
2. What do you understand by resilience? Is it a helpful concept? If so, 
how? 
3. How did you engage in the floods? What was your role? What did you 
do? 
4. How do your activities build resilience? 
5. How do you work with communities? 
6. If there were no constraints to your work, what would you do? 
7. What is the role of planning in building resilience? 
8. What are the major barriers to community resilience, please explain? 
9. In your view what do you think could be done better? 
10. Does the private sector have a role? If so, how? 
11. What are the best examples you’ve seen of flood resilience? Why? 
12. What  are the major challenges? Why? 
13. What will happen differently for the next floods? 
14. How effective is master planning for building resilience? Please explain. 
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f.) Businesses 
 
 
 
1. What role can businesses play in disaster prevention and response? 
2. What was your role in the flood?  
3. How did you prepare?  
4. Who did you assist? 
5. How did you decide who and how to assist? 
6. What do you plan to do next time? 
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Appendix C – Sample of interview transcripts 
 
Sample 1: A Transcript of a Key Informant Interview 
 
Timespan 
 
Content 
 
 Key informant interview  
Name: (anonymous)   
Organisation: King Mongkut’s Institute of Technology 
Position: Professor 
 
0:00.0 - 
0:55.7 
Professor: Social vulnerability sometimes lacks the ecosystem 
perspective, to me that depends because social vulnerability is also 
rooted in political ecology, which looks a lot at human and 
environmental interaction.  
 
0:55.7 - 
1:07.2 
Pam: What does resilience mean to you? 
 
1:07.2 - 
5:10.9 
Professor: We as academics are in the process to define it. We don't 
have a direct translated word for resilience. What I usually talk to 
community. I used to talk about immunity. Immunity to changes, crises, 
disasters. I think that captures the simple concept that the community 
can understand. It's helpful in academia to investigate it thoroughly. To 
get this concept to the community, I may not focus on this word or it's 
meaning but more into the elements and the process within this concept 
and the kind of goals we would like to achieve from the concept. For 
academic sector, I think it's like a brain exercise to look into fuzzy 
concepts to compare and contrast to see how different disciplines or 
stakeholders view this concept. Different disciplines from different 
epsistomology. It's insightful but I'm also worried. The words such as 
sustainability, vulnerability and resilience start to be used in many ways 
and it can lose it's meaning. Everyone's doing work on resilience.  
 
5:10.9 - 
5:14.1 
Pam: Is disaster resilience different? 
 
5:14.0 - 
5:58.1 
Professor: I think it provides more focus. Resilience alone, from my 
understanding, includes any kind of changes. Those changes may not be 
disasters.  
 
5:58.1 - 
6:33.7 
Pam: What kind of vulnerability was revealed by the floods?  
 
6:33.7 - 
11:27.8 
Professor: I have limited experience with the Bangkok floods but I can 
share some things I recently discussed with community leaders from 
some of my limited experience in Bangkok. There's an observation from 
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community leaders and local authorities who work in providing aid to 
flood victims, which seems that the typical vulnerable people may not 
fully represented in Bangkok. For example, in Lai Krabang area there are 
groups that rely on agriculture and other groups that seem like typical 
urban dwellers who have jobs in town but their residences are here in 
compact structures like apartments. The observation from those aid 
supporters reflect that those who seem to be urban dwellers need 
demand more than those in agricultural sector. If you like we may say 
that those in agricultural sector, seem to have a certain character of 
rural lifestyle, way of life. They seem to be able to be independent, those 
in agricultural sector. There's another big question about rural and 
urban. We are still in Bangkok but we have an agricultural sector area. 
The livestock from my perspective, seem to have some characteristics of 
rural people. Most of them are people who live here for a long time, 
their parents and ancestors live here. They know the area, know the 
area is a flood plane. They have a certain experience of adaptation 
compared to the new comers who want an urban lifestyle, are familiar 
with typical urban life. From what I heard is that they have less tolerance 
to floods.  
 
11:27.8 - 
11:50.0 
Pam: Do you mean that people living in urban areas demanded a higher 
quality of life and therefore demanded more aid? 
 
11:50.0 - 
15:11.3 
Professor: No. I think the term higher quality or standard is also difficult. 
Sometimes I didn't see much as higher or lower, but different. Different 
ways of living. A typical example is the ones who are in agricultural 
sector, their residential space provides them some tolerance to floods, 
like houses on stilts. They have different levels. They can adapt through 
the changes of water level. If it gets higher they move to higher level or 
move their stuff to the higher level. They know how to cook, survive, 
sleep, travel. Some of them still have boats and they know how to 
operate them. Many of them told me that they closely monitor water 
from the north and they prepare for that ahead. What he referred to at 
that point was that the flood for 2010 they prepared for the incoming 
flood to protect their assets. They have really large fish farms. They even 
built up dykes before the coming floods. For some people they may have 
some kind of stereotype that agricultural people are poor. That might 
not be the case. Many are well off and have some financial power to put 
up some prevention.  
 
15:11.3 - 
15:21.0 
Pam: What did the floods reveal about Bangkok in terms of 
preparedness and its ability to respond and recover? 
 
15:21.0 - 
19:04.8 
Professor: I would say that it revealed ... what we observed in our 
studies that right now, each sector... the efforts in responding to floods 
mostly based on individual practice. For example, the industrial estate 
would like to protect their property so they put up walls and dykes to 
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protect their property. Some households also built up walls to prevent 
their house from flooding, some will elevate their house and change the 
landscape of their house so water would not collect in their house. Our 
question is when each individual is doing this kind of thing, where will 
the water go? How about the collective perspective, which seems to me 
I didn't see much of that even though there's a huge project trying to do 
a macro level project but it's... you may of heard the news but it got very 
low level of participation and is still in a lot of conflict. What surprised 
me a lot is that they proposed for a large amount of loans even before 
they had a plan. I heard that some projects are still moving on. The court 
ordered the project owner to have higher level of participation, that's 
what I heard.  
 
19:04.8 - 
19:19.2 
Pam: Was there a flood plan in place during the 2011 floods? 
 
19:19.2 - 
19:56.4 
Professor: I think that's the issue because the information at those days 
was pretty confused. Information given by the government and other. I 
think the government was also not very clear on the information so 
there were other sectors that tried to provide alternative information as 
well.  
 
19:56.4 - 
19:57.6 
Pam: If I lived in Bangkok and was worried that my neighbourhood was 
going to flood, where would I go for information? 
 
19:57.5 - 
23:06.1 
Professor: From my experience during those days we stayed pretty close 
with media, news - different sources. The government also came up with 
a vision about where the water would go, their plans. It was a long 
process and it changed everyday. There was a group called ... volunteers 
from academic, private sector to model the flood and allow Bangkok 
residents to give a call to get the information whether their house or 
neighbourhood was going to get flooded. From my perspective this was 
very helpful to prepare. I have a friend, he volunteered to work in that 
group for some sections. I may be able to put you in cotact with him and 
he may be able to direct you to the key actors. He's working in the 
ministry of environment resources etc. Maybe he's also in the team that 
worked on the community development plan.   
 
23:06.1 - 
24:13.1 
Pam: In the city land ownership is complex. How do we adapt our tools 
and techniques to be more suitable to the city? What are some of the 
social challenges in the city i.e. gangs and their networks? 
 
24:13.1 - 
27:12.3 
Professor: In Bangkok and many other developing countries there are a 
lot of informal sectors, which usually are not officially supported. Most 
of the aid from the government supports official residents and 
communities who are officially registered in their data base. Those who 
are not registered, I think it's a big challenge. It will reply on, I would say, 
informal power structures, which also are a challenge to gauge. This is 
Appendix C 
 
 
 Page 450 
also where political factors come in. I've heard from some aid workers 
that those aid become political tools as well. That some politicians take it 
as a tool to gain votes and popularity. It influences how these aids are 
distributed. The down part is that I was not part of the aid distribution so 
I don't have experience at hand.  
 
27:12.3 - 
27:32.3 
Pam: Based on the political situation, is there a specific group that was 
more successful at getting aid? 
 
27:32.2 - 
31:43.0 
Professor: yes, that's what I heard. It was the group that had power at 
that moment. It depends on which group is in power and has access to 
resources. Then it goes through their networks, I would say. I think you 
should open up to the broader network they may have. For example, the 
communities around here have many kinds of connections and 
networks, which are pretty interesting. I think to review the texture and 
fabric of networks and connections would be insightful. Of course, one 
of the networks will be linked to political parties. I heard that sometimes 
they have power even to channel the aid. This is the story we heard: 
There were two groups that needed aid. They went to one group to 
support and they were going to go to another group, and this group is a 
large political base for one politician. When the truck was about to leave 
this road to another group, the pump was out of work and then the 
floods get in. So that truck was ordered to stop going to this group to 
provide resources. That's what we heard. From my experience, not in 
Bangkok, but in the south, within the communities there could be 
divisions. Even to have political affiliation at the community level means 
a lot. For example, those who acquire the network of community leaders 
may have better access to resources.  
 
31:43.0 - 
32:54.3 
Professor: I used to work with an NGO. I was there to explore green 
design and other environmetnal designs. The mission of the organisation 
was much broader, looking at alternative ways to life. They are more 
into anti-capitalism.  
 
32:54.3 - 
33:41.3 
Pam: What about cash? Was it used? What are the risks and successes? 
 
33:41.3 - 
37:18.7 
Professor: Yes it was used on the floods. The risks are issues of 
transparency. For example, my brother's house was flooded in an area 
that was supposed to get compensation but he's well off and didn't need 
that. Later he found out that someone already took the money on his 
behalf. We don't know who. I'm not sure about Bangkok but in other 
provincial floods I heard that it can be a political tool to or strategy to 
gain votes. This is what I've heard from those involved in aid distribution. 
But I also met the households who received the money and used it for 
future household flood prevention. They built a tall wall. I'm not sure 
building walls is the right thing to do but at least they used it for 
prevention. I've gotten great complaints from the community that aid 
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from the government is very slow and isn't appropriate, gender or 
culture wise, it might not match with the needs of the people down 
there. I think it's a flexible kind of resource that can transfer. It's still very 
complex.  
 
37:18.7 - 
37:28.9 
Pam: What about technology?  
 
37:28.9 - 
44:21.3 
Professor: I think the modeling technology is really helpful to get 
information for people to prepare. One is from the macro level, the 
group that I mentioned. The micro level in this area, we had just a group 
of our faculty from engineering who do a kind of monitoring study to be 
able to provide information to communities around here to prepare. The 
response from the community is very good. As long as they know ahead 
what will happen, they can prepare. They use these different kinds of 
technologies to monitor these floods. They call it Lad Krabang model. 
We've got both technology from the campus and the communities to 
monitor the flood level. We calculate and model and provide projections 
to the communities. Again, I think information is critical. Many of the 
communities lose trust to the government information.  
 
Trust to the government is another key point. You can create a lot of our 
phenomena. You may have heard during the floods that even water is 
difficult to find in the department store because some people are so 
panicked that they bought such large amounts of water bottles that it 
became unavailable duing those stage. Some people blame these people 
for being too panicked but I myself understand them because there is no 
precise information for them. The government says this and then many 
times it's not as they said. If they said you are safe, but then you are not 
safe. As you is a typical word that the Prime Minister usually said. It 
implies that we can deal with it. We can manage the floods, we can 
control the floods but in many cases we can't. I think I'm not surprised if 
people start to doubt what the government says. Most of the time is said 
calm down, we are okay. When we show evidence that we are not okay 
we wonder to what level we should take information from the 
government. If the government said that we are at risk in this level 
perhaps it could be in this level. We got a sense that the information was 
tamed down. When we hear something we need to start to add it up. 
Also there's alternate sector who provides this information as counter 
balance to what was said.  We had many sources of information and no 
one could tell which information was better than the other. Then there 
was trust in this information. People would save their own as best they 
can and it came back to the individual efforts. I think it's very interesting 
to compare what happened in Bangkok to what happened in Japan to 
the earthquake and tsunami and nuclear plants. I think for Japanese they 
have a certain trust in their government and discipline to stay in order. 
Here to me it's a bit chaos. It seems to be that a lot of people who live in 
Bangkok find it easy to get a sense of survival, to do what ever they can 
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do to survive like to get as much water bottles as they can.  
 
44:21.3 - 
44:36.2 
Pam: Is Bangkok ready for another large-scale flood? 
 
44:36.2 - 
49:40.7 
Professor: I don't know all the preparation Bangkok did, and the whole 
country but it seems to me no. Looking at it from a very small scale there 
is a programme to increase the capacity of the canal to have a better 
flow. But I heard from the communities that it's just a programme that 
the outcome is not what we expected. For example, some informants 
said that you may see the machine floating on the canal try to dig the 
mud of the canal but if the canal drops you see holes in the canals, which 
means that those digs occurred sparsely. It's not really levelled down to 
increase the capacity. No one knows what happens below the canal. One 
resident said that he needed to do a favour to the workers to ask them 
to really do the job in front of his house because he really needed to get 
it done. Looking at broader scale we so far see a lot of expansion of 
urbanised area into flood plains and wetlands. In the plan you have a 
plan to preserve as a green area that water can then go through. The 
plan sometimes has been shifted like with Subanaphomi airport. It was 
directly in the bottom of the flood way. Have you seen the land use plan 
of Bangkok? That's legally done. There are others that may not comply 
with the plans. I still see a lot of new developments on flood plains.  
 
In the plan they try to keep some flood plain that in real life is not really 
kept. More development is going on there.  
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Appendix D – Focus group discussions 
 
Focus Group Discussions 
 
Code name Type # of people Date  
BBFGD1 Focus Group Discussion 18 21 Feb 2014 
BBFGD2 Focus Group Discussion 13 2 Mar 2014 
BBFDG3 Focus Group Discussion 13 10 Aug 2014 
 
Code name Type # of people Date  
SMFDG1 Focus Group Discussion 8 10 Aug 2014 
 
Code name Type # of people Date  
RKFDG1 Focus Group Discussion 12 10 Aug 2014 
 
 
Sample 1: Questions for FDGs 
  
Code name Type # of people Date  
FGD1 World Bank Focus Group 
Discussion 
4 25 Feb 2014 
FDG2 CODI Focus Group 
Discussion  
3 25 Feb 2014 
1. How did you prepare for the floods? What actions did you take? 
2. What were the resources available to the neighbourhood and were 
they utilised?  
3. Who is responsible for disaster coordination? 
4. What forms of assistance were offered in this neighbourhood and how 
were they shared? 
5. What form of assistance helped you the most? Why? 
6. What were some of the ways information about the floods and flood 
assistance reached people in this neighbourhood? What was the most 
effective method? 
7. What kind of technology did you use to communicate about the flood? 
What was the most preferred method? 
8. What was your top priority when the water receded? 
9. Were you able to continue doing your job? How? 
10. If you were to focus on changing one thing that would offer the most 
stability and safety to your life right now, what would it be? 
11. Are there policies you would change that would help you prevent 
future floods? 
12. What basic functions were maintained during the floods? (i.e. access to 
school, access to jobs, health clinics, water, power, electricity etc.) 
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Sample 2: Key Findings used for validation on 10 Aug 2014 in Bang Bua, 
Saphan Mai and Roi Krong Neighbourhoods 
 
 
  
Physical 
Infrastructure 
(Environment, urban 
form, infrastructure 
and services) 
Political 
Infrastructure (Civil 
society, government) 
 
Economic 
Infrastructure 
(Jobs, loans, 
money) 
Social Infrastructure 
(Social capital, power, 
leadership and 
decision-making) 
 
Technical 
Infrastructure 
(Information 
Communication 
Technology - 
ICT)  
 
1. Identity: My 
neighbourhood is … 
(fill in the blank) 
 
2.  Children have 
more protection 
with the new public 
space for them to 
play in. 
 
3.  Public buildings 
and community 
infrastructure unites 
residents and offers 
a sense of 
rootedness and 
belonging due to the 
permanent nature of 
the buildings. 
The physical re-
organisation of the 
neighbourhood 
resulted in a place 
that was more 
transparent, more 
accountable, trusted 
and inclusive. 
 
2.  Participation is 
key to building trust 
and communication 
in “peace” times (i.e. 
through mechanisms 
such as savings clubs, 
celebrations and 
events), and is the 
foundation for an 
effective community 
response.  
 
3.  During the 
flood, the way in 
which items 
were distributed 
and decisions 
made in my 
neighbourhood 
was transparent. 
1. I needed 
access to a 
small loan 
after the 
floods in order 
to get back to 
work again.  
 
 
1. People who fall out 
of favour with the 
community or are 
illegal have less 
protection. The 
community is not 
incentivized to 
protect people who 
break away from 
communal value 
systems. 
 
2. People on the edge 
are excluded from 
help. 
 
3. Evacuation centres 
hosted the most 
vulnerable, including:  
A. the elderly, sick, 
young children and 
differently abled 
persons; those who 
did not have relatives 
or friends they could 
stay with.  
C. Families with a one 
story home. 
 
4.  People in my 
neighbourhood know 
what to do to 
prepare for the next 
big flood.   
1. The most 
reliable, 
accurate 
information 
comes from my 
community 
leader and 
people in the 
committee. 
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Sample 3: Transcript of a focus group discussion 
 
Timespan 
 
Content 
 
0:00.0 - 
0:08.7 
Key informant interview 
Name: (anonymous) 
Organisation: World Bank 
Position: Community development workers 
 
0:08.7 - 
0:55.9 
Pam: What is the project you are working on now? 
 
0:55.9 - 
5:17.1 
WB: This is the project that got support from the world bank 
funded by the Japanese government. The project was run 2-3 
years ago. The team surveyed the affected area. We haven't yet 
started the programme. The target is to support the flood 
affected people, the urban poor and those who are ready with 
the system, like strengthen community. This programme is not 
focused on building construction. We are looking to strengthen 
community capacity. It's staring now. We had to make an 
operation manual, CODI will be the main organisation who gets 
the money. We call this programme the Livelihood Support for 
the Urban Poor. It's funded by the World Bank but implemented 
by CODI. Finally they agree that they are going to support five 
provinces in Thailand, about 3,000 households in about ten 
communities per province.  
 
5:17.1 - 
6:47.3 
Pam: What is the word used in Thailand by Thai people instead 
of resilience and what kind of concepts are in there? 
 
6:47.3 - 
12:23.5 
WB: It means flexible. We don't have this word in Thai.  
 
Fuen foo. We use that word. Like a recovery. After a disaster we 
use many words but usually fuen foo. It might not be recover 
better because some people after the floods might go back to 
their home town or cannot stay in the same place so you can't 
use fuen foo in their case.  
 
The situation that has been destroyed or collapsed from the 
normal life and people try to recover it back to the same 
position. I work in tsunami and I never see this word. It must 
mean recovery or reconstruction after disaster.   
 
12:23.5 - 
12:47.2 
WB: I think from the dictionary it says flexible.  
 
14:09.4 - 
15:08.4 
Pam: What kind of vulnerabilities were revealed by the Bangkok 
floods? In Bang Bua if you can or in Bangkok more generally.  
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15:08.4 - 
21:39.7 
WB: the urban people who are depending on the food, water 
etc. mainly the people who spend money to buy the products 
because they cannot produce it themselves. The main problem 
at that time. The dirty water leaked out into the drinking water 
supply. It means that the people who depend on the main 
infrastructure of the city are the main ones affected because 
the road is blocked and no one can send the food from the rural 
area, not even eggs or vegetables. This really affected people in 
Bangkok. The second is the urban poor group who are the 
people who are working day by day. Earning money for each 
day to survive. Like a street vendor who has to sell food to earn 
money. Those people are the most affected because they 
couldn't go out for work and there was little opportunity to go 
out and find money. This contrasts with the middle class who 
are working in the office or have monthly income. They are not 
affected much. They might go to other provinces and work from 
the Internet.  
 
He mentioned the same point that the low income group that 
earns daily wages are the most affected.  
 
21:39.7 - 
21:56.2 
Pam: What is the World Bank proposing to do in Bang Bua with 
this project? 
 
21:56.2 - 
25:27.8 
WB: for this programme it might not be clear yet but up until 
now our process is selecting the target area and it is not 
decided yet if Bang Bua will be one of the communities.  
 
Pam: Will disaster preparedness factor in your programmes? 
 
WB: Yes, the flooding will come every year. This programme is 
adaptation and ? We try to protect and recover the affected 
area. The process is to select the area then design the project.   
 
25:27.8 - 
25:42.9 
Pam: How do you do urban disaster preparedness?  
 
25:42.9 - 
32:23.0 
WB: Facebook. The urban poor are using Facebook. The 
quickest way to get real time information is from Facebook. The 
information from the government may not be real.  
 
Pam: Who do you believe when you read facebook.  
 
WB: During the floods...it was the fastest way to update 
information. Not only the general people used this application. 
The celebrities and famous reporters used it. When they went 
to the area they easily update the situation. When they went to 
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distribute the life savings kit they mainly go to the community 
area, not to the people who live in the condos or big houses. 
The possibility to update info about when and where they are 
going to start giving food was possible. The volunteer group 
formed a group and opened a page. People interested joined. 
They could give if they wanted. This is the group from CODI so 
they already have a connection with the community leader. It's 
easier for them to have a call and manage how to distribute to 
each area. The people in the community, teenagers in the poor 
communities also use Facebook. For 2,000-3,000 it's possible to 
buy a phone that can access Facebook. It's possible to show you 
some FB of the community leader.  
 
32:23.0 - 
32:38.1 
Pam: What lessons have we learned from the Bangkok floods?  
 
32:38.1 - 
42:37.7 
WB: It's obvious that the case of the flooding shows the lack of 
management between the government and the needs of the 
people. For example, the life savings bag, every bag is the same 
with sardines in the can, instant noodles. The people who are in 
that area have to survive with that kind of food for more than a 
month. Sometimes it's possible to change... they think this is the 
way to deal with the problem. But if they had a better 
management system we can adapt those affected people in the 
same table with a more proper plan to help them. It would be 
better. The case of the food is just the example.  
 
Pam: Do you mean that the government has to speak or 
interact more with the community and together they should 
make a plan?  
 
WB: Yes. It's easier to contribute but something might not fit 
with the needs of the receiver. It's easier to give things but 
those things might not be the things people need. In Thailand 
we have a variety of food, our areas can produce a lot of food. 
In this case the bag from the helpers gave the same thing all 
over the affected area. It show they are not improve in the 
negotiation, plan. People have to think more and distribute 
better variety of food. And not only food. Use local products 
and let the local people be the main actors to do this kind of 
thing because the central government is central to deal with the 
central problems but if you see another side the local 
government / people it's possible to run and manage this kind 
of thing by itself, ie. set up a kitchen for the whole area.  
 
Have you seen the news that the Don Muang is the government 
place to store dry goods for people all over the country but it 
was flooded. The other important thing is that Bang Bua is very 
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close to Don Muang, yet the things from the Don Muang didn't 
get sent to Bang Bua.   
 
42:37.6 - 
54:20.4 
Pam: So lesson 1 is better coordination with the community, 
right?  
2. Locally driven response. Meaning the planning, food 
distribution etc. should happen at the local level with some 
support from the government. According to the Thai policy, the 
disaster has to happen first and then the money distributed. In 
this case I have experience from Nakonsawan. The info came 
from the mayor. I.e. you have to see the water before you can 
distribute the sand bags. This is quite a big issue. A ministerial 
issue. The way to solve this is to let the local people and 
authorities deal with this problem by themselves.  
 
Pam: So what if we change the policy to release money before 
the water comes. Is that good? 
 
WB: the plan is okay. Disbursement is the problem. So cities 
disperse the money before the disaster happens. The have been 
cities to go to court over that case to get the money back. In 
terms of Bangkok it's possible to disperse the money and solve 
the problem by themselves because Bangkok has the money. In 
Bangkok we have the BEST which is a team to prevent the flood 
situation. There is a team to control and plan the opening and 
closing of the canal in Bangkok for each canal.  
 
City development funds help CDF is a fund that helps 
communities in disaster preparedness. They used the money in 
the flood situation to cook the food, buy some boats.  
 
54:20.4 - 
54:45.2 
Pam: How do urban planners work together with NGOs? Or 
should they? 
 
54:45.2 - 
59:52.9 
WB: It has a network to deal with disasters. With many people 
from the community side and from the government side and 
the media to work together to deal with the flood as a forum. 
They can have a TV programme to raise discuss the problems on 
the TV show. That TV programme has been started with the 
flood and it has continued up until now. After the discussion 
from the TV show is it possible to implement? After the floods 
finished the situation was not a hot issue any more so there are 
no plans. TV show is called Early Warning. (Thuen Pie). or Alert / 
Warning.  
 
(No urban planners in the room.) We are community 
development workers. One is finance.  
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59:52.9 - 
1:00:09.3 
Pam: If you could change anything or do anything next time 
there is a flood, what would you change? 
 
1:00:09.3 - 
1:14:47.2 
WB: We always have two ways to support, one from the 
government and one from the volunteers. In terms of the 
volunteers it's faster and you can do more than the 
government. Poeople can directly go to the affected people. 
The flood in the rural areas they needed water. In Bangkok the 
houses flooded so it requires a plan. They should have a plan to 
protect from flooding in Bangkok. Two problems is that there 
was too much water and sea level rise. The real problem is the 
bad management and releasing water from the damn.  
 
WB: I work on the CDF and I see those funds really help people 
when there is a disaster. *** Need to follow up with Om on this.   
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A sample of the notes taken during the FGD 
 
  
 
 
